nim-dagger/codex/storageproofs/por/por.nim

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## Nim-Codex
## Copyright (c) 2021 Status Research & Development GmbH
## Licensed under either of
## * Apache License, version 2.0, ([LICENSE-APACHE](LICENSE-APACHE))
## * MIT license ([LICENSE-MIT](LICENSE-MIT))
## at your option.
## This file may not be copied, modified, or distributed except according to
## those terms.
# Implementation of the BLS-based public PoS scheme from
# Shacham H., Waters B., "Compact Proofs of Retrievability"
# using pairing over BLS12-381 ECC
#
# Notation from the paper
# In Z:
# - n: number of blocks
# - s: number of sectors per block
#
# In Z_p: modulo curve order
# - m_{ij}: sectors of the file i:0..n-1 j:0..s-1
# - α: PoS secret key
# - name: random string
# - μ_j: part of proof, j:0..s-1
#
# In G_1: multiplicative cyclic group
# - H: {0,1} →G_1 : hash function
# - u_1,…,u_s ←R G_1 : random coefficients
# - σ_i: authenticators
# - σ: part of proof
#
# In G_2: multiplicative cyclic group
# - g: generator of G_2
# - v ← g^α: PoS public key
#
# In G_T:
# - used only to calculate the two pairings during validation
#
# Implementation:
# Our implementation uses additive cyclic groups instead of the multiplicative
# cyclic group in the paper, thus changing the name of the group operation as in
# blscurve and blst. Thus, point multiplication becomes point addition, and scalar
# exponentiation becomes scalar multiplicaiton.
#
# Number of operations:
# The following table summarizes the number of operations in different phases
# using the following notation:
# - f: file size expressed in units of 31 bytes
# - n: number of blocks
# - s: number of sectors per block
# - q: number of query items
#
# Since f = n * s and s is a parameter of the scheme, it is better to express
# the cost as a function of f and s. This only matters for Setup, all other
# phases are independent of the file size assuming a given q.
#
# | | Setup | Challenge | Proof | Verify |
# |----------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
# | G1 random | s = s | q | | |
# | G1 scalar mult | n * (s+1) = f * (1 + 1/s) | | q | q + s |
# | G1 add | n * s = f | | q-1 | q-1 + s-1 |
# | Hash to G1 | n = f / s | | | q |
# | Z_p mult | = | | s * q | |
# | Z_p add | = | | s * (q-1) | |
# | pairing | = | | | 2 |
#
#
# Storage and communication cost:
# The storage overhead for a file of f_b bytes is given by the n authenticators
# calculated in the setup phase.
# f_b = f * 31 = n * s * 31
# Each authenticator is a point on G_1, which occupies 48 bytes in compressed form.
# Thus, the overall sorage size in bytes is:
# f_pos = fb + n * 48 = fb * (1 + (48/31) * (1/s))
#
# Communicaiton cost in the Setup phase is simply related to the storage cost.
# The size of the challenge is
# q * (8 + 48) bytes
# The size of the proof is instead
# s * 32 + 48 bytes
import std/endians
import pkg/chronos
import pkg/blscurve
import pkg/blscurve/blst/blst_abi
import ../../rng
import ../../streams
# sector size in bytes. Must be smaller than the subgroup order r
# which is 255 bits long for BLS12-381
const
BytesPerSector* = 31
# length in bytes of the unique (random) name
Namelen = 512
type
# a single sector
ZChar* = array[BytesPerSector, byte]
# secret key combining the metadata signing key and the POR generation key
SecretKey* = object
signkey*: blscurve.SecretKey
key*: blst_scalar
# public key combining the metadata signing key and the POR validation key
PublicKey* = object
signkey*: blscurve.PublicKey
key*: blst_p2
# POR metadata (called "file tag t_0" in the original paper)
TauZero* = object
name*: array[Namelen, byte]
n*: int64
u*: seq[blst_p1]
# signed POR metadata (called "signed file tag t" in the original paper)
Tau* = object
t*: TauZero
signature*: array[96, byte]
Proof* = object
mu*: seq[blst_scalar]
sigma*: blst_p1
# PoR query element
QElement* = object
i*: int64
v*: blst_scalar
PoR* = object
ssk*: SecretKey
spk*: PublicKey
tau*: Tau
authenticators*: seq[blst_p1]
proc fromBytesBE(a: openArray[byte]): blst_scalar =
## Convert data to blst native form
##
var b: array[32, byte]
doAssert(a.len <= b.len)
let d = b.len - a.len
for i in 0..<a.len:
b[i+d] = a[i]
blst_scalar_from_bendian(result, b)
doAssert(blst_scalar_fr_check(result).bool)
proc getSector(
stream: SeekableStream,
blockId: int64,
sectorId: int64,
spb: int64): Future[ZChar] {.async.} =
## Read file sector at given <blockid, sectorid> postion
##
var res: ZChar
stream.setPos(((blockId * spb + sectorId) * ZChar.len).int)
discard await stream.readOnce(addr res[0], ZChar.len)
return res
proc rndScalar(): blst_scalar =
## Generate random scalar within the subroup order r
##
var scal : array[32, byte]
var scalar : blst_scalar
while true:
for val in scal.mitems:
val = byte Rng.instance.rand(0xFF)
scalar.blst_scalar_from_bendian(scal)
if blst_scalar_fr_check(scalar).bool:
break
return scalar
proc rndP2(): (blst_p2, blst_scalar) =
## Generate random point on G2
##
var
x : blst_p2
x.blst_p2_from_affine(BLS12_381_G2) # init from generator
let
scalar = rndScalar()
x.blst_p2_mult(x, scalar, 255)
return (x, scalar)
proc rndP1(): (blst_p1, blst_scalar) =
## Generate random point on G1
var
x : blst_p1
x.blst_p1_from_affine(BLS12_381_G1) # init from generator
let
scalar = rndScalar()
x.blst_p1_mult(x, scalar, 255)
return (x, scalar)
template posKeygen(): (blst_p2, blst_scalar) =
## Generate POS key pair
##
rndP2()
proc keyGen*(): (PublicKey, SecretKey) =
## Generate key pair for signing metadata and for POS tags
##
var
pk: PublicKey
sk: SecretKey
ikm: array[32, byte]
for b in ikm.mitems:
b = byte Rng.instance.rand(0xFF)
doAssert ikm.keyGen(pk.signkey, sk.signkey)
(pk.key, sk.key) = posKeygen()
return (pk, sk)
proc sectorsCount(stream: SeekableStream, s: int64): int64 =
## Calculate number of blocks for a file
##
let
size = stream.size()
n = ((size - 1) div (s * sizeof(ZChar))) + 1
# debugEcho "File size=", size, " bytes",
# ", blocks=", n,
# ", sectors/block=", $s,
# ", sectorsize=", $sizeof(ZChar), " bytes"
return n
proc hashToG1[T: byte|char](msg: openArray[T]): blst_p1 =
## Hash to curve with Dagger specific domain separation
##
const dst = "DAGGER-PROOF-OF-CONCEPT"
result.blst_hash_to_g1(msg, dst, aug = "")
proc hashNameI(name: array[Namelen, byte], i: int64): blst_p1 =
## Calculate unique filename and block index based hash
##
# # naive implementation, hashing a long string representation
# # such as "[255, 242, 23]1"
# return hashToG1($name & $i)
# more compact and faster implementation
var namei: array[sizeof(name) + sizeof(int64), byte]
namei[0..sizeof(name)-1] = name
bigEndian64(addr(namei[sizeof(name)]), unsafeAddr(i))
return hashToG1(namei)
proc generateAuthenticatorOpt(
stream: SeekableStream,
ssk: SecretKey,
i: int64,
s: int64,
t: TauZero,
ubase: seq[blst_scalar]): Future[blst_p1] {.async.} =
## Optimized implementation of authenticator generation
## This implementation is reduces the number of scalar multiplications
## from s+1 to 1+1 , using knowledge about the scalars (r_j)
## used to generate u_j as u_j = g^{r_j}
##
## With the paper's multiplicative notation, we use:
## (H(file||i)\cdot g^{\sum{j=0}^{s-1}{r_j \cdot m[i][j]}})^{\alpha}
##
var sum: blst_fr
var sums: blst_scalar
for j in 0..<s:
var a, b, x: blst_fr
a.blst_fr_from_scalar(ubase[j])
b.blst_fr_from_scalar(fromBytesBE((await stream.getSector(i, j, s))))
x.blst_fr_mul(a, b)
sum.blst_fr_add(sum, x)
sums.blst_scalar_from_fr(sum)
result.blst_p1_from_affine(BLS12_381_G1)
result.blst_p1_mult(result, sums, 255)
result.blst_p1_add_or_double(result, hashNameI(t.name, i))
result.blst_p1_mult(result, ssk.key, 255)
proc generateAuthenticator(
stream: SeekableStream,
ssk: SecretKey,
i: int64,
s: int64,
t: TauZero,
ubase: seq[blst_scalar]): Future[blst_p1] =
## Wrapper to select tag generator implementation
##
# let a = generateAuthenticatorNaive(i, s, t, f, ssk)
return generateAuthenticatorOpt(stream, ssk, i, s, t, ubase)
# doAssert(a.blst_p1_is_equal(b).bool)
proc generateQuery*(tau: Tau, l: int): seq[QElement] =
## Generata a random BLS query of given size
##
let n = tau.t.n # number of blocks
for i in 0..<l:
var q: QElement
q.i = Rng.instance.rand(n-1) #TODO: dedup
q.v = rndScalar() #TODO: fix range
result.add(q)
proc generateProof*(
stream: SeekableStream,
q: seq[QElement],
authenticators: seq[blst_p1],
s: int64): Future[Proof] {.async.} =
## Generata BLS proofs for a given query
##
var
mu: seq[blst_scalar]
for j in 0..<s:
var
muj: blst_fr
for qelem in q:
let
sect = fromBytesBE((await stream.getSector(qelem.i, j, s)))
var
x, v, sector: blst_fr
sector.blst_fr_from_scalar(sect)
v.blst_fr_from_scalar(qelem.v)
x.blst_fr_mul(v, sector)
muj.blst_fr_add(muj, x)
var
mujs: blst_scalar
mujs.blst_scalar_from_fr(muj)
mu.add(mujs)
var
sigma: blst_p1
for qelem in q:
var
prod: blst_p1
prod.blst_p1_mult(authenticators[qelem.i], qelem.v, 255)
sigma.blst_p1_add_or_double(sigma, prod)
return Proof(mu: mu, sigma: sigma)
proc pairing(a: blst_p1, b: blst_p2): blst_fp12 =
## Calculate pairing G_1,G_2 -> G_T
##
var
aa: blst_p1_affine
bb: blst_p2_affine
l: blst_fp12
blst_p1_to_affine(aa, a)
blst_p2_to_affine(bb, b)
blst_miller_loop(l, bb, aa)
blst_final_exp(result, l)
proc verifyPairingsNaive(a1: blst_p1, a2: blst_p2, b1: blst_p1, b2: blst_p2) : bool =
let e1 = pairing(a1, a2)
let e2 = pairing(b1, b2)
return e1 == e2
proc verifyPairings(a1: blst_p1, a2: blst_p2, b1: blst_p1, b2: blst_p2) : bool =
## Wrapper to select verify pairings implementation
##
verifyPairingsNaive(a1, a2, b1, b2)
#verifyPairingsNeg(a1, a2, b1, b2)
proc verifyProof*(
self: PoR,
q: seq[QElement],
mus: seq[blst_scalar],
sigma: blst_p1): bool =
## Verify a BLS proof given a query
##
# verify signature on Tau
var signature: blscurve.Signature
if not signature.fromBytes(self.tau.signature):
return false
if not verify(self.spk.signkey, $self.tau.t, signature):
return false
var first: blst_p1
for qelem in q:
var prod: blst_p1
prod.blst_p1_mult(hashNameI(self.tau.t.name, qelem.i), qelem.v, 255)
first.blst_p1_add_or_double(first, prod)
doAssert(blst_p1_on_curve(first).bool)
let us = self.tau.t.u
var second: blst_p1
for j in 0..<len(us):
var prod: blst_p1
prod.blst_p1_mult(us[j], mus[j], 255)
second.blst_p1_add_or_double(second, prod)
doAssert(blst_p1_on_curve(second).bool)
var sum: blst_p1
sum.blst_p1_add_or_double(first, second)
var g : blst_p2
g.blst_p2_from_affine(BLS12_381_G2)
return verifyPairings(sum, self.spk.key, sigma, g)
proc init*(
T: type PoR,
stream: SeekableStream,
ssk: SecretKey,
spk: PublicKey,
blockSize: int64): Future[PoR] {.async.} =
## Set up the POR scheme by generating tags and metadata
##
doAssert(
(blockSize mod BytesPerSector) == 0,
"Block size should be divisible by `BytesPerSector`")
let
s = blockSize div BytesPerSector
n = stream.sectorsCount(s)
# generate a random name
var t = TauZero(n: n)
for i in 0..<Namelen:
t.name[i] = byte Rng.instance.rand(0xFF)
# generate the coefficient vector for combining sectors of a block: U
var ubase: seq[blst_scalar]
for i in 0..<s:
let (u, ub) = rndP1()
t.u.add(u)
ubase.add(ub)
#TODO: a better bytearray conversion of TauZero for the signature might be needed
# the current conversion using $t might be architecture dependent and not unique
let
signature = sign(ssk.signkey, $t)
tau = Tau(t: t, signature: signature.exportRaw())
# generate sigmas
var
sigmas: seq[blst_p1]
for i in 0..<n:
sigmas.add((await stream.generateAuthenticator(ssk, i, s, t, ubase)))
return PoR(
ssk: ssk,
spk: spk,
tau: tau,
authenticators: sigmas)