# Ethereum 2.0 Phase 1 -- Custody Game **Notice**: This document is a work-in-progress for researchers and implementers. ## Table of contents - [Introduction](#introduction) - [Constants](#constants) - [Misc](#misc) - [Configuration](#configuration) - [Time parameters](#time-parameters) - [Max operations per block](#max-operations-per-block) - [Reward and penalty quotients](#reward-and-penalty-quotients) - [Signature domain types](#signature-domain-types) - [Data structures](#data-structures) - [New Beacon Chain operations](#new-beacon-chain-operations) - [`CustodySlashing`](#custodyslashing) - [`SignedCustodySlashing`](#signedcustodyslashing) - [`CustodyKeyReveal`](#custodykeyreveal) - [`EarlyDerivedSecretReveal`](#earlyderivedsecretreveal) - [Helpers](#helpers) - [`legendre_bit`](#legendre_bit) - [`custody_atoms`](#custody_atoms) - [`compute_custody_bit`](#compute_custody_bit) - [`get_randao_epoch_for_custody_period`](#get_randao_epoch_for_custody_period) - [`get_custody_period_for_validator`](#get_custody_period_for_validator) - [Per-block processing](#per-block-processing) - [Custody Game Operations](#custody-game-operations) - [Custody key reveals](#custody-key-reveals) - [Early derived secret reveals](#early-derived-secret-reveals) - [Custody Slashings](#custody-slashings) - [Per-epoch processing](#per-epoch-processing) - [Handling of reveal deadlines](#handling-of-reveal-deadlines) - [Final updates](#final-updates) ## Introduction This document details the beacon chain additions and changes in Phase 1 of Ethereum 2.0 to support the shard data custody game, building upon the [Phase 0](../phase0/beacon-chain.md) specification. ## Constants ### Misc | Name | Value | Unit | | - | - | - | | `BLS12_381_Q` | `4002409555221667393417789825735904156556882819939007885332058136124031650490837864442687629129015664037894272559787` | - | | `BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_ATOM` | `48` | bytes | ## Configuration ### Time parameters | Name | Value | Unit | Duration | | - | - | :-: | :-: | | `RANDAO_PENALTY_EPOCHS` | `2**1` (= 2) | epochs | 12.8 minutes | | `EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_PENALTY_MAX_FUTURE_EPOCHS` | `2**14` (= 16,384) | epochs | ~73 days | | `EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD` | `2**11` (= 2,048) | epochs | ~9 days | | `CUSTODY_PERIOD_TO_RANDAO_PADDING` | `2**11` (= 2,048) | epochs | ~9 days | | `MAX_REVEAL_LATENESS_DECREMENT` | `2**7` (= 128) | epochs | ~14 hours | ### Max operations per block | Name | Value | | - | - | | `MAX_CUSTODY_KEY_REVEALS` | `2**8` (= 256) | | `MAX_EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_REVEALS` | `1` | | `MAX_CUSTODY_SLASHINGS` | `1` | ### Reward and penalty quotients | Name | Value | | - | - | | `EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_REVEAL_SLOT_REWARD_MULTIPLE` | `2**1` (= 2) | | `MINOR_REWARD_QUOTIENT` | `2**8` (= 256) | ### Signature domain types The following types are defined, mapping into `DomainType` (little endian): | Name | Value | | - | - | | `DOMAIN_CUSTODY_BIT_SLASHING` | `DomainType('0x83000000')` | ## Data structures ### New Beacon Chain operations #### `CustodySlashing` ```python class CustodySlashing(Container): # Attestation.custody_bits_blocks[data_index][committee.index(malefactor_index)] is the target custody bit to check. # (Attestation.data.shard_transition_root as ShardTransition).shard_data_roots[data_index] is the root of the data. data_index: uint64 malefactor_index: ValidatorIndex malefactor_secret: BLSSignature whistleblower_index: ValidatorIndex shard_transition: ShardTransition attestation: Attestation data: ByteList[MAX_SHARD_BLOCK_SIZE] ``` #### `SignedCustodySlashing` ```python class SignedCustodySlashing(Container): message: CustodySlashing signature: BLSSignature ``` #### `CustodyKeyReveal` ```python class CustodyKeyReveal(Container): # Index of the validator whose key is being revealed revealer_index: ValidatorIndex # Reveal (masked signature) reveal: BLSSignature ``` #### `EarlyDerivedSecretReveal` Represents an early (punishable) reveal of one of the derived secrets, where derived secrets are RANDAO reveals and custody reveals (both are part of the same domain). ```python class EarlyDerivedSecretReveal(Container): # Index of the validator whose key is being revealed revealed_index: ValidatorIndex # RANDAO epoch of the key that is being revealed epoch: Epoch # Reveal (masked signature) reveal: BLSSignature # Index of the validator who revealed (whistleblower) masker_index: ValidatorIndex # Mask used to hide the actual reveal signature (prevent reveal from being stolen) mask: Bytes32 ``` ## Helpers ### `legendre_bit` Returns the Legendre symbol `(a/q)` normalizes as a bit (i.e. `((a/q) + 1) // 2`). In a production implementation, a well-optimized library (e.g. GMP) should be used for this. ```python def legendre_bit(a: int, q: int) -> int: if a >= q: return legendre_bit(a % q, q) if a == 0: return 0 assert(q > a > 0 and q % 2 == 1) t = 1 n = q while a != 0: while a % 2 == 0: a //= 2 r = n % 8 if r == 3 or r == 5: t = -t a, n = n, a if a % 4 == n % 4 == 3: t = -t a %= n if n == 1: return (t + 1) // 2 else: return 0 ``` ### `custody_atoms` Given one set of data, return the custody atoms: each atom will be combined with one legendre bit. ```python def get_custody_atoms(bytez: bytes) -> Sequence[bytes]: bytez += b'\x00' * (-len(bytez) % BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_ATOM) # right-padding return [bytez[i:i + BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_ATOM] for i in range(0, len(bytez), BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_ATOM)] ``` ### `compute_custody_bit` ```python def compute_custody_bit(key: BLSSignature, data: bytes) -> bit: full_G2_element = bls.signature_to_G2(key) s = full_G2_element[0].coeffs custody_atoms = get_custody_atoms(data) n = len(custody_atoms) a = sum(s[i % 2]**i * int.from_bytes(atom, "little") for i, atom in enumerate(custody_atoms) + s[n % 2]**n) return legendre_bit(a, BLS12_381_Q) ``` ### `get_randao_epoch_for_custody_period` ```python def get_randao_epoch_for_custody_period(period: uint64, validator_index: ValidatorIndex) -> Epoch: next_period_start = (period + 1) * EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD - validator_index % EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD return Epoch(next_period_start + CUSTODY_PERIOD_TO_RANDAO_PADDING) ``` ### `get_custody_period_for_validator` ```python def get_custody_period_for_validator(validator_index: ValidatorIndex, epoch: Epoch) -> int: ''' Return the reveal period for a given validator. ''' return (epoch + validator_index % EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD) // EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD ``` ## Per-block processing ### Custody Game Operations ```python def process_custody_game_operations(state: BeaconState, body: BeaconBlockBody) -> None: def for_ops(operations: Sequence[Any], fn: Callable[[BeaconState, Any], None]) -> None: for operation in operations: fn(state, operation) for_ops(body.custody_key_reveals, process_custody_key_reveal) for_ops(body.early_derived_secret_reveals, process_early_derived_secret_reveal) for_ops(body.custody_slashings, process_custody_slashing) ``` #### Custody key reveals ```python def process_custody_key_reveal(state: BeaconState, reveal: CustodyKeyReveal) -> None: """ Process ``CustodyKeyReveal`` operation. Note that this function mutates ``state``. """ revealer = state.validators[reveal.revealer_index] epoch_to_sign = get_randao_epoch_for_custody_period(revealer.next_custody_secret_to_reveal, reveal.revealer_index) custody_reveal_period = get_custody_period_for_validator(reveal.revealer_index, get_current_epoch(state)) assert revealer.next_custody_secret_to_reveal < custody_reveal_period # Revealed validator is active or exited, but not withdrawn assert is_slashable_validator(revealer, get_current_epoch(state)) # Verify signature domain = get_domain(state, DOMAIN_RANDAO, epoch_to_sign) signing_root = compute_signing_root(epoch_to_sign, domain) assert bls.Verify(revealer.pubkey, signing_root, reveal.reveal) # Decrement max reveal lateness if response is timely if epoch_to_sign + EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD >= get_current_epoch(state): if revealer.max_reveal_lateness >= MAX_REVEAL_LATENESS_DECREMENT: revealer.max_reveal_lateness -= MAX_REVEAL_LATENESS_DECREMENT else: revealer.max_reveal_lateness = 0 else: revealer.max_reveal_lateness = max( revealer.max_reveal_lateness, get_current_epoch(state) - epoch_to_sign - EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD ) # Process reveal revealer.next_custody_secret_to_reveal += 1 # Reward Block Proposer proposer_index = get_beacon_proposer_index(state) increase_balance( state, proposer_index, Gwei(get_base_reward(state, reveal.revealer_index) // MINOR_REWARD_QUOTIENT) ) ``` #### Early derived secret reveals ```python def process_early_derived_secret_reveal(state: BeaconState, reveal: EarlyDerivedSecretReveal) -> None: """ Process ``EarlyDerivedSecretReveal`` operation. Note that this function mutates ``state``. """ revealed_validator = state.validators[reveal.revealed_index] derived_secret_location = reveal.epoch % EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_PENALTY_MAX_FUTURE_EPOCHS assert reveal.epoch >= get_current_epoch(state) + RANDAO_PENALTY_EPOCHS assert reveal.epoch < get_current_epoch(state) + EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_PENALTY_MAX_FUTURE_EPOCHS assert not revealed_validator.slashed assert reveal.revealed_index not in state.exposed_derived_secrets[derived_secret_location] # Verify signature correctness masker = state.validators[reveal.masker_index] pubkeys = [revealed_validator.pubkey, masker.pubkey] domain = get_domain(state, DOMAIN_RANDAO, reveal.epoch) signing_roots = [compute_signing_root(root, domain) for root in [hash_tree_root(reveal.epoch), reveal.mask]] assert bls.AggregateVerify(zip(pubkeys, signing_roots), reveal.reveal) if reveal.epoch >= get_current_epoch(state) + CUSTODY_PERIOD_TO_RANDAO_PADDING: # Full slashing when the secret was revealed so early it may be a valid custody # round key slash_validator(state, reveal.revealed_index, reveal.masker_index) else: # Only a small penalty proportional to proposer slot reward for RANDAO reveal # that does not interfere with the custody period # The penalty is proportional to the max proposer reward # Calculate penalty max_proposer_slot_reward = ( get_base_reward(state, reveal.revealed_index) * SLOTS_PER_EPOCH // len(get_active_validator_indices(state, get_current_epoch(state))) // PROPOSER_REWARD_QUOTIENT ) penalty = Gwei( max_proposer_slot_reward * EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_REVEAL_SLOT_REWARD_MULTIPLE * (len(state.exposed_derived_secrets[derived_secret_location]) + 1) ) # Apply penalty proposer_index = get_beacon_proposer_index(state) whistleblower_index = reveal.masker_index whistleblowing_reward = Gwei(penalty // WHISTLEBLOWER_REWARD_QUOTIENT) proposer_reward = Gwei(whistleblowing_reward // PROPOSER_REWARD_QUOTIENT) increase_balance(state, proposer_index, proposer_reward) increase_balance(state, whistleblower_index, whistleblowing_reward - proposer_reward) decrease_balance(state, reveal.revealed_index, penalty) # Mark this derived secret as exposed so validator cannot be punished repeatedly state.exposed_derived_secrets[derived_secret_location].append(reveal.revealed_index) ``` #### Custody Slashings ```python def process_custody_slashing(state: BeaconState, signed_custody_slashing: SignedCustodySlashing) -> None: custody_slashing = signed_custody_slashing.message attestation = custody_slashing.attestation # Any signed custody-slashing should result in at least one slashing. # If the custody bits are valid, then the claim itself is slashed. malefactor = state.validators[custody_slashing.malefactor_index] whistleblower = state.validators[custody_slashing.whistleblower_index] domain = get_domain(state, DOMAIN_CUSTODY_BIT_SLASHING, get_current_epoch(state)) signing_root = compute_signing_root(custody_slashing, domain) assert bls.Verify(whistleblower.pubkey, signing_root, signed_custody_slashing.signature) # Verify that the whistleblower is slashable assert is_slashable_validator(whistleblower, get_current_epoch(state)) # Verify that the claimed malefactor is slashable assert is_slashable_validator(malefactor, get_current_epoch(state)) # Verify the attestation assert is_valid_indexed_attestation(state, get_indexed_attestation(state, attestation)) # TODO: custody_slashing.data is not chunked like shard blocks yet, result is lots of padding. # TODO: can do a single combined merkle proof of data being attested. # Verify the shard transition is indeed attested by the attestation shard_transition = custody_slashing.shard_transition assert hash_tree_root(shard_transition) == attestation.shard_transition_root # Verify that the provided data matches the shard-transition assert hash_tree_root(custody_slashing.data) == shard_transition.shard_data_roots[custody_slashing.data_index] # Verify existence and participation of claimed malefactor attesters = get_attesting_indices(state, attestation.data, attestation.aggregation_bits) assert custody_slashing.malefactor_index in attesters # Verify the malefactor custody key epoch_to_sign = get_randao_epoch_for_custody_period( get_custody_period_for_validator(custody_slashing.malefactor_index, attestation.data.target.epoch), custody_slashing.malefactor_index, ) domain = get_domain(state, DOMAIN_RANDAO, epoch_to_sign) signing_root = compute_signing_root(epoch_to_sign, domain) assert bls.Verify(malefactor.pubkey, signing_root, custody_slashing.malefactor_secret) # Get the custody bit custody_bits = attestation.custody_bits_blocks[custody_slashing.data_index] committee = get_beacon_committee(state, attestation.data.slot, attestation.data.index) claimed_custody_bit = custody_bits[committee.index(custody_slashing.malefactor_index)] # Compute the custody bit computed_custody_bit = compute_custody_bit(custody_slashing.malefactor_secret, custody_slashing.data) # Verify the claim if claimed_custody_bit != computed_custody_bit: # Slash the malefactor, reward the other committee members slash_validator(state, custody_slashing.malefactor_index) others_count = len(committee) - 1 whistleblower_reward = Gwei(malefactor.effective_balance // WHISTLEBLOWER_REWARD_QUOTIENT // others_count) for attester_index in attesters: if attester_index != custody_slashing.malefactor_index: increase_balance(state, attester_index, whistleblower_reward) # No special whisteblower reward: it is expected to be an attester. Others are free to slash too however. else: # The claim was false, the custody bit was correct. Slash the whistleblower that induced this work. slash_validator(state, custody_slashing.whistleblower_index) ``` ## Per-epoch processing ### Handling of reveal deadlines Run `process_reveal_deadlines(state)` after `process_registry_updates(state)`: ```python def process_reveal_deadlines(state: BeaconState) -> None: epoch = get_current_epoch(state) for index, validator in enumerate(state.validators): if get_custody_period_for_validator(ValidatorIndex(index), epoch) > validator.next_custody_secret_to_reveal: slash_validator(state, ValidatorIndex(index)) ``` ### Final updates After `process_final_updates(state)`, additional updates are made for the custody game: ```python def process_custody_final_updates(state: BeaconState) -> None: # Clean up exposed RANDAO key reveals state.exposed_derived_secrets[get_current_epoch(state) % EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_PENALTY_MAX_FUTURE_EPOCHS] = [] ```