From 822fbed83fef77ffd1dd889c417855f145abcd16 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: vbuterin Date: Tue, 27 Nov 2018 11:08:43 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] BLS-12-381 specification (#141) * Partial draft of BLS-12-381 specification * Some updates * Updated point serialization to standard * Added BLSMultiVerify * Added domain separation logic * Added point to hash algorithm * Represented field_modulus as decimal along with the cofactor * Added what e(x,y) means. * Pass domain into hash_to_G2 * Updated code to make it more easily runnable in py_ecc * Add pending review warning --- specs/bls_verify.md | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 64 insertions(+) create mode 100644 specs/bls_verify.md diff --git a/specs/bls_verify.md b/specs/bls_verify.md new file mode 100644 index 000000000..9736c0151 --- /dev/null +++ b/specs/bls_verify.md @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +### BLS Verification + +**Warning: This document is pending academic review and should not yet be considered secure.** + +See https://z.cash/blog/new-snark-curve/ for BLS-12-381 parameters. + +We represent coordinates as defined in https://github.com/zkcrypto/pairing/tree/master/src/bls12_381/. + +Specifically, a point in G1 as a 384-bit integer `z`, which we decompose into: + +* `x = z % 2**381` +* `highflag = z // 2**382` +* `lowflag = (z % 2**382) // 2**381` + +If `highflag == 3`, the point is the point at infinity and we require `lowflag = x = 0`. Otherwise, we require `highflag == 2`, in which case the point is `(x, y)` where `y` is the valid coordinate such that `(y * 2) // q == lowflag`. + +We represent a point in G2 as a pair of 384-bit integers `(z1, z2)` that are each decomposed into `x1`, `highflag1`, `lowflag1`, `x2`, `highflag2`, `lowflag2` as above. We require `lowflag2 == highflag2 == 0`. If `highflag1 == 3`, the point is the point at infinity and we require `lowflag1 == x1 == x2 == 0`. Otherwise, we require `highflag == 2`, in which case the point is `(x1 * i + x2, y)` where `y` is the valid coordinate such that the imaginary part of `y` satisfies `(y_im * 2) // q == lowflag1`. + +`BLSVerify(pubkey: uint384, msg: bytes32, sig: [uint384], domain: uint64)` is done as follows: + +* Verify that `pubkey` is a valid G1 point and `sig` is a valid G2 point. +* Convert `msg` to a G2 point using `hash_to_G2` defined below. +* Do the pairing check: verify `e(pubkey, hash_to_G2(msg, domain)) == e(G1, sig)` (where `e` is the BLS pairing function) + +Here is the `hash_to_G2` definition: + +```python +G2_cofactor = 305502333931268344200999753193121504214466019254188142667664032982267604182971884026507427359259977847832272839041616661285803823378372096355777062779109 +field_modulus = 4002409555221667393417789825735904156556882819939007885332058136124031650490837864442687629129015664037894272559787 + +def hash_to_G2(m, domain): + x1 = hash(bytes8(domain) + b'\x01' + m) + x2 = hash(bytes8(domain) + b'\x02' + m) + x_coord = FQ2([x1, x2]) # x1 + x2 * i + while 1: + x_cubed_plus_b2 = x_coord ** 3 + FQ2([4,4]) + y_coord = mod_sqrt(x_cubed_plus_b2) + if y_coord is not None: + break + x_coord += FQ2([1, 0]) # Add one until we get a quadratic residue + assert is_on_curve((x_coord, y_coord)) + return multiply((x_coord, y_coord), G2_cofactor) +``` + +Here is a sample implementation of `mod_sqrt`: + +```python +qmod = field_modulus ** 2 - 1 +eighth_roots_of_unity = [FQ2([1,1]) ** ((qmod * k) // 8) for k in range(8)] + +def mod_sqrt(val): + candidate_sqrt = val ** ((qmod + 8) // 16) + check = candidate_sqrt ** 2 / val + if check in eighth_roots_of_unity[::2]: + return candidate_sqrt / eighth_roots_of_unity[eighth_roots_of_unity.index(check) // 2] + return None +``` + +`BLSMultiVerify(pubkeys: [uint384], msgs: [bytes32], sig: [uint384], domain: uint64)` is done as follows: + +* Verify that each element of `pubkeys` is a valid G1 point and `sig` is a valid G2 point. +* Convert each element of `msg` to a G2 point using `hash_to_G2` defined above, using the specified `domain`. +* Check that the length of `pubkeys` and `msgs` is the same, call the length `L` +* Do the pairing check: verify `e(pubkeys[0], hash_to_G2(msgs[0], domain)) * ... * e(pubkeys[L-1], hash_to_G2(msgs[L-1], domain)) == e(G1, sig)`