Tidy, add validator endpoints

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Paul Hauner 2021-12-20 17:46:42 +11:00
parent aa9a2967aa
commit 7837dc74bf
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1 changed files with 28 additions and 25 deletions

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@ -19,8 +19,10 @@ blocks without verifying the execution payloads. This partial sync is called an
## Helpers
Let `head_block: BeaconBlock` be the result of calling of the fork choice
algorithm at the time of block production. Let `justified_block: BeaconBlock`
be the latest current justified ancestor ancestor of the `head_block`.
algorithm at the time of block production.
Let `justified_block: BeaconBlock` be the latest current justified ancestor
ancestor of the `head_block`.
Let `optimistic_roots: Set[Root]` be the set of `hash_tree_root(block)` for all
optimistically imported blocks which have yet to receive an `INVALID` or
@ -99,7 +101,7 @@ considered "optimistically imported".
When a block transitions from `SYNCING` -> `INVALID`, all *descendants* of the
block MUST also transition from `SYNCING` -> `INVALID`.
When a node transitions from the `SYNCING` state it is removed from the set of
When a block transitions from the `SYNCING` state it is removed from the set of
`optimistic_roots`.
### Execution Engine Errors
@ -116,9 +118,9 @@ validity request some block, a consensus engine:
This specification assumes execution engines will only return `SYNCING` when
there is insufficient information available to make a `VALID` or `INVALID`
determination on the given `ExecutionPayload` (e.g., the parent payload is
unknown). Specifically, `SYNCING` responses should be fork-specific; the search
for a block on one chain MUST NOT trigger a `SYNCING` response for another
chain.
unknown). Specifically, `SYNCING` responses should be fork-specific, in that
the search for a block on one chain MUST NOT trigger a `SYNCING` response for
another chain.
### Re-Orgs
@ -132,7 +134,7 @@ exit.
## Fork Choice
Consensus engines MUST support removing from fork choice blocks that transition
Consensus engines MUST support removing blocks from fork choice that transition
from `SYNCING` to `INVALID`. Specifically, a block deemed `INVALID` at any
point MUST NOT be included in the canonical chain and the weights from those
`INVALID` blocks MUST NOT be applied to any `VALID` or `SYNCING` ancestors.
@ -141,17 +143,18 @@ point MUST NOT be included in the canonical chain and the weights from those
During the merge transition it is possible for an attacker to craft a
`BeaconBlock` with an execution payload that references an
eternally-unavailable `body.execution_payload.parent_hash` value. In rare
circumstances, it is possible that an attacker can build atop such a block to
trigger justification. If an optimistic node imports this malicious chain, that
node will have a "poisoned" fork choice store, such that the node is unable to
produce a child of the head (due to the invalid chain of payloads) and the node
is unable to fork around the head (due to the justification of the malicious
eternally-unavailable `body.execution_payload.parent_hash` (i.e., the parent
hash is random bytes). In rare circumstances, it is possible that an attacker
can build atop such a block to trigger justification. If an optimistic node
imports this malicious chain, that node will have a "poisoned" fork choice
store, such that the node is unable to produce a block that descends from the
head (due to the invalid chain of payloads) and the node is unable to produce a
block that forks around the head (due to the justification of the malicious
chain).
The fork choice poisoning attack is temporary for an individual node, assuming
there exists an honest chain which justifies a higher epoch than the malicious
chain. Such an honest chain will take precedence and revive any poisoned store.
The fork choice poisoning attack is temporary for an individual node when that
an honest chain exists which justifies a higher epoch than the malicious chain.
Such an honest chain will take precedence and revive any poisoned store.
The `SAFE_SLOTS_TO_IMPORT_OPTIMISTICALLY` parameter assumes that the network
will justify a honest chain within some number of slots. With this assumption,
@ -170,9 +173,9 @@ disaster recovery:
## Checkpoint Sync (Weak Subjectivity Sync)
A consensus engine MAY assume that the `ExecutionPayload` of a block used for
checkpoint sync is `VALID` without providing that payload to an execution
engine.
A consensus engine MAY assume that the `ExecutionPayload` of a block used as an
anchor for checkpoint sync is `VALID` without necessarily providing that
payload to an execution engine.
## Validator assignments
@ -220,8 +223,7 @@ Do not apply the existing condition:
Instead, apply the new condition:
- [IGNORE] The block's parent (defined by block.parent_root) passes validation
except the block.body.execution_payload was deemed INVALID.
- [IGNORE] The block's parent was imported optimistically.
- [REJECT] The block's parent (defined by block.parent_root) passes all
validation, excluding verification of the block.body.execution_payload.
@ -274,16 +276,17 @@ When information about an optimistic block is requested, the consensus engine:
- MAY respond with not found.
- MAY respond with syncing.
### Requests for the Head
### Requests for an Optimistic Head
When `is_optimistic(head) == True`, the consensus engine:
- MUST NOT return `head`.
- MUST NOT return an optimistic `head`.
- MAY substitute the head block with `latest_valid_ancestor(block)`.
- MAY return syncing.
### Requests to Validators Endpoints
When `is_optimistic(head) == True`, the consensus engine:
When `is_optimistic(head) == True`, the consensus engine MUST return syncing to
all endpoints which match the following pattern:
MUST respon
- `eth/*/validator/*`