diff --git a/specs/core/0_beacon-chain.md b/specs/core/0_beacon-chain.md index 9563e22bb..5bf130b83 100644 --- a/specs/core/0_beacon-chain.md +++ b/specs/core/0_beacon-chain.md @@ -2362,74 +2362,49 @@ def process_attestation(state: BeaconState, attestation: Attestation) -> None: Process ``Attestation`` transaction. Note that this function mutates ``state``. """ - # Can't submit attestations that are too far in history (or in prehistory) - assert attestation.data.slot >= GENESIS_SLOT - assert state.slot <= attestation.data.slot + SLOTS_PER_EPOCH - # Can't submit attestations too quickly - assert attestation.data.slot + MIN_ATTESTATION_INCLUSION_DELAY <= state.slot - # Verify that the justified epoch and root is correct - if slot_to_epoch(attestation.data.slot) >= get_current_epoch(state): - # Case 1: current epoch attestations - assert attestation.data.source_epoch == state.current_justified_epoch - assert attestation.data.source_root == state.current_justified_root - else: - # Case 2: previous epoch attestations - assert attestation.data.source_epoch == state.previous_justified_epoch - assert attestation.data.source_root == state.previous_justified_root - # Check that the crosslink data is valid - acceptable_crosslink_data = { - # Case 1: Latest crosslink matches the one in the state - attestation.data.previous_crosslink, - # Case 2: State has already been updated, state's latest crosslink matches the crosslink - # the attestation is trying to create - Crosslink( - crosslink_data_root=attestation.data.crosslink_data_root, - epoch=slot_to_epoch(attestation.data.slot) - ) - } - assert state.latest_crosslinks[attestation.data.shard] in acceptable_crosslink_data - # Attestation must be nonempty! - assert attestation.aggregation_bitfield != b'\x00' * len(attestation.aggregation_bitfield) - # Custody must be empty (to be removed in phase 1) - assert attestation.custody_bitfield == b'\x00' * len(attestation.custody_bitfield) - # Get the committee for the specific shard that this attestation is for - crosslink_committee = [ - committee for committee, shard in get_crosslink_committees_at_slot(state, attestation.data.slot) - if shard == attestation.data.shard - ][0] - # Custody bitfield must be a subset of the attestation bitfield - for i in range(len(crosslink_committee)): - if get_bitfield_bit(attestation.aggregation_bitfield, i) == 0b0: - assert get_bitfield_bit(attestation.custody_bitfield, i) == 0b0 - # Verify aggregate signature - participants = get_attestation_participants(state, attestation.data, attestation.aggregation_bitfield) - custody_bit_1_participants = get_attestation_participants(state, attestation.data, attestation.custody_bitfield) - custody_bit_0_participants = [i for i in participants if i not in custody_bit_1_participants] + assert max(GENESIS_SLOT, state.slot - SLOTS_PER_EPOCH) <= attestation.data.slot + assert attestation.data.slot <= state.slot - MIN_ATTESTATION_INCLUSION_DELAY - assert bls_verify_multiple( - pubkeys=[ - bls_aggregate_pubkeys([state.validator_registry[i].pubkey for i in custody_bit_0_participants]), - bls_aggregate_pubkeys([state.validator_registry[i].pubkey for i in custody_bit_1_participants]), - ], - message_hashes=[ - hash_tree_root(AttestationDataAndCustodyBit(data=attestation.data, custody_bit=0b0)), - hash_tree_root(AttestationDataAndCustodyBit(data=attestation.data, custody_bit=0b1)), - ], + # Check target epoch, source epoch, and source root + target_epoch = slot_to_epoch(attestation.data.slot) + assert (target_epoch, attestation.data.source_epoch, attestation.data.source_root) in { + (get_current_epoch(state), state.current_justified_epoch, state.current_justified_root), + (get_previous_epoch(state), state.previous_justified_epoch, state.previous_justified_root), + } + + # Check crosslink data + assert attestation.data.crosslink_data_root == ZERO_HASH # [to be removed in phase 1] + assert state.latest_crosslinks[attestation.data.shard] in { + attestation.data.previous_crosslink, # Case 1: latest crosslink matches previous crosslink + Crosslink( # Case 2: latest crosslink matches current crosslink + crosslink_data_root=attestation.data.crosslink_data_root, + epoch=target_epoch, + ), + } + + # Check custody bits [to be generalised in phase 1] + assert attestation.custody_bitfield == b'\x00' * len(attestation.custody_bitfield) + + # Check aggregate signature [to be generalised in phase 1] + participants = get_attestation_participants(state, attestation.data, attestation.aggregation_bitfield) + assert len(participants) != 0 + assert bls_verify( + pubkey=bls_aggregate_pubkeys([state.validator_registry[i].pubkey for i in participants]), + message_hash=hash_tree_root(AttestationDataAndCustodyBit(data=attestation.data, custody_bit=0b0)), signature=attestation.aggregate_signature, - domain=get_domain(state.fork, slot_to_epoch(attestation.data.slot), DOMAIN_ATTESTATION), + domain=get_domain(state.fork, target_epoch, DOMAIN_ATTESTATION), ) - # Crosslink data root is zero (to be removed in phase 1) - assert attestation.data.crosslink_data_root == ZERO_HASH - # Apply the attestation + + # Cache pending attestation pending_attestation = PendingAttestation( data=attestation.data, aggregation_bitfield=attestation.aggregation_bitfield, custody_bitfield=attestation.custody_bitfield, inclusion_slot=state.slot ) - if slot_to_epoch(attestation.data.slot) == get_current_epoch(state): + if target_epoch == get_current_epoch(state): state.current_epoch_attestations.append(pending_attestation) - elif slot_to_epoch(attestation.data.slot) == get_previous_epoch(state): + else: state.previous_epoch_attestations.append(pending_attestation) ```