diff --git a/specs/core/1_beacon-chain.md b/specs/core/1_beacon-chain.md index 919c2a36a..021636967 100644 --- a/specs/core/1_beacon-chain.md +++ b/specs/core/1_beacon-chain.md @@ -39,11 +39,11 @@ Configuration is not namespaced. Instead it is strictly an extension; | `LIGHT_CLIENT_COMMITTEE_PERIOD` | `2**8` (= 256) | epochs | ~27 hours | | `SHARD_COMMITTEE_PERIOD` | `2**8` (= 256) | epochs | ~27 hours | | `SHARD_BLOCK_CHUNK_SIZE` | `2**18` (= 262,144) | | -| `MAX_SHARD_BLOCK_CHUNKS` | `2**2` (= 4) | | -| `BLOCK_SIZE_TARGET` | `3 * 2**16` (= 196,608) | | +| `SHARD_BLOCK_CHUNKS` | `2**2` (= 4) | | +| `TARGET_SHARD_BLOCK_SIZE` | `3 * 2**16` (= 196,608) | | | `SHARD_BLOCK_OFFSETS` | `[1, 2, 3, 5, 8, 13, 21, 34, 55, 89, 144, 233]` | | | `MAX_SHARD_BLOCKS_PER_ATTESTATION` | `len(SHARD_BLOCK_OFFSETS)` | | -| `EMPTY_CHUNK_ROOT` | `hash_tree_root(BytesN[SHARD_BLOCK_CHUNK_SIZE]())` | | +| `EMPTY_CHUNK_ROOT` | `hash_tree_root(ByteVector[SHARD_BLOCK_CHUNK_SIZE]())` | | | `MAX_GASPRICE` | `2**14` (= 16,384) | Gwei | | | `MIN_GASPRICE` | `2**5` (= 32) | Gwei | | | `GASPRICE_ADJUSTMENT_COEFFICIENT` | `2**3` (= 8) | | @@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ class ShardBlockWrapper(Container): shard_parent_root: Hash beacon_parent_root: Hash slot: Slot - body: BytesN[SHARD_BLOCK_CHUNK_SIZE] + body: ByteVector[MAX_SHARD_BLOCK_SIZE] signature: BLSSignature ``` @@ -202,8 +202,7 @@ class BeaconBlockBody(Container): deposits: List[Deposit, MAX_DEPOSITS] voluntary_exits: List[VoluntaryExit, MAX_VOLUNTARY_EXITS] # Custody game - custody_chunk_challenges: List[CustodyChunkChallenge, MAX_CUSTODY_CHUNK_CHALLENGES] - custody_bit_challenges: List[CustodyBitChallenge, MAX_CUSTODY_BIT_CHALLENGES] + custody_slashings: List[CustodySlashing, MAX_CUSTODY_SLASHINGS] custody_key_reveals: List[CustodyKeyReveal, MAX_CUSTODY_KEY_REVEALS] early_derived_secret_reveals: List[EarlyDerivedSecretReveal, MAX_EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_REVEALS] # Shards @@ -266,8 +265,6 @@ class BeaconState(Container): current_light_committee: CompactCommittee next_light_committee: CompactCommittee # Custody game - # TODO: custody game refactor, no challenge-records, immediate processing. - custody_challenge_index: uint64 # Future derived secrets already exposed; contains the indices of the exposed validator # at RANDAO reveal period % EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_PENALTY_MAX_FUTURE_EPOCHS exposed_derived_secrets: Vector[List[ValidatorIndex, MAX_EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_REVEALS * SLOTS_PER_EPOCH], @@ -317,7 +314,9 @@ def committee_to_compact_committee(state: BeaconState, committee: Sequence[Valid ```python def chunks_to_body_root(chunks): - return hash_tree_root(chunks + [EMPTY_CHUNK_ROOT] * (MAX_SHARD_BLOCK_CHUNKS - len(chunks))) + return hash_tree_root(Vector[Hash, MAX_SHARD_BLOCK_CHUNKS]( + chunks + [EMPTY_CHUNK_ROOT] * (MAX_SHARD_BLOCK_CHUNKS - len(chunks)) + )) ``` ### Beacon state accessors @@ -375,11 +374,13 @@ def get_indexed_attestation(beacon_state: BeaconState, attestation: Attestation) ```python def get_updated_gasprice(prev_gasprice: Gwei, length: uint8) -> Gwei: - if length > BLOCK_SIZE_TARGET: - delta = prev_gasprice * (length - BLOCK_SIZE_TARGET) // BLOCK_SIZE_TARGET // GASPRICE_ADJUSTMENT_COEFFICIENT + if length > TARGET_SHARD_BLOCK_SIZE: + delta = (prev_gasprice * (length - TARGET_SHARD_BLOCK_SIZE) + // TARGET_SHARD_BLOCK_SIZE // GASPRICE_ADJUSTMENT_COEFFICIENT) return min(prev_gasprice + delta, MAX_GASPRICE) else: - delta = prev_gasprice * (BLOCK_SIZE_TARGET - length) // BLOCK_SIZE_TARGET // GASPRICE_ADJUSTMENT_COEFFICIENT + delta = (prev_gasprice * (TARGET_SHARD_BLOCK_SIZE - length) + // TARGET_SHARD_BLOCK_SIZE // GASPRICE_ADJUSTMENT_COEFFICIENT) return max(prev_gasprice, MIN_GASPRICE + delta) - delta ``` diff --git a/specs/core/1_custody-game.md b/specs/core/1_custody-game.md index 7b554720d..7ae1c5170 100644 --- a/specs/core/1_custody-game.md +++ b/specs/core/1_custody-game.md @@ -12,43 +12,29 @@ - [Terminology](#terminology) - [Constants](#constants) - [Misc](#misc) - - [Custody game parameters](#custody-game-parameters) - [Time parameters](#time-parameters) - [Max operations per block](#max-operations-per-block) - [Reward and penalty quotients](#reward-and-penalty-quotients) - [Signature domain types](#signature-domain-types) - [Data structures](#data-structures) - - [Custody objects](#custody-objects) - - [`CustodyChunkChallenge`](#custodychunkchallenge) - - [`CustodyBitChallenge`](#custodybitchallenge) - - [`CustodyChunkChallengeRecord`](#custodychunkchallengerecord) - - [`CustodyBitChallengeRecord`](#custodybitchallengerecord) - - [`CustodyResponse`](#custodyresponse) - [New beacon operations](#new-beacon-operations) + - [`CustodySlashing`](#custody-slashing) - [`CustodyKeyReveal`](#custodykeyreveal) - [`EarlyDerivedSecretReveal`](#earlyderivedsecretreveal) - - [Phase 0 container updates](#phase-0-container-updates) - - [`Validator`](#validator) - - [`BeaconState`](#beaconstate) - - [`BeaconBlockBody`](#beaconblockbody) - [Helpers](#helpers) - - [`ceillog2`](#ceillog2) - - [`is_valid_merkle_branch_with_mixin`](#is_valid_merkle_branch_with_mixin) - [`legendre_bit`](#legendre_bit) - - [`custody_subchunkify`](#custody_subchunkify) - - [`get_custody_chunk_bit`](#get_custody_chunk_bit) - - [`get_chunk_bits_root`](#get_chunk_bits_root) + - [`get_custody_atoms`](#get_custody_atoms) + - [`compute_custody_bit`](#compute_custody_bit) - [`get_randao_epoch_for_custody_period`](#get_randao_epoch_for_custody_period) - [`get_custody_period_for_validator`](#get_custody_period_for_validator) - [Per-block processing](#per-block-processing) - - [Operations](#operations) + - [Custody Game Operations](#custody-game-operations) - [Custody key reveals](#custody-key-reveals) - [Early derived secret reveals](#early-derived-secret-reveals) - - [Chunk challenges](#chunk-challenges) - - [Bit challenges](#bit-challenges) - - [Custody responses](#custody-responses) + - [Custody Slashings](#custody-slashings) - [Per-epoch processing](#per-epoch-processing) - - [Handling of custody-related deadlines](#handling-of-custody-related-deadlines) + - [Handling of reveal deadlines](#handling-of-reveal-deadlines) + - [Final updates](#final-updates) @@ -56,46 +42,19 @@ This document details the beacon chain additions and changes in Phase 1 of Ethereum 2.0 to support the shard data custody game, building upon the [Phase 0](0_beacon-chain.md) specification. -## Terminology - -- **Custody game**— -- **Custody period**— -- **Custody chunk**— -- **Custody chunk bit**— -- **Custody chunk challenge**— -- **Custody bit**— -- **Custody bit challenge**— -- **Custody key**— -- **Custody key reveal**— -- **Custody key mask**— - ## Constants ### Misc -| Name | Value | +| Name | Value | Unit | | - | - | | `BLS12_381_Q` | `4002409555221667393417789825735904156556882819939007885332058136124031650490837864442687629129015664037894272559787` | | `MINOR_REWARD_QUOTIENT` | `2**8` (= 256) | -| `MAX_EPOCHS_PER_CROSSLINK` | `2**6` (= 64) | epochs | ~7 hours | - -### Custody game parameters - -| Name | Value | -| - | - | -| `BYTES_PER_SHARD_BLOCK` | `2**14` (= 16,384) | -| `BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_CHUNK` | `2**9` (= 512) | -| `BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_SUBCHUNK` | `48` | -| `CHUNKS_PER_EPOCH` | `2 * BYTES_PER_SHARD_BLOCK * SLOTS_PER_EPOCH // BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_CHUNK` | -| `MAX_CUSTODY_CHUNKS` | `MAX_EPOCHS_PER_CROSSLINK * CHUNKS_PER_EPOCH` | -| `CUSTODY_DATA_DEPTH` | `ceillog2(MAX_CUSTODY_CHUNKS) + 1` | -| `CUSTODY_CHUNK_BIT_DEPTH` | `ceillog2(MAX_EPOCHS_PER_CROSSLINK * CHUNKS_PER_EPOCH // 256) + 2` | +| `BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_ATOM` | `48` | bytes | ### Time parameters | Name | Value | Unit | Duration | | - | - | :-: | :-: | -| `MAX_CHUNK_CHALLENGE_DELAY` | `2**11` (= 2,048) | epochs | ~9 days | -| `CUSTODY_RESPONSE_DEADLINE` | `2**14` (= 16,384) | epochs | ~73 days | | `RANDAO_PENALTY_EPOCHS` | `2**1` (= 2) | epochs | 12.8 minutes | | `EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_PENALTY_MAX_FUTURE_EPOCHS` | `2**14` | epochs | ~73 days | | `EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD` | `2**11` (= 2,048) | epochs | ~9 days | @@ -108,8 +67,7 @@ This document details the beacon chain additions and changes in Phase 1 of Ether | - | - | | `MAX_CUSTODY_KEY_REVEALS` | `2**4` (= 16) | | `MAX_EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_REVEALS` | `1` | -| `MAX_CUSTODY_CHUNK_CHALLENGES` | `2**2` (= 4) | -| `MAX_CUSTODY_BIT_CHALLENGES` | `2**2` (= 4) | +| `MAX_CUSTODY_SLASHINGS` | `1` | ### Reward and penalty quotients @@ -123,51 +81,29 @@ The following types are defined, mapping into `DomainType` (little endian): | Name | Value | | - | - | -| `DOMAIN_CUSTODY_BIT_CHALLENGE` | `6` | +| `DOMAIN_CUSTODY_BIT_SLASHING` | `6` | ## Data structures -### Custody objects +### New Beacon Chain operations -#### `Crosslink` - -*Note*: Crosslinks have been removed in the phase 1 redesign. This is a placeholder until the custody game is revamped. +#### `CustodySlashing` ```python -class Crosslink(Container): - shard: uint64 - parent_root: Hash - # Crosslinking data - start_epoch: Epoch - end_epoch: Epoch - data_root: Hash -``` - - -#### `CustodyChunkChallenge` - -```python -class CustodyChunkChallenge(Container): - responder_index: ValidatorIndex +class CustodySlashing(Container): + # Attestation.custody_bits[data_index][committee.index(malefactor_index)] is the target custody bit to check. + # (Attestation.data.shard_transition_root as ShardTransition).shard_data_roots[data_index] is the root of the data. + data_index: uint64 + malefactor_index: ValidatorIndex + malefactor_key: BLSSignature + whistleblower_index: ValidatorIndex + shard_transition: ShardTransition attestation: Attestation - chunk_index: uint64 -``` - -#### `CustodyBitChallenge` - -```python -class CustodyBitChallenge(Container): - responder_index: ValidatorIndex - attestation: Attestation - challenger_index: ValidatorIndex - responder_key: BLSSignature - chunk_bits: Bitlist[MAX_CUSTODY_CHUNKS] + data: ByteList[MAX_SHARD_BLOCK_SIZE] signature: BLSSignature ``` -### New Beacon Chain operations - #### `CustodyKeyReveal` ```python @@ -199,33 +135,6 @@ class EarlyDerivedSecretReveal(Container): ## Helpers -### `ceillog2` - -```python -def ceillog2(x: uint64) -> int: - return (x - 1).bit_length() -``` - -### `is_valid_merkle_branch_with_mixin` - -```python -def is_valid_merkle_branch_with_mixin(leaf: Bytes32, - branch: Sequence[Bytes32], - depth: uint64, - index: uint64, - root: Root, - mixin: uint64) -> bool: - value = leaf - for i in range(depth): - if index // (2**i) % 2: - value = hash(branch[i] + value) - else: - value = hash(value + branch[i]) - value = hash(value + mixin.to_bytes(32, "little")) - return value == root -``` - - ### `legendre_bit` Returns the Legendre symbol `(a/q)` normalizes as a bit (i.e. `((a/q) + 1) // 2`). In a production implementation, a well-optimized library (e.g. GMP) should be used for this. @@ -255,39 +164,29 @@ def legendre_bit(a: int, q: int) -> int: return 0 ``` -### `custody_subchunkify` +### `custody_atoms` -Given one proof of custody chunk, returns the proof of custody subchunks of the correct sizes. +Given one set of data, return the custody atoms: each atom will be combined with one legendre bit. ```python -def custody_subchunkify(bytez: bytes) -> Sequence[bytes]: - bytez += b'\x00' * (-len(bytez) % BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_SUBCHUNK) - return [bytez[i:i + BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_SUBCHUNK] - for i in range(0, len(bytez), BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_SUBCHUNK)] +def get_custody_atoms(bytez: bytes) -> Sequence[bytes]: + bytez += b'\x00' * (-len(bytez) % BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_ATOM) # right-padding + return [bytez[i:i + BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_ATOM] + for i in range(0, len(bytez), BYTES_PER_CUSTODY_ATOM)] ``` -### `get_custody_chunk_bit` +### `compute_custody_bit` ```python -def get_custody_chunk_bit(key: BLSSignature, chunk: bytes) -> bool: +def compute_custody_bit(key: BLSSignature, data: bytes) -> bool: full_G2_element = bls_signature_to_G2(key) s = full_G2_element[0].coeffs - bits = [legendre_bit((i + 1) * s[i % 2] + int.from_bytes(subchunk, "little"), BLS12_381_Q) - for i, subchunk in enumerate(custody_subchunkify(chunk))] - + bits = [legendre_bit((i + 1) * s[i % 2] + int.from_bytes(atom, "little"), BLS12_381_Q) + for i, atom in enumerate(get_custody_atoms(data))] + # XOR all atom bits return bool(sum(bits) % 2) ``` -### `get_chunk_bits_root` - -```python -def get_chunk_bits_root(chunk_bits: Bitlist[MAX_CUSTODY_CHUNKS]) -> bit: - aggregated_bits = 0 - for i, b in enumerate(chunk_bits): - aggregated_bits += 2**i * b - return legendre_bit(aggregated_bits, BLS12_381_Q) -``` - ### `get_randao_epoch_for_custody_period` ```python @@ -319,8 +218,7 @@ def process_custody_game_operations(state: BeaconState, body: BeaconBlockBody) - for_ops(body.custody_key_reveals, process_custody_key_reveal) for_ops(body.early_derived_secret_reveals, process_early_derived_secret_reveal) - for_ops(body.custody_chunk_challenges, process_chunk_challenge) - for_ops(body.custody_bit_challenges, process_bit_challenge) + for_ops(body.custody_slashings, process_custody_slashing) ``` #### Custody key reveals @@ -367,7 +265,7 @@ def process_custody_key_reveal(state: BeaconState, reveal: CustodyKeyReveal) -> # Process reveal revealer.next_custody_secret_to_reveal += 1 - # Reward Block Preposer + # Reward Block Proposer proposer_index = get_beacon_proposer_index(state) increase_balance( state, @@ -446,190 +344,81 @@ def process_early_derived_secret_reveal(state: BeaconState, reveal: EarlyDerived state.exposed_derived_secrets[derived_secret_location].append(reveal.revealed_index) ``` -#### Chunk challenges +#### Custody Slashings ```python -def process_chunk_challenge(state: BeaconState, challenge: CustodyChunkChallenge) -> None: +def process_custody_slashing(state: BeaconState, custody_slashing: CustodySlashing) -> None: + attestation = custody_slashing.attestation + + # Any signed custody-slashing should result in at least one slashing. + # If the custody bits are valid, then the claim itself is slashed. + malefactor = state.validators[custody_slashing.malefactor_index] + whistleblower = state.validators[custody_slashing.whistleblower_index] + domain = get_domain(state, DOMAIN_CUSTODY_BIT_SLASHING, get_current_epoch(state)) + assert bls_verify(whistleblower.pubkey, signing_root(custody_slashing), custody_slashing.signature, domain) + # Verify that the whistleblower is slashable + assert is_slashable_validator(whistleblower, get_current_epoch(state)) + # Verify that the claimed malefactor is slashable + assert is_slashable_validator(malefactor, get_current_epoch(state)) + # Verify the attestation - assert is_valid_indexed_attestation(state, get_indexed_attestation(state, challenge.attestation)) - # Verify it is not too late to challenge - assert (compute_epoch_at_slot(challenge.attestation.data.slot) - >= get_current_epoch(state) - MAX_CHUNK_CHALLENGE_DELAY) - responder = state.validators[challenge.responder_index] - assert responder.exit_epoch >= get_current_epoch(state) - MAX_CHUNK_CHALLENGE_DELAY - # Verify the responder participated in the attestation - attesters = get_attesting_indices(state, challenge.attestation.data, challenge.attestation.aggregation_bits) - assert challenge.responder_index in attesters - # Verify the challenge is not a duplicate - for record in state.custody_chunk_challenge_records: - assert ( - record.data_root != challenge.attestation.data.crosslink.data_root or - record.chunk_index != challenge.chunk_index - ) - # Verify depth - depth = 123 # TODO - assert challenge.chunk_index < 2**depth - # Add new chunk challenge record - new_record = CustodyChunkChallengeRecord( - challenge_index=state.custody_challenge_index, - challenger_index=get_beacon_proposer_index(state), - responder_index=challenge.responder_index, - inclusion_epoch=get_current_epoch(state), - data_root=challenge.attestation.data.crosslink.data_root, - depth=depth, - chunk_index=challenge.chunk_index, - ) - replace_empty_or_append(state.custody_chunk_challenge_records, new_record) - - state.custody_challenge_index += 1 - # Postpone responder withdrawability - responder.withdrawable_epoch = FAR_FUTURE_EPOCH -``` - -TODO: immediate challenge processing, no state records. - -```python -def process_chunk_challenge_response(state: BeaconState, - response: CustodyResponse, - challenge: CustodyChunkChallengeRecord) -> None: - # Verify chunk index - assert response.chunk_index == challenge.chunk_index - # Verify bit challenge data is null - assert response.chunk_bits_branch == [] and response.chunk_bits_leaf == Hash() - # Verify minimum delay - assert get_current_epoch(state) >= challenge.inclusion_epoch + MAX_SEED_LOOKAHEAD - # Verify the chunk matches the crosslink data root - assert is_valid_merkle_branch( - leaf=hash_tree_root(response.chunk), - branch=response.data_branch, - depth=challenge.depth, - index=response.chunk_index, - root=challenge.data_root, - ) - # Clear the challenge - records = state.custody_chunk_challenge_records - records[records.index(challenge)] = CustodyChunkChallengeRecord() - # Reward the proposer - proposer_index = get_beacon_proposer_index(state) - increase_balance(state, proposer_index, Gwei(get_base_reward(state, proposer_index) // MINOR_REWARD_QUOTIENT)) -``` - -#### Bit challenges - -```python -def process_bit_challenge(state: BeaconState, challenge: CustodyBitChallenge) -> None: - attestation = challenge.attestation - epoch = attestation.data.target.epoch - shard = attestation.data.crosslink.shard - - # Verify challenge signature - challenger = state.validators[challenge.challenger_index] - domain = get_domain(state, DOMAIN_CUSTODY_BIT_CHALLENGE, get_current_epoch(state)) - # TODO incorrect hash-tree-root, but this changes with phase 1 PR #1483 - assert bls_verify(challenger.pubkey, hash_tree_root(challenge), challenge.signature, domain) - # Verify challenger is slashable - assert is_slashable_validator(challenger, get_current_epoch(state)) - # Verify attestation assert is_valid_indexed_attestation(state, get_indexed_attestation(state, attestation)) - # Verify attestation is eligible for challenging - responder = state.validators[challenge.responder_index] - assert get_current_epoch(state) <= get_randao_epoch_for_custody_period( - get_custody_period_for_validator(challenge.responder_index, epoch), - challenge.responder_index - ) + 2 * EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD + responder.max_reveal_lateness - # Verify the responder participated in the attestation + # TODO: custody_slashing.data is not chunked like shard blocks yet, result is lots of padding. + + # TODO: can do a single combined merkle proof of data being attested. + # Verify the shard transition is indeed attested by the attestation + shard_transition = custody_slashing.shard_transition + assert hash_tree_root(shard_transition) == attestation.shard_transition_root + # Verify that the provided data matches the shard-transition + shard_chunk_roots = shard_transition.shard_data_roots[custody_slashing.data_index] + assert hash_tree_root(custody_slashing.data) == chunks_to_body_root(shard_chunk_roots) + + # Verify existence of claimed malefactor attesters = get_attesting_indices(state, attestation.data, attestation.aggregation_bits) - assert challenge.responder_index in attesters - # Verifier challenger is not already challenging - for record in state.custody_bit_challenge_records: - assert record.challenger_index != challenge.challenger_index - # Verify the responder custody key - epoch_to_sign = get_randao_epoch_for_custody_period( - get_custody_period_for_validator(challenge.responder_index, epoch), - challenge.responder_index, - ) - domain = get_domain(state, DOMAIN_RANDAO, epoch_to_sign) - assert bls_verify(responder.pubkey, hash_tree_root(epoch_to_sign), challenge.responder_key, domain) - # Verify the chunk count - chunk_count = 123 # TODO - assert chunk_count == len(challenge.chunk_bits) - # Verify custody bit is incorrect - committee = get_beacon_committee(state, epoch, shard) - custody_bit = attestation.custody_bits[committee.index(challenge.responder_index)] - assert custody_bit != get_chunk_bits_root(challenge.chunk_bits) - # TODO: immediate processing of challenge? - state.custody_challenge_index += 1 - # Postpone responder withdrawability - responder.withdrawable_epoch = FAR_FUTURE_EPOCH + assert custody_slashing.malefactor_index in attesters + + # Get the custody bit + custody_bits = attestation.custody_bits[custody_slashing.data_index] + claimed_custody_bit = custody_bits[attesters.index(custody_slashing.malefactor_index)] + + # Compute the custody bit + computed_custody_bit = compute_custody_bit(custody_slashing.data) + + # Verify the claim + if claimed_custody_bit != computed_custody_bit: + # Slash the malefactor, reward the other committee members + slash_validator(state, custody_slashing.malefactor_index) + whistleblower_reward = Gwei(malefactor.effective_balance // WHISTLEBLOWER_REWARD_QUOTIENT) // len(attesters - 1) + for attester_index in attesters: + if attester_index != custody_slashing.malefactor_index: + increase_balance(state, attester_index, whistleblower_reward) + # No special whisteblower reward: it is expected to be an attester. Others are free to slash too however. + else: + # The claim was false, the custody bit was correct. Slash the whistleblower that induced this work. + slash_validator(state, custody_slashing.whistleblower_index) ``` -TODO: immediate challenge processing, no state records. - -```python -def process_bit_challenge_response(state: BeaconState, - response: CustodyResponse, - challenge: CustodyBitChallengeRecord) -> None: - # Verify chunk index - assert response.chunk_index < challenge.chunk_count - # Verify responder has not been slashed - responder = state.validators[challenge.responder_index] - assert not responder.slashed - # Verify the chunk matches the crosslink data root - assert is_valid_merkle_branch( - leaf=hash_tree_root(response.chunk), - branch=response.data_branch, - depth=ceillog2(challenge.chunk_count), - index=response.chunk_index, - root=challenge.data_root, - ) - # Verify the chunk bit leaf matches the challenge data - assert is_valid_merkle_branch_with_mixin( - leaf=hash_tree_root(response.chunk_bits_leaf), - branch=response.chunk_bits_branch, - depth=ceillog2(MAX_CUSTODY_CHUNKS // 256), - index=response.chunk_index // 256, - root=challenge.chunk_bits_merkle_root, - mixin=challenge.chunk_count, - ) - # Verify the chunk bit does not match the challenge chunk bit - assert (get_custody_chunk_bit(challenge.responder_key, response.chunk) - != response.chunk_bits_leaf[response.chunk_index % 256]) - # Clear the challenge - records = state.custody_bit_challenge_records - records[records.index(challenge)] = CustodyBitChallengeRecord() - # Slash challenger - slash_validator(state, challenge.challenger_index, challenge.responder_index) -``` ## Per-epoch processing -### Handling of custody-related deadlines +### Handling of reveal deadlines Run `process_reveal_deadlines(state)` after `process_registry_updates(state)`: ```python def process_reveal_deadlines(state: BeaconState) -> None: for index, validator in enumerate(state.validators): - deadline = validator.next_custody_secret_to_reveal + (CUSTODY_RESPONSE_DEADLINE // EPOCHS_PER_CUSTODY_PERIOD) - if get_custody_period_for_validator(state, ValidatorIndex(index)) > deadline: + if get_custody_period_for_validator(state, ValidatorIndex(index)) > validator.next_custody_secret_to_reveal: slash_validator(state, ValidatorIndex(index)) ``` +### Final updates + After `process_final_updates(state)`, additional updates are made for the custody game: ```python def process_custody_final_updates(state: BeaconState) -> None: - current_epoch = get_current_epoch(state) # Clean up exposed RANDAO key reveals - state.exposed_derived_secrets[current_epoch % EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_PENALTY_MAX_FUTURE_EPOCHS] = [] - # Reset withdrawable epochs if challenge records are empty - records = state.custody_chunk_challenge_records + state.custody_bit_challenge_records - validator_indices_in_records = set( - [record.challenger_index for record in records] + [record.responder_index for record in records] - ) - for index, validator in enumerate(state.validators): - if index not in validator_indices_in_records: - if validator.exit_epoch != FAR_FUTURE_EPOCH and validator.withdrawable_epoch == FAR_FUTURE_EPOCH: - validator.withdrawable_epoch = Epoch(validator.exit_epoch + MIN_VALIDATOR_WITHDRAWABILITY_DELAY) + state.exposed_derived_secrets[get_current_epoch(state) % EARLY_DERIVED_SECRET_PENALTY_MAX_FUTURE_EPOCHS] = [] ```