Evaluation of IPFS paper

evaluations/ipfs.md

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+An evaluation of the IPFS paper
+===============================
+
+2021-01-06 Mark Spanbroek
+
+https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmR7GSQM93Cx5eAg6a6yRzNde1FQv7uL6X1o4k7zrJa3LX/ipfs.draft3.pdf
+
+Goal of this evaluation is to find things to adopt or avoid while designing
+Dagger. It is not meant to be a criticism of IPFS.
+
+#### Pros:
+
++ IPFS is designed by simplifying, evolving, and connecting proven techniques
+  (§3)
++ Consists of a stack of separately described sub-protocols (§3)
++ Uses Coral DSHT to favor data that is nearby, reducing latency of lookup
+  (§2.1.2)
++ Uses proof-of-work in S/Kademlia to discourage Sybil attacks (§2.1.3)
++ Favors self-describing values such as multihash (§3.1) and multiaddr (§3.2.1)
++ BitSwap protocol for exchanging blocks supports multiple strategies (§3.4.2)
++ Uses content addressing (§3.5)
++ The Merkle DAG is simple, yet allows constucting filesystems,
+  key-value stores, databases, messaging system, etc.. (§3.5)
+
+#### Cons:
+
+- Kademlia prefers long-lived nodes, which is not ideal for mobile enviroments
+  (§2.1.1)
+- BitSwap falls just short of introducing a currency with micro payments,
+  necessitating additional work for nodes to find blocks to barter with (§3.4)
+- Merkle DAGs and Paths (§3.5.1) feel like an unnecessary complication at the
+  protocol level; they could have been implemented on top of a system consisting
+  solely of content addressable chunks
+- Object pinning (§3.5.3) inevitably leads to centralized gateways to IPFS, such
+  as Infura and Pinata
+- There are no self-describing multiformats for encryption and signing (§3.5.5)
+- IPFS uses variable size blocks instead of fixed-size chunks (§3.6)
+- Supporting version control directly in IPFS feels like an unnecessary
+  complication (§3.6.5)
+- Handles mutable state by hacking it into the routing DHT, instead of using a
+  separate mutable naming system like ENS