Repair incentive not longer grows over time

Use the collateral instead of missed payouts
as incentive for repairs.
This commit is contained in:
Mark Spanbroek 2022-06-01 13:04:51 +02:00 committed by markspanbroek
parent 423def9fbb
commit 14a311f25c
1 changed files with 21 additions and 15 deletions

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@ -98,21 +98,11 @@ The time interval that a slot is filled by a host determines the host payout;
for every second of the interval a certain amount of tokens are awarded to the
host. Hosts that fill a slot are required to submit frequent proofs of storage.
When a proof is missed, the collateral associated with a slot is mostly burned,
except for a fee for the one who marked the proof as missing. The slot is now
considered empty again until another host submits a correct proof together with
collateral.
To incentivize repair, we allow the host that takes over a slot to count the
interval between the missed proof and the new proof towards its own profits.
This means that when a proof is missed, the incentive to repair increases over
time.
The situation where the payout on repair becomes larger than the required
collateral is an interesting one. On the one hand, this could be an opportunity
for zero-cash entry into the network. On the other hand, it might lead to
undesired behavior because the loss of collateral is no longer that important
for a node. This is probably worth looking further into.
When a proof is missed, the collateral associated with a slot is used to pay a
fee to the one who marked the proof as missing. The rest of the slot collateral
is reserved for repairs. The slot is now considered empty again until another
host submits a correct proof together with collateral. Payouts for the time
interval that a slot is empty are burned.
Contract lifecycle
------------------
@ -165,6 +155,22 @@ The client is able to retrieve any funds that are left in the contract.
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Repairs
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When a slot becomes empty, the remaining collateral associated with the slot is
used as an incentive to repair the lost content. Repair typically involves
downloading other parts of the content and using erasure coding to restore the
missing parts. This incurs costs for a host. To compensate the host for these
costs it receives not only its own collateral back at the end of the contract,
but also the remaining collateral from the host that failed to hold a slot.
We expect the collateral to be significantly higher than the costs of repair.
This means that hosts in the network can benefit greatly from repairs, and they
may prioritize repairs over filling slots in new contracts. This is intentional,
we want the network to prioritize honoring existing contracts over starting new
ones.
Renewal
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