Repair incentive not longer grows over time
Use the collateral instead of missed payouts as incentive for repairs.
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@ -98,21 +98,11 @@ The time interval that a slot is filled by a host determines the host payout;
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for every second of the interval a certain amount of tokens are awarded to the
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host. Hosts that fill a slot are required to submit frequent proofs of storage.
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When a proof is missed, the collateral associated with a slot is mostly burned,
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except for a fee for the one who marked the proof as missing. The slot is now
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considered empty again until another host submits a correct proof together with
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collateral.
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To incentivize repair, we allow the host that takes over a slot to count the
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interval between the missed proof and the new proof towards its own profits.
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This means that when a proof is missed, the incentive to repair increases over
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time.
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The situation where the payout on repair becomes larger than the required
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collateral is an interesting one. On the one hand, this could be an opportunity
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for zero-cash entry into the network. On the other hand, it might lead to
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undesired behavior because the loss of collateral is no longer that important
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for a node. This is probably worth looking further into.
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When a proof is missed, the collateral associated with a slot is used to pay a
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fee to the one who marked the proof as missing. The rest of the slot collateral
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is reserved for repairs. The slot is now considered empty again until another
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host submits a correct proof together with collateral. Payouts for the time
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interval that a slot is empty are burned.
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Contract lifecycle
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------------------
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@ -165,6 +155,22 @@ The client is able to retrieve any funds that are left in the contract.
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---------
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Repairs
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When a slot becomes empty, the remaining collateral associated with the slot is
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used as an incentive to repair the lost content. Repair typically involves
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downloading other parts of the content and using erasure coding to restore the
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missing parts. This incurs costs for a host. To compensate the host for these
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costs it receives not only its own collateral back at the end of the contract,
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but also the remaining collateral from the host that failed to hold a slot.
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We expect the collateral to be significantly higher than the costs of repair.
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This means that hosts in the network can benefit greatly from repairs, and they
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may prioritize repairs over filling slots in new contracts. This is intentional,
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we want the network to prioritize honoring existing contracts over starting new
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ones.
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Renewal
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-------
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