status-im
/
dagger-contracts
mirror of https://github.com/status-im/dagger-contracts.git
2
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Projects Releases Wiki Activity

refactor(certora): extract `allowedRequestStateChanges` rule into own 

file

Closes #192
This commit is contained in:
r4bbit 2024-10-15 12:12:59 +02:00
parent c3e4fdd321
commit 0b39274ed5
6 changed files with 117 additions and 81 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

8
.github/workflows/ci.yml vendored
View File

@ -70,10 +70,16 @@ jobs:
run: npm install
- name: Verify rules
run: npm run verify
run: |
npm run ${{matrix.rule}}
env:
CERTORAKEY: ${{ secrets.CERTORAKEY }}
strategy:
fail-fast: false
max-parallel: 16
matrix:
rule:
- verify:marketplace
- verify:state_changes

23
certora/confs/StateChanges.conf Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
{
"files": [
"certora/harness/MarketplaceHarness.sol",
"contracts/Marketplace.sol",
"contracts/Groth16Verifier.sol",
"certora/helpers/ERC20A.sol",
],
"parametric_contracts": ["MarketplaceHarness"],
"link" : [
"MarketplaceHarness:_token=ERC20A",
"MarketplaceHarness:_verifier=Groth16Verifier"
],
"msg": "Verifying StateChanges",
"rule_sanity": "basic",
"verify": "MarketplaceHarness:certora/specs/StateChanges.spec",
"optimistic_loop": true,
"loop_iter": "3",
"optimistic_hashing": true,
"hashing_length_bound": "512",
}

80
certora/specs/Marketplace.spec
View File

@ -1,3 +1,5 @@
import "./shared.spec";
using ERC20A as Token;
methods {
@ -108,16 +110,6 @@ hook Sstore _slots[KEY Marketplace.SlotId slotId].state Marketplace.SlotState ne
}
}
ghost mapping(MarketplaceHarness.SlotId => MarketplaceHarness.RequestId) slotIdToRequestId;
hook Sload Marketplace.RequestId defaultValue _slots[KEY MarketplaceHarness.SlotId SlotId].requestId {
require slotIdToRequestId[SlotId] == defaultValue;
}
hook Sstore _slots[KEY MarketplaceHarness.SlotId SlotId].requestId Marketplace.RequestId defaultValue {
slotIdToRequestId[SlotId] = defaultValue;
}
ghost mapping(MarketplaceHarness.RequestId => uint256) slotsFilledGhost;
hook Sload uint256 defaultValue _requestContexts[KEY MarketplaceHarness.RequestId RequestId].slotsFilled {
@ -142,22 +134,6 @@ hook Sstore _requestContexts[KEY MarketplaceHarness.RequestId RequestId].endsAt
| Helper functions |
--------------------------------------------*/
function ensureValidRequestId(Marketplace.RequestId requestId) {
// Without this, the prover will find counter examples with `requestId == 0`,
// which are unlikely in practice as `requestId` is a hash from a request object.
// However, `requestId == 0` enforces `SlotState.Free` in the `fillSlot` function regardless,
// which ultimately results in counter examples where we have a state change
// RequestState.Finished -> RequestState.Started, which is forbidden.
//
// COUNTER EXAMPLE: https://prover.certora.com/output/6199/81939b2b12d74a5cae5e84ceadb901c0?anonymousKey=a4ad6268598a1077ecfce75493b0c0f9bc3b17a0
//
// The `require` below is a hack to ensure we exclude such cases as the code
// reverts in `requestIsKnown()` modifier (simply `require requestId != 0` isn't
// sufficient here)
// require requestId == to_bytes32(0) => currentContract._requests[requestId].client == 0;
require requestId != to_bytes32(0) && currentContract._requests[requestId].client != 0;
}
function canCancelRequest(method f) returns bool {
return f.selector == sig:withdrawFunds(Marketplace.RequestId).selector;
}
@ -228,13 +204,6 @@ invariant failedRequestAlwaysEnded(env e, Marketplace.RequestId requestId)
currentContract.requestState(e, requestId) == Marketplace.RequestState.Failed =>
endsAtGhost[requestId] < lastBlockTimestampGhost;
// STATUS - verified
// finished slot always has finished request
// https://prover.certora.com/output/6199/3371ee4f80354ac9b05b1c84c53b6154?anonymousKey=eab83785acb61ccd31ed0c9d5a2e9e2b24099156
invariant finishedSlotAlwaysHasFinishedRequest(env e, Marketplace.SlotId slotId)
currentContract.slotState(e, slotId) == Marketplace.SlotState.Finished =>
currentContract.requestState(e, slotIdToRequestId[slotId]) == Marketplace.RequestState.Finished;
// STATUS - verified
// paid slot always has finished or cancelled request
// https://prover.certora.com/output/6199/d0e165ed5d594f9fb477602af06cfeb1?anonymousKey=01ffaad46027786c38d78e5a41c03ce002032200
@ -246,12 +215,6 @@ invariant paidSlotAlwaysHasFinishedOrCancelledRequest(env e, Marketplace.SlotId
}
}
// STATUS - verified
// cancelled slot always belongs to cancelled request
// https://prover.certora.com/output/6199/80d5dc73d406436db166071e277283f1?anonymousKey=d5d175960dc40f72e22ba8e31c6904a488277e57
invariant cancelledSlotAlwaysHasCancelledRequest(env e, Marketplace.SlotId slotId)
currentContract.slotState(e, slotId) == Marketplace.SlotState.Cancelled =>
currentContract.requestState(e, slotIdToRequestId[slotId]) == Marketplace.RequestState.Cancelled;
/*--------------------------------------------
| Properties |
@ -301,45 +264,6 @@ rule slotIsFailedOrFreeIfRequestHasFailed(env e, method f) {
}
rule allowedRequestStateChanges(env e, method f) {
calldataarg args;
Marketplace.SlotId slotId;
Marketplace.RequestId requestId = slotIdToRequestId[slotId];
// needed, otherwise it finds counter examples where
// `SlotState.Cancelled` and `RequestState.New`
requireInvariant cancelledSlotAlwaysHasCancelledRequest(e, slotId);
// needed, otherwise it finds counter example where
// `SlotState.Finished` and `RequestState.New`
requireInvariant finishedSlotAlwaysHasFinishedRequest(e, slotId);
ensureValidRequestId(requestId);
Marketplace.RequestState requestStateBefore = currentContract.requestState(e, requestId);
// we need to check for `freeSlot(slotId)` here to ensure it's being called with
// the slotId we're interested in and not any other slotId (that may not pass the
// required invariants)
if (f.selector == sig:freeSlot(Marketplace.SlotId).selector || f.selector == sig:freeSlot(Marketplace.SlotId, address, address).selector) {
freeSlot(e, slotId);
} else {
f(e, args);
}
Marketplace.RequestState requestStateAfter = currentContract.requestState(e, requestId);
// RequestState.New -> RequestState.Started
assert requestStateBefore != requestStateAfter && requestStateAfter == Marketplace.RequestState.Started => requestStateBefore == Marketplace.RequestState.New;
// RequestState.Started -> RequestState.Finished
assert requestStateBefore != requestStateAfter && requestStateAfter == Marketplace.RequestState.Finished => requestStateBefore == Marketplace.RequestState.Started;
// RequestState.Started -> RequestState.Failed
assert requestStateBefore != requestStateAfter && requestStateAfter == Marketplace.RequestState.Failed => requestStateBefore == Marketplace.RequestState.Started;
// RequestState.New -> RequestState.Cancelled
assert requestStateBefore != requestStateAfter && requestStateAfter == Marketplace.RequestState.Cancelled => requestStateBefore == Marketplace.RequestState.New;
}
rule functionsCausingRequestStateChanges(env e, method f) {
calldataarg args;

42
certora/specs/StateChanges.spec Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
import "./shared.spec";
rule allowedRequestStateChanges(env e, method f) {
calldataarg args;
Marketplace.SlotId slotId;
Marketplace.RequestId requestId = slotIdToRequestId[slotId];
// needed, otherwise it finds counter examples where
// `SlotState.Cancelled` and `RequestState.New`
requireInvariant cancelledSlotAlwaysHasCancelledRequest(e, slotId);
// needed, otherwise it finds counter example where
// `SlotState.Finished` and `RequestState.New`
requireInvariant finishedSlotAlwaysHasFinishedRequest(e, slotId);
ensureValidRequestId(requestId);
Marketplace.RequestState requestStateBefore = currentContract.requestState(e, requestId);
// we need to check for `freeSlot(slotId)` here to ensure it's being called with
// the slotId we're interested in and not any other slotId (that may not pass the
// required invariants)
if (f.selector == sig:freeSlot(Marketplace.SlotId).selector || f.selector == sig:freeSlot(Marketplace.SlotId, address, address).selector) {
freeSlot(e, slotId);
} else {
f(e, args);
}
Marketplace.RequestState requestStateAfter = currentContract.requestState(e, requestId);
// RequestState.New -> RequestState.Started
assert requestStateBefore != requestStateAfter && requestStateAfter == Marketplace.RequestState.Started => requestStateBefore == Marketplace.RequestState.New;
// RequestState.Started -> RequestState.Finished
assert requestStateBefore != requestStateAfter && requestStateAfter == Marketplace.RequestState.Finished => requestStateBefore == Marketplace.RequestState.Started;
// RequestState.Started -> RequestState.Failed
assert requestStateBefore != requestStateAfter && requestStateAfter == Marketplace.RequestState.Failed => requestStateBefore == Marketplace.RequestState.Started;
// RequestState.New -> RequestState.Cancelled
assert requestStateBefore != requestStateAfter && requestStateAfter == Marketplace.RequestState.Cancelled => requestStateBefore == Marketplace.RequestState.New;
}

40
certora/specs/shared.spec Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
ghost mapping(MarketplaceHarness.SlotId => MarketplaceHarness.RequestId) slotIdToRequestId;
hook Sload Marketplace.RequestId defaultValue _slots[KEY MarketplaceHarness.SlotId SlotId].requestId {
require slotIdToRequestId[SlotId] == defaultValue;
}
hook Sstore _slots[KEY MarketplaceHarness.SlotId SlotId].requestId Marketplace.RequestId defaultValue {
slotIdToRequestId[SlotId] = defaultValue;
}
function ensureValidRequestId(Marketplace.RequestId requestId) {
// Without this, the prover will find counter examples with `requestId == 0`,
// which are unlikely in practice as `requestId` is a hash from a request object.
// However, `requestId == 0` enforces `SlotState.Free` in the `fillSlot` function regardless,
// which ultimately results in counter examples where we have a state change
// RequestState.Finished -> RequestState.Started, which is forbidden.
//
// COUNTER EXAMPLE: https://prover.certora.com/output/6199/81939b2b12d74a5cae5e84ceadb901c0?anonymousKey=a4ad6268598a1077ecfce75493b0c0f9bc3b17a0
//
// The `require` below is a hack to ensure we exclude such cases as the code
// reverts in `requestIsKnown()` modifier (simply `require requestId != 0` isn't
// sufficient here)
// require requestId == to_bytes32(0) => currentContract._requests[requestId].client == 0;
require requestId != to_bytes32(0) && currentContract._requests[requestId].client != 0;
}
// STATUS - verified
// cancelled slot always belongs to cancelled request
// https://prover.certora.com/output/6199/80d5dc73d406436db166071e277283f1?anonymousKey=d5d175960dc40f72e22ba8e31c6904a488277e57
invariant cancelledSlotAlwaysHasCancelledRequest(env e, Marketplace.SlotId slotId)
currentContract.slotState(e, slotId) == Marketplace.SlotState.Cancelled =>
currentContract.requestState(e, slotIdToRequestId[slotId]) == Marketplace.RequestState.Cancelled;
// STATUS - verified
// finished slot always has finished request
// https://prover.certora.com/output/6199/3371ee4f80354ac9b05b1c84c53b6154?anonymousKey=eab83785acb61ccd31ed0c9d5a2e9e2b24099156
invariant finishedSlotAlwaysHasFinishedRequest(env e, Marketplace.SlotId slotId)
currentContract.slotState(e, slotId) == Marketplace.SlotState.Finished =>
currentContract.requestState(e, slotIdToRequestId[slotId]) == Marketplace.RequestState.Finished;

5
package.json
View File

@ -10,8 +10,9 @@
"format:check": "prettier --check contracts/**/*.sol test/**/*.js",
"lint": "solhint contracts/**.sol",
"deploy": "hardhat deploy",
"verify": "npm run verify:marketplace",
"verify:marketplace": "certoraRun certora/confs/Marketplace.conf"
"verify": "npm run verify:marketplace && npm run verify:state_changes",
"verify:marketplace": "certoraRun certora/confs/Marketplace.conf",
"verify:state_changes": "certoraRun certora/confs/StateChanges.conf"
},
"devDependencies": {
"@nomiclabs/hardhat-ethers": "^2.2.1",