consul/agent/acl.go

287 lines
7.9 KiB
Go

package agent
import (
"fmt"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/types"
"github.com/hashicorp/serf/serf"
)
// resolveToken is the primary interface used by ACL-checkers in the agent
// endpoints, which is the one place where we do some ACL enforcement on
// clients. Some of the enforcement is normative (e.g. self and monitor)
// and some is informative (e.g. catalog and health).
func (a *Agent) resolveToken(id string) (acl.Authorizer, error) {
// ACLs are disabled
if !a.delegate.ACLsEnabled() {
return nil, nil
}
// Disable ACLs if version 8 enforcement isn't enabled.
if !a.config.ACLEnforceVersion8 {
return nil, nil
}
if acl.RootAuthorizer(id) != nil {
return nil, acl.ErrRootDenied
}
if a.tokens.IsAgentMasterToken(id) {
return a.aclMasterAuthorizer, nil
}
return a.delegate.ResolveToken(id)
}
func (a *Agent) initializeACLs() error {
// Build a policy for the agent master token.
// The builtin agent master policy allows reading any node information
// and allows writes to the agent with the node name of the running agent
// only. This used to allow a prefix match on agent names but that seems
// entirely unnecessary so it is now using an exact match.
policy := &acl.Policy{
PolicyRules: acl.PolicyRules{
Agents: []*acl.AgentRule{
&acl.AgentRule{
Node: a.config.NodeName,
Policy: acl.PolicyWrite,
},
},
NodePrefixes: []*acl.NodeRule{
&acl.NodeRule{
Name: "",
Policy: acl.PolicyRead,
},
},
},
}
master, err := acl.NewPolicyAuthorizerWithDefaults(acl.DenyAll(), []*acl.Policy{policy}, nil)
if err != nil {
return err
}
a.aclMasterAuthorizer = master
return nil
}
// vetServiceRegister makes sure the service registration action is allowed by
// the given token.
func (a *Agent) vetServiceRegister(token string, service *structs.NodeService) error {
// Resolve the token and bail if ACLs aren't enabled.
rule, err := a.resolveToken(token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if rule == nil {
return nil
}
// Vet the service itself.
// TODO (namespaces) - pass through a real ent authz ctx
if rule.ServiceWrite(service.Service, nil) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Vet any service that might be getting overwritten.
services := a.State.Services()
if existing, ok := services[service.ID]; ok {
// TODO (namespaces) - pass through a real ent authz ctx
if rule.ServiceWrite(existing.Service, nil) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
// If the service is a proxy, ensure that it has write on the destination too
// since it can be discovered as an instance of that service.
if service.Kind == structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy {
// TODO (namespaces) - pass through a real ent authz ctx
if rule.ServiceWrite(service.Proxy.DestinationServiceName, nil) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
return nil
}
// vetServiceUpdate makes sure the service update action is allowed by the given
// token.
func (a *Agent) vetServiceUpdate(token string, serviceID string) error {
// Resolve the token and bail if ACLs aren't enabled.
rule, err := a.resolveToken(token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if rule == nil {
return nil
}
// Vet any changes based on the existing services's info.
services := a.State.Services()
if existing, ok := services[serviceID]; ok {
// TODO (namespaces) - pass through a real ent authz ctx
if rule.ServiceWrite(existing.Service, nil) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
} else {
return fmt.Errorf("Unknown service %q", serviceID)
}
return nil
}
// vetCheckRegister makes sure the check registration action is allowed by the
// given token.
func (a *Agent) vetCheckRegister(token string, check *structs.HealthCheck) error {
// Resolve the token and bail if ACLs aren't enabled.
rule, err := a.resolveToken(token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if rule == nil {
return nil
}
// Vet the check itself.
if len(check.ServiceName) > 0 {
// TODO (namespaces) - pass through a real ent authz ctx
if rule.ServiceWrite(check.ServiceName, nil) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
} else {
// TODO (namespaces) - pass through a real ent authz ctx
if rule.NodeWrite(a.config.NodeName, nil) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
// Vet any check that might be getting overwritten.
checks := a.State.Checks()
if existing, ok := checks[check.CheckID]; ok {
if len(existing.ServiceName) > 0 {
// TODO (namespaces) - pass through a real ent authz ctx
if rule.ServiceWrite(existing.ServiceName, nil) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
} else {
// TODO (namespaces) - pass through a real ent authz ctx
if rule.NodeWrite(a.config.NodeName, nil) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
}
return nil
}
// vetCheckUpdate makes sure that a check update is allowed by the given token.
func (a *Agent) vetCheckUpdate(token string, checkID types.CheckID) error {
// Resolve the token and bail if ACLs aren't enabled.
rule, err := a.resolveToken(token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if rule == nil {
return nil
}
// Vet any changes based on the existing check's info.
checks := a.State.Checks()
if existing, ok := checks[checkID]; ok {
if len(existing.ServiceName) > 0 {
// TODO (namespaces) - pass through a real ent authz ctx
if rule.ServiceWrite(existing.ServiceName, nil) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
} else {
// TODO (namespaces) - pass through a real ent authz ctx
if rule.NodeWrite(a.config.NodeName, nil) != acl.Allow {
return acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
}
} else {
return fmt.Errorf("Unknown check %q", checkID)
}
return nil
}
// filterMembers redacts members that the token doesn't have access to.
func (a *Agent) filterMembers(token string, members *[]serf.Member) error {
// Resolve the token and bail if ACLs aren't enabled.
rule, err := a.resolveToken(token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if rule == nil {
return nil
}
// Filter out members based on the node policy.
m := *members
for i := 0; i < len(m); i++ {
node := m[i].Name
// TODO (namespaces) - pass through a real ent authz ctx
if rule.NodeRead(node, nil) == acl.Allow {
continue
}
a.logger.Printf("[DEBUG] agent: dropping node %q from result due to ACLs", node)
m = append(m[:i], m[i+1:]...)
i--
}
*members = m
return nil
}
// filterServices redacts services that the token doesn't have access to.
func (a *Agent) filterServices(token string, services *map[string]*structs.NodeService) error {
// Resolve the token and bail if ACLs aren't enabled.
rule, err := a.resolveToken(token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if rule == nil {
return nil
}
// Filter out services based on the service policy.
for id, service := range *services {
// TODO (namespaces) - pass through a real ent authz ctx
if rule.ServiceRead(service.Service, nil) == acl.Allow {
continue
}
a.logger.Printf("[DEBUG] agent: dropping service %q from result due to ACLs", id)
delete(*services, id)
}
return nil
}
// filterChecks redacts checks that the token doesn't have access to.
func (a *Agent) filterChecks(token string, checks *map[types.CheckID]*structs.HealthCheck) error {
// Resolve the token and bail if ACLs aren't enabled.
rule, err := a.resolveToken(token)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if rule == nil {
return nil
}
// Filter out checks based on the node or service policy.
for id, check := range *checks {
if len(check.ServiceName) > 0 {
// TODO (namespaces) - pass through a real ent authz ctx
if rule.ServiceRead(check.ServiceName, nil) == acl.Allow {
continue
}
} else {
// TODO (namespaces) - pass through a real ent authz ctx
if rule.NodeRead(a.config.NodeName, nil) == acl.Allow {
continue
}
}
a.logger.Printf("[DEBUG] agent: dropping check %q from result due to ACLs", id)
delete(*checks, id)
}
return nil
}