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246 lines
10 KiB
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246 lines
10 KiB
Plaintext
---
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layout: docs
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page_title: Service-to-service permissions - Intentions
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sidebar_title: Service-to-service permissions - Intentions
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description: >-
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Intentions define access control for services via Connect and are used to
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control which services may establish connections or make requests.
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---
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# Intentions
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-> **1.9.0 and later:** This guide only applies in Consul versions 1.9.0 and
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later. The documentation for the legacy intentions system is
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[here](/docs/connect/intentions-legacy).
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Intentions define access control for services via Connect and are used to
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control which services may establish connections or make requests. Intentions
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can be managed via the API, CLI, or UI.
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Intentions are enforced on inbound connections or requests by the
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[proxy](/docs/connect/proxies) or within a [natively integrated
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application](/docs/connect/native).
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Depending upon the [protocol] in use by the destination service, you can define
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intentions to control Connect traffic authorization either at networking layer
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4 (e.g. TCP) and networking layer 7 (e.g. HTTP):
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* **Identity-based** - All intentions may enforce access based on identities
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encoded within [TLS
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certificates](/docs/connect/connect-internals#mutual-transport-layer-security-mtls).
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This allows for coarse all-or-nothing access control between pairs of
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services. These work with for services with any [protocol] as they only
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require awareness of the TLS handshake that wraps the opaque TCP connection.
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These can also be thought of as **L4 intentions**.
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* **Application-aware** - Some intentions may additionally enforce access based
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on [L7 request
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attributes](/docs/agent/config-entries/service-intentions#permissions) in
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addition to connection identity. These may only be defined for services with
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a [protocol] that is HTTP-based. These can also be thought of as **L7
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intentions**.
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At any given point in time, between any pair of services **only one intention
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controls authorization**. This may be either an L4 intention or an L7
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intention, but at any given point in time only one of those applies.
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The [intention match API](/api/connect/intentions#list-matching-intentions)
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should be periodically called to retrieve all relevant intentions for the
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target destination. After verifying the TLS client certificate, the cached
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intentions should be consulted for each incoming connection/request to
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determine if it should be accepted or rejected.
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The default intention behavior is defined by the default [ACL
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policy](/docs/agent/options#acl_default_policy). If the default ACL policy is
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"allow all", then all Connect connections are allowed by default. If the
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default ACL policy is "deny all", then all Connect connections or requests are
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denied by default.
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## Intention Basics
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Intentions are managed primarily via
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[`service-intentions`](/docs/agent/config-entries/service-intentions) config
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entries or the UI. Some simpler tasks can also be achieved with the older
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[API](/api-docs/connect/intentions) or [CLI](/commands/intention). Please see
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the respective documentation for each for full details on options, flags, etc.
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Below is an example of a basic
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[`service-intentions`](/docs/agent/config-entries/service-intentions) config
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entry representing two simple intentions. The full data model complete with
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more examples can be found in the
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[`service-intentions`](/docs/agent/config-entries/service-intentions) config
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entry documentation.
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```hcl
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Kind = "service-intentions"
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Name = "db"
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Sources = [
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{
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Name = "web"
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Action = "deny"
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},
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{
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Name = "api"
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Action = "allow"
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}
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]
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```
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This config entry defines two intentions with a common destination of "db". The
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first intention above is a deny intention with a source of "web". This says
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that connections from web to db are not allowed and the connection will be
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rejected. The second intention is an allow intention with a source of "api".
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This says that connections from api to db are allowed and connections will be
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accepted.
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### Wildcard Intentions
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An intention source or destination may also be the special wildcard
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value `*`. This matches _any_ value and is used as a catch-all.
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This example says that the "web" service cannot connect to _any_ service:
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```hcl
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Kind = "service-intentions"
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Name = "*"
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Sources = [
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{
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Name = "web"
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Action = "deny"
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}
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]
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```
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And this example says that _no_ service can connect to the "db" service:
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```hcl
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Kind = "service-intentions"
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Name = "db"
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Sources = [
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{
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Name = "*"
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Action = "deny"
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}
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]
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```
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### Enforcement
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For services that define their [protocol] as TCP, intentions mediate the
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ability to **establish new connections**. When an intention is modified,
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existing connections will not be affected. This means that changing a
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connection from "allow" to "deny" today _will not_ kill the connection.
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For services that define their protocol as HTTP-based, intentions mediate the
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ability to **issue new requests**.
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When an intention is modified, requests received after the modification will
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use the latest intention rules to enforce access. This means that though
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changing a connection from "allow" to "deny" today will not kill the
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connection, it will correctly block new requests from being processed.
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## Precedence and Match Order
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Intentions are matched in an implicit order based on specificity, preferring
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deny over allow. Specificity is determined by whether a value is an exact
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specified value or is the wildcard value `*`.
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The full precedence table is shown below and is evaluated
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top to bottom, with larger numbers being evaluated first.
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| Source Namespace | Source Name | Destination Namespace | Destination Name | Precedence |
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| ---------------- | ----------- | --------------------- | ---------------- | ---------- |
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| Exact | Exact | Exact | Exact | 9 |
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| Exact | `*` | Exact | Exact | 8 |
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| `*` | `*` | Exact | Exact | 7 |
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| Exact | Exact | Exact | `*` | 6 |
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| Exact | `*` | Exact | `*` | 5 |
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| `*` | `*` | Exact | `*` | 4 |
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| Exact | Exact | `*` | `*` | 3 |
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| Exact | `*` | `*` | `*` | 2 |
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| `*` | `*` | `*` | `*` | 1 |
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The precedence value can be read from a
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[field](/docs/agent/config-entries/service-intentions#precedence) on the
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`service-intentions` config entry after it is modified. Precedence cannot be
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manually overridden today.
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The numbers in the table above are not stable. Their ordering will remain
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fixed but the actual number values may change in the future.
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-> <EnterpriseAlert inline /> - Namespaces are an Enterprise feature. In Consul
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OSS the only allowable value for either namespace field is `"default"`. Other
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rows in this table are not applicable.
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## Intention Management Permissions
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Intention management can be protected by [ACLs](/docs/security/acl).
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Permissions for intentions are _destination-oriented_, meaning the ACLs
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for managing intentions are looked up based on the destination value
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of the intention, not the source.
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Intention permissions are by default implicitly granted at `read` level
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when granting `service:read` or `service:write`. This is because a
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service registered that wants to use Connect needs `intentions:read`
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for its own service name in order to know whether or not to authorize
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connections. The following ACL policy will implicitly grant `intentions:read`
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(note _read_) for service `web`.
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```hcl
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service "web" {
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policy = "write"
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}
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```
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It is possible to explicitly specify intention permissions. For example,
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the following policy will allow a service to be discovered without granting
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access to read intentions for it.
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```hcl
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service "web" {
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policy = "read"
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intentions = "deny"
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}
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```
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Note that `intentions:read` is required for a token that a Connect-enabled
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service uses to register itself or its proxy. If the token used does not
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have `intentions:read` then the agent will be unable to resolve intentions
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for the service and so will not be able to authorize any incoming connections.
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~> **Security Note:** Explicitly allowing `intentions:write` on the token you
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provide to a service instance at registration time opens up a significant
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additional vulnerability. Although you may trust the service _team_ to define
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which inbound connections they accept, using a combined token for registration
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allows a compromised instance to to redefine the intentions which allows many
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additional attack vectors and may be hard to detect. We strongly recommend only
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delegating `intentions:write` using tokens that are used by operations teams or
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orchestrators rather than spread via application config, or only manage
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intentions with management tokens.
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## Performance and Intention Updates
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The intentions for services registered with a Consul agent are cached
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locally on that agent. They are then updated via a background blocking query
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against the Consul servers.
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Supported [proxies] (such as [Envoy]) also cache this data within their own
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configuration so that inbound connections or requests require no Consul agent
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involvement during authorization. All actions in the data path of connections
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happen within the proxy.
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Updates to intentions are propagated nearly instantly to agents since agents
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maintain a continuous blocking query in the background for intention updates
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for registered services. Proxies similarly use blocking queries to update
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their local configurations quickly.
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Because all the intention data is cached locally, the agents or proxies can
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fail static. Even if the agents are severed completely from the Consul servers,
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or the proxies are severed completely from their local Consul agent, inbound
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connection authorization continues to work indefinitely. Changes to intentions
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will not be picked up until the partition heals, but will then automatically
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take effect when connectivity is restored.
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[protocol]: /docs/agent/config-entries/service-defaults#protocol
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[proxies]: /docs/connect/proxies
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[Envoy]: /docs/connect/proxies/envoy
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