consul/agent/event_endpoint.go
Freddy fdd10dd8b8
Expose HTTP-based paths through Connect proxy (#6446)
Fixes: #5396

This PR adds a proxy configuration stanza called expose. These flags register
listeners in Connect sidecar proxies to allow requests to specific HTTP paths from outside of the node. This allows services to protect themselves by only
listening on the loopback interface, while still accepting traffic from non
Connect-enabled services.

Under expose there is a boolean checks flag that would automatically expose all
registered HTTP and gRPC check paths.

This stanza also accepts a paths list to expose individual paths. The primary
use case for this functionality would be to expose paths for third parties like
Prometheus or the kubelet.

Listeners for requests to exposed paths are be configured dynamically at run
time. Any time a proxy, or check can be registered, a listener can also be
created.

In this initial implementation requests to these paths are not
authenticated/encrypted.
2019-09-25 20:55:52 -06:00

197 lines
4.7 KiB
Go

package agent
import (
"bytes"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
)
// EventFire is used to fire a new event
func (s *HTTPServer) EventFire(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Get the datacenter
var dc string
s.parseDC(req, &dc)
event := &UserEvent{}
event.Name = strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/event/fire/")
if event.Name == "" {
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing name")
return nil, nil
}
// Get the ACL token
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
// Get the filters
if filt := req.URL.Query().Get("node"); filt != "" {
event.NodeFilter = filt
}
if filt := req.URL.Query().Get("service"); filt != "" {
event.ServiceFilter = filt
}
if filt := req.URL.Query().Get("tag"); filt != "" {
event.TagFilter = filt
}
// Get the payload
if req.ContentLength > 0 {
var buf bytes.Buffer
if _, err := io.Copy(&buf, req.Body); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
event.Payload = buf.Bytes()
}
// Try to fire the event
if err := s.agent.UserEvent(dc, token, event); err != nil {
if acl.IsErrPermissionDenied(err) {
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusForbidden)
fmt.Fprint(resp, acl.ErrPermissionDenied.Error())
return nil, nil
}
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusInternalServerError)
return nil, err
}
// Return the event
return event, nil
}
// EventList is used to retrieve the recent list of events
func (s *HTTPServer) EventList(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Parse the query options, since we simulate a blocking query
var b structs.QueryOptions
if parseWait(resp, req, &b) {
return nil, nil
}
// Fetch the ACL token, if any.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
acl, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Look for a name filter
var nameFilter string
if filt := req.URL.Query().Get("name"); filt != "" {
nameFilter = filt
}
// Lots of this logic is borrowed from consul/rpc.go:blockingQuery
// However we cannot use that directly since this code has some
// slight semantics differences...
var timeout <-chan time.Time
var notifyCh chan struct{}
// Fast path non-blocking
if b.MinQueryIndex == 0 {
goto RUN_QUERY
}
// Restrict the max query time
if b.MaxQueryTime > maxQueryTime {
b.MaxQueryTime = maxQueryTime
}
// Ensure a time limit is set if we have an index
if b.MinQueryIndex > 0 && b.MaxQueryTime == 0 {
b.MaxQueryTime = maxQueryTime
}
// Setup a query timeout
if b.MaxQueryTime > 0 {
timeout = time.After(b.MaxQueryTime)
}
// Setup a notification channel for changes
SETUP_NOTIFY:
if b.MinQueryIndex > 0 {
notifyCh = make(chan struct{}, 1)
s.agent.eventNotify.Wait(notifyCh)
defer s.agent.eventNotify.Clear(notifyCh)
}
RUN_QUERY:
// Get the recent events
events := s.agent.UserEvents()
// Filter the events using the ACL, if present
if acl != nil {
for i := 0; i < len(events); i++ {
name := events[i].Name
if acl.EventRead(name) {
continue
}
s.agent.logger.Printf("[DEBUG] agent: dropping event %q from result due to ACLs", name)
events = append(events[:i], events[i+1:]...)
i--
}
}
// Filter the events if requested
if nameFilter != "" {
for i := 0; i < len(events); i++ {
if events[i].Name != nameFilter {
events = append(events[:i], events[i+1:]...)
i--
}
}
}
// Determine the index
var index uint64
if len(events) == 0 {
// Return a non-zero index to prevent a hot query loop. This
// can be caused by a watch for example when there is no matching
// events.
index = 1
} else {
last := events[len(events)-1]
index = uuidToUint64(last.ID)
}
setIndex(resp, index)
// Check for exact match on the query value. Because
// the index value is not monotonic, we just ensure it is
// not an exact match.
if index > 0 && index == b.MinQueryIndex {
select {
case <-notifyCh:
goto SETUP_NOTIFY
case <-timeout:
}
}
return events, nil
}
// uuidToUint64 is a bit of a hack to generate a 64bit Consul index.
// In effect, we take our random UUID, convert it to a 128 bit number,
// then XOR the high-order and low-order 64bit's together to get the
// output. This lets us generate an index which can be used to simulate
// the blocking behavior of other catalog endpoints.
func uuidToUint64(uuid string) uint64 {
lower := uuid[0:8] + uuid[9:13] + uuid[14:18]
upper := uuid[19:23] + uuid[24:36]
lowVal, err := strconv.ParseUint(lower, 16, 64)
if err != nil {
panic("Failed to convert " + lower)
}
highVal, err := strconv.ParseUint(upper, 16, 64)
if err != nil {
panic("Failed to convert " + upper)
}
return lowVal ^ highVal
}