mirror of https://github.com/status-im/consul.git
54 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
54 lines
2.6 KiB
Markdown
---
|
|
layout: "docs"
|
|
page_title: "Security Model"
|
|
sidebar_current: "docs-internals-security"
|
|
description: |-
|
|
Consul relies on both a lightweight gossip mechanism and an RPC system to provide various features. Both of the systems have different security mechanisms that stem from their designs. However, the goals of Consuls security are to provide confidentiality, integrity and authentication.
|
|
---
|
|
|
|
# Security Model
|
|
|
|
Consul relies on both a lightweight gossip mechanism and an RPC system
|
|
to provide various features. Both of the systems have different security
|
|
mechanisms that stem from their designs. However, the overall goal
|
|
of Consul's security model is to provide [confidentiality, integrity and authentication](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_security).
|
|
|
|
The [gossip protocol](/docs/internals/gossip.html) is powered by [Serf](http://www.serfdom.io/),
|
|
which uses a symmetric key, or shared secret, cryptosystem. There are more
|
|
details on the security of [Serf here](http://www.serfdom.io/docs/internals/security.html).
|
|
|
|
The RPC system supports using end-to-end TLS, with optional client authentication.
|
|
[TLS](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security) is a widely deployed asymmetric
|
|
cryptosystem, and is the foundation of security on the Web, as well as
|
|
some other critical parts of the Internet.
|
|
|
|
This means Consul communication is protected against eavesdropping, tampering,
|
|
and spoofing. This makes it possible to run Consul over untrusted networks such
|
|
as EC2 and other shared hosting providers.
|
|
|
|
~> **Advanced Topic!** This page covers the technical details of
|
|
the security model of Consul. You don't need to know these details to
|
|
operate and use Consul. These details are documented here for those who wish
|
|
to learn about them without having to go spelunking through the source code.
|
|
|
|
## Threat Model
|
|
|
|
The following are the various parts of our threat model:
|
|
|
|
* Non-members getting access to data
|
|
* Cluster state manipulation due to malicious messages
|
|
* Fake data generation due to malicious messages
|
|
* Tampering causing state corruption
|
|
* Denial of Service against a node
|
|
|
|
Additionally, we recognize that an attacker that can observe network
|
|
traffic for an extended period of time may infer the cluster members.
|
|
The gossip mechanism used by Consul relies on sending messages to random
|
|
members, so an attacker can record all destinations and determine all
|
|
members of the cluster.
|
|
|
|
When designing security into a system you design it to fit the threat model.
|
|
Our goal is not to protect top secret data but to provide a "reasonable"
|
|
level of security that would require an attacker to commit a considerable
|
|
amount of resources to defeat.
|