A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with `operator:read` ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the `/v1/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh.
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This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the `/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint. They are now `operator:write`.
The Catalog, Config Entry, KV and Session resources potentially re-validate the input as its coming in. We need to prevent snapshot restoration failures due to missing namespaces or namespaces that are being deleted in enterprise.
Previously config entries sharing a kind & name but in different
namespaces could occasionally cause "stuck states" in replication
because the namespace fields were ignored during the differential
comparison phase.
Example:
Two config entries written to the primary:
kind=A,name=web,namespace=bar
kind=A,name=web,namespace=foo
Under the covers these both get saved to memdb, so they are sorted by
all 3 components (kind,name,namespace) during natural iteration. This
means that before the replication code does it's own incomplete sort,
the underlying data IS sorted by namespace ascending (bar comes before
foo).
After one pass of replication the primary and secondary datacenters have
the same set of config entries present. If
"kind=A,name=web,namespace=bar" were to be deleted, then things get
weird. Before replication the two sides look like:
primary: [
kind=A,name=web,namespace=foo
]
secondary: [
kind=A,name=web,namespace=bar
kind=A,name=web,namespace=foo
]
The differential comparison phase walks these two lists in sorted order
and first compares "kind=A,name=web,namespace=foo" vs
"kind=A,name=web,namespace=bar" and falsely determines they are the SAME
and are thus cause an update of "kind=A,name=web,namespace=foo". Then it
compares "<nothing>" with "kind=A,name=web,namespace=foo" and falsely
determines that the latter should be DELETED.
During reconciliation the deletes are processed before updates, and so
for a brief moment in the secondary "kind=A,name=web,namespace=foo" is
erroneously deleted and then immediately restored.
Unfortunately after this replication phase the final state is identical
to the initial state, so when it loops around again (rate limited) it
repeats the same set of operations indefinitely.
* fix lessThanHalfTime
* get lock for CAProvider()
* make a var to relate both vars
* rename to getCAProviderWithLock
* move CertificateTimeDriftBuffer to agent/connect/ca
secondaryIntermediateCertRenewalWatch was using `retryLoopBackoff` to
renew the intermediate certificate. Once it entered the inner loop and
started `retryLoopBackoff` it would never leave that.
`retryLoopBackoffAbortOnSuccess` will return when renewing is
successful, like it was intended originally.
Whenever an upsert/deletion of a config entry happens, within the open
state store transaction we speculatively test compile all discovery
chains that may be affected by the pending modification to verify that
the write would not create an erroneous scenario (such as splitting
traffic to a subset that did not exist).
If a single discovery chain evaluation references two config entries
with the same kind and name in different namespaces then sometimes the
upsert/deletion would be falsely rejected. It does not appear as though
this bug would've let invalid writes through to the state store so the
correction does not require a cleanup phase.
Freddy
Matt Keeler
Daniel Nephin
Kyle Havlovitz
hashicorp-ci
R.B. Boyer
Hans Hasselberg
Alexander Mykolaichuk
Mike Morris
Jack