* Add templating to inject JSON into an application/json script tag
Plus an external script in order to pick it out and inject the values we
need injecting into ember's environment meta tag.
The UI still uses env style naming (CONSUL_*) but we uses the new style
JSON/golang props behind the scenes.
Co-authored-by: Paul Banks <banks@banksco.de>
These expectations are optional because in a slow CI environment the deadline to cancell the context might occur before the go routine reaches issuing the RPC. Either way we are successfully ensuring context cancellation is working.
* Fix bug in usage metrics that caused a negative count to occur
There were a couple of instances were usage metrics would do the wrong
thing and result in incorrect counts, causing the count to attempt to
decrement below zero and return an error. The usage metrics did not
account for various places where a single transaction could
delete/update/add multiple service instances at once.
We also remove the error when attempting to decrement below zero, and
instead just make sure we do not accidentally underflow the unsigned
integer. This is a more graceful failure than returning an error and not
allowing a transaction to commit.
* Add changelog
* Display a warning when rpc.enable_streaming = true is set on a client
This option has no effect when running as an agent
* Added warning when server starts with use_streaming_backend but without rpc.enable_streaming
* Added unit test
This can happen when one other node in the cluster such as a client is unable to communicate with the leader server and sees it as failed. When that happens its failing status eventually gets propagated to the other servers in the cluster and eventually this can result in RPCs returning “No cluster leader” error.
That error is misleading and unhelpful for determing the root cause of the issue as its not raft stability but rather and client -> server networking issue. Therefore this commit will add a new error that will be returned in that case to differentiate between the two cases.
In some circumstances this endpoint will have no results in it (dues to
ACLs, Namespaces or filtering).
This ensures that the response is at least an empty array (`[]`) rather
than `null`
Previously the tokens would fail to insert into the secondary's state
store because the AuthMethod field of the ACLToken did not point to a
known auth method from the primary.
* create consul version metric with version label
* agent/agent.go: add pre-release Version as well as label
Co-Authored-By: Radha13 <kumari.radha3@gmail.com>
* verion and pre-release version labels.
* hyphen/- breaks prometheus
* Add Prometheus gauge defintion for version metric
* Add new metric to telemetry docs
Co-authored-by: Radha Kumari <kumari.radha3@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Aestek <thib.gilles@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Nephin <dnephin@hashicorp.com>
* server: fix panic when deleting a non existent intention
* add changelog
* Always return an error when deleting non-existent ixn
Co-authored-by: freddygv <gh@freddygv.xyz>
* server: fix panic when deleting a non existent intention
* add changelog
* Always return an error when deleting non-existent ixn
Co-authored-by: freddygv <gh@freddygv.xyz>
A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with `operator:read` ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the `/v1/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh.
--
This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the `/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint. They are now `operator:write`.
A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with `operator:read` ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the `/v1/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh.
--
This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the `/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint. They are now `operator:write`.
A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with `operator:read` ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the `/v1/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh.
--
This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the `/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint. They are now `operator:write`.
Previously the listener was being passed to a closure in a loop without
capturing the loop variable. The result is only the last listener is
used, so the http/https servers only listen on one address.
This problem is fixed by capturing the variable by passing it into a
function.
Matt Keeler
Hans Hasselberg
R.B. Boyer
hashicorp-ci
John Cowen
Freddy
Daniel Nephin
Chris Piraino
Pierre Souchay
Kenia
Kyle Havlovitz
Mike Morris
Kit Patella