A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with `operator:read` ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the `/v1/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh.
--
This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the `/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint. They are now `operator:write`.
A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with `operator:read` ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the `/v1/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh.
--
This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the `/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint. They are now `operator:write`.
A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with `operator:read` ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the `/v1/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh.
--
This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the `/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint. They are now `operator:write`.
* ui: Ensure search is enabled for child items in the ACLs area
* Refactor comparators to reuse some utility functions
* Add search and sorting to the ACLs child selector
* Add tests for searching within child selectors
* Allow sorting by CreateIndex
* ui: Ensure search is enabled for child items in the ACLs area
* Refactor comparators to reuse some utility functions
* Add search and sorting to the ACLs child selector
* Add tests for searching within child selectors
* Allow sorting by CreateIndex
* ui: Fixup service instance healthcheck list not to show ghost check
If the proxy is undefined, then an undefined vaule is appended to the
list of checks
* There are only 6 checks in the mocks so only expect 6
* ui: Fixup service instance healthcheck list not to show ghost check
If the proxy is undefined, then an undefined vaule is appended to the
list of checks
* There are only 6 checks in the mocks so only expect 6
Previously the listener was being passed to a closure in a loop without
capturing the loop variable. The result is only the last listener is
used, so the http/https servers only listen on one address.
This problem is fixed by capturing the variable by passing it into a
function.
Freddy
Sabeen Syed
Kit Patella
Kenia
R.B. Boyer
John Cowen
Mike Morris
Daniel Nephin
hashicorp-ci
Matt Keeler