* Add InboundPeerTrustBundle maps to Terminating Gateway
* Add notify and cancelation of watch for inbound peer trust bundles
* Pass peer trust bundles to the RBAC creation function
* Regenerate Golden Files
* add changelog, also adds another spot that needed peeredTrustBundles
* Add basic test for terminating gateway with peer trust bundle
* Add intention to cluster peered golden test
* rerun codegen
* update changelog
* really update the changelog
---------
Co-authored-by: Melisa Griffin <melisa.griffin@hashicorp.com>
Fix issues with empty sources
* Validate that each permission on traffic permissions resources has at least one source.
* Don't construct RBAC policies when there aren't any principals. This resulted in Envoy rejecting xDS updates with a validation error.
```
error=
| rpc error: code = Internal desc = Error adding/updating listener(s) public_listener: Proto constraint validation failed (RBACValidationError.Rules: embedded message failed validation | caused by RBACValidationError.Policies[consul-intentions-layer4-1]: embedded message failed validation | caused by PolicyValidationError.Principals: value must contain at least 1 item(s)): rules {
```
Configure Envoy to use the same HTTP protocol version used by the
downstream caller when forwarding requests to a local application that
is configured with the protocol set to either `http2` or `grpc`.
This allows upstream applications that support both HTTP/1.1 and
HTTP/2 on a single port to receive requests using either protocol. This
is beneficial when the application primarily communicates using HTTP/2,
but also needs to support HTTP/1.1, such as to respond to Kubernetes
HTTP readiness/liveness probes.
Co-authored-by: Derek Menteer <derek.menteer@hashicorp.com>
* Fixes issues in setting status
* Update golden files for changes to xds generation to not use deprecated
methods
* Fixed default for validation of JWT for route
### Description
<!-- Please describe why you're making this change, in plain English.
-->
- Currently the jwt-auth filter doesn't take into account the service
identity when validating jwt-auth, it only takes into account the path
and jwt provider during validation. This causes issues when multiple
source intentions restrict access to an endpoint with different JWT
providers.
- To fix these issues, rather than use the JWT auth filter for
validation, we use it in metadata mode and allow it to forward the
successful validated JWT token payload to the RBAC filter which will
make the decisions.
This PR ensures requests with and without JWT tokens successfully go
through the jwt-authn filter. The filter however only forwards the data
for successful/valid tokens. On the RBAC filter level, we check the
payload for claims and token issuer + existing rbac rules.
### Testing & Reproduction steps
<!--
* In the case of bugs, describe how to replicate
* If any manual tests were done, document the steps and the conditions
to replicate
* Call out any important/ relevant unit tests, e2e tests or integration
tests you have added or are adding
-->
- This test covers a multi level jwt requirements (requirements at top
level and permissions level). It also assumes you have envoy running,
you have a redis and a sidecar proxy service registered, and have a way
to generate jwks with jwt. I mostly use:
https://www.scottbrady91.com/tools/jwt for this.
- first write your proxy defaults
```
Kind = "proxy-defaults"
name = "global"
config {
protocol = "http"
}
```
- Create two providers
```
Kind = "jwt-provider"
Name = "auth0"
Issuer = "https://ronald.local"
JSONWebKeySet = {
Local = {
JWKS = "eyJrZXlzIjog....."
}
}
```
```
Kind = "jwt-provider"
Name = "okta"
Issuer = "https://ronald.local"
JSONWebKeySet = {
Local = {
JWKS = "eyJrZXlzIjogW3...."
}
}
```
- add a service intention
```
Kind = "service-intentions"
Name = "redis"
JWT = {
Providers = [
{
Name = "okta"
},
]
}
Sources = [
{
Name = "*"
Permissions = [{
Action = "allow"
HTTP = {
PathPrefix = "/workspace"
}
JWT = {
Providers = [
{
Name = "okta"
VerifyClaims = [
{
Path = ["aud"]
Value = "my_client_app"
},
{
Path = ["sub"]
Value = "5be86359073c434bad2da3932222dabe"
}
]
},
]
}
},
{
Action = "allow"
HTTP = {
PathPrefix = "/"
}
JWT = {
Providers = [
{
Name = "auth0"
},
]
}
}]
}
]
```
- generate 3 jwt tokens: 1 from auth0 jwks, 1 from okta jwks with
different claims than `/workspace` expects and 1 with correct claims
- connect to your envoy (change service and address as needed) to view
logs and potential errors. You can add: `-- --log-level debug` to see
what data is being forwarded
```
consul connect envoy -sidecar-for redis1 -grpc-addr 127.0.0.1:8502
```
- Make the following requests:
```
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $Auth0_TOKEN" --insecure --cert leaf.cert --key leaf.key --cacert connect-ca.pem https://localhost:20000/workspace -v
RBAC filter denied
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $Okta_TOKEN_with_wrong_claims" --insecure --cert leaf.cert --key leaf.key --cacert connect-ca.pem https://localhost:20000/workspace -v
RBAC filter denied
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $Okta_TOKEN_with_correct_claims" --insecure --cert leaf.cert --key leaf.key --cacert connect-ca.pem https://localhost:20000/workspace -v
Successful request
```
### TODO
* [x] Update test coverage
* [ ] update integration tests (follow-up PR)
* [x] appropriate backport labels added
* Add header filter to api-gateway xDS golden test
* Stop adding all header filters to virtual host when generating xDS for api-gateway
* Regenerate xDS golden file for api-gateway w/ header filter
When UpstreamEnvoyExtender was introduced, some code was left duplicated
between it and BasicEnvoyExtender. One path in that code panics when a
TProxy listener patch is attempted due to no upstream data in
RuntimeConfig matching the local service (which would only happen in
rare cases).
Instead, we can remove the special handling of upstream VIPs from
BasicEnvoyExtender entirely, greatly simplifying the listener filter
patch code and avoiding the panic. UpstreamEnvoyExtender, which needs
this code to function, is modified to ensure a panic does not occur.
This also fixes a second regression in which the Lua extension was not
applied to TProxy outbound listeners.
* add upstream service targeting to property override extension
* Also add baseline goldens for service specific property override extension.
* Refactor the extension framework to put more logic into the templates.
* fix up the golden tests
* Support Listener in Property Override
Add support for patching `Listener` resources via the builtin
`property-override` extension.
Refactor existing listener patch code in `BasicEnvoyExtender` to
simplify addition of resource support.
* Support ClusterLoadAssignment in Property Override
Add support for patching `ClusterLoadAssignment` resources via the
builtin `property-override` extension.
`property-override` is an extension that allows for arbitrarily
patching Envoy resources based on resource matching filters. Patch
operations resemble a subset of the JSON Patch spec with minor
differences to facilitate patching pre-defined (protobuf) schemas.
See Envoy Extension product documentation for more details.
Co-authored-by: Eric Haberkorn <eric.haberkorn@hashicorp.com>
Co-authored-by: Kyle Havlovitz <kyle@hashicorp.com>
To avoid unintended tampering with remote downstreams via service
config, refactor BasicEnvoyExtender and RuntimeConfig to disallow
typical Envoy extensions from being applied to non-local proxies.
Continue to allow this behavior for AWS Lambda and the read-only
Validate builtin extensions.
Addresses CVE-2023-2816.
UNIX domain socket paths are limited to 104-108 characters, depending on
the OS. This limit was quite easy to exceed when testing the feature on
Kubernetes, due to how proxy IDs encode the Pod ID eg:
metrics-collector-59467bcb9b-fkkzl-hcp-metrics-collector-sidecar-proxy
To ensure we stay under that character limit this commit makes a
couple changes:
- Use a b64 encoded SHA1 hash of the namespace + proxy ID to create a
short and deterministic socket file name.
- Add validation to proxy registrations and proxy-defaults to enforce a
limit on the socket directory length.
* Add MaxEjectionPercent to config entry
* Add BaseEjectionTime to config entry
* Add MaxEjectionPercent and BaseEjectionTime to protobufs
* Add MaxEjectionPercent and BaseEjectionTime to api
* Fix integration test breakage
* Verify MaxEjectionPercent and BaseEjectionTime in integration test upstream confings
* Website docs for MaxEjectionPercent and BaseEjection time
* Add `make docs` to browse docs at http://localhost:3000
* Changelog entry
* so that is the difference between consul-docker and dev-docker
* blah
* update proto funcs
* update proto
---------
Co-authored-by: Maliz <maliheh.monshizadeh@hashicorp.com>
This implements permissive mTLS , which allows toggling services into "permissive" mTLS mode.
Permissive mTLS mode allows incoming "non Consul-mTLS" traffic to be forward unmodified to the application.
* Update service-defaults and proxy-defaults config entries with a MutualTLSMode field
* Update the mesh config entry with an AllowEnablingPermissiveMutualTLS field and implement the necessary validation. AllowEnablingPermissiveMutualTLS must be true to allow changing to MutualTLSMode=permissive, but this does not require that all proxy-defaults and service-defaults are currently in strict mode.
* Update xDS listener config to add a "permissive filter chain" when MutualTLSMode=permissive for a particular service. The permissive filter chain matches incoming traffic by the destination port. If the destination port matches the service port from the catalog, then no mTLS is required and the traffic sent is forwarded unmodified to the application.
This commit swaps the partition field to the local partition for
discovery chains targeting peers. Prior to this change, peer upstreams
would always use a value of default regardless of which partition they
exist in. This caused several issues in xds / proxycfg because of id
mismatches.
Some prior fixes were made to deal with one-off id mismatches that this
PR also cleans up, since they are no longer needed.