* reorganize for clarity and update for value syntax
* fix quotes around value
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Blake Covarrubias <blake@covarrubi.as>
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-authored-by: Freddy <freddygv@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Blake Covarrubias <blake@covarrubi.as>
Co-authored-by: Freddy <freddygv@users.noreply.github.com>
* create consul version metric with version label
* agent/agent.go: add pre-release Version as well as label
Co-Authored-By: Radha13 <kumari.radha3@gmail.com>
* verion and pre-release version labels.
* hyphen/- breaks prometheus
* Add Prometheus gauge defintion for version metric
* Add new metric to telemetry docs
Co-authored-by: Radha Kumari <kumari.radha3@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Aestek <thib.gilles@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel Nephin <dnephin@hashicorp.com>
- Fix anchors for client.extraEnvironmentVars and
server.extraEnvironmentVars.
- Change extraEnvironmentVars data type to `map`.
- Fix external link to kubernetes.io under
connectInject.namespaceSelector.
A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with `operator:read` ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the `/v1/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh.
--
This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the `/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint. They are now `operator:write`.
A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with `operator:read` ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the `/v1/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh.
--
This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the `/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint. They are now `operator:write`.
A vulnerability was identified in Consul and Consul Enterprise (“Consul”) such that operators with `operator:read` ACL permissions are able to read the Consul Connect CA configuration when explicitly configured with the `/v1/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint, including the private key. This allows the user to effectively privilege escalate by enabling the ability to mint certificates for any Consul Connect services. This would potentially allow them to masquerade (receive/send traffic) as any service in the mesh.
--
This PR increases the permissions required to read the Connect CA's private key when it was configured via the `/connect/ca/configuration` endpoint. They are now `operator:write`.
Header is: X-Consul-Default-ACL-Policy=<allow|deny>
This is of particular utility when fetching matching intentions, as the
fallthrough for a request that doesn't match any intentions is to
enforce using the default acl policy.
kaitlincarter-hc
Noel Quiles
Kenia
Sabeen Syed
Blake Covarrubias
Max G
Rob Taylor
Hans Hasselberg
David Yu
Mike Morris
hashicorp-ci
Kit Patella
Daniel Nephin
Freddy
R.B. Boyer
Matt Keeler
Luke Kysow
Iryna Shustava
Kyle Schochenmaier
Nitya Dhanushkodi
Paul Banks