Currently when using the built-in CA provider for Connect, root certificates are valid for 10 years, however secondary DCs get intermediates that are valid for only 1 year. There is no mechanism currently short of rotating the root in the primary that will cause the secondary DCs to renew their intermediates.
This PR adds a check that renews the cert if it is half way through its validity period.
In order to be able to test these changes, a new configuration option was added: IntermediateCertTTL which is set extremely low in the tests.
* Allow RSA CA certs for consul and vault providers to correctly sign EC leaf certs.
* Ensure key type ad bits are populated from CA cert and clean up tests
* Add integration test and fix error when initializing secondary CA with RSA key.
* Add more tests, fix review feedback
* Update docs with key type config and output
* Apply suggestions from code review
Co-Authored-By: R.B. Boyer <rb@hashicorp.com>
The fields in the certs are meant to hold the original binary
representation of this data, not some ascii-encoded version.
The only time we should be colon-hex-encoding fields is for display
purposes or marshaling through non-TLS mediums (like RPC).
* Add State storage and LastResult argument into Cache so that cache.Types can safely store additional data that is eventually expired.
* New Leaf cache type working and basic tests passing. TODO: more extensive testing for the Root change jitter across blocking requests, test concurrent fetches for different leaves interact nicely with rootsWatcher.
* Add multi-client and delayed rotation tests.
* Typos and cleanup error handling in roots watch
* Add comment about how the FetchResult can be used and change ca leaf state to use a non-pointer state.
* Plumb test override of root CA jitter through TestAgent so that tests are deterministic again!
* Fix failing config test
These were only added as SPIFFE intends to use the in the future but currently does not mandate their usage due to patch support in common TLS implementations and some ambiguity over how to use them with URI SAN certificates. We included them because until now everything seem fine with it, however we've found the latest version of `openssl` (1.1.0h) fails to validate our certificats if its enabled. LibreSSL as installed on OS X by default doesn’t have these issues. For now it's most compatible not to have them and later we can find ways to add constraints with wider compatibility testing.
There are also a lot of small bug fixes found when testing lots of things end-to-end for the first time and some cleanup now it's integrated with real CA code.
Hans Hasselberg
Matt Keeler
Todd Radel
Paul Banks
R.B. Boyer
Alvin Huang
tradel
R.B. Boyer
Paul Banks
Kyle Havlovitz
Matt Keeler
Mitchell Hashimoto