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Fix sublist format for client agent threats

This commit is contained in:
Kent 'picat' Gruber 2020-11-05 16:41:15 -05:00
parent 05b34a3cf0
commit c7c151f789
1 changed files with 33 additions and 14 deletions
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47
website/pages/docs/security/security-models/core.mdx
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@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ environment, but the general mechanisms for a secure Consul deployment revolve a
[authentication methods](/docs/security/acl/auth-methods) can be used to enable trusted external parties to authorize
ACL token creation.
- **Namespaces (Enterprise Only)** - Read and write operations can be scoped to a logical name to restrict access to
Consul components within a multi-tenant environment.
- **Namespaces (Enterprise Only)** - Read and write operations can be scoped to a logical namespace to restrict access
to Consul components within a multi-tenant environment.
- **Sentinel Policies (Enterprise Only)** - Sentinel policies enable policy-as-code for granular control over the
built-in key-value store.
@ -177,9 +177,9 @@ environment and adapt these configurations accordingly.
- [`encrypt_verify_outgoing`](/docs/agent/options#encrypt_verify_outgoing) - By default this is true to enforce
encryption on *outgoing* gossip communications.
- **Namespaces (Enterprise Only)** - Read and write operations should be scoped to logical names to restrict access to
Consul components within a multi-tenant environment. Furthermore, this feature can be used to enable a self-service
approach to Consul ACL administration for teams within a scoped namespace.
- **Namespaces (Enterprise Only)** - Read and write operations should be scoped to logical namespaces to restrict access
to Consul components within a multi-tenant environment. Furthermore, this feature can be used to enable a self-service
approach to Consul ACL administration for teams within a scoped namespace.
- **Sentinel Policies (Enterprise Only)** - Sentinel policies allow for granular control over the builtin
key-value store.
@ -330,17 +330,36 @@ The following are not part of the threat model for server agents:
Connect TLS certificates should be considered compromised; they are never persisted by server agents but do exist
in-memory during at least the duration of a Sign request.
The following are not part of the threat model for client agents:
The following are not part of the threat model for client agents:
Access (read or write) to the Consul data directory - Consul clients will use the data directory to cache local state. This includes local services, associated ACL tokens, Connect TLS certificates, and more. Read or write access to this directory will allow an attacker to access this data. This data is typically a smaller subset of the full data of the cluster.
- **Access (read or write) to the Consul data directory** - Consul clients will use the data directory to cache local
state. This includes local services, associated ACL tokens, Connect TLS certificates, and more. Read or write access
to this directory will allow an attacker to access this data. This data is typically a smaller subset of the full data
of the cluster.
Access (read or write) to the Consul configuration directory - Consul client configuration files contain the address and port information of services, default ACL tokens for the agent, and more. Access to Consul configuration could enable an attacker to change the port of a service to a malicious port, register new services, and more. Further, some service definitions have ACL tokens attached that could be used cluster-wide to impersonate that service. An attacker cannot change cluster-wide configurations such as disabling the ACL system.
Memory access to a running Consul client agent - The blast radius of this is much smaller than a server agent but the confidentiality of a subset of data can still be compromised. Particularly, any data requested against the agent's API including services, KV, and Connect information may be compromised. If a particular set of data on the server was never requested by the agent, it never enters the agent's memory since replication only exists between servers. An attacker could also potentially extract ACL tokens used for service registration on this agent, since the tokens must be stored in-memory alongside the registered service.
Network access to a local Connect proxy or service - Communications between a service and a Connect-aware proxy are generally unencrypted and must happen over a trusted network. This is typically a loopback device. This requires that other processes on the same machine are trusted, or more complex isolation mechanisms are used such as network namespaces. This also requires that external processes cannot communicate to the Connect service or proxy (except on the inbound port). Therefore, non-native Connect applications should only bind to non-public addresses.
Improperly Implemented Connect proxy or service - A Connect proxy or natively integrated service must correctly serve a valid leaf certificate, verify the inbound TLS client certificate, and call the Consul agent-local authorized endpoint. If any of this isn't performed correctly, the proxy or service may allow unauthenticated or unauthorized connections.
- **Access (read or write) to the Consul configuration directory** - Consul client configuration files contain the
address and port information of services, default ACL tokens for the agent, and more. Access to Consul configuration
could enable an attacker to change the port of a service to a malicious port, register new services, and more.
Further, some service definitions have ACL tokens attached that could be used cluster-wide to impersonate that
service. An attacker cannot change cluster-wide configurations such as disabling the ACL system.
- **Memory access to a running Consul client agent** - The blast radius of this is much smaller than a server agent but
the confidentiality of a subset of data can still be compromised. Particularly, any data requested against the agent's
API including services, KV, and Connect information may be compromised. If a particular set of data on the server was
never requested by the agent, it never enters the agent's memory since replication only exists between servers. An
attacker could also potentially extract ACL tokens used for service registration on this agent, since the tokens must
be stored in-memory alongside the registered service.
- **Network access to a local Connect proxy or service** - Communications between a service and a Connect-aware proxy
are generally unencrypted and must happen over a trusted network. This is typically a loopback device. This requires
that other processes on the same machine are trusted, or more complex isolation mechanisms are used such as network
namespaces. This also requires that external processes cannot communicate to the Connect service or proxy (except on
the inbound port). Therefore, non-native Connect applications should only bind to non-public addresses.
- **Improperly Implemented Connect proxy or service** - A Connect proxy or natively integrated service must correctly
serve a valid leaf certificate, verify the inbound TLS client certificate, and call the Consul agent-local authorized
endpoint. If any of this isn't performed correctly, the proxy or service may allow unauthenticated or unauthorized
connections.
#### Internal Threats