mirror of https://github.com/status-im/consul.git
Fix some doc typos.
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@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ Connect relies on to ensure it's security properties.
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A service's identity, in the form of an x.509 certificate, will only be issued
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A service's identity, in the form of an x.509 certificate, will only be issued
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to an API client that has `service:write` permission for that service. In other
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to an API client that has `service:write` permission for that service. In other
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words, any client that has permission to _register_ an instance of a service
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words, any client that has permission to _register_ an instance of a service
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will be able to identify as that service and access all of resources that that
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will be able to identify as that service and access all of the resources that that
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service is allowed to access.
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service is allowed to access.
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A secure ACL setup must meet these criteria:
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A secure ACL setup must meet these criteria:
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@ -77,13 +77,13 @@ sufficient for ACL tokens to only be unique per _service_ and shared between
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instances.
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instances.
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It is much better though if ACL tokens are unique per service _instance_ because
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It is much better though if ACL tokens are unique per service _instance_ because
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it limit the blast radius of a compromise.
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it limits the blast radius of a compromise.
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A future release of Connect will support revoking specific certificates that
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A future release of Connect will support revoking specific certificates that
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have been issued. For example if a single node in a datacenter has been
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have been issued. For example if a single node in a datacenter has been
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compromised, it will be possible to find all certificates issued to the agent on
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compromised, it will be possible to find all certificates issued to the agent on
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that node and revoke them. This will block all access to the intruder without
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that node and revoke them. This will block all access to the intruder without
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taking unaffected instances of the service(s) on that node offline too.
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taking instances of the service(s) on other nodes offline too.
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While this will work with service-unique tokens, there is nothing stopping an
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While this will work with service-unique tokens, there is nothing stopping an
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attacker from obtaining certificates while spoofing the agent ID or other
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attacker from obtaining certificates while spoofing the agent ID or other
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@ -103,15 +103,19 @@ Vault](https://www.vaultproject.io/docs/secrets/consul/index.html).
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## Configure Agent Transport Encryption
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## Configure Agent Transport Encryption
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Consul's gossip (UDP) and RPC (TCP) communications need to be encrypted
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Consul's gossip (UDP) and RPC (TCP) communications need to be encrypted
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otherwise attackers may be able to see tokens and private keys while in flight
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otherwise attackers may be able to see ACL tokens while in flight
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between the server and client agents or between client agent and application.
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between the server and client agents (RPC) or between client agent and
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application (HTTP). Certificate private keys never leave the host they
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are used on but are delivered to the application or proxy over local
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HTTP so local agent traffic should be encrypted where potentially
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untrusted parties might be able to observe localhost agent API traffic.
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Follow the [encryption documentation](/docs/agent/encryption.html) to ensure
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Follow the [encryption documentation](/docs/agent/encryption.html) to ensure
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both gossip encryption and RPC TLS are configured securely.
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both gossip encryption and RPC/HTTP TLS are configured securely.
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For now client and server TLS certificates are still managed by manual
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For now client and server TLS certificates are still managed by manual
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configuration. In the future we plan to automate more of that with the same
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configuration. In the future we plan to automate more of that with the same
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mechanisms connect offers to user applications.
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mechanisms Connect offers to user applications.
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## Bootstrap Certificate Authority
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## Bootstrap Certificate Authority
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@ -202,4 +206,4 @@ integrate](/docs/connect/native.html) with connect.
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If using any kind of proxy for connect, the application must ensure no untrusted
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If using any kind of proxy for connect, the application must ensure no untrusted
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connections can be made to it's unprotected listening port. This is typically
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connections can be made to it's unprotected listening port. This is typically
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done by binding to `localhost` and only allowing loopback traffic, but may also
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done by binding to `localhost` and only allowing loopback traffic, but may also
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be achieved using firewall rules or network namespacing.
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be achieved using firewall rules or network namespacing.
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