consul/agent/proxycfg/state.go

1571 lines
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package proxycfg
import (
"context"
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"reflect"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/cache"
cachetype "github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/cache-types"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/logging"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog"
"github.com/mitchellh/copystructure"
connect: reconcile how upstream configuration works with discovery chains (#6225) * connect: reconcile how upstream configuration works with discovery chains The following upstream config fields for connect sidecars sanely integrate into discovery chain resolution: - Destination Namespace/Datacenter: Compilation occurs locally but using different default values for namespaces and datacenters. The xDS clusters that are created are named as they normally would be. - Mesh Gateway Mode (single upstream): If set this value overrides any value computed for any resolver for the entire discovery chain. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Mesh Gateway Mode (whole sidecar): If set this value overrides any value computed for any resolver for the entire discovery chain. If this is specifically overridden for a single upstream this value is ignored in that case. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Protocol (in opaque config): If set this value overrides the value computed when evaluating the entire discovery chain. If the normal chain would be TCP or if this override is set to TCP then the result is that we explicitly disable L7 Routing and Splitting. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Connect Timeout (in opaque config): If set this value overrides the value for any resolver in the entire discovery chain. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). If any of the above overrides affect the actual result of compiling the discovery chain (i.e. "tcp" becomes "grpc" instead of being a no-op override to "tcp") then the relevant parameters are hashed and provided to the xDS layer as a prefix for use in naming the Clusters. This is to ensure that if one Upstream discovery chain has no overrides and tangentially needs a cluster named "api.default.XXX", and another Upstream does have overrides for "api.default.XXX" that they won't cross-pollinate against the operator's wishes. Fixes #6159
2019-08-02 03:03:34 +00:00
"github.com/mitchellh/mapstructure"
)
type CacheNotifier interface {
Notify(ctx context.Context, t string, r cache.Request,
correlationID string, ch chan<- cache.UpdateEvent) error
}
const (
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
coalesceTimeout = 200 * time.Millisecond
rootsWatchID = "roots"
leafWatchID = "leaf"
intentionsWatchID = "intentions"
serviceListWatchID = "service-list"
federationStateListGatewaysWatchID = "federation-state-list-mesh-gateways"
consulServerListWatchID = "consul-server-list"
datacentersWatchID = "datacenters"
serviceResolversWatchID = "service-resolvers"
gatewayServicesWatchID = "gateway-services"
gatewayConfigWatchID = "gateway-config"
2020-04-20 19:42:33 +00:00
externalServiceIDPrefix = "external-service:"
serviceLeafIDPrefix = "service-leaf:"
serviceResolverIDPrefix = "service-resolver:"
serviceIntentionsIDPrefix = "service-intentions:"
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
svcChecksWatchIDPrefix = cachetype.ServiceHTTPChecksName + ":"
serviceIDPrefix = string(structs.UpstreamDestTypeService) + ":"
preparedQueryIDPrefix = string(structs.UpstreamDestTypePreparedQuery) + ":"
defaultPreparedQueryPollInterval = 30 * time.Second
)
// state holds all the state needed to maintain the config for a registered
// connect-proxy service. When a proxy registration is changed, the entire state
// is discarded and a new one created.
type state struct {
// logger, source and cache are required to be set before calling Watch.
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
logger hclog.Logger
source *structs.QuerySource
cache CacheNotifier
dnsConfig DNSConfig
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
serverSNIFn ServerSNIFunc
// ctx and cancel store the context created during initWatches call
ctx context.Context
cancel func()
kind structs.ServiceKind
service string
proxyID structs.ServiceID
address string
port int
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
meta map[string]string
taggedAddresses map[string]structs.ServiceAddress
proxyCfg structs.ConnectProxyConfig
token string
ch chan cache.UpdateEvent
snapCh chan ConfigSnapshot
reqCh chan chan *ConfigSnapshot
}
type DNSConfig struct {
Domain string
AltDomain string
}
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
type ServerSNIFunc func(dc, nodeName string) string
func copyProxyConfig(ns *structs.NodeService) (structs.ConnectProxyConfig, error) {
if ns == nil {
return structs.ConnectProxyConfig{}, nil
}
// Copy the config map
proxyCfgRaw, err := copystructure.Copy(ns.Proxy)
if err != nil {
return structs.ConnectProxyConfig{}, err
}
proxyCfg, ok := proxyCfgRaw.(structs.ConnectProxyConfig)
if !ok {
return structs.ConnectProxyConfig{}, errors.New("failed to copy proxy config")
}
// we can safely modify these since we just copied them
for idx := range proxyCfg.Upstreams {
us := &proxyCfg.Upstreams[idx]
if us.DestinationType != structs.UpstreamDestTypePreparedQuery && us.DestinationNamespace == "" {
// default the upstreams target namespace to the namespace of the proxy
// doing this here prevents needing much more complex logic a bunch of other
// places and makes tracking these upstreams simpler as we can dedup them
// with the maps tracking upstream ids being watched.
proxyCfg.Upstreams[idx].DestinationNamespace = ns.EnterpriseMeta.NamespaceOrDefault()
}
}
return proxyCfg, nil
}
// newState populates the state struct by copying relevant fields from the
// NodeService and Token. We copy so that we can use them in a separate
// goroutine later without reasoning about races with the NodeService passed
// (especially for embedded fields like maps and slices).
//
// The returned state needs its required dependencies to be set before Watch
// can be called.
func newState(ns *structs.NodeService, token string) (*state, error) {
switch ns.Kind {
case structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy:
case structs.ServiceKindTerminatingGateway:
case structs.ServiceKindMeshGateway:
case structs.ServiceKindIngressGateway:
default:
return nil, errors.New("not a connect-proxy, terminating-gateway, mesh-gateway, or ingress-gateway")
}
proxyCfg, err := copyProxyConfig(ns)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
taggedAddresses := make(map[string]structs.ServiceAddress)
for k, v := range ns.TaggedAddresses {
taggedAddresses[k] = v
}
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
meta := make(map[string]string)
for k, v := range ns.Meta {
meta[k] = v
}
return &state{
kind: ns.Kind,
service: ns.Service,
proxyID: ns.CompoundServiceID(),
address: ns.Address,
port: ns.Port,
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
meta: meta,
taggedAddresses: taggedAddresses,
proxyCfg: proxyCfg,
token: token,
// 10 is fairly arbitrary here but allow for the 3 mandatory and a
// reasonable number of upstream watches to all deliver their initial
// messages in parallel without blocking the cache.Notify loops. It's not a
// huge deal if we do for a short period so we don't need to be more
// conservative to handle larger numbers of upstreams correctly but gives
// some head room for normal operation to be non-blocking in most typical
// cases.
ch: make(chan cache.UpdateEvent, 10),
snapCh: make(chan ConfigSnapshot, 1),
reqCh: make(chan chan *ConfigSnapshot, 1),
}, nil
}
// Watch initialized watches on all necessary cache data for the current proxy
// registration state and returns a chan to observe updates to the
// ConfigSnapshot that contains all necessary config state. The chan is closed
// when the state is Closed.
func (s *state) Watch() (<-chan ConfigSnapshot, error) {
s.ctx, s.cancel = context.WithCancel(context.Background())
err := s.initWatches()
if err != nil {
s.cancel()
return nil, err
}
go s.run()
return s.snapCh, nil
}
// Close discards the state and stops any long-running watches.
func (s *state) Close() error {
if s.cancel != nil {
s.cancel()
}
return nil
}
// initWatches sets up the watches needed for the particular service
func (s *state) initWatches() error {
switch s.kind {
case structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy:
return s.initWatchesConnectProxy()
case structs.ServiceKindTerminatingGateway:
return s.initWatchesTerminatingGateway()
case structs.ServiceKindMeshGateway:
return s.initWatchesMeshGateway()
case structs.ServiceKindIngressGateway:
return s.initWatchesIngressGateway()
default:
return fmt.Errorf("Unsupported service kind")
}
}
connect: fix failover through a mesh gateway to a remote datacenter (#6259) Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080: - name: foo load_assignment: cluster_name: foo policy: overprovisioning_factor: 100000 endpoints: - priority: 0 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 1.2.3.4 port_value: 8080 - priority: 1 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 6.7.8.9 port_value: 8080 Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI header at the cluster layer. If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy today. This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now: 1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets. 2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we move on to the next target. 3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the affected resolver nodes. 4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster (note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target) 5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored. One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect failover. In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much. Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of failover mode).
2019-08-05 18:30:35 +00:00
func (s *state) watchMeshGateway(ctx context.Context, dc string, upstreamID string) error {
return s.cache.Notify(ctx, cachetype.InternalServiceDumpName, &structs.ServiceDumpRequest{
Datacenter: dc,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
ServiceKind: structs.ServiceKindMeshGateway,
UseServiceKind: true,
Source: *s.source,
EnterpriseMeta: *structs.DefaultEnterpriseMeta(),
connect: fix failover through a mesh gateway to a remote datacenter (#6259) Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080: - name: foo load_assignment: cluster_name: foo policy: overprovisioning_factor: 100000 endpoints: - priority: 0 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 1.2.3.4 port_value: 8080 - priority: 1 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 6.7.8.9 port_value: 8080 Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI header at the cluster layer. If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy today. This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now: 1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets. 2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we move on to the next target. 3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the affected resolver nodes. 4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster (note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target) 5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored. One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect failover. In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much. Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of failover mode).
2019-08-05 18:30:35 +00:00
}, "mesh-gateway:"+dc+":"+upstreamID, s.ch)
}
func (s *state) watchConnectProxyService(ctx context.Context, correlationId string, service string, dc string, filter string, entMeta *structs.EnterpriseMeta) error {
var finalMeta structs.EnterpriseMeta
finalMeta.Merge(entMeta)
connect: fix failover through a mesh gateway to a remote datacenter (#6259) Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080: - name: foo load_assignment: cluster_name: foo policy: overprovisioning_factor: 100000 endpoints: - priority: 0 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 1.2.3.4 port_value: 8080 - priority: 1 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 6.7.8.9 port_value: 8080 Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI header at the cluster layer. If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy today. This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now: 1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets. 2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we move on to the next target. 3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the affected resolver nodes. 4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster (note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target) 5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored. One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect failover. In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much. Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of failover mode).
2019-08-05 18:30:35 +00:00
return s.cache.Notify(ctx, cachetype.HealthServicesName, &structs.ServiceSpecificRequest{
Datacenter: dc,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{
Token: s.token,
Filter: filter,
},
ServiceName: service,
Connect: true,
// Note that Identifier doesn't type-prefix for service any more as it's
// the default and makes metrics and other things much cleaner. It's
// simpler for us if we have the type to make things unambiguous.
Source: *s.source,
EnterpriseMeta: finalMeta,
connect: fix failover through a mesh gateway to a remote datacenter (#6259) Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080: - name: foo load_assignment: cluster_name: foo policy: overprovisioning_factor: 100000 endpoints: - priority: 0 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 1.2.3.4 port_value: 8080 - priority: 1 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 6.7.8.9 port_value: 8080 Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI header at the cluster layer. If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy today. This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now: 1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets. 2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we move on to the next target. 3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the affected resolver nodes. 4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster (note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target) 5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored. One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect failover. In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much. Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of failover mode).
2019-08-05 18:30:35 +00:00
}, correlationId, s.ch)
}
// initWatchesConnectProxy sets up the watches needed based on current proxy registration
// state.
func (s *state) initWatchesConnectProxy() error {
// Watch for root changes
err := s.cache.Notify(s.ctx, cachetype.ConnectCARootName, &structs.DCSpecificRequest{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
Source: *s.source,
}, rootsWatchID, s.ch)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Watch the leaf cert
err = s.cache.Notify(s.ctx, cachetype.ConnectCALeafName, &cachetype.ConnectCALeafRequest{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
Token: s.token,
Service: s.proxyCfg.DestinationServiceName,
EnterpriseMeta: s.proxyID.EnterpriseMeta,
}, leafWatchID, s.ch)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Watch for intention updates
err = s.cache.Notify(s.ctx, cachetype.IntentionMatchName, &structs.IntentionQueryRequest{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
Match: &structs.IntentionQueryMatch{
Type: structs.IntentionMatchDestination,
Entries: []structs.IntentionMatchEntry{
{
Namespace: s.proxyID.NamespaceOrDefault(),
Name: s.proxyCfg.DestinationServiceName,
},
},
},
}, intentionsWatchID, s.ch)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Watch for service check updates
err = s.cache.Notify(s.ctx, cachetype.ServiceHTTPChecksName, &cachetype.ServiceHTTPChecksRequest{
ServiceID: s.proxyCfg.DestinationServiceID,
EnterpriseMeta: s.proxyID.EnterpriseMeta,
}, svcChecksWatchIDPrefix+structs.ServiceIDString(s.proxyCfg.DestinationServiceID, &s.proxyID.EnterpriseMeta), s.ch)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// default the namespace to the namespace of this proxy service
currentNamespace := s.proxyID.NamespaceOrDefault()
connect: reconcile how upstream configuration works with discovery chains (#6225) * connect: reconcile how upstream configuration works with discovery chains The following upstream config fields for connect sidecars sanely integrate into discovery chain resolution: - Destination Namespace/Datacenter: Compilation occurs locally but using different default values for namespaces and datacenters. The xDS clusters that are created are named as they normally would be. - Mesh Gateway Mode (single upstream): If set this value overrides any value computed for any resolver for the entire discovery chain. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Mesh Gateway Mode (whole sidecar): If set this value overrides any value computed for any resolver for the entire discovery chain. If this is specifically overridden for a single upstream this value is ignored in that case. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Protocol (in opaque config): If set this value overrides the value computed when evaluating the entire discovery chain. If the normal chain would be TCP or if this override is set to TCP then the result is that we explicitly disable L7 Routing and Splitting. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Connect Timeout (in opaque config): If set this value overrides the value for any resolver in the entire discovery chain. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). If any of the above overrides affect the actual result of compiling the discovery chain (i.e. "tcp" becomes "grpc" instead of being a no-op override to "tcp") then the relevant parameters are hashed and provided to the xDS layer as a prefix for use in naming the Clusters. This is to ensure that if one Upstream discovery chain has no overrides and tangentially needs a cluster named "api.default.XXX", and another Upstream does have overrides for "api.default.XXX" that they won't cross-pollinate against the operator's wishes. Fixes #6159
2019-08-02 03:03:34 +00:00
// Watch for updates to service endpoints for all upstreams
for _, u := range s.proxyCfg.Upstreams {
dc := s.source.Datacenter
if u.Datacenter != "" {
dc = u.Datacenter
}
connect: reconcile how upstream configuration works with discovery chains (#6225) * connect: reconcile how upstream configuration works with discovery chains The following upstream config fields for connect sidecars sanely integrate into discovery chain resolution: - Destination Namespace/Datacenter: Compilation occurs locally but using different default values for namespaces and datacenters. The xDS clusters that are created are named as they normally would be. - Mesh Gateway Mode (single upstream): If set this value overrides any value computed for any resolver for the entire discovery chain. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Mesh Gateway Mode (whole sidecar): If set this value overrides any value computed for any resolver for the entire discovery chain. If this is specifically overridden for a single upstream this value is ignored in that case. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Protocol (in opaque config): If set this value overrides the value computed when evaluating the entire discovery chain. If the normal chain would be TCP or if this override is set to TCP then the result is that we explicitly disable L7 Routing and Splitting. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Connect Timeout (in opaque config): If set this value overrides the value for any resolver in the entire discovery chain. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). If any of the above overrides affect the actual result of compiling the discovery chain (i.e. "tcp" becomes "grpc" instead of being a no-op override to "tcp") then the relevant parameters are hashed and provided to the xDS layer as a prefix for use in naming the Clusters. This is to ensure that if one Upstream discovery chain has no overrides and tangentially needs a cluster named "api.default.XXX", and another Upstream does have overrides for "api.default.XXX" that they won't cross-pollinate against the operator's wishes. Fixes #6159
2019-08-02 03:03:34 +00:00
ns := currentNamespace
if u.DestinationNamespace != "" {
ns = u.DestinationNamespace
}
cfg, err := parseReducedUpstreamConfig(u.Config)
if err != nil {
// Don't hard fail on a config typo, just warn. We'll fall back on
// the plain discovery chain if there is an error so it's safe to
// continue.
s.logger.Warn("failed to parse upstream config",
"upstream", u.Identifier(),
"error", err,
)
connect: reconcile how upstream configuration works with discovery chains (#6225) * connect: reconcile how upstream configuration works with discovery chains The following upstream config fields for connect sidecars sanely integrate into discovery chain resolution: - Destination Namespace/Datacenter: Compilation occurs locally but using different default values for namespaces and datacenters. The xDS clusters that are created are named as they normally would be. - Mesh Gateway Mode (single upstream): If set this value overrides any value computed for any resolver for the entire discovery chain. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Mesh Gateway Mode (whole sidecar): If set this value overrides any value computed for any resolver for the entire discovery chain. If this is specifically overridden for a single upstream this value is ignored in that case. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Protocol (in opaque config): If set this value overrides the value computed when evaluating the entire discovery chain. If the normal chain would be TCP or if this override is set to TCP then the result is that we explicitly disable L7 Routing and Splitting. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Connect Timeout (in opaque config): If set this value overrides the value for any resolver in the entire discovery chain. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). If any of the above overrides affect the actual result of compiling the discovery chain (i.e. "tcp" becomes "grpc" instead of being a no-op override to "tcp") then the relevant parameters are hashed and provided to the xDS layer as a prefix for use in naming the Clusters. This is to ensure that if one Upstream discovery chain has no overrides and tangentially needs a cluster named "api.default.XXX", and another Upstream does have overrides for "api.default.XXX" that they won't cross-pollinate against the operator's wishes. Fixes #6159
2019-08-02 03:03:34 +00:00
}
switch u.DestinationType {
case structs.UpstreamDestTypePreparedQuery:
err = s.cache.Notify(s.ctx, cachetype.PreparedQueryName, &structs.PreparedQueryExecuteRequest{
Datacenter: dc,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token, MaxAge: defaultPreparedQueryPollInterval},
QueryIDOrName: u.DestinationName,
Connect: true,
Source: *s.source,
}, "upstream:"+u.Identifier(), s.ch)
if err != nil {
return err
}
connect: reconcile how upstream configuration works with discovery chains (#6225) * connect: reconcile how upstream configuration works with discovery chains The following upstream config fields for connect sidecars sanely integrate into discovery chain resolution: - Destination Namespace/Datacenter: Compilation occurs locally but using different default values for namespaces and datacenters. The xDS clusters that are created are named as they normally would be. - Mesh Gateway Mode (single upstream): If set this value overrides any value computed for any resolver for the entire discovery chain. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Mesh Gateway Mode (whole sidecar): If set this value overrides any value computed for any resolver for the entire discovery chain. If this is specifically overridden for a single upstream this value is ignored in that case. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Protocol (in opaque config): If set this value overrides the value computed when evaluating the entire discovery chain. If the normal chain would be TCP or if this override is set to TCP then the result is that we explicitly disable L7 Routing and Splitting. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Connect Timeout (in opaque config): If set this value overrides the value for any resolver in the entire discovery chain. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). If any of the above overrides affect the actual result of compiling the discovery chain (i.e. "tcp" becomes "grpc" instead of being a no-op override to "tcp") then the relevant parameters are hashed and provided to the xDS layer as a prefix for use in naming the Clusters. This is to ensure that if one Upstream discovery chain has no overrides and tangentially needs a cluster named "api.default.XXX", and another Upstream does have overrides for "api.default.XXX" that they won't cross-pollinate against the operator's wishes. Fixes #6159
2019-08-02 03:03:34 +00:00
case structs.UpstreamDestTypeService:
fallthrough
connect: reconcile how upstream configuration works with discovery chains (#6225) * connect: reconcile how upstream configuration works with discovery chains The following upstream config fields for connect sidecars sanely integrate into discovery chain resolution: - Destination Namespace/Datacenter: Compilation occurs locally but using different default values for namespaces and datacenters. The xDS clusters that are created are named as they normally would be. - Mesh Gateway Mode (single upstream): If set this value overrides any value computed for any resolver for the entire discovery chain. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Mesh Gateway Mode (whole sidecar): If set this value overrides any value computed for any resolver for the entire discovery chain. If this is specifically overridden for a single upstream this value is ignored in that case. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Protocol (in opaque config): If set this value overrides the value computed when evaluating the entire discovery chain. If the normal chain would be TCP or if this override is set to TCP then the result is that we explicitly disable L7 Routing and Splitting. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Connect Timeout (in opaque config): If set this value overrides the value for any resolver in the entire discovery chain. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). If any of the above overrides affect the actual result of compiling the discovery chain (i.e. "tcp" becomes "grpc" instead of being a no-op override to "tcp") then the relevant parameters are hashed and provided to the xDS layer as a prefix for use in naming the Clusters. This is to ensure that if one Upstream discovery chain has no overrides and tangentially needs a cluster named "api.default.XXX", and another Upstream does have overrides for "api.default.XXX" that they won't cross-pollinate against the operator's wishes. Fixes #6159
2019-08-02 03:03:34 +00:00
case "": // Treat unset as the default Service type
err = s.cache.Notify(s.ctx, cachetype.CompiledDiscoveryChainName, &structs.DiscoveryChainRequest{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
Name: u.DestinationName,
EvaluateInDatacenter: dc,
EvaluateInNamespace: ns,
OverrideMeshGateway: s.proxyCfg.MeshGateway.OverlayWith(u.MeshGateway),
OverrideProtocol: cfg.Protocol,
OverrideConnectTimeout: cfg.ConnectTimeout(),
}, "discovery-chain:"+u.Identifier(), s.ch)
if err != nil {
return err
}
default:
return fmt.Errorf("unknown upstream type: %q", u.DestinationType)
}
}
return nil
}
connect: reconcile how upstream configuration works with discovery chains (#6225) * connect: reconcile how upstream configuration works with discovery chains The following upstream config fields for connect sidecars sanely integrate into discovery chain resolution: - Destination Namespace/Datacenter: Compilation occurs locally but using different default values for namespaces and datacenters. The xDS clusters that are created are named as they normally would be. - Mesh Gateway Mode (single upstream): If set this value overrides any value computed for any resolver for the entire discovery chain. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Mesh Gateway Mode (whole sidecar): If set this value overrides any value computed for any resolver for the entire discovery chain. If this is specifically overridden for a single upstream this value is ignored in that case. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Protocol (in opaque config): If set this value overrides the value computed when evaluating the entire discovery chain. If the normal chain would be TCP or if this override is set to TCP then the result is that we explicitly disable L7 Routing and Splitting. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). - Connect Timeout (in opaque config): If set this value overrides the value for any resolver in the entire discovery chain. The xDS clusters that are created may be named differently (see below). If any of the above overrides affect the actual result of compiling the discovery chain (i.e. "tcp" becomes "grpc" instead of being a no-op override to "tcp") then the relevant parameters are hashed and provided to the xDS layer as a prefix for use in naming the Clusters. This is to ensure that if one Upstream discovery chain has no overrides and tangentially needs a cluster named "api.default.XXX", and another Upstream does have overrides for "api.default.XXX" that they won't cross-pollinate against the operator's wishes. Fixes #6159
2019-08-02 03:03:34 +00:00
// reducedProxyConfig represents the basic opaque config values that are now
// managed with the discovery chain but for backwards compatibility reasons
// should still affect how the proxy is configured.
//
// The full-blown config is agent/xds.UpstreamConfig
type reducedUpstreamConfig struct {
Protocol string `mapstructure:"protocol"`
ConnectTimeoutMs int `mapstructure:"connect_timeout_ms"`
}
func (c *reducedUpstreamConfig) ConnectTimeout() time.Duration {
return time.Duration(c.ConnectTimeoutMs) * time.Millisecond
}
func parseReducedUpstreamConfig(m map[string]interface{}) (reducedUpstreamConfig, error) {
var cfg reducedUpstreamConfig
err := mapstructure.WeakDecode(m, &cfg)
return cfg, err
}
// initWatchesTerminatingGateway sets up the initial watches needed based on the terminating-gateway registration
func (s *state) initWatchesTerminatingGateway() error {
// Watch for root changes
err := s.cache.Notify(s.ctx, cachetype.ConnectCARootName, &structs.DCSpecificRequest{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
Source: *s.source,
}, rootsWatchID, s.ch)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Named(logging.TerminatingGateway).
Error("failed to register watch for root changes", "error", err)
return err
}
// Watch for the terminating-gateway's linked services
err = s.cache.Notify(s.ctx, cachetype.GatewayServicesName, &structs.ServiceSpecificRequest{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
ServiceName: s.service,
EnterpriseMeta: s.proxyID.EnterpriseMeta,
}, gatewayServicesWatchID, s.ch)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Named(logging.TerminatingGateway).
Error("failed to register watch for linked services", "error", err)
return err
}
return nil
}
// initWatchesMeshGateway sets up the watches needed based on the current mesh gateway registration
func (s *state) initWatchesMeshGateway() error {
// Watch for root changes
err := s.cache.Notify(s.ctx, cachetype.ConnectCARootName, &structs.DCSpecificRequest{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
Source: *s.source,
}, rootsWatchID, s.ch)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Watch for all services
err = s.cache.Notify(s.ctx, cachetype.CatalogServiceListName, &structs.DCSpecificRequest{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
Source: *s.source,
EnterpriseMeta: *structs.WildcardEnterpriseMeta(),
}, serviceListWatchID, s.ch)
if err != nil {
return err
}
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
if s.meta[structs.MetaWANFederationKey] == "1" {
// Conveniently we can just use this service meta attribute in one
// place here to set the machinery in motion and leave the conditional
// behavior out of the rest of the package.
err = s.cache.Notify(s.ctx, cachetype.FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName, &structs.DCSpecificRequest{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
Source: *s.source,
}, federationStateListGatewaysWatchID, s.ch)
if err != nil {
return err
}
err = s.cache.Notify(s.ctx, cachetype.HealthServicesName, &structs.ServiceSpecificRequest{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
ServiceName: structs.ConsulServiceName,
}, consulServerListWatchID, s.ch)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
// Eventually we will have to watch connect enable instances for each service as well as the
// destination services themselves but those notifications will be setup later. However we
// cannot setup those watches until we know what the services are. from the service list
// watch above
err = s.cache.Notify(s.ctx, cachetype.CatalogDatacentersName, &structs.DatacentersRequest{
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token, MaxAge: 30 * time.Second},
}, datacentersWatchID, s.ch)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Once we start getting notified about the datacenters we will setup watches on the
// gateways within those other datacenters. We cannot do that here because we don't
// know what they are yet.
// Watch service-resolvers so we can setup service subset clusters
err = s.cache.Notify(s.ctx, cachetype.ConfigEntriesName, &structs.ConfigEntryQuery{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
Kind: structs.ServiceResolver,
EnterpriseMeta: *structs.WildcardEnterpriseMeta(),
}, serviceResolversWatchID, s.ch)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Named(logging.MeshGateway).
Error("failed to register watch for service-resolver config entries", "error", err)
return err
}
return err
}
func (s *state) initWatchesIngressGateway() error {
// Watch for root changes
err := s.cache.Notify(s.ctx, cachetype.ConnectCARootName, &structs.DCSpecificRequest{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
Source: *s.source,
}, rootsWatchID, s.ch)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Watch this ingress gateway's config entry
err = s.cache.Notify(s.ctx, cachetype.ConfigEntryName, &structs.ConfigEntryQuery{
Kind: structs.IngressGateway,
Name: s.service,
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
EnterpriseMeta: s.proxyID.EnterpriseMeta,
}, gatewayConfigWatchID, s.ch)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Watch the ingress-gateway's list of upstreams
err = s.cache.Notify(s.ctx, cachetype.GatewayServicesName, &structs.ServiceSpecificRequest{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
ServiceName: s.service,
EnterpriseMeta: s.proxyID.EnterpriseMeta,
}, gatewayServicesWatchID, s.ch)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (s *state) initialConfigSnapshot() ConfigSnapshot {
snap := ConfigSnapshot{
Kind: s.kind,
Service: s.service,
ProxyID: s.proxyID,
Address: s.address,
Port: s.port,
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
ServiceMeta: s.meta,
TaggedAddresses: s.taggedAddresses,
Proxy: s.proxyCfg,
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
ServerSNIFn: s.serverSNIFn,
}
switch s.kind {
case structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy:
snap.ConnectProxy.DiscoveryChain = make(map[string]*structs.CompiledDiscoveryChain)
snap.ConnectProxy.WatchedUpstreams = make(map[string]map[string]context.CancelFunc)
snap.ConnectProxy.WatchedUpstreamEndpoints = make(map[string]map[string]structs.CheckServiceNodes)
connect: fix failover through a mesh gateway to a remote datacenter (#6259) Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080: - name: foo load_assignment: cluster_name: foo policy: overprovisioning_factor: 100000 endpoints: - priority: 0 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 1.2.3.4 port_value: 8080 - priority: 1 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 6.7.8.9 port_value: 8080 Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI header at the cluster layer. If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy today. This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now: 1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets. 2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we move on to the next target. 3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the affected resolver nodes. 4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster (note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target) 5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored. One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect failover. In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much. Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of failover mode).
2019-08-05 18:30:35 +00:00
snap.ConnectProxy.WatchedGateways = make(map[string]map[string]context.CancelFunc)
snap.ConnectProxy.WatchedGatewayEndpoints = make(map[string]map[string]structs.CheckServiceNodes)
snap.ConnectProxy.WatchedServiceChecks = make(map[structs.ServiceID][]structs.CheckType)
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
snap.ConnectProxy.PreparedQueryEndpoints = make(map[string]structs.CheckServiceNodes)
case structs.ServiceKindTerminatingGateway:
snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedServices = make(map[structs.ServiceName]context.CancelFunc)
snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedLeaves = make(map[structs.ServiceName]context.CancelFunc)
snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedIntentions = make(map[structs.ServiceName]context.CancelFunc)
snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedResolvers = make(map[structs.ServiceName]context.CancelFunc)
snap.TerminatingGateway.ServiceLeaves = make(map[structs.ServiceName]*structs.IssuedCert)
snap.TerminatingGateway.ServiceGroups = make(map[structs.ServiceName]structs.CheckServiceNodes)
snap.TerminatingGateway.ServiceResolvers = make(map[structs.ServiceName]*structs.ServiceResolverConfigEntry)
snap.TerminatingGateway.GatewayServices = make(map[structs.ServiceName]structs.GatewayService)
snap.TerminatingGateway.HostnameServices = make(map[structs.ServiceName]structs.CheckServiceNodes)
case structs.ServiceKindMeshGateway:
snap.MeshGateway.WatchedServices = make(map[structs.ServiceName]context.CancelFunc)
snap.MeshGateway.WatchedDatacenters = make(map[string]context.CancelFunc)
snap.MeshGateway.ServiceGroups = make(map[structs.ServiceName]structs.CheckServiceNodes)
snap.MeshGateway.GatewayGroups = make(map[string]structs.CheckServiceNodes)
snap.MeshGateway.ServiceResolvers = make(map[structs.ServiceName]*structs.ServiceResolverConfigEntry)
snap.MeshGateway.HostnameDatacenters = make(map[string]structs.CheckServiceNodes)
// there is no need to initialize the map of service resolvers as we
// fully rebuild it every time we get updates
case structs.ServiceKindIngressGateway:
snap.IngressGateway.WatchedDiscoveryChains = make(map[string]context.CancelFunc)
snap.IngressGateway.DiscoveryChain = make(map[string]*structs.CompiledDiscoveryChain)
snap.IngressGateway.WatchedUpstreams = make(map[string]map[string]context.CancelFunc)
snap.IngressGateway.WatchedUpstreamEndpoints = make(map[string]map[string]structs.CheckServiceNodes)
snap.IngressGateway.WatchedGateways = make(map[string]map[string]context.CancelFunc)
snap.IngressGateway.WatchedGatewayEndpoints = make(map[string]map[string]structs.CheckServiceNodes)
}
return snap
}
func (s *state) run() {
// Close the channel we return from Watch when we stop so consumers can stop
// watching and clean up their goroutines. It's important we do this here and
// not in Close since this routine sends on this chan and so might panic if it
// gets closed from another goroutine.
defer close(s.snapCh)
snap := s.initialConfigSnapshot()
// This turns out to be really fiddly/painful by just using time.Timer.C
// directly in the code below since you can't detect when a timer is stopped
// vs waiting in order to know to reset it. So just use a chan to send
// ourselves messages.
sendCh := make(chan struct{})
var coalesceTimer *time.Timer
for {
select {
case <-s.ctx.Done():
return
case u := <-s.ch:
if err := s.handleUpdate(u, &snap); err != nil {
s.logger.Error("watch error",
"id", u.CorrelationID,
"error", err,
)
continue
}
case <-sendCh:
// Make a deep copy of snap so we don't mutate any of the embedded structs
// etc on future updates.
snapCopy, err := snap.Clone()
if err != nil {
s.logger.Error("Failed to copy config snapshot for proxy",
"proxy", s.proxyID,
"error", err,
)
continue
}
s.snapCh <- *snapCopy
// Allow the next change to trigger a send
coalesceTimer = nil
// Skip rest of loop - there is nothing to send since nothing changed on
// this iteration
continue
case replyCh := <-s.reqCh:
if !snap.Valid() {
// Not valid yet just respond with nil and move on to next task.
replyCh <- nil
continue
}
// Make a deep copy of snap so we don't mutate any of the embedded structs
// etc on future updates.
snapCopy, err := snap.Clone()
if err != nil {
s.logger.Error("Failed to copy config snapshot for proxy",
"proxy", s.proxyID,
"error", err,
)
continue
}
replyCh <- snapCopy
// Skip rest of loop - there is nothing to send since nothing changed on
// this iteration
continue
}
// Check if snap is complete enough to be a valid config to deliver to a
// proxy yet.
if snap.Valid() {
// Don't send it right away, set a short timer that will wait for updates
// from any of the other cache values and deliver them all together.
if coalesceTimer == nil {
coalesceTimer = time.AfterFunc(coalesceTimeout, func() {
// This runs in another goroutine so we can't just do the send
// directly here as access to snap is racy. Instead, signal the main
// loop above.
sendCh <- struct{}{}
})
}
}
}
}
func (s *state) handleUpdate(u cache.UpdateEvent, snap *ConfigSnapshot) error {
switch s.kind {
case structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy:
return s.handleUpdateConnectProxy(u, snap)
case structs.ServiceKindTerminatingGateway:
return s.handleUpdateTerminatingGateway(u, snap)
case structs.ServiceKindMeshGateway:
return s.handleUpdateMeshGateway(u, snap)
case structs.ServiceKindIngressGateway:
return s.handleUpdateIngressGateway(u, snap)
default:
return fmt.Errorf("Unsupported service kind")
}
}
func (s *state) handleUpdateConnectProxy(u cache.UpdateEvent, snap *ConfigSnapshot) error {
if u.Err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error filling agent cache: %v", u.Err)
}
switch {
case u.CorrelationID == rootsWatchID:
roots, ok := u.Result.(*structs.IndexedCARoots)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
snap.Roots = roots
case u.CorrelationID == intentionsWatchID:
// no-op: Intentions don't get stored in the snapshot, calls to ConnectAuthorize will fetch them from the cache
case strings.HasPrefix(u.CorrelationID, "upstream:"+preparedQueryIDPrefix):
resp, ok := u.Result.(*structs.PreparedQueryExecuteResponse)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
pq := strings.TrimPrefix(u.CorrelationID, "upstream:")
snap.ConnectProxy.PreparedQueryEndpoints[pq] = resp.Nodes
case strings.HasPrefix(u.CorrelationID, svcChecksWatchIDPrefix):
resp, ok := u.Result.([]structs.CheckType)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for service checks response: %T, want: []structs.CheckType", u.Result)
}
svcID := structs.ServiceIDFromString(strings.TrimPrefix(u.CorrelationID, svcChecksWatchIDPrefix))
snap.ConnectProxy.WatchedServiceChecks[svcID] = resp
default:
return s.handleUpdateUpstreams(u, &snap.ConnectProxy.ConfigSnapshotUpstreams)
}
return nil
}
func (s *state) handleUpdateUpstreams(u cache.UpdateEvent, snap *ConfigSnapshotUpstreams) error {
if u.Err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error filling agent cache: %v", u.Err)
}
switch {
case u.CorrelationID == leafWatchID:
leaf, ok := u.Result.(*structs.IssuedCert)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
snap.Leaf = leaf
case strings.HasPrefix(u.CorrelationID, "discovery-chain:"):
resp, ok := u.Result.(*structs.DiscoveryChainResponse)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
svc := strings.TrimPrefix(u.CorrelationID, "discovery-chain:")
snap.DiscoveryChain[svc] = resp.Chain
if err := s.resetWatchesFromChain(svc, resp.Chain, snap); err != nil {
return err
}
case strings.HasPrefix(u.CorrelationID, "upstream-target:"):
resp, ok := u.Result.(*structs.IndexedCheckServiceNodes)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
correlationID := strings.TrimPrefix(u.CorrelationID, "upstream-target:")
targetID, svc, ok := removeColonPrefix(correlationID)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid correlation id %q", u.CorrelationID)
}
if _, ok := snap.WatchedUpstreamEndpoints[svc]; !ok {
snap.WatchedUpstreamEndpoints[svc] = make(map[string]structs.CheckServiceNodes)
}
snap.WatchedUpstreamEndpoints[svc][targetID] = resp.Nodes
connect: fix failover through a mesh gateway to a remote datacenter (#6259) Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080: - name: foo load_assignment: cluster_name: foo policy: overprovisioning_factor: 100000 endpoints: - priority: 0 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 1.2.3.4 port_value: 8080 - priority: 1 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 6.7.8.9 port_value: 8080 Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI header at the cluster layer. If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy today. This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now: 1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets. 2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we move on to the next target. 3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the affected resolver nodes. 4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster (note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target) 5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored. One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect failover. In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much. Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of failover mode).
2019-08-05 18:30:35 +00:00
case strings.HasPrefix(u.CorrelationID, "mesh-gateway:"):
resp, ok := u.Result.(*structs.IndexedCheckServiceNodes)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
connect: fix failover through a mesh gateway to a remote datacenter (#6259) Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080: - name: foo load_assignment: cluster_name: foo policy: overprovisioning_factor: 100000 endpoints: - priority: 0 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 1.2.3.4 port_value: 8080 - priority: 1 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 6.7.8.9 port_value: 8080 Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI header at the cluster layer. If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy today. This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now: 1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets. 2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we move on to the next target. 3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the affected resolver nodes. 4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster (note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target) 5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored. One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect failover. In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much. Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of failover mode).
2019-08-05 18:30:35 +00:00
}
correlationID := strings.TrimPrefix(u.CorrelationID, "mesh-gateway:")
dc, svc, ok := removeColonPrefix(correlationID)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid correlation id %q", u.CorrelationID)
}
if _, ok = snap.WatchedGatewayEndpoints[svc]; !ok {
snap.WatchedGatewayEndpoints[svc] = make(map[string]structs.CheckServiceNodes)
connect: fix failover through a mesh gateway to a remote datacenter (#6259) Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080: - name: foo load_assignment: cluster_name: foo policy: overprovisioning_factor: 100000 endpoints: - priority: 0 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 1.2.3.4 port_value: 8080 - priority: 1 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 6.7.8.9 port_value: 8080 Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI header at the cluster layer. If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy today. This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now: 1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets. 2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we move on to the next target. 3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the affected resolver nodes. 4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster (note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target) 5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored. One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect failover. In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much. Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of failover mode).
2019-08-05 18:30:35 +00:00
}
snap.WatchedGatewayEndpoints[svc][dc] = resp.Nodes
default:
return fmt.Errorf("unknown correlation ID: %s", u.CorrelationID)
}
return nil
}
func removeColonPrefix(s string) (string, string, bool) {
idx := strings.Index(s, ":")
if idx == -1 {
return "", "", false
}
return s[0:idx], s[idx+1:], true
}
func (s *state) resetWatchesFromChain(
id string,
chain *structs.CompiledDiscoveryChain,
snap *ConfigSnapshotUpstreams,
) error {
s.logger.Trace("resetting watches for discovery chain", "id", id)
if chain == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("not possible to arrive here with no discovery chain")
}
// Initialize relevant sub maps.
if _, ok := snap.WatchedUpstreams[id]; !ok {
snap.WatchedUpstreams[id] = make(map[string]context.CancelFunc)
}
if _, ok := snap.WatchedUpstreamEndpoints[id]; !ok {
snap.WatchedUpstreamEndpoints[id] = make(map[string]structs.CheckServiceNodes)
}
if _, ok := snap.WatchedGateways[id]; !ok {
snap.WatchedGateways[id] = make(map[string]context.CancelFunc)
connect: fix failover through a mesh gateway to a remote datacenter (#6259) Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080: - name: foo load_assignment: cluster_name: foo policy: overprovisioning_factor: 100000 endpoints: - priority: 0 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 1.2.3.4 port_value: 8080 - priority: 1 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 6.7.8.9 port_value: 8080 Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI header at the cluster layer. If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy today. This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now: 1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets. 2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we move on to the next target. 3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the affected resolver nodes. 4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster (note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target) 5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored. One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect failover. In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much. Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of failover mode).
2019-08-05 18:30:35 +00:00
}
if _, ok := snap.WatchedGatewayEndpoints[id]; !ok {
snap.WatchedGatewayEndpoints[id] = make(map[string]structs.CheckServiceNodes)
connect: fix failover through a mesh gateway to a remote datacenter (#6259) Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080: - name: foo load_assignment: cluster_name: foo policy: overprovisioning_factor: 100000 endpoints: - priority: 0 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 1.2.3.4 port_value: 8080 - priority: 1 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 6.7.8.9 port_value: 8080 Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI header at the cluster layer. If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy today. This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now: 1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets. 2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we move on to the next target. 3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the affected resolver nodes. 4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster (note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target) 5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored. One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect failover. In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much. Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of failover mode).
2019-08-05 18:30:35 +00:00
}
// We could invalidate this selectively based on a hash of the relevant
// resolver information, but for now just reset anything about this
// upstream when the chain changes in any way.
//
// TODO(rb): content hash based add/remove
for targetID, cancelFn := range snap.WatchedUpstreams[id] {
s.logger.Trace("stopping watch of target",
"upstream", id,
"chain", chain.ServiceName,
"target", targetID,
)
delete(snap.WatchedUpstreams[id], targetID)
delete(snap.WatchedUpstreamEndpoints[id], targetID)
cancelFn()
}
connect: fix failover through a mesh gateway to a remote datacenter (#6259) Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080: - name: foo load_assignment: cluster_name: foo policy: overprovisioning_factor: 100000 endpoints: - priority: 0 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 1.2.3.4 port_value: 8080 - priority: 1 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 6.7.8.9 port_value: 8080 Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI header at the cluster layer. If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy today. This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now: 1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets. 2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we move on to the next target. 3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the affected resolver nodes. 4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster (note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target) 5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored. One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect failover. In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much. Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of failover mode).
2019-08-05 18:30:35 +00:00
needGateways := make(map[string]struct{})
for _, target := range chain.Targets {
s.logger.Trace("initializing watch of target",
"upstream", id,
"chain", chain.ServiceName,
"target", target.ID,
"mesh-gateway-mode", target.MeshGateway.Mode,
)
connect: fix failover through a mesh gateway to a remote datacenter (#6259) Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080: - name: foo load_assignment: cluster_name: foo policy: overprovisioning_factor: 100000 endpoints: - priority: 0 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 1.2.3.4 port_value: 8080 - priority: 1 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 6.7.8.9 port_value: 8080 Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI header at the cluster layer. If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy today. This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now: 1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets. 2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we move on to the next target. 3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the affected resolver nodes. 4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster (note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target) 5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored. One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect failover. In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much. Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of failover mode).
2019-08-05 18:30:35 +00:00
// We'll get endpoints from the gateway query, but the health still has
// to come from the backing service query.
switch target.MeshGateway.Mode {
case structs.MeshGatewayModeRemote:
needGateways[target.Datacenter] = struct{}{}
case structs.MeshGatewayModeLocal:
needGateways[s.source.Datacenter] = struct{}{}
}
connect: fix failover through a mesh gateway to a remote datacenter (#6259) Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080: - name: foo load_assignment: cluster_name: foo policy: overprovisioning_factor: 100000 endpoints: - priority: 0 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 1.2.3.4 port_value: 8080 - priority: 1 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 6.7.8.9 port_value: 8080 Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI header at the cluster layer. If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy today. This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now: 1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets. 2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we move on to the next target. 3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the affected resolver nodes. 4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster (note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target) 5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored. One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect failover. In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much. Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of failover mode).
2019-08-05 18:30:35 +00:00
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(s.ctx)
err := s.watchConnectProxyService(
ctx,
"upstream-target:"+target.ID+":"+id,
target.Service,
target.Datacenter,
target.Subset.Filter,
target.GetEnterpriseMetadata(),
)
if err != nil {
cancel()
return err
}
snap.WatchedUpstreams[id][target.ID] = cancel
}
for dc := range needGateways {
if _, ok := snap.WatchedGateways[id][dc]; ok {
connect: fix failover through a mesh gateway to a remote datacenter (#6259) Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080: - name: foo load_assignment: cluster_name: foo policy: overprovisioning_factor: 100000 endpoints: - priority: 0 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 1.2.3.4 port_value: 8080 - priority: 1 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 6.7.8.9 port_value: 8080 Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI header at the cluster layer. If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy today. This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now: 1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets. 2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we move on to the next target. 3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the affected resolver nodes. 4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster (note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target) 5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored. One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect failover. In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much. Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of failover mode).
2019-08-05 18:30:35 +00:00
continue
}
s.logger.Trace("initializing watch of mesh gateway in datacenter",
"upstream", id,
"chain", chain.ServiceName,
"datacenter", dc,
)
connect: fix failover through a mesh gateway to a remote datacenter (#6259) Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080: - name: foo load_assignment: cluster_name: foo policy: overprovisioning_factor: 100000 endpoints: - priority: 0 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 1.2.3.4 port_value: 8080 - priority: 1 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 6.7.8.9 port_value: 8080 Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI header at the cluster layer. If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy today. This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now: 1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets. 2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we move on to the next target. 3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the affected resolver nodes. 4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster (note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target) 5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored. One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect failover. In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much. Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of failover mode).
2019-08-05 18:30:35 +00:00
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(s.ctx)
err := s.watchMeshGateway(ctx, dc, id)
if err != nil {
cancel()
return err
}
snap.WatchedGateways[id][dc] = cancel
connect: fix failover through a mesh gateway to a remote datacenter (#6259) Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080: - name: foo load_assignment: cluster_name: foo policy: overprovisioning_factor: 100000 endpoints: - priority: 0 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 1.2.3.4 port_value: 8080 - priority: 1 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 6.7.8.9 port_value: 8080 Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI header at the cluster layer. If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy today. This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now: 1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets. 2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we move on to the next target. 3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the affected resolver nodes. 4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster (note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target) 5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored. One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect failover. In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much. Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of failover mode).
2019-08-05 18:30:35 +00:00
}
for dc, cancelFn := range snap.WatchedGateways[id] {
connect: fix failover through a mesh gateway to a remote datacenter (#6259) Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080: - name: foo load_assignment: cluster_name: foo policy: overprovisioning_factor: 100000 endpoints: - priority: 0 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 1.2.3.4 port_value: 8080 - priority: 1 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 6.7.8.9 port_value: 8080 Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI header at the cluster layer. If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy today. This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now: 1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets. 2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we move on to the next target. 3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the affected resolver nodes. 4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster (note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target) 5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored. One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect failover. In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much. Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of failover mode).
2019-08-05 18:30:35 +00:00
if _, ok := needGateways[dc]; ok {
continue
}
s.logger.Trace("stopping watch of mesh gateway in datacenter",
"upstream", id,
"chain", chain.ServiceName,
"datacenter", dc,
)
delete(snap.WatchedGateways[id], dc)
delete(snap.WatchedGatewayEndpoints[id], dc)
connect: fix failover through a mesh gateway to a remote datacenter (#6259) Failover is pushed entirely down to the data plane by creating envoy clusters and putting each successive destination in a different load assignment priority band. For example this shows that normally requests go to 1.2.3.4:8080 but when that fails they go to 6.7.8.9:8080: - name: foo load_assignment: cluster_name: foo policy: overprovisioning_factor: 100000 endpoints: - priority: 0 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 1.2.3.4 port_value: 8080 - priority: 1 lb_endpoints: - endpoint: address: socket_address: address: 6.7.8.9 port_value: 8080 Mesh gateways route requests based solely on the SNI header tacked onto the TLS layer. Envoy currently only lets you configure the outbound SNI header at the cluster layer. If you try to failover through a mesh gateway you ideally would configure the SNI value per endpoint, but that's not possible in envoy today. This PR introduces a simpler way around the problem for now: 1. We identify any target of failover that will use mesh gateway mode local or remote and then further isolate any resolver node in the compiled discovery chain that has a failover destination set to one of those targets. 2. For each of these resolvers we will perform a small measurement of comparative healths of the endpoints that come back from the health API for the set of primary target and serial failover targets. We walk the list of targets in order and if any endpoint is healthy we return that target, otherwise we move on to the next target. 3. The CDS and EDS endpoints both perform the measurements in (2) for the affected resolver nodes. 4. For CDS this measurement selects which TLS SNI field to use for the cluster (note the cluster is always going to be named for the primary target) 5. For EDS this measurement selects which set of endpoints will populate the cluster. Priority tiered failover is ignored. One of the big downsides to this approach to failover is that the failover detection and correction is going to be controlled by consul rather than deferring that entirely to the data plane as with the prior version. This also means that we are bound to only failover using official health signals and cannot make use of data plane signals like outlier detection to affect failover. In this specific scenario the lack of data plane signals is ok because the effectiveness is already muted by the fact that the ultimate destination endpoints will have their data plane signals scrambled when they pass through the mesh gateway wrapper anyway so we're not losing much. Another related fix is that we now use the endpoint health from the underlying service, not the health of the gateway (regardless of failover mode).
2019-08-05 18:30:35 +00:00
cancelFn()
}
return nil
}
func (s *state) handleUpdateTerminatingGateway(u cache.UpdateEvent, snap *ConfigSnapshot) error {
if u.Err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error filling agent cache: %v", u.Err)
}
logger := s.logger.Named(logging.TerminatingGateway)
switch {
case u.CorrelationID == rootsWatchID:
roots, ok := u.Result.(*structs.IndexedCARoots)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
snap.Roots = roots
// Update watches based on the current list of services associated with the terminating-gateway
case u.CorrelationID == gatewayServicesWatchID:
services, ok := u.Result.(*structs.IndexedGatewayServices)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
svcMap := make(map[structs.ServiceName]struct{})
for _, svc := range services.Services {
// Make sure to add every service to this map, we use it to cancel watches below.
svcMap[svc.Service] = struct{}{}
// Store the gateway <-> service mapping for TLS origination
snap.TerminatingGateway.GatewayServices[svc.Service] = *svc
// Watch the health endpoint to discover endpoints for the service
if _, ok := snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedServices[svc.Service]; !ok {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(s.ctx)
err := s.cache.Notify(ctx, cachetype.HealthServicesName, &structs.ServiceSpecificRequest{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
ServiceName: svc.Service.Name,
EnterpriseMeta: svc.Service.EnterpriseMeta,
// The gateway acts as the service's proxy, so we do NOT want to discover other proxies
Connect: false,
2020-04-20 19:42:33 +00:00
}, externalServiceIDPrefix+svc.Service.String(), s.ch)
if err != nil {
logger.Error("failed to register watch for external-service",
"service", svc.Service.String(),
"error", err,
)
cancel()
return err
}
snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedServices[svc.Service] = cancel
}
// Watch intentions with this service as their destination
// The gateway will enforce intentions for connections to the service
if _, ok := snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedIntentions[svc.Service]; !ok {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(s.ctx)
err := s.cache.Notify(ctx, cachetype.IntentionMatchName, &structs.IntentionQueryRequest{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
Match: &structs.IntentionQueryMatch{
Type: structs.IntentionMatchDestination,
Entries: []structs.IntentionMatchEntry{
{
Namespace: svc.Service.NamespaceOrDefault(),
Name: svc.Service.Name,
},
},
},
2020-04-20 19:42:33 +00:00
}, serviceIntentionsIDPrefix+svc.Service.String(), s.ch)
if err != nil {
logger.Error("failed to register watch for service-intentions",
"service", svc.Service.String(),
"error", err,
)
cancel()
return err
}
snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedIntentions[svc.Service] = cancel
}
// Watch leaf certificate for the service
// This cert is used to terminate mTLS connections on the service's behalf
if _, ok := snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedLeaves[svc.Service]; !ok {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(s.ctx)
err := s.cache.Notify(ctx, cachetype.ConnectCALeafName, &cachetype.ConnectCALeafRequest{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
Token: s.token,
Service: svc.Service.Name,
EnterpriseMeta: svc.Service.EnterpriseMeta,
2020-04-20 19:42:33 +00:00
}, serviceLeafIDPrefix+svc.Service.String(), s.ch)
if err != nil {
logger.Error("failed to register watch for a service-leaf",
"service", svc.Service.String(),
"error", err,
)
cancel()
return err
}
snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedLeaves[svc.Service] = cancel
}
2020-04-14 14:59:23 +00:00
// Watch service resolvers for the service
// These are used to create clusters and endpoints for the service subsets
if _, ok := snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedResolvers[svc.Service]; !ok {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(s.ctx)
err := s.cache.Notify(ctx, cachetype.ConfigEntriesName, &structs.ConfigEntryQuery{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
Kind: structs.ServiceResolver,
Name: svc.Service.Name,
2020-04-14 14:59:23 +00:00
EnterpriseMeta: svc.Service.EnterpriseMeta,
2020-04-20 19:42:33 +00:00
}, serviceResolverIDPrefix+svc.Service.String(), s.ch)
2020-04-14 14:59:23 +00:00
if err != nil {
logger.Error("failed to register watch for a service-resolver",
"service", svc.Service.String(),
"error", err,
)
cancel()
return err
}
snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedResolvers[svc.Service] = cancel
}
}
// Delete gateway service mapping for services that were not in the update
for sn := range snap.TerminatingGateway.GatewayServices {
if _, ok := svcMap[sn]; !ok {
delete(snap.TerminatingGateway.GatewayServices, sn)
}
}
// Clean up services with hostname mapping for services that were not in the update
for sn := range snap.TerminatingGateway.HostnameServices {
if _, ok := svcMap[sn]; !ok {
delete(snap.TerminatingGateway.HostnameServices, sn)
}
}
// Cancel service instance watches for services that were not in the update
for sn, cancelFn := range snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedServices {
if _, ok := svcMap[sn]; !ok {
logger.Debug("canceling watch for service", "service", sn.String())
delete(snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedServices, sn)
delete(snap.TerminatingGateway.ServiceGroups, sn)
cancelFn()
}
}
// Cancel leaf cert watches for services that were not in the update
for sn, cancelFn := range snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedLeaves {
if _, ok := svcMap[sn]; !ok {
logger.Debug("canceling watch for leaf cert", "service", sn.String())
delete(snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedLeaves, sn)
delete(snap.TerminatingGateway.ServiceLeaves, sn)
cancelFn()
}
}
2020-04-14 14:59:23 +00:00
// Cancel service-resolver watches for services that were not in the update
for sn, cancelFn := range snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedResolvers {
if _, ok := svcMap[sn]; !ok {
logger.Debug("canceling watch for service-resolver", "service", sn.String())
delete(snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedResolvers, sn)
delete(snap.TerminatingGateway.ServiceResolvers, sn)
2020-04-14 14:59:23 +00:00
cancelFn()
}
}
// Cancel intention watches for services that were not in the update
for sn, cancelFn := range snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedIntentions {
if _, ok := svcMap[sn]; !ok {
logger.Debug("canceling watch for intention", "service", sn.String())
delete(snap.TerminatingGateway.WatchedIntentions, sn)
// No additional deletions needed, since intentions aren't stored in snapshot
cancelFn()
}
}
2020-04-20 19:42:33 +00:00
case strings.HasPrefix(u.CorrelationID, externalServiceIDPrefix):
resp, ok := u.Result.(*structs.IndexedCheckServiceNodes)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
sn := structs.ServiceNameFromString(strings.TrimPrefix(u.CorrelationID, externalServiceIDPrefix))
delete(snap.TerminatingGateway.ServiceGroups, sn)
delete(snap.TerminatingGateway.HostnameServices, sn)
if len(resp.Nodes) > 0 {
snap.TerminatingGateway.ServiceGroups[sn] = resp.Nodes
snap.TerminatingGateway.HostnameServices[sn] = s.hostnameEndpoints(logging.TerminatingGateway, snap.Datacenter, resp.Nodes)
}
// Store leaf cert for watched service
2020-04-20 19:42:33 +00:00
case strings.HasPrefix(u.CorrelationID, serviceLeafIDPrefix):
leaf, ok := u.Result.(*structs.IssuedCert)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
sn := structs.ServiceNameFromString(strings.TrimPrefix(u.CorrelationID, serviceLeafIDPrefix))
snap.TerminatingGateway.ServiceLeaves[sn] = leaf
case strings.HasPrefix(u.CorrelationID, "service-resolver:"):
configEntries, ok := u.Result.(*structs.IndexedConfigEntries)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
// There should only ever be one entry for a service resolver within a namespace
if len(configEntries.Entries) == 1 {
if resolver, ok := configEntries.Entries[0].(*structs.ServiceResolverConfigEntry); ok {
snap.TerminatingGateway.ServiceResolvers[structs.NewServiceName(resolver.Name, &resolver.EnterpriseMeta)] = resolver
2020-04-14 14:59:23 +00:00
}
}
2020-04-14 14:59:23 +00:00
// nolint: staticcheck // github.com/dominikh/go-tools/issues/580
2020-04-20 19:42:33 +00:00
case strings.HasPrefix(u.CorrelationID, serviceIntentionsIDPrefix):
// no-op: Intentions don't get stored in the snapshot, calls to ConnectAuthorize will fetch them from the cache
default:
// do nothing
}
return nil
}
func (s *state) handleUpdateMeshGateway(u cache.UpdateEvent, snap *ConfigSnapshot) error {
if u.Err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error filling agent cache: %v", u.Err)
}
meshLogger := s.logger.Named(logging.MeshGateway)
switch u.CorrelationID {
case rootsWatchID:
roots, ok := u.Result.(*structs.IndexedCARoots)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
snap.Roots = roots
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
case federationStateListGatewaysWatchID:
dcIndexedNodes, ok := u.Result.(*structs.DatacenterIndexedCheckServiceNodes)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
snap.MeshGateway.FedStateGateways = dcIndexedNodes.DatacenterNodes
for dc, nodes := range dcIndexedNodes.DatacenterNodes {
snap.MeshGateway.HostnameDatacenters[dc] = s.hostnameEndpoints(logging.MeshGateway, snap.Datacenter, nodes)
}
for dc := range snap.MeshGateway.HostnameDatacenters {
if _, ok := dcIndexedNodes.DatacenterNodes[dc]; !ok {
delete(snap.MeshGateway.HostnameDatacenters, dc)
}
}
case serviceListWatchID:
services, ok := u.Result.(*structs.IndexedServiceList)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
svcMap := make(map[structs.ServiceName]struct{})
for _, svc := range services.Services {
// Make sure to add every service to this map, we use it to cancel
// watches below.
svcMap[svc] = struct{}{}
if _, ok := snap.MeshGateway.WatchedServices[svc]; !ok {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(s.ctx)
err := s.cache.Notify(ctx, cachetype.HealthServicesName, &structs.ServiceSpecificRequest{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
ServiceName: svc.Name,
Connect: true,
EnterpriseMeta: svc.EnterpriseMeta,
}, fmt.Sprintf("connect-service:%s", svc.String()), s.ch)
if err != nil {
meshLogger.Error("failed to register watch for connect-service",
"service", svc.String(),
"error", err,
)
cancel()
return err
}
snap.MeshGateway.WatchedServices[svc] = cancel
}
}
for sid, cancelFn := range snap.MeshGateway.WatchedServices {
if _, ok := svcMap[sid]; !ok {
meshLogger.Debug("canceling watch for service", "service", sid.String())
// TODO (gateways) Should the sid also be deleted from snap.MeshGateway.ServiceGroups?
// Do those endpoints get cleaned up some other way?
delete(snap.MeshGateway.WatchedServices, sid)
cancelFn()
}
}
snap.MeshGateway.WatchedServicesSet = true
case datacentersWatchID:
datacentersRaw, ok := u.Result.(*[]string)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
if datacentersRaw == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid response with a nil datacenter list")
}
datacenters := *datacentersRaw
for _, dc := range datacenters {
if dc == s.source.Datacenter {
continue
}
if _, ok := snap.MeshGateway.WatchedDatacenters[dc]; !ok {
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(s.ctx)
err := s.cache.Notify(ctx, cachetype.InternalServiceDumpName, &structs.ServiceDumpRequest{
Datacenter: dc,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
ServiceKind: structs.ServiceKindMeshGateway,
UseServiceKind: true,
Source: *s.source,
EnterpriseMeta: *structs.DefaultEnterpriseMeta(),
}, fmt.Sprintf("mesh-gateway:%s", dc), s.ch)
if err != nil {
meshLogger.Error("failed to register watch for mesh-gateway",
"datacenter", dc,
"error", err,
)
cancel()
return err
}
snap.MeshGateway.WatchedDatacenters[dc] = cancel
}
}
for dc, cancelFn := range snap.MeshGateway.WatchedDatacenters {
found := false
for _, dcCurrent := range datacenters {
if dcCurrent == dc {
found = true
break
}
}
if !found {
delete(snap.MeshGateway.WatchedDatacenters, dc)
cancelFn()
}
}
case serviceResolversWatchID:
configEntries, ok := u.Result.(*structs.IndexedConfigEntries)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
resolvers := make(map[structs.ServiceName]*structs.ServiceResolverConfigEntry)
for _, entry := range configEntries.Entries {
if resolver, ok := entry.(*structs.ServiceResolverConfigEntry); ok {
resolvers[structs.NewServiceName(resolver.Name, &resolver.EnterpriseMeta)] = resolver
}
}
snap.MeshGateway.ServiceResolvers = resolvers
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
case consulServerListWatchID:
resp, ok := u.Result.(*structs.IndexedCheckServiceNodes)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
// Do some initial sanity checks to avoid doing something dumb.
for _, csn := range resp.Nodes {
if csn.Service.Service != structs.ConsulServiceName {
return fmt.Errorf("expected service name %q but got %q",
structs.ConsulServiceName, csn.Service.Service)
}
if csn.Node.Datacenter != snap.Datacenter {
return fmt.Errorf("expected datacenter %q but got %q",
snap.Datacenter, csn.Node.Datacenter)
}
}
snap.MeshGateway.ConsulServers = resp.Nodes
default:
switch {
case strings.HasPrefix(u.CorrelationID, "connect-service:"):
resp, ok := u.Result.(*structs.IndexedCheckServiceNodes)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
sn := structs.ServiceNameFromString(strings.TrimPrefix(u.CorrelationID, "connect-service:"))
if len(resp.Nodes) > 0 {
snap.MeshGateway.ServiceGroups[sn] = resp.Nodes
} else if _, ok := snap.MeshGateway.ServiceGroups[sn]; ok {
delete(snap.MeshGateway.ServiceGroups, sn)
}
case strings.HasPrefix(u.CorrelationID, "mesh-gateway:"):
resp, ok := u.Result.(*structs.IndexedCheckServiceNodes)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
dc := strings.TrimPrefix(u.CorrelationID, "mesh-gateway:")
delete(snap.MeshGateway.GatewayGroups, dc)
delete(snap.MeshGateway.HostnameDatacenters, dc)
if len(resp.Nodes) > 0 {
snap.MeshGateway.GatewayGroups[dc] = resp.Nodes
snap.MeshGateway.HostnameDatacenters[dc] = s.hostnameEndpoints(logging.MeshGateway, snap.Datacenter, resp.Nodes)
}
default:
// do nothing for now
}
}
return nil
}
func (s *state) handleUpdateIngressGateway(u cache.UpdateEvent, snap *ConfigSnapshot) error {
if u.Err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error filling agent cache: %v", u.Err)
}
switch {
case u.CorrelationID == rootsWatchID:
roots, ok := u.Result.(*structs.IndexedCARoots)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
snap.Roots = roots
case u.CorrelationID == gatewayConfigWatchID:
resp, ok := u.Result.(*structs.ConfigEntryResponse)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
gatewayConf, ok := resp.Entry.(*structs.IngressGatewayConfigEntry)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for config entry: %T", resp.Entry)
}
snap.IngressGateway.TLSEnabled = gatewayConf.TLS.Enabled
snap.IngressGateway.TLSSet = true
if err := s.watchIngressLeafCert(snap); err != nil {
return err
}
case u.CorrelationID == gatewayServicesWatchID:
services, ok := u.Result.(*structs.IndexedGatewayServices)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid type for response: %T", u.Result)
}
// Update our upstreams and watches.
var hosts []string
watchedSvcs := make(map[string]struct{})
upstreamsMap := make(map[IngressListenerKey]structs.Upstreams)
for _, service := range services.Services {
u := makeUpstream(service)
err := s.watchIngressDiscoveryChain(snap, u)
if err != nil {
return err
}
watchedSvcs[u.Identifier()] = struct{}{}
hosts = append(hosts, service.Hosts...)
id := IngressListenerKey{Protocol: service.Protocol, Port: service.Port}
upstreamsMap[id] = append(upstreamsMap[id], u)
}
snap.IngressGateway.Upstreams = upstreamsMap
snap.IngressGateway.Hosts = hosts
snap.IngressGateway.HostsSet = true
for id, cancelFn := range snap.IngressGateway.WatchedDiscoveryChains {
if _, ok := watchedSvcs[id]; !ok {
cancelFn()
delete(snap.IngressGateway.WatchedDiscoveryChains, id)
}
}
if err := s.watchIngressLeafCert(snap); err != nil {
return err
}
default:
return s.handleUpdateUpstreams(u, &snap.IngressGateway.ConfigSnapshotUpstreams)
}
return nil
}
func makeUpstream(g *structs.GatewayService) structs.Upstream {
upstream := structs.Upstream{
DestinationName: g.Service.Name,
DestinationNamespace: g.Service.NamespaceOrDefault(),
LocalBindPort: g.Port,
IngressHosts: g.Hosts,
// Pass the protocol that was configured on the ingress listener in order
// to force that protocol on the Envoy listener.
Config: map[string]interface{}{
"protocol": g.Protocol,
},
}
return upstream
}
func (s *state) watchIngressDiscoveryChain(snap *ConfigSnapshot, u structs.Upstream) error {
if _, ok := snap.IngressGateway.WatchedDiscoveryChains[u.Identifier()]; ok {
return nil
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(s.ctx)
err := s.cache.Notify(ctx, cachetype.CompiledDiscoveryChainName, &structs.DiscoveryChainRequest{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
QueryOptions: structs.QueryOptions{Token: s.token},
Name: u.DestinationName,
EvaluateInDatacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
EvaluateInNamespace: u.DestinationNamespace,
}, "discovery-chain:"+u.Identifier(), s.ch)
if err != nil {
cancel()
return err
}
snap.IngressGateway.WatchedDiscoveryChains[u.Identifier()] = cancel
return nil
}
func (s *state) generateIngressDNSSANs(snap *ConfigSnapshot) []string {
// Update our leaf cert watch with wildcard entries for our DNS domains as well as any
// configured custom hostnames from the service.
if !snap.IngressGateway.TLSEnabled {
return nil
}
var dnsNames []string
namespaces := make(map[string]struct{})
for _, upstreams := range snap.IngressGateway.Upstreams {
for _, u := range upstreams {
namespaces[u.DestinationNamespace] = struct{}{}
}
}
for ns := range namespaces {
// The default namespace is special cased in DNS resolution, so special
// case it here.
if ns == structs.IntentionDefaultNamespace {
ns = ""
} else {
ns = ns + "."
}
dnsNames = append(dnsNames, fmt.Sprintf("*.ingress.%s%s", ns, s.dnsConfig.Domain))
dnsNames = append(dnsNames, fmt.Sprintf("*.ingress.%s%s.%s", ns, s.source.Datacenter, s.dnsConfig.Domain))
if s.dnsConfig.AltDomain != "" {
dnsNames = append(dnsNames, fmt.Sprintf("*.ingress.%s%s", ns, s.dnsConfig.AltDomain))
dnsNames = append(dnsNames, fmt.Sprintf("*.ingress.%s%s.%s", ns, s.source.Datacenter, s.dnsConfig.AltDomain))
}
}
dnsNames = append(dnsNames, snap.IngressGateway.Hosts...)
return dnsNames
}
func (s *state) watchIngressLeafCert(snap *ConfigSnapshot) error {
if !snap.IngressGateway.TLSSet || !snap.IngressGateway.HostsSet {
return nil
}
// Watch the leaf cert
if snap.IngressGateway.LeafCertWatchCancel != nil {
snap.IngressGateway.LeafCertWatchCancel()
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(s.ctx)
err := s.cache.Notify(ctx, cachetype.ConnectCALeafName, &cachetype.ConnectCALeafRequest{
Datacenter: s.source.Datacenter,
Token: s.token,
Service: s.service,
DNSSAN: s.generateIngressDNSSANs(snap),
EnterpriseMeta: s.proxyID.EnterpriseMeta,
}, leafWatchID, s.ch)
if err != nil {
cancel()
return err
}
snap.IngressGateway.LeafCertWatchCancel = cancel
return nil
}
// CurrentSnapshot synchronously returns the current ConfigSnapshot if there is
// one ready. If we don't have one yet because not all necessary parts have been
// returned (i.e. both roots and leaf cert), nil is returned.
func (s *state) CurrentSnapshot() *ConfigSnapshot {
// Make a chan for the response to be sent on
ch := make(chan *ConfigSnapshot, 1)
s.reqCh <- ch
// Wait for the response
return <-ch
}
// Changed returns whether or not the passed NodeService has had any of the
// fields we care about for config state watching changed or a different token.
func (s *state) Changed(ns *structs.NodeService, token string) bool {
if ns == nil {
return true
}
proxyCfg, err := copyProxyConfig(ns)
if err != nil {
s.logger.Warn("Failed to parse proxy config and will treat the new service as unchanged")
}
return ns.Kind != s.kind ||
s.proxyID != ns.CompoundServiceID() ||
s.address != ns.Address ||
s.port != ns.Port ||
!reflect.DeepEqual(s.proxyCfg, proxyCfg) ||
s.token != token
}
// hostnameEndpoints returns all CheckServiceNodes that have hostnames instead of IPs as the address.
// Envoy cannot resolve hostnames provided through EDS, so we exclusively use CDS for these clusters.
// If there is a mix of hostnames and addresses we exclusively use the hostnames, since clusters cannot discover
// services with both EDS and DNS.
func (s *state) hostnameEndpoints(loggerName string, localDC string, nodes structs.CheckServiceNodes) structs.CheckServiceNodes {
var (
hasIP bool
hasHostname bool
resp structs.CheckServiceNodes
)
for _, n := range nodes {
addr, _ := n.BestAddress(localDC != n.Node.Datacenter)
if net.ParseIP(addr) != nil {
hasIP = true
continue
}
hasHostname = true
resp = append(resp, n)
}
if hasHostname && hasIP {
dc := nodes[0].Node.Datacenter
sn := nodes[0].Service.CompoundServiceName()
s.logger.Named(loggerName).
Warn("service contains instances with mix of hostnames and IP addresses; only hostnames will be passed to Envoy",
"dc", dc, "service", sn.String())
}
return resp
}