consul/agent/connect/ca/provider_aws.go

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// Copyright (c) HashiCorp, Inc.
[COMPLIANCE] License changes (#18443) * Adding explicit MPL license for sub-package This directory and its subdirectories (packages) contain files licensed with the MPLv2 `LICENSE` file in this directory and are intentionally licensed separately from the BSL `LICENSE` file at the root of this repository. * Adding explicit MPL license for sub-package This directory and its subdirectories (packages) contain files licensed with the MPLv2 `LICENSE` file in this directory and are intentionally licensed separately from the BSL `LICENSE` file at the root of this repository. * Updating the license from MPL to Business Source License Going forward, this project will be licensed under the Business Source License v1.1. Please see our blog post for more details at <Blog URL>, FAQ at www.hashicorp.com/licensing-faq, and details of the license at www.hashicorp.com/bsl. * add missing license headers * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 --------- Co-authored-by: hashicorp-copywrite[bot] <110428419+hashicorp-copywrite[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2023-08-11 13:12:13 +00:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
package ca
import (
"bytes"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"sync/atomic"
"time"
"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/aws"
"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/aws/awserr"
"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/aws/session"
"github.com/aws/aws-sdk-go/service/acmpca"
check expiry date of the root/intermediate before using it to sign a leaf (#10500) * ca: move provider creation into CAManager This further decouples the CAManager from Server. It reduces the interface between them and removes the need for the SetLogger method on providers. * ca: move SignCertificate to CAManager To reduce the scope of Server, and keep all the CA logic together * ca: move SignCertificate to the file where it is used * auto-config: move autoConfigBackend impl off of Server Most of these methods are used exclusively for the AutoConfig RPC endpoint. This PR uses a pattern that we've used in other places as an incremental step to reducing the scope of Server. * fix linter issues * check error when `raftApplyMsgpack` * ca: move SignCertificate to CAManager To reduce the scope of Server, and keep all the CA logic together * check expiry date of the intermediate before using it to sign a leaf * fix typo in comment Co-authored-by: Kyle Havlovitz <kylehav@gmail.com> * Fix test name * do not check cert start date * wrap error to mention it is the intermediate expired * Fix failing test * update comment Co-authored-by: Daniel Nephin <dnephin@hashicorp.com> * use shim to avoid sleep in test * add root cert validation * remove duplicate code * Revert "fix linter issues" This reverts commit 6356302b54f06c8f2dee8e59740409d49e84ef24. * fix import issue * gofmt leader_connect_ca * add changelog entry * update error message Co-authored-by: Freddy <freddygv@users.noreply.github.com> * fix error message in test Co-authored-by: Daniel Nephin <dnephin@hashicorp.com> Co-authored-by: Kyle Havlovitz <kylehav@gmail.com> Co-authored-by: Freddy <freddygv@users.noreply.github.com>
2021-07-13 16:15:06 +00:00
"github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog"
2021-07-12 14:37:25 +00:00
"github.com/mitchellh/mapstructure"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/connect"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/lib"
)
const (
// RootTemplateARN is the AWS-defined template we need to use when issuing a
// root cert.
RootTemplateARN = "arn:aws:acm-pca:::template/RootCACertificate/V1"
// IntermediateTemplateARN is the AWS-defined template we need to use when
// issuing an intermediate cert.
IntermediateTemplateARN = "arn:aws:acm-pca:::template/SubordinateCACertificate_PathLen0/V1"
// LeafTemplateARN is the AWS-defined template we need to use when issuing a
// leaf cert.
LeafTemplateARN = "arn:aws:acm-pca:::template/EndEntityCertificate/V1"
// IntermediateTTL is the validity duration for the intermediate certs we
// create.
AWSIntermediateTTL = 1 * 365 * 24 * time.Hour
// SignTimout is the maximum time we will spend waiting (polling) for a leaf
// certificate to be signed.
AWSSignTimeout = 45 * time.Second
// CreateTimeout is the maximum time we will spend waiting (polling)
// for the CA to be created.
AWSCreateTimeout = 2 * time.Minute
// AWSStateCAARNKey is the key in the provider State we store the ARN of the
// CA we created if any.
AWSStateCAARNKey = "CA_ARN"
// day is a more readable shorthand for a duration of 24 hours. Note time
// package doesn't provide time.Day due to ambiguity around DST and leap
// seconds where a day may not actually be 24 hours.
day = 24 * time.Hour
)
// AWSProvider implements Provider for AWS ACM PCA
type AWSProvider struct {
stopped uint32 // atomically accessed, at start to prevent alignment issues
stopCh chan struct{}
config *structs.AWSCAProviderConfig
session *session.Session
client *acmpca.ACMPCA
isPrimary bool
datacenter string
clusterID string
arn string
arnChecked bool
caCreated bool
rootPEM string
intermediatePEM string
logger hclog.Logger
}
var _ Provider = (*AWSProvider)(nil)
// NewAWSProvider returns a new AWSProvider
func NewAWSProvider(logger hclog.Logger) *AWSProvider {
return &AWSProvider{logger: logger}
}
// Configure implements Provider
func (a *AWSProvider) Configure(cfg ProviderConfig) error {
config, err := ParseAWSCAConfig(cfg.RawConfig)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// We only support setting IAM credentials through the normal methods ENV,
// SharedCredentialsFile, IAM role. Per
// https://docs.aws.amazon.com/sdk-for-go/v1/developer-guide/configuring-sdk.html#specifying-credentials
// Putting them in CA config amounts to writing them to disk config file in
// another place or sending them via API call and persisting them in state
// store in a new place on disk. One of the existing standard solutions seems
// better in all cases.
awsSession, err := session.NewSessionWithOptions(session.Options{
SharedConfigState: session.SharedConfigEnable,
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
a.config = config
a.session = awsSession
a.isPrimary = cfg.IsPrimary
a.clusterID = cfg.ClusterID
a.datacenter = cfg.Datacenter
a.client = acmpca.New(awsSession)
a.stopCh = make(chan struct{})
// Load the ARN from config or previous state.
if config.ExistingARN != "" {
a.arn = config.ExistingARN
} else if arn := cfg.State[AWSStateCAARNKey]; arn != "" {
a.arn = arn
// We only pass ARN through state if we created the resource. We don't
// "remember" previously existing resources the user configured.
a.caCreated = true
}
return nil
}
// State implements Provider
func (a *AWSProvider) State() (map[string]string, error) {
if a.arn == "" {
return nil, nil
}
// Preserve the CA ARN if there is one
state := make(map[string]string)
state[AWSStateCAARNKey] = a.arn
return state, nil
}
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
2023-04-03 15:40:33 +00:00
// GenerateCAChain implements Provider
func (a *AWSProvider) GenerateCAChain() (string, error) {
if !a.isPrimary {
return "", fmt.Errorf("provider is not the root certificate authority")
}
if err := a.ensureCA(); err != nil {
return "", err
}
if a.rootPEM == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("AWS CA provider not fully Initialized")
}
return a.rootPEM, nil
}
// ensureCA loads the CA resource to check it exists if configured by User or in
// state from previous run. Otherwise it creates a new CA of the correct type
// for this DC.
func (a *AWSProvider) ensureCA() error {
// If we already have an ARN, we assume the CA is created and sanity check
// it's available.
if a.arn != "" {
// Only check this once on startup not on every operation
if a.arnChecked {
return nil
}
// Load from the resource.
input := &acmpca.DescribeCertificateAuthorityInput{
CertificateAuthorityArn: aws.String(a.arn),
}
output, err := a.client.DescribeCertificateAuthority(input)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Allow it to be active or pending a certificate (leadership might have
// changed during a secondary initialization for example).
if *output.CertificateAuthority.Status != acmpca.CertificateAuthorityStatusActive &&
*output.CertificateAuthority.Status != acmpca.CertificateAuthorityStatusPendingCertificate {
verb := "configured"
if a.caCreated {
verb = "created"
}
// Don't recreate CA that was manually disabled, force full deletion or
// manual recreation. We might later support this or an explicit
// "recreate" config option to allow rotating without a manual creation
// but this is simpler and less surprising default behavior if user
// disabled a CA due to a security concern and we just work around it.
return fmt.Errorf("the %s PCA is not active: status is %s", verb,
*output.CertificateAuthority.Status)
}
// Load the certs
if err := a.loadCACerts(); err != nil {
return err
}
a.arnChecked = true
return nil
}
// Need to create a Private CA resource.
err := a.createPCA()
if err != nil {
return err
}
// If we are in a secondary DC this is all we can do for now - the rest is
// handled by the Initialization routine of calling GenerateIntermediateCSR
// and then SetIntermediate.
if !a.isPrimary {
return nil
}
// CA is created and in PENDING_CERTIFCATE state, generate a self-signed cert
// and install it.
csrPEM, err := a.getCACSR()
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Self-sign it as a root
certPEM, err := a.signCSR(csrPEM, RootTemplateARN, a.config.RootCertTTL)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Submit the signed cert
input := acmpca.ImportCertificateAuthorityCertificateInput{
CertificateAuthorityArn: aws.String(a.arn),
Certificate: []byte(certPEM),
}
a.logger.Debug("uploading certificate for ARN", "arn", a.arn)
_, err = a.client.ImportCertificateAuthorityCertificate(&input)
if err != nil {
return err
}
a.rootPEM = certPEM
return nil
}
func keyTypeToAlgos(keyType string, keyBits int) (string, string, error) {
switch keyType {
case "rsa":
switch keyBits {
case 2048:
return acmpca.KeyAlgorithmRsa2048, acmpca.SigningAlgorithmSha256withrsa, nil
case 4096:
return acmpca.KeyAlgorithmRsa4096, acmpca.SigningAlgorithmSha256withrsa, nil
default:
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("AWS PCA only supports RSA key lengths 2048"+
" and 4096, PrivateKeyBits of %d configured", keyBits)
}
case "ec":
if keyBits != 256 {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("AWS PCA only supports P256 EC curve, keyBits of %d configured", keyBits)
}
return acmpca.KeyAlgorithmEcPrime256v1, acmpca.SigningAlgorithmSha256withecdsa, nil
default:
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("AWS PCA only supports P256 EC curve, or RSA"+
" 2048/4096. %s, %d configured", keyType, keyBits)
}
}
func (a *AWSProvider) createPCA() error {
pcaType := "ROOT" // For some reason there is no constant for this in the SDK
if !a.isPrimary {
pcaType = acmpca.CertificateAuthorityTypeSubordinate
}
keyAlg, signAlg, err := keyTypeToAlgos(a.config.PrivateKeyType, a.config.PrivateKeyBits)
if err != nil {
return err
}
uid, err := connect.CompactUID()
if err != nil {
return err
}
commonName := connect.CACN("aws", uid, a.clusterID, a.isPrimary)
createInput := acmpca.CreateCertificateAuthorityInput{
CertificateAuthorityType: aws.String(pcaType),
CertificateAuthorityConfiguration: &acmpca.CertificateAuthorityConfiguration{
Subject: &acmpca.ASN1Subject{
CommonName: aws.String(commonName),
},
KeyAlgorithm: aws.String(keyAlg),
SigningAlgorithm: aws.String(signAlg),
},
RevocationConfiguration: &acmpca.RevocationConfiguration{
// TODO support CRL in future when we manage revocation in Connect more
// generally.
CrlConfiguration: &acmpca.CrlConfiguration{
Enabled: aws.Bool(false),
},
},
// uid is unique to each PCA we create so use it as an idempotency string. We
// don't actually retry on failure yet but might as well!
IdempotencyToken: aws.String(uid),
Tags: []*acmpca.Tag{
{Key: aws.String("consul_cluster_id"), Value: aws.String(a.clusterID)},
{Key: aws.String("consul_datacenter"), Value: aws.String(a.datacenter)},
},
}
a.logger.Debug("creating new PCA", "common_name", commonName)
createOutput, err := a.client.CreateCertificateAuthority(&createInput)
if err != nil {
a.logger.Error("failed to create new PCA", "common_name", commonName, "error", err)
return err
}
// wait for PCA to be created
newARN := *createOutput.CertificateAuthorityArn
describeInput := acmpca.DescribeCertificateAuthorityInput{
CertificateAuthorityArn: aws.String(newARN),
}
_, err = a.pollLoop("Private CA", AWSCreateTimeout, func() (bool, string, error) {
describeOutput, err := a.client.DescribeCertificateAuthority(&describeInput)
if err != nil {
if err.(awserr.Error).Code() != acmpca.ErrCodeRequestInProgressException {
return true, "", fmt.Errorf("error waiting for PCA to be created: %s", err)
}
}
if *describeOutput.CertificateAuthority.Status == acmpca.CertificateAuthorityStatusPendingCertificate {
a.logger.Debug("new PCA is ready to accept a certificate", "pca", newARN)
a.arn = newARN
// We don't need to reload this ARN since we just created it and know what
// state it's in
a.arnChecked = true
return true, "", nil
}
// Retry
return false, "", nil
})
return err
}
func (a *AWSProvider) getCACSR() (string, error) {
input := &acmpca.GetCertificateAuthorityCsrInput{
CertificateAuthorityArn: aws.String(a.arn),
}
a.logger.Debug("retrieving CSR for PCA", "pca", a.arn)
output, err := a.client.GetCertificateAuthorityCsr(input)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
csrPEM := output.Csr
if csrPEM == nil {
// Probably shouldn't be able to happen but being defensive.
return "", fmt.Errorf("invalid response from AWS PCA: CSR is nil")
}
return *csrPEM, nil
}
func (a *AWSProvider) loadCACerts() error {
input := &acmpca.GetCertificateAuthorityCertificateInput{
CertificateAuthorityArn: aws.String(a.arn),
}
output, err := a.client.GetCertificateAuthorityCertificate(input)
if err != nil {
return err
}
if a.isPrimary {
// Just use the cert as a root
a.rootPEM = lib.EnsureTrailingNewline(*output.Certificate)
} else {
a.intermediatePEM = lib.EnsureTrailingNewline(*output.Certificate)
// TODO(banks) support user-supplied CA being a Subordinate even in the
// primary DC. For now this assumes there is only one cert in the chain
if output.CertificateChain == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("Subordinate CA %s returned no chain", a.arn)
}
a.rootPEM = lib.EnsureTrailingNewline(*output.CertificateChain)
}
return nil
}
func (a *AWSProvider) signCSRRaw(csr *x509.CertificateRequest, templateARN string, ttl time.Duration) (string, error) {
// PEM encode the CSR
var pemBuf bytes.Buffer
if err := pem.Encode(&pemBuf, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE REQUEST", Bytes: csr.Raw}); err != nil {
return "", err
}
return a.signCSR(pemBuf.String(), templateARN, ttl)
}
// pollWait returns how long to wait for the next poll of an async operation. We
// optimize for times typically seen in the API. This is called _before_ the
// first poll so we can provide a typical delay since operations are never
// complete immediately so it's a waste to try.
func pollWait(attemptsMade int) time.Duration {
// Hard code times for now
waits := []time.Duration{
// Never seen it complete first time with a lower value
100 * time.Millisecond,
200 * time.Millisecond,
500 * time.Millisecond,
1 * time.Second,
3 * time.Second,
5 * time.Second,
}
maxIdx := len(waits) - 1
if attemptsMade > maxIdx {
attemptsMade = maxIdx
}
return waits[attemptsMade]
}
func (a *AWSProvider) pollLoop(desc string, timeout time.Duration, f func() (bool, string, error)) (string, error) {
attemptsMade := 0
start := time.Now()
wait := pollWait(attemptsMade)
for {
elapsed := time.Since(start)
if elapsed >= timeout {
return "", fmt.Errorf("timeout after %s waiting for %s", elapsed, desc)
}
a.logger.Debug(fmt.Sprintf("%s pending, waiting to check readiness", desc),
"wait_time", wait,
)
select {
case <-a.stopCh:
// Provider discarded
a.logger.Warn(fmt.Sprintf("provider instance terminated while waiting for %s.", desc))
return "", fmt.Errorf("provider terminated")
case <-time.After(wait):
// Continue looping...
}
done, out, err := f()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if done {
return out, err
}
attemptsMade++
wait = pollWait(attemptsMade)
}
}
func (a *AWSProvider) signCSR(csrPEM string, templateARN string, ttl time.Duration) (string, error) {
_, signAlg, err := keyTypeToAlgos(a.config.PrivateKeyType, a.config.PrivateKeyBits)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
issueInput := acmpca.IssueCertificateInput{
CertificateAuthorityArn: aws.String(a.arn),
Csr: []byte(csrPEM),
SigningAlgorithm: aws.String(signAlg),
TemplateArn: aws.String(templateARN),
Validity: &acmpca.Validity{
Value: aws.Int64(int64(ttl / day)),
Type: aws.String(acmpca.ValidityPeriodTypeDays),
},
}
issueOutput, err := a.client.IssueCertificate(&issueInput)
// ErrCodeLimitExceededException is used for both hard and soft limits in AWS
// SDK :(. In this specific context though (issuing a certificate) there is no
// hard limit on number of certs so a limit exceeded here is a rate limit.
if aerr, ok := err.(awserr.Error); ok && err != nil {
if aerr.Code() == acmpca.ErrCodeLimitExceededException {
return "", ErrRateLimited
}
}
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("error issuing certificate from PCA: %s", err)
}
// wait for certificate to be created
certInput := acmpca.GetCertificateInput{
CertificateAuthorityArn: aws.String(a.arn),
CertificateArn: issueOutput.CertificateArn,
}
return a.pollLoop(fmt.Sprintf("certificate %s", *issueOutput.CertificateArn),
AWSSignTimeout,
func() (bool, string, error) {
certOutput, err := a.client.GetCertificate(&certInput)
if err != nil {
if err.(awserr.Error).Code() != acmpca.ErrCodeRequestInProgressException {
return true, "", fmt.Errorf("error retrieving certificate from PCA: %s", err)
}
}
if certOutput.Certificate != nil {
return true, lib.EnsureTrailingNewline(*certOutput.Certificate), nil
}
return false, "", nil
})
}
// GenerateIntermediateCSR implements Provider
func (a *AWSProvider) GenerateIntermediateCSR() (string, string, error) {
if a.isPrimary {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("provider is the root certificate authority, " +
"cannot generate an intermediate CSR")
}
err := a.ensureCA()
if err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
// We should have the CA created now and should be able to generate the CSR.
pem, err := a.getCACSR()
return pem, "", err
}
// SetIntermediate implements Provider
func (a *AWSProvider) SetIntermediate(intermediatePEM string, rootPEM string, _ string) error {
err := a.ensureCA()
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Install the certificate
input := acmpca.ImportCertificateAuthorityCertificateInput{
CertificateAuthorityArn: aws.String(a.arn),
Certificate: []byte(intermediatePEM),
CertificateChain: []byte(rootPEM),
}
a.logger.Debug("uploading certificate for PCA", "pca", a.arn)
_, err = a.client.ImportCertificateAuthorityCertificate(&input)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// We successfully initialized, keep track of the root and intermediate certs.
a.rootPEM = lib.EnsureTrailingNewline(rootPEM)
a.intermediatePEM = lib.EnsureTrailingNewline(intermediatePEM)
return nil
}
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
2023-04-03 15:40:33 +00:00
// ActiveLeafSigningCert implements Provider
func (a *AWSProvider) ActiveLeafSigningCert() (string, error) {
err := a.ensureCA()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if a.rootPEM == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("AWS CA provider not fully Initialized")
}
if a.isPrimary {
// In the simple case the primary DC owns a Root CA and signs with it
// directly so just return that for "intermediate" too since that is what we
// will sign leafs with.
//
// TODO(banks) support user-supplied CA being a Subordinate even in the
// primary DC. We'd have to figure that out here and return the actual
// signing cert as well as somehow populate the intermediate chain.
return a.rootPEM, nil
}
if a.intermediatePEM == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("secondary AWS CA provider not fully Initialized")
}
return a.intermediatePEM, nil
}
// Sign implements Provider
func (a *AWSProvider) Sign(csr *x509.CertificateRequest) (string, error) {
connect.HackSANExtensionForCSR(csr)
if a.rootPEM == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("AWS CA provider not fully Initialized")
}
a.logger.Debug("signing csr for requester",
"requester", csr.Subject.CommonName,
)
return a.signCSRRaw(csr, LeafTemplateARN, a.config.LeafCertTTL)
}
// SignIntermediate implements Provider
func (a *AWSProvider) SignIntermediate(csr *x509.CertificateRequest) (string, error) {
err := validateSignIntermediate(csr, connect.SpiffeIDSigningForCluster(a.clusterID))
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Sign it!
return a.signCSRRaw(csr, IntermediateTemplateARN, AWSIntermediateTTL)
}
// CrossSignCA implements Provider
func (a *AWSProvider) CrossSignCA(newCA *x509.Certificate) (string, error) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("not implemented in AWS PCA provider")
}
func (a *AWSProvider) disablePCA() error {
if a.arn == "" {
return nil
}
input := acmpca.UpdateCertificateAuthorityInput{
CertificateAuthorityArn: aws.String(a.arn),
Status: aws.String(acmpca.CertificateAuthorityStatusDisabled),
}
a.logger.Info("disabling PCA", "pca", a.arn)
_, err := a.client.UpdateCertificateAuthority(&input)
return err
}
func (a *AWSProvider) deletePCA() error {
if a.arn == "" {
return nil
}
input := acmpca.DeleteCertificateAuthorityInput{
CertificateAuthorityArn: aws.String(a.arn),
// We only ever use this to clean up after tests so delete as quickly as
// possible (7 days).
PermanentDeletionTimeInDays: aws.Int64(7),
}
a.logger.Info("deleting PCA", "pca", a.arn)
_, err := a.client.DeleteCertificateAuthority(&input)
return err
}
// Cleanup implements Provider
func (a *AWSProvider) Cleanup(providerTypeChange bool, otherConfig map[string]interface{}) error {
old := atomic.SwapUint32(&a.stopped, 1)
if old == 0 {
close(a.stopCh)
}
if !providerTypeChange {
awsConfig, err := ParseAWSCAConfig(otherConfig)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// if the provider is being replaced and using an existing PCA instance
// then prevent deletion of that instance if the new provider uses
// the same instance.
if a.config.ExistingARN == awsConfig.ExistingARN {
return nil
}
}
if a.config.DeleteOnExit {
if err := a.disablePCA(); err != nil {
// Log the error but continue trying to delete as some errors may still
// allow that and this is best-effort delete anyway.
a.logger.Error("failed to disable PCA",
"pca", a.arn,
"error", err,
)
}
if err := a.deletePCA(); err != nil {
// Log the error but continue trying to delete as some errors may still
// allow that and this is best-effort delete anyway.
a.logger.Error("failed to delete PCA",
"pca", a.arn,
"error", err,
)
}
// Don't stall leader shutdown, non of the failures here are fatal.
return nil
}
return nil
}
// SupportsCrossSigning implements Provider
func (a *AWSProvider) SupportsCrossSigning() (bool, error) {
return false, nil
}
// ParseAWSCAConfig parses and validates AWS CA Provider configuration.
func ParseAWSCAConfig(raw map[string]interface{}) (*structs.AWSCAProviderConfig, error) {
config := structs.AWSCAProviderConfig{
CommonCAProviderConfig: defaultCommonConfig(),
}
decodeConf := &mapstructure.DecoderConfig{
DecodeHook: structs.ParseDurationFunc(),
Result: &config,
WeaklyTypedInput: true,
}
decoder, err := mapstructure.NewDecoder(decodeConf)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := decoder.Decode(raw); err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("error decoding config: %s", err)
}
if err := config.CommonCAProviderConfig.Validate(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Extra keytype validation since PCA is more limited than other providers
_, _, err = keyTypeToAlgos(config.PrivateKeyType, config.PrivateKeyBits)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if config.LeafCertTTL < 24*time.Hour {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("AWS PCA doesn't support certificates that are valid"+
" for less than 24 hours, LeafTTL of %s configured", config.LeafCertTTL)
}
return &config, nil
}