mirror of https://github.com/status-im/consul.git
26 lines
1.1 KiB
Markdown
26 lines
1.1 KiB
Markdown
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# xDS Server
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The xDS Server is a gRPC service that implements [xDS] and handles requests from
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an [envoy proxy].
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[xDS]: https://www.envoyproxy.io/docs/envoy/latest/api-docs/xds_protocol
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[envoy proxy]: https://www.consul.io/docs/connect/proxies/envoy
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## Authorization
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Requests to the xDS server are authorized based on an assumption of how
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`proxycfg.ConfigSnapshot` are constructed. Most interfaces (HTTP, DNS, RPC)
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authorize requests by authorizing the data in the response, or by filtering
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out data that the requester is not authorized to view. The xDS server authorizes
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requests by looking at the proxy ID in the request and ensuring the ACL token has
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`service:write` access to either the destination service (for kind=ConnectProxy), or
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the gateway service (for other kinds).
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This authorization strategy requires that [agent/proxycfg] only fetches data using a
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token with the same permissions, and that it only stores data by proxy ID. We assume
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that any data in the snapshot was already filtered, which allows this authorization to
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only perform a shallow check against the proxy ID.
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[agent/proxycfg]: https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/blob/main/agent/proxycfg
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