consul/agent/connect/ca/provider_vault.go

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// Copyright (c) HashiCorp, Inc.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MPL-2.0
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package ca
import (
"bytes"
"context"
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"crypto/x509"
"encoding/pem"
"fmt"
"io"
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"net/http"
"strings"
"sync"
"time"
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"github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog"
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vaultapi "github.com/hashicorp/vault/api"
"github.com/mitchellh/mapstructure"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/connect"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/lib"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/lib/decode"
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)
const (
VaultCALeafCertRole = "leaf-cert"
VaultAuthMethodTypeAliCloud = "alicloud"
VaultAuthMethodTypeAppRole = "approle"
VaultAuthMethodTypeAWS = "aws"
VaultAuthMethodTypeAzure = "azure"
VaultAuthMethodTypeCloudFoundry = "cf"
VaultAuthMethodTypeGitHub = "github"
VaultAuthMethodTypeGCP = "gcp"
VaultAuthMethodTypeJWT = "jwt"
VaultAuthMethodTypeKerberos = "kerberos"
VaultAuthMethodTypeKubernetes = "kubernetes"
VaultAuthMethodTypeLDAP = "ldap"
VaultAuthMethodTypeOCI = "oci"
VaultAuthMethodTypeOkta = "okta"
VaultAuthMethodTypeRadius = "radius"
VaultAuthMethodTypeTLS = "cert"
VaultAuthMethodTypeToken = "token"
VaultAuthMethodTypeUserpass = "userpass"
defaultK8SServiceAccountTokenPath = "/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token"
)
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var (
ErrBackendNotMounted = fmt.Errorf("backend not mounted")
ErrBackendNotInitialized = fmt.Errorf("backend not initialized")
)
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type VaultProvider struct {
config *structs.VaultCAProviderConfig
client *vaultapi.Client
// We modify the namespace on the fly to override default namespace for rootCertificate and intermediateCertificate. Can't guarantee
// all operations (specifically Sign) are not called re-entrantly, so we add this for safety.
clientMutex sync.Mutex
baseNamespace string
stopWatcher func()
isPrimary bool
clusterID string
spiffeID *connect.SpiffeIDSigning
logger hclog.Logger
// isConsulMountedIntermediate is used to determine if we should tune the
// mount if the VaultProvider is ever reconfigured. This is at most a
// "best guess" to determine whether this instance of Consul created the
// intermediate mount but will not be able to tell if an existing mount
// was created by Consul (in a previous running instance) or was external.
isConsulMountedIntermediate bool
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}
var _ Provider = (*VaultProvider)(nil)
func NewVaultProvider(logger hclog.Logger) *VaultProvider {
return &VaultProvider{
stopWatcher: func() {},
logger: logger,
}
}
func vaultTLSConfig(config *structs.VaultCAProviderConfig) *vaultapi.TLSConfig {
return &vaultapi.TLSConfig{
CACert: config.CAFile,
CAPath: config.CAPath,
ClientCert: config.CertFile,
ClientKey: config.KeyFile,
Insecure: config.TLSSkipVerify,
TLSServerName: config.TLSServerName,
}
}
// Configure sets up the provider using the given configuration.
// Configure supports being called multiple times to re-configure the provider.
func (v *VaultProvider) Configure(cfg ProviderConfig) error {
config, err := ParseVaultCAConfig(cfg.RawConfig)
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if err != nil {
return err
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}
clientConf := &vaultapi.Config{
Address: config.Address,
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}
err = clientConf.ConfigureTLS(vaultTLSConfig(config))
if err != nil {
return err
}
client, err := vaultapi.NewClient(clientConf)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// We don't want to set the namespace if it's empty to prevent potential
// unknown behavior (what does Vault do with an empty namespace). The Vault
// client also makes sure the inputs are not empty strings so let's do the
// same.
if config.Namespace != "" {
client.SetNamespace(config.Namespace)
v.baseNamespace = config.Namespace
}
if config.AuthMethod != nil {
loginResp, err := vaultLogin(client, config.AuthMethod)
if err != nil {
return err
}
config.Token = loginResp.Auth.ClientToken
}
client.SetToken(config.Token)
v.config = config
v.client = client
v.isPrimary = cfg.IsPrimary
v.clusterID = cfg.ClusterID
v.spiffeID = connect.SpiffeIDSigningForCluster(v.clusterID)
// Look up the token to see if we can auto-renew its lease.
secret, err := client.Auth().Token().LookupSelf()
if err != nil {
return err
} else if secret == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not look up Vault provider token: not found")
}
var token struct {
Renewable bool
TTL int
}
if err := mapstructure.Decode(secret.Data, &token); err != nil {
return err
}
// Set up a renewer to renew the token automatically, if supported.
if token.Renewable || config.AuthMethod != nil {
lifetimeWatcher, err := client.NewLifetimeWatcher(&vaultapi.LifetimeWatcherInput{
Secret: &vaultapi.Secret{
Auth: &vaultapi.SecretAuth{
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ClientToken: config.Token,
Renewable: token.Renewable,
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LeaseDuration: secret.LeaseDuration,
},
},
Increment: token.TTL,
RenewBehavior: vaultapi.RenewBehaviorIgnoreErrors,
})
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("error beginning Vault provider token renewal: %v", err)
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithCancel(context.Background())
if v.stopWatcher != nil {
// stop the running watcher loop if we are re-configuring
v.stopWatcher()
}
v.stopWatcher = cancel
go v.renewToken(ctx, lifetimeWatcher)
}
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// Update the intermediate (managed) PKI mount and role
if err := v.setupIntermediatePKIPath(); err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
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func (v *VaultProvider) ValidateConfigUpdate(prevRaw, nextRaw map[string]interface{}) error {
prev, err := ParseVaultCAConfig(prevRaw)
if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse existing CA config: %w", err)
}
next, err := ParseVaultCAConfig(nextRaw)
if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to parse new CA config: %w", err)
}
if prev.RootPKIPath != next.RootPKIPath {
return nil
}
if prev.PrivateKeyType != "" && prev.PrivateKeyType != connect.DefaultPrivateKeyType {
if prev.PrivateKeyType != next.PrivateKeyType {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot update the PrivateKeyType field without changing RootPKIPath")
}
}
if prev.PrivateKeyBits != 0 && prev.PrivateKeyBits != connect.DefaultPrivateKeyBits {
if prev.PrivateKeyBits != next.PrivateKeyBits {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot update the PrivateKeyBits field without changing RootPKIPath")
}
}
return nil
}
// renewToken uses a vaultapi.LifetimeWatcher to repeatedly renew our token's lease.
// If the token can no longer be renewed and auth method is set,
// it will re-authenticate to Vault using the auth method and restart the renewer with the new token.
func (v *VaultProvider) renewToken(ctx context.Context, watcher *vaultapi.LifetimeWatcher) {
go watcher.Start()
defer watcher.Stop()
for {
select {
case <-ctx.Done():
return
case err := <-watcher.DoneCh():
// Watcher has stopped
if err != nil {
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v.logger.Error("Error renewing token for Vault provider", "error", err)
}
// If the watcher has exited and auth method is enabled,
// re-authenticate using the auth method and set up a new watcher.
if v.config.AuthMethod != nil {
// Login to Vault using the auth method.
loginResp, err := vaultLogin(v.client, v.config.AuthMethod)
if err != nil {
v.logger.Error("Error login in to Vault with %q auth method", v.config.AuthMethod.Type)
go watcher.Start()
continue
}
// Set the new token for the vault client.
v.client.SetToken(loginResp.Auth.ClientToken)
v.logger.Info("Successfully re-authenticated with Vault using auth method")
// Start the new watcher for the new token.
watcher, err = v.client.NewLifetimeWatcher(&vaultapi.LifetimeWatcherInput{
Secret: loginResp,
RenewBehavior: vaultapi.RenewBehaviorIgnoreErrors,
})
if err != nil {
v.logger.Error("Error starting token renewal process")
go watcher.Start()
continue
}
}
go watcher.Start()
case <-watcher.RenewCh():
v.logger.Info("Successfully renewed token for Vault provider")
}
}
}
// State implements Provider. Vault provider needs no state other than the
// user-provided config currently.
func (v *VaultProvider) State() (map[string]string, error) {
return nil, nil
}
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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// GenerateCAChain mounts and initializes a new root PKI backend if needed.
func (v *VaultProvider) GenerateCAChain() (CAChainResult, error) {
if !v.isPrimary {
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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return CAChainResult{}, fmt.Errorf("provider is not the root certificate authority")
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}
// Set up the root PKI backend if necessary.
rootPEM, err := v.getCA(v.config.RootPKINamespace, v.config.RootPKIPath)
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switch err {
case ErrBackendNotMounted:
err := v.mountNamespaced(v.config.RootPKINamespace, v.config.RootPKIPath, &vaultapi.MountInput{
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Type: "pki",
Description: "root CA backend for Consul Connect",
Config: vaultapi.MountConfigInput{
// the max lease ttl denotes the maximum ttl that secrets are created from the engine
// the default lease ttl is the kind of ttl that will *reliably* set the ttl to v.config.RootCertTTL
// https://www.vaultproject.io/docs/secrets/pki#configure-a-ca-certificate
MaxLeaseTTL: v.config.RootCertTTL.String(),
DefaultLeaseTTL: v.config.RootCertTTL.String(),
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},
})
if err != nil {
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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return CAChainResult{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to mount root CA backend: %w", err)
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}
// We want to initialize afterwards
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fallthrough
case ErrBackendNotInitialized:
uid, err := connect.CompactUID()
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if err != nil {
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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return CAChainResult{}, err
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}
resp, err := v.writeNamespaced(v.config.RootPKINamespace, v.config.RootPKIPath+"root/generate/internal", map[string]interface{}{
"common_name": connect.CACN("vault", uid, v.clusterID, v.isPrimary),
"uri_sans": v.spiffeID.URI().String(),
"key_type": v.config.PrivateKeyType,
"key_bits": v.config.PrivateKeyBits,
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})
if err != nil {
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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return CAChainResult{}, fmt.Errorf("failed to initialize root CA: %w", err)
}
var ok bool
rootPEM, ok = resp.Data["certificate"].(string)
if !ok {
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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return CAChainResult{}, fmt.Errorf("unexpected response from Vault: %v", resp.Data["certificate"])
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}
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default:
if err != nil {
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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return CAChainResult{}, fmt.Errorf("unexpected error while setting root PKI backend: %w", err)
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}
}
rootChain, err := v.getCAChain(v.config.RootPKINamespace, v.config.RootPKIPath)
if err != nil {
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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return CAChainResult{}, err
}
// Workaround for a bug in the Vault PKI API.
// See https://github.com/hashicorp/vault/issues/13489
if rootChain == "" {
rootChain = rootPEM
}
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
2023-04-03 15:40:33 +00:00
intermediate, err := v.ActiveLeafSigningCert()
if err != nil {
return CAChainResult{}, fmt.Errorf("error fetching active intermediate: %w", err)
}
if intermediate == "" {
intermediate, err = v.GenerateLeafSigningCert()
if err != nil {
return CAChainResult{}, fmt.Errorf("error generating intermediate: %w", err)
}
}
return CAChainResult{PEM: rootChain, IntermediatePEM: intermediate}, nil
2018-06-13 08:40:03 +00:00
}
// GenerateIntermediateCSR creates a private key and generates a CSR
// for another datacenter's root to sign, overwriting the intermediate backend
// in the process.
func (v *VaultProvider) GenerateIntermediateCSR() (string, string, error) {
if v.isPrimary {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("provider is the root certificate authority, " +
"cannot generate an intermediate CSR")
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}
return v.generateIntermediateCSR()
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}
func (v *VaultProvider) setupIntermediatePKIPath() error {
mountConfig := vaultapi.MountConfigInput{
MaxLeaseTTL: v.config.IntermediateCertTTL.String(),
}
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_, err := v.getCA(v.config.IntermediatePKINamespace, v.config.IntermediatePKIPath)
if err != nil {
if err == ErrBackendNotMounted {
err := v.mountNamespaced(v.config.IntermediatePKINamespace, v.config.IntermediatePKIPath, &vaultapi.MountInput{
Type: "pki",
Description: "intermediate CA backend for Consul Connect",
Config: mountConfig,
})
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to mount intermediate PKI backend: %w", err)
}
// Required to determine if we should tune the mount
// if the VaultProvider is ever reconfigured.
v.isConsulMountedIntermediate = true
} else if err == ErrBackendNotInitialized {
// If this is the first time calling setupIntermediatePKIPath, the backend
// will not have been initialized. Since the mount is ready we can suppress
// this error.
} else {
return fmt.Errorf("unexpected error while fetching intermediate CA: %w", err)
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}
} else {
v.logger.Info("Found existing Intermediate PKI path mount",
"namespace", v.config.IntermediatePKINamespace,
"path", v.config.IntermediatePKIPath,
)
// This codepath requires the Vault policy:
//
// path "/sys/mounts/<intermediate_pki_path>/tune" {
// capabilities = [ "update" ]
// }
//
err := v.tuneMountNamespaced(v.config.IntermediatePKINamespace, v.config.IntermediatePKIPath, &mountConfig)
if err != nil {
if v.isConsulMountedIntermediate {
v.logger.Warn("Intermediate PKI path was mounted by Consul but could not be tuned",
"namespace", v.config.IntermediatePKINamespace,
"path", v.config.IntermediatePKIPath,
"error", err,
)
} else {
v.logger.Debug("Failed to tune Intermediate PKI mount. 403 Forbidden is expected if Consul does not have tune capabilities for the Intermediate PKI mount (i.e. using Vault-managed policies)",
"namespace", v.config.IntermediatePKINamespace,
"path", v.config.IntermediatePKIPath,
"error", err,
)
}
}
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}
// Create the role for issuing leaf certs
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rolePath := v.config.IntermediatePKIPath + "roles/" + VaultCALeafCertRole
_, err = v.writeNamespaced(v.config.IntermediatePKINamespace, rolePath, map[string]interface{}{
"allow_any_name": true,
"allowed_uri_sans": "spiffe://*",
"key_type": "any",
"max_ttl": v.config.LeafCertTTL.String(),
"no_store": true,
"require_cn": false,
})
// enable auto-tidy with tidy_expired_issuers
v.autotidyIssuers(v.config.IntermediatePKIPath)
return err
}
// generateIntermediateCSR returns the CSR and key_id (only present in
// Vault 1.11+) or any errors encountered.
func (v *VaultProvider) generateIntermediateCSR() (string, string, error) {
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// Generate a new intermediate CSR for the root to sign.
uid, err := connect.CompactUID()
if err != nil {
return "", "", err
}
data, err := v.writeNamespaced(v.config.IntermediatePKINamespace, v.config.IntermediatePKIPath+"intermediate/generate/internal", map[string]interface{}{
"common_name": connect.CACN("vault", uid, v.clusterID, v.isPrimary),
"key_type": v.config.PrivateKeyType,
"key_bits": v.config.PrivateKeyBits,
"uri_sans": v.spiffeID.URI().String(),
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})
if err != nil {
return "", "", err
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}
if data == nil || data.Data["csr"] == "" {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("got empty value when generating intermediate CSR")
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}
csr, ok := data.Data["csr"].(string)
if !ok {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("csr result is not a string")
}
// Vault 1.11+ will return a "key_id" field which helps
// identify the correct issuer to set as default.
// https://github.com/hashicorp/vault/blob/e445c8b4f58dc20a0316a7fd1b5725b401c3b17a/builtin/logical/pki/path_intermediate.go#L154
if rawkeyId, ok := data.Data["key_id"]; ok {
keyId, ok := rawkeyId.(string)
if !ok {
return "", "", fmt.Errorf("key_id is not a string")
}
return csr, keyId, nil
}
return csr, "", nil
}
// SetIntermediate writes the incoming intermediate and root certificates to the
// intermediate backend (as a chain).
func (v *VaultProvider) SetIntermediate(intermediatePEM, rootPEM, keyId string) error {
if v.isPrimary {
return fmt.Errorf("cannot set an intermediate using another root in the primary datacenter")
}
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err := validateSetIntermediate(intermediatePEM, rootPEM, v.spiffeID)
if err != nil {
return err
}
importResp, err := v.writeNamespaced(v.config.IntermediatePKINamespace, v.config.IntermediatePKIPath+"intermediate/set-signed", map[string]interface{}{
"certificate": intermediatePEM,
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Vault 1.11+ will return a non-nil response from intermediate/set-signed
if importResp != nil {
err := v.setDefaultIntermediateIssuer(importResp, keyId)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("failed to update default intermediate issuer: %w", err)
}
}
return nil
}
// ActiveIntermediate returns the current intermediate certificate.
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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func (v *VaultProvider) ActiveLeafSigningCert() (string, error) {
cert, err := v.getCA(v.config.IntermediatePKINamespace, v.config.IntermediatePKIPath)
// This error is expected when calling initializeSecondaryCA for the
// first time. It means that the backend is mounted and ready, but
// there is no intermediate.
// This error is swallowed because there is nothing the caller can do
// about it. The caller needs to handle the empty cert though and
// create an intermediate CA.
if err == ErrBackendNotInitialized {
return "", nil
}
return cert, err
}
// getCA returns the raw CA cert for the given endpoint if there is one.
// We have to use the raw NewRequest call here instead of Logical().Read
// because the endpoint only returns the raw PEM contents of the CA cert
// and not the typical format of the secrets endpoints.
func (v *VaultProvider) getCA(namespace, path string) (string, error) {
defer v.setNamespace(namespace)()
resp, err := v.client.Logical().ReadRaw(path + "/ca/pem")
if resp != nil {
defer resp.Body.Close()
}
if resp != nil && resp.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound {
return "", ErrBackendNotMounted
}
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
bytes, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
root := lib.EnsureTrailingNewline(string(bytes))
if root == "" {
return "", ErrBackendNotInitialized
}
return root, nil
}
// TODO: refactor to remove duplication with getCA
func (v *VaultProvider) getCAChain(namespace, path string) (string, error) {
defer v.setNamespace(namespace)()
resp, err := v.client.Logical().ReadRaw(path + "/ca_chain")
if resp != nil {
defer resp.Body.Close()
}
if resp != nil && resp.StatusCode == http.StatusNotFound {
return "", ErrBackendNotMounted
}
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
raw, err := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
root := lib.EnsureTrailingNewline(string(raw))
return root, nil
}
// GenerateIntermediate mounts the configured intermediate PKI backend if
// necessary, then generates and signs a new CA CSR using the root PKI backend
// and updates the intermediate backend to use that new certificate.
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
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func (v *VaultProvider) GenerateLeafSigningCert() (string, error) {
csr, keyId, err := v.generateIntermediateCSR()
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
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// Sign the CSR with the root backend.
intermediate, err := v.writeNamespaced(v.config.RootPKINamespace, v.config.RootPKIPath+"root/sign-intermediate", map[string]interface{}{
"csr": csr,
"use_csr_values": true,
"format": "pem_bundle",
"ttl": v.config.IntermediateCertTTL.String(),
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})
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if intermediate == nil || intermediate.Data["certificate"] == "" {
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return "", fmt.Errorf("got empty value when generating intermediate certificate")
}
// Set the intermediate backend to use the new certificate.
importResp, err := v.writeNamespaced(v.config.IntermediatePKINamespace, v.config.IntermediatePKIPath+"intermediate/set-signed", map[string]interface{}{
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"certificate": intermediate.Data["certificate"],
})
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Vault 1.11+ will return a non-nil response from intermediate/set-signed
if importResp != nil {
err := v.setDefaultIntermediateIssuer(importResp, keyId)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to update default intermediate issuer: %w", err)
}
}
Connect CA Primary Provider refactor (#16749) * Rename Intermediate cert references to LeafSigningCert Within the Consul CA subsystem, the term "Intermediate" is confusing because the meaning changes depending on provider and datacenter (primary vs secondary). For example, when using the Consul CA the "ActiveIntermediate" may return the root certificate in a primary datacenter. At a high level, we are interested in knowing which CA is responsible for signing leaf certs, regardless of its position in a certificate chain. This rename makes the intent clearer. * Move provider state check earlier * Remove calls to GenerateLeafSigningCert GenerateLeafSigningCert (formerly known as GenerateIntermediate) is vestigial in non-Vault providers, as it simply returns the root certificate in primary datacenters. By folding Vault's intermediate cert logic into `GenerateRoot` we can encapsulate the intermediate cert handling within `newCARoot`. * Move GenerateLeafSigningCert out of PrimaryProvidder Now that the Vault Provider calls GenerateLeafSigningCert within GenerateRoot, we can remove the method from all other providers that never used it in a meaningful way. * Add test for IntermediatePEM * Rename GenerateRoot to GenerateCAChain "Root" was being overloaded in the Consul CA context, as different providers and configs resulted in a single root certificate or a chain originating from an external trusted CA. Since the Vault provider also generates intermediates, it seems more accurate to call this a CAChain.
2023-04-03 15:40:33 +00:00
return v.ActiveLeafSigningCert()
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}
// setDefaultIntermediateIssuer updates the default issuer for
// intermediate CA since Vault, as part of its 1.11+ support for
// multiple issuers, no longer overwrites the default issuer when
// generateIntermediateCSR (intermediate/generate/internal) is called.
//
// The response we get from calling [/intermediate/set-signed]
// should contain a "mapping" data field we can use to cross-reference
// with the keyId returned when calling [/intermediate/generate/internal].
//
// [/intermediate/set-signed]: https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/api-docs/secret/pki#import-ca-certificates-and-keys
// [/intermediate/generate/internal]: https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/api-docs/secret/pki#generate-intermediate-csr
func (v *VaultProvider) setDefaultIntermediateIssuer(vaultResp *vaultapi.Secret, keyId string) error {
if vaultResp.Data["mapping"] == nil {
return fmt.Errorf("expected Vault response data to have a 'mapping' key")
}
if keyId == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("expected non-empty keyId")
}
mapping, ok := vaultResp.Data["mapping"].(map[string]any)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("unexpected type for 'mapping' value in Vault response")
}
var intermediateId string
// The value in this KV pair is called "key"
for issuer, key := range mapping {
if key == keyId {
// Expect to find the key_id we got from Vault when we
// generated the intermediate CSR.
intermediateId = issuer
break
}
}
if intermediateId == "" {
return fmt.Errorf("could not find key_id %q in response from vault", keyId)
}
// For Vault 1.11+ it is important to GET then POST to avoid clobbering fields
// like `default_follows_latest_issuer`.
// https://developer.hashicorp.com/vault/api-docs/secret/pki#default_follows_latest_issuer
resp, err := v.readNamespaced(v.config.IntermediatePKINamespace, v.config.IntermediatePKIPath+"config/issuers")
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not read from /config/issuers: %w", err)
}
issuersConf := resp.Data
// Overwrite the default issuer
issuersConf["default"] = intermediateId
_, err = v.writeNamespaced(v.config.IntermediatePKINamespace, v.config.IntermediatePKIPath+"config/issuers", issuersConf)
if err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("could not write default issuer to /config/issuers: %w", err)
}
return nil
}
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// Sign calls the configured role in the intermediate PKI backend to issue
// a new leaf certificate based on the provided CSR, with the issuing
// intermediate CA cert attached.
func (v *VaultProvider) Sign(csr *x509.CertificateRequest) (string, error) {
connect.HackSANExtensionForCSR(csr)
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var pemBuf bytes.Buffer
if err := pem.Encode(&pemBuf, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE REQUEST", Bytes: csr.Raw}); err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Use the leaf cert role to sign a new cert for this CSR.
response, err := v.writeNamespaced(v.config.IntermediatePKINamespace, v.config.IntermediatePKIPath+"sign/"+VaultCALeafCertRole, map[string]interface{}{
"csr": pemBuf.String(),
"ttl": v.config.LeafCertTTL.String(),
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})
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("error issuing cert: %v", err)
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}
if response == nil || response.Data["certificate"] == "" || response.Data["issuing_ca"] == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("certificate info returned from Vault was blank")
}
cert, ok := response.Data["certificate"].(string)
if !ok {
return "", fmt.Errorf("certificate was not a string")
}
return lib.EnsureTrailingNewline(cert), nil
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}
// SignIntermediate returns a signed CA certificate with a path length constraint
// of 0 to ensure that the certificate cannot be used to generate further CA certs.
func (v *VaultProvider) SignIntermediate(csr *x509.CertificateRequest) (string, error) {
err := validateSignIntermediate(csr, v.spiffeID)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
var pemBuf bytes.Buffer
err = pem.Encode(&pemBuf, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE REQUEST", Bytes: csr.Raw})
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
// Sign the CSR with the root backend.
data, err := v.writeNamespaced(v.config.RootPKINamespace, v.config.RootPKIPath+"root/sign-intermediate", map[string]interface{}{
"csr": pemBuf.String(),
"use_csr_values": true,
"format": "pem_bundle",
"max_path_length": 0,
"ttl": v.config.IntermediateCertTTL.String(),
})
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
if data == nil || data.Data["certificate"] == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("got empty value when generating intermediate certificate")
}
intermediate, ok := data.Data["certificate"].(string)
if !ok {
return "", fmt.Errorf("signed intermediate result is not a string")
}
return lib.EnsureTrailingNewline(intermediate), nil
}
// CrossSignCA takes a CA certificate and cross-signs it to form a trust chain
// back to our active root.
func (v *VaultProvider) CrossSignCA(cert *x509.Certificate) (string, error) {
rootPEM, err := v.getCA(v.config.RootPKINamespace, v.config.RootPKIPath)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("failed to get root CA: %w", err)
}
rootCert, err := connect.ParseCert(rootPEM)
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("error parsing root cert: %v", err)
}
if rootCert.NotAfter.Before(time.Now()) {
return "", fmt.Errorf("root certificate is expired")
}
var pemBuf bytes.Buffer
err = pem.Encode(&pemBuf, &pem.Block{Type: "CERTIFICATE", Bytes: cert.Raw})
if err != nil {
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return "", err
}
// Have the root PKI backend sign this cert.
response, err := v.writeNamespaced(v.config.RootPKINamespace, v.config.RootPKIPath+"root/sign-self-issued", map[string]interface{}{
"certificate": pemBuf.String(),
})
if err != nil {
return "", fmt.Errorf("error having Vault cross-sign cert: %v", err)
}
if response == nil || response.Data["certificate"] == "" {
return "", fmt.Errorf("certificate info returned from Vault was blank")
}
xcCert, ok := response.Data["certificate"].(string)
if !ok {
return "", fmt.Errorf("certificate was not a string")
}
return lib.EnsureTrailingNewline(xcCert), nil
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}
// SupportsCrossSigning implements Provider
func (v *VaultProvider) SupportsCrossSigning() (bool, error) {
return true, nil
}
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// Cleanup unmounts the configured intermediate PKI backend. It's fine to tear
// this down and recreate it on small config changes because the intermediate
// certs get bundled with the leaf certs, so there's no cost to the CA changing.
func (v *VaultProvider) Cleanup(providerTypeChange bool, otherConfig map[string]interface{}) error {
v.Stop()
if !providerTypeChange {
newConfig, err := ParseVaultCAConfig(otherConfig)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// if the intermeidate PKI path isn't changing we don't want to delete it as
// Cleanup is called after initializing the new provider
if newConfig.IntermediatePKIPath == v.config.IntermediatePKIPath {
return nil
}
}
err := v.unmountNamespaced(v.config.IntermediatePKINamespace, v.config.IntermediatePKIPath)
switch err {
case ErrBackendNotMounted, ErrBackendNotInitialized:
// suppress these errors if we didn't finish initialization before
return nil
default:
return err
}
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}
// Stop shuts down the token renew goroutine.
func (v *VaultProvider) Stop() {
v.stopWatcher()
}
// We use raw path here
func (v *VaultProvider) mountNamespaced(namespace, path string, mountInfo *vaultapi.MountInput) error {
defer v.setNamespace(namespace)()
return v.client.Sys().Mount(path, mountInfo)
}
func (v *VaultProvider) tuneMountNamespaced(namespace, path string, mountConfig *vaultapi.MountConfigInput) error {
defer v.setNamespace(namespace)()
return v.client.Sys().TuneMount(path, *mountConfig)
}
func (v *VaultProvider) unmountNamespaced(namespace, path string) error {
defer v.setNamespace(namespace)()
return v.client.Sys().Unmount(path)
}
func (v *VaultProvider) readNamespaced(namespace string, resource string) (*vaultapi.Secret, error) {
defer v.setNamespace(namespace)()
return v.client.Logical().Read(resource)
}
func (v *VaultProvider) writeNamespaced(namespace string, resource string, data map[string]interface{}) (*vaultapi.Secret, error) {
defer v.setNamespace(namespace)()
return v.client.Logical().Write(resource, data)
}
func (v *VaultProvider) setNamespace(namespace string) func() {
if namespace != "" {
v.clientMutex.Lock()
v.client.SetNamespace(namespace)
return func() {
v.client.SetNamespace(v.baseNamespace)
v.clientMutex.Unlock()
}
} else {
return func() {}
}
}
// autotidyIssuers sets Vault's auto-tidy to remove expired issuers
// Returns a boolean on success for testing (as there is no post-facto way of
// checking if it is set). Logs at info level on failure to set and why,
// returning the log message for test purposes as well.
func (v *VaultProvider) autotidyIssuers(path string) (bool, string) {
s, err := v.client.Logical().Write(path+"/config/auto-tidy",
map[string]interface{}{
"enabled": true,
"tidy_expired_issuers": true,
})
var errStr string
if err != nil {
errStr = err.Error()
switch {
case strings.Contains(errStr, "404"):
errStr = "vault versions < 1.12 don't support auto-tidy"
case strings.Contains(errStr, "400"):
errStr = "vault versions < 1.13 don't support the tidy_expired_issuers field"
case strings.Contains(errStr, "403"):
errStr = "permission denied on auto-tidy path in vault"
}
v.logger.Info("Unable to enable Vault's auto-tidy feature for expired issuers", "reason", errStr, "path", path)
}
// return values for tests
tidySet := false
if s != nil {
if tei, ok := s.Data["tidy_expired_issuers"]; ok {
tidySet, _ = tei.(bool)
}
}
return tidySet, errStr
}
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func ParseVaultCAConfig(raw map[string]interface{}) (*structs.VaultCAProviderConfig, error) {
config := structs.VaultCAProviderConfig{
CommonCAProviderConfig: defaultCommonConfig(),
}
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decodeConf := &mapstructure.DecoderConfig{
DecodeHook: mapstructure.ComposeDecodeHookFunc(
structs.ParseDurationFunc(),
decode.HookTranslateKeys,
),
Result: &config,
WeaklyTypedInput: true,
}
decoder, err := mapstructure.NewDecoder(decodeConf)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := decoder.Decode(raw); err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("error decoding config: %s", err)
}
if config.Token == "" && config.AuthMethod == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("must provide a Vault token or configure a Vault auth method")
}
if config.Token != "" && config.AuthMethod != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("only one of Vault token or Vault auth method can be provided, but not both")
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}
if config.RootPKIPath == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("must provide a valid path to a root PKI backend")
}
if !strings.HasSuffix(config.RootPKIPath, "/") {
config.RootPKIPath += "/"
}
if config.IntermediatePKIPath == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("must provide a valid path for the intermediate PKI backend")
}
if !strings.HasSuffix(config.IntermediatePKIPath, "/") {
config.IntermediatePKIPath += "/"
}
if err := config.CommonCAProviderConfig.Validate(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
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return &config, nil
}
func vaultLogin(client *vaultapi.Client, authMethod *structs.VaultAuthMethod) (*vaultapi.Secret, error) {
vaultAuth, err := configureVaultAuthMethod(authMethod)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
resp, err := vaultAuth.Login(context.Background(), client)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if resp == nil || resp.Auth == nil || resp.Auth.ClientToken == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("login response did not return client token")
}
return resp, nil
}
// Note the authMethod's parameters (Params) is populated from a freeform map
// in the configuration where they could hardcode values to be passed directly
// to the `auth/*/login` endpoint. Each auth method's authentication code
// needs to handle two cases:
// - The legacy case (which should be deprecated) where the user has
// hardcoded login values directly (eg. a `jwt` string)
// - The case where they use the configuration option used in the
// vault agent's auth methods.
func configureVaultAuthMethod(authMethod *structs.VaultAuthMethod) (VaultAuthenticator, error) {
if authMethod.MountPath == "" {
authMethod.MountPath = authMethod.Type
}
loginPath := ""
switch authMethod.Type {
case VaultAuthMethodTypeAWS:
return NewAWSAuthClient(authMethod), nil
case VaultAuthMethodTypeAzure:
return NewAzureAuthClient(authMethod)
case VaultAuthMethodTypeGCP:
return NewGCPAuthClient(authMethod)
case VaultAuthMethodTypeJWT:
return NewJwtAuthClient(authMethod)
case VaultAuthMethodTypeAppRole:
return NewAppRoleAuthClient(authMethod)
case VaultAuthMethodTypeAliCloud:
return NewAliCloudAuthClient(authMethod)
case VaultAuthMethodTypeKubernetes:
return NewK8sAuthClient(authMethod)
// These auth methods require a username for the login API path.
case VaultAuthMethodTypeLDAP, VaultAuthMethodTypeUserpass, VaultAuthMethodTypeOkta, VaultAuthMethodTypeRadius:
// Get username from the params.
if username, ok := authMethod.Params["username"]; ok {
loginPath = fmt.Sprintf("auth/%s/login/%s", authMethod.MountPath, username)
} else {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get 'username' from auth method params")
}
return NewVaultAPIAuthClient(authMethod, loginPath), nil
// This auth method requires a role for the login API path.
case VaultAuthMethodTypeOCI:
if role, ok := authMethod.Params["role"]; ok {
loginPath = fmt.Sprintf("auth/%s/login/%s", authMethod.MountPath, role)
} else {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to get 'role' from auth method params")
}
return NewVaultAPIAuthClient(authMethod, loginPath), nil
case VaultAuthMethodTypeToken:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("'token' auth method is not supported via auth method configuration; " +
"please provide the token with the 'token' parameter in the CA configuration")
// The rest of the auth methods use auth/<auth method path> login API path.
case VaultAuthMethodTypeCloudFoundry,
VaultAuthMethodTypeGitHub,
VaultAuthMethodTypeKerberos,
VaultAuthMethodTypeTLS:
return NewVaultAPIAuthClient(authMethod, loginPath), nil
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("auth method %q is not supported", authMethod.Type)
}
}