consul/agent/agent_endpoint.go

1659 lines
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2014-01-04 01:15:51 +00:00
package agent
import (
ACL Token Persistence and Reloading (#5328) This PR adds two features which will be useful for operators when ACLs are in use. 1. Tokens set in configuration files are now reloadable. 2. If `acl.enable_token_persistence` is set to `true` in the configuration, tokens set via the `v1/agent/token` endpoint are now persisted to disk and loaded when the agent starts (or during configuration reload) Note that token persistence is opt-in so our users who do not want tokens on the local disk will see no change. Some other secondary changes: * Refactored a bunch of places where the replication token is retrieved from the token store. This token isn't just for replicating ACLs and now it is named accordingly. * Allowed better paths in the `v1/agent/token/` API. Instead of paths like: `v1/agent/token/acl_replication_token` the path can now be just `v1/agent/token/replication`. The old paths remain to be valid. * Added a couple new API functions to set tokens via the new paths. Deprecated the old ones and pointed to the new names. The names are also generally better and don't imply that what you are setting is for ACLs but rather are setting ACL tokens. There is a minor semantic difference there especially for the replication token as again, its no longer used only for ACL token/policy replication. The new functions will detect 404s and fallback to using the older token paths when talking to pre-1.4.3 agents. * Docs updated to reflect the API additions and to show using the new endpoints. * Updated the ACL CLI set-agent-tokens command to use the non-deprecated APIs.
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"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
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"log"
"net"
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"net/http"
ACL Token Persistence and Reloading (#5328) This PR adds two features which will be useful for operators when ACLs are in use. 1. Tokens set in configuration files are now reloadable. 2. If `acl.enable_token_persistence` is set to `true` in the configuration, tokens set via the `v1/agent/token` endpoint are now persisted to disk and loaded when the agent starts (or during configuration reload) Note that token persistence is opt-in so our users who do not want tokens on the local disk will see no change. Some other secondary changes: * Refactored a bunch of places where the replication token is retrieved from the token store. This token isn't just for replicating ACLs and now it is named accordingly. * Allowed better paths in the `v1/agent/token/` API. Instead of paths like: `v1/agent/token/acl_replication_token` the path can now be just `v1/agent/token/replication`. The old paths remain to be valid. * Added a couple new API functions to set tokens via the new paths. Deprecated the old ones and pointed to the new names. The names are also generally better and don't imply that what you are setting is for ACLs but rather are setting ACL tokens. There is a minor semantic difference there especially for the replication token as again, its no longer used only for ACL token/policy replication. The new functions will detect 404s and fallback to using the older token paths when talking to pre-1.4.3 agents. * Docs updated to reflect the API additions and to show using the new endpoints. * Updated the ACL CLI set-agent-tokens command to use the non-deprecated APIs.
2019-02-27 19:28:31 +00:00
"path/filepath"
"strconv"
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"strings"
"time"
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"github.com/mitchellh/mapstructure"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-memdb"
"github.com/mitchellh/hashstructure"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
cachetype "github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/cache-types"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/checks"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/config"
New command: consul debug (#4754) * agent/debug: add package for debugging, host info * api: add v1/agent/host endpoint * agent: add v1/agent/host endpoint * command/debug: implementation of static capture * command/debug: tests and only configured targets * agent/debug: add basic test for host metrics * command/debug: add methods for dynamic data capture * api: add debug/pprof endpoints * command/debug: add pprof * command/debug: timing, wg, logs to disk * vendor: add gopsutil/disk * command/debug: add a usage section * website: add docs for consul debug * agent/host: require operator:read * api/host: improve docs and no retry timing * command/debug: fail on extra arguments * command/debug: fixup file permissions to 0644 * command/debug: remove server flags * command/debug: improve clarity of usage section * api/debug: add Trace for profiling, fix profile * command/debug: capture profile and trace at the same time * command/debug: add index document * command/debug: use "clusters" in place of members * command/debug: remove address in output * command/debug: improve comment on metrics sleep * command/debug: clarify usage * agent: always register pprof handlers and protect This will allow us to avoid a restart of a target agent for profiling by always registering the pprof handlers. Given this is a potentially sensitive path, it is protected with an operator:read ACL and enable debug being set to true on the target agent. enable_debug still requires a restart. If ACLs are disabled, enable_debug is sufficient. * command/debug: use trace.out instead of .prof More in line with golang docs. * agent: fix comment wording * agent: wrap table driven tests in t.run()
2018-10-17 20:20:35 +00:00
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/debug"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/local"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
ACL Token Persistence and Reloading (#5328) This PR adds two features which will be useful for operators when ACLs are in use. 1. Tokens set in configuration files are now reloadable. 2. If `acl.enable_token_persistence` is set to `true` in the configuration, tokens set via the `v1/agent/token` endpoint are now persisted to disk and loaded when the agent starts (or during configuration reload) Note that token persistence is opt-in so our users who do not want tokens on the local disk will see no change. Some other secondary changes: * Refactored a bunch of places where the replication token is retrieved from the token store. This token isn't just for replicating ACLs and now it is named accordingly. * Allowed better paths in the `v1/agent/token/` API. Instead of paths like: `v1/agent/token/acl_replication_token` the path can now be just `v1/agent/token/replication`. The old paths remain to be valid. * Added a couple new API functions to set tokens via the new paths. Deprecated the old ones and pointed to the new names. The names are also generally better and don't imply that what you are setting is for ACLs but rather are setting ACL tokens. There is a minor semantic difference there especially for the replication token as again, its no longer used only for ACL token/policy replication. The new functions will detect 404s and fallback to using the older token paths when talking to pre-1.4.3 agents. * Docs updated to reflect the API additions and to show using the new endpoints. * Updated the ACL CLI set-agent-tokens command to use the non-deprecated APIs.
2019-02-27 19:28:31 +00:00
token_store "github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/token"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/api"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/ipaddr"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/lib"
ACL Token Persistence and Reloading (#5328) This PR adds two features which will be useful for operators when ACLs are in use. 1. Tokens set in configuration files are now reloadable. 2. If `acl.enable_token_persistence` is set to `true` in the configuration, tokens set via the `v1/agent/token` endpoint are now persisted to disk and loaded when the agent starts (or during configuration reload) Note that token persistence is opt-in so our users who do not want tokens on the local disk will see no change. Some other secondary changes: * Refactored a bunch of places where the replication token is retrieved from the token store. This token isn't just for replicating ACLs and now it is named accordingly. * Allowed better paths in the `v1/agent/token/` API. Instead of paths like: `v1/agent/token/acl_replication_token` the path can now be just `v1/agent/token/replication`. The old paths remain to be valid. * Added a couple new API functions to set tokens via the new paths. Deprecated the old ones and pointed to the new names. The names are also generally better and don't imply that what you are setting is for ACLs but rather are setting ACL tokens. There is a minor semantic difference there especially for the replication token as again, its no longer used only for ACL token/policy replication. The new functions will detect 404s and fallback to using the older token paths when talking to pre-1.4.3 agents. * Docs updated to reflect the API additions and to show using the new endpoints. * Updated the ACL CLI set-agent-tokens command to use the non-deprecated APIs.
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/lib/file"
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/logger"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/types"
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"github.com/hashicorp/logutils"
"github.com/hashicorp/serf/coordinate"
"github.com/hashicorp/serf/serf"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus/promhttp"
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)
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type Self struct {
Config interface{}
DebugConfig map[string]interface{}
Coord *coordinate.Coordinate
Member serf.Member
Stats map[string]map[string]string
Meta map[string]string
}
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentSelf(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentRead(s.agent.config.NodeName) {
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
var cs lib.CoordinateSet
if !s.agent.config.DisableCoordinates {
var err error
if cs, err = s.agent.GetLANCoordinate(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
config := struct {
Datacenter string
NodeName string
NodeID string
Revision string
Server bool
Version string
}{
Datacenter: s.agent.config.Datacenter,
NodeName: s.agent.config.NodeName,
NodeID: string(s.agent.config.NodeID),
Revision: s.agent.config.Revision,
Server: s.agent.config.ServerMode,
Version: s.agent.config.Version,
}
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return Self{
Config: config,
DebugConfig: s.agent.config.Sanitized(),
Coord: cs[s.agent.config.SegmentName],
Member: s.agent.LocalMember(),
Stats: s.agent.Stats(),
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Meta: s.agent.State.Metadata(),
}, nil
}
// enablePrometheusOutput will look for Prometheus mime-type or format Query parameter the same way as Nomad
func enablePrometheusOutput(req *http.Request) bool {
if format := req.URL.Query().Get("format"); format == "prometheus" {
return true
}
return false
}
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func (s *HTTPServer) AgentMetrics(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
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if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentRead(s.agent.config.NodeName) {
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
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}
if enablePrometheusOutput(req) {
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if s.agent.config.Telemetry.PrometheusRetentionTime < 1 {
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusUnsupportedMediaType)
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fmt.Fprint(resp, "Prometheus is not enabled since its retention time is not positive")
return nil, nil
}
handlerOptions := promhttp.HandlerOpts{
ErrorLog: s.agent.logger,
ErrorHandling: promhttp.ContinueOnError,
}
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handler := promhttp.HandlerFor(prometheus.DefaultGatherer, handlerOptions)
handler.ServeHTTP(resp, req)
return nil, nil
}
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return s.agent.MemSink.DisplayMetrics(resp, req)
}
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentReload(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName) {
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// Trigger the reload
errCh := make(chan error, 0)
select {
case <-s.agent.shutdownCh:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Agent was shutdown before reload could be completed")
case s.agent.reloadCh <- errCh:
}
// Wait for the result of the reload, or for the agent to shutdown
select {
case <-s.agent.shutdownCh:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Agent was shutdown before reload could be completed")
case err := <-errCh:
return nil, err
}
}
func buildAgentService(s *structs.NodeService, proxies map[string]*local.ManagedProxy) api.AgentService {
weights := api.AgentWeights{Passing: 1, Warning: 1}
if s.Weights != nil {
if s.Weights.Passing > 0 {
weights.Passing = s.Weights.Passing
}
weights.Warning = s.Weights.Warning
}
as := api.AgentService{
Kind: api.ServiceKind(s.Kind),
ID: s.ID,
Service: s.Service,
Tags: s.Tags,
Meta: s.Meta,
Port: s.Port,
Address: s.Address,
EnableTagOverride: s.EnableTagOverride,
CreateIndex: s.CreateIndex,
ModifyIndex: s.ModifyIndex,
Weights: weights,
}
if as.Tags == nil {
as.Tags = []string{}
}
if as.Meta == nil {
as.Meta = map[string]string{}
}
// Attach Unmanaged Proxy config if exists
if s.Kind == structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy {
as.Proxy = s.Proxy.ToAPI()
// DEPRECATED (ProxyDestination) - remove this when removing ProxyDestination
// Also set the deprecated ProxyDestination
as.ProxyDestination = as.Proxy.DestinationServiceName
}
// Attach Connect configs if they exist. We use the actual proxy state since
// that may have had defaults filled in compared to the config that was
// provided with the service as stored in the NodeService here.
if proxy, ok := proxies[s.ID+"-proxy"]; ok {
as.Connect = &api.AgentServiceConnect{
Proxy: &api.AgentServiceConnectProxy{
ExecMode: api.ProxyExecMode(proxy.Proxy.ExecMode.String()),
Command: proxy.Proxy.Command,
Config: proxy.Proxy.Config,
Upstreams: proxy.Proxy.Upstreams.ToAPI(),
},
}
} else if s.Connect.Native {
as.Connect = &api.AgentServiceConnect{
Native: true,
}
}
return as
}
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func (s *HTTPServer) AgentServices(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Fetch the ACL token, if any.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
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services := s.agent.State.Services()
if err := s.agent.filterServices(token, &services); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
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proxies := s.agent.State.Proxies()
// Convert into api.AgentService since that includes Connect config but so far
// NodeService doesn't need to internally. They are otherwise identical since
// that is the struct used in client for reading the one we output here
// anyway.
agentSvcs := make(map[string]*api.AgentService)
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// Use empty list instead of nil
for id, s := range services {
agentService := buildAgentService(s, proxies)
agentSvcs[id] = &agentService
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}
return agentSvcs, nil
}
// GET /v1/agent/service/:service_id
//
// Returns the service definition for a single local services and allows
// blocking watch using hash-based blocking.
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentService(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Get the proxy ID. Note that this is the ID of a proxy's service instance.
id := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/service/")
// DEPRECATED(managed-proxies) - remove this whole hack.
//
// Support managed proxies until they are removed entirely. Since built-in
// proxy will now use this endpoint, in order to not break managed proxies in
// the interim until they are removed, we need to mirror the default-setting
// behavior they had. Rather than thread that through this whole method as
// special cases that need to be unwound later (and duplicate logic in the
// proxy config endpoint) just defer to that and then translate the response.
if managedProxy := s.agent.State.Proxy(id); managedProxy != nil {
// This is for a managed proxy, use the old endpoint's behavior
req.URL.Path = "/v1/agent/connect/proxy/" + id
obj, err := s.AgentConnectProxyConfig(resp, req)
if err != nil {
return obj, err
}
proxyCfg, ok := obj.(*api.ConnectProxyConfig)
if !ok {
return nil, errors.New("internal error")
}
// These are all set by defaults so type checks are just sanity checks that
// should never fail.
port, ok := proxyCfg.Config["bind_port"].(int)
if !ok || port < 1 {
return nil, errors.New("invalid proxy config")
}
addr, ok := proxyCfg.Config["bind_address"].(string)
if !ok || addr == "" {
return nil, errors.New("invalid proxy config")
}
localAddr, ok := proxyCfg.Config["local_service_address"].(string)
if !ok || localAddr == "" {
return nil, errors.New("invalid proxy config")
}
// Old local_service_address was a host:port
localAddress, localPortRaw, err := net.SplitHostPort(localAddr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
localPort, err := strconv.Atoi(localPortRaw)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
reply := &api.AgentService{
Kind: api.ServiceKindConnectProxy,
ID: proxyCfg.ProxyServiceID,
Service: managedProxy.Proxy.ProxyService.Service,
Port: port,
Address: addr,
ContentHash: proxyCfg.ContentHash,
Proxy: &api.AgentServiceConnectProxyConfig{
DestinationServiceName: proxyCfg.TargetServiceName,
DestinationServiceID: proxyCfg.TargetServiceID,
LocalServiceAddress: localAddress,
LocalServicePort: localPort,
Config: proxyCfg.Config,
Upstreams: proxyCfg.Upstreams,
},
}
return reply, nil
}
// Maybe block
var queryOpts structs.QueryOptions
if parseWait(resp, req, &queryOpts) {
// parseWait returns an error itself
return nil, nil
}
// Parse the token
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
// Parse hash specially. Eventually this should happen in parseWait and end up
// in QueryOptions but I didn't want to make very general changes right away.
hash := req.URL.Query().Get("hash")
return s.agentLocalBlockingQuery(resp, hash, &queryOpts,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet) (string, interface{}, error) {
svcState := s.agent.State.ServiceState(id)
if svcState == nil {
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "unknown proxy service ID: %s", id)
return "", nil, nil
}
svc := svcState.Service
// Setup watch on the service
ws.Add(svcState.WatchCh)
// Check ACLs.
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, err
}
if rule != nil && !rule.ServiceRead(svc.Service) {
return "", nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
var connect *api.AgentServiceConnect
var proxy *api.AgentServiceConnectProxyConfig
if svc.Connect.Native {
connect = &api.AgentServiceConnect{
Native: svc.Connect.Native,
}
}
if svc.Kind == structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy {
proxy = svc.Proxy.ToAPI()
}
var weights api.AgentWeights
if svc.Weights != nil {
err := mapstructure.Decode(svc.Weights, &weights)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, err
}
}
// Calculate the content hash over the response, minus the hash field
reply := &api.AgentService{
Kind: api.ServiceKind(svc.Kind),
ID: svc.ID,
Service: svc.Service,
Tags: svc.Tags,
Meta: svc.Meta,
Port: svc.Port,
Address: svc.Address,
EnableTagOverride: svc.EnableTagOverride,
Weights: weights,
Proxy: proxy,
Connect: connect,
}
rawHash, err := hashstructure.Hash(reply, nil)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, err
}
// Include the ContentHash in the response body
reply.ContentHash = fmt.Sprintf("%x", rawHash)
return reply.ContentHash, reply, nil
})
}
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentChecks(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Fetch the ACL token, if any.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
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checks := s.agent.State.Checks()
if err := s.agent.filterChecks(token, &checks); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
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// Use empty list instead of nil
for id, c := range checks {
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if c.ServiceTags == nil {
clone := *c
clone.ServiceTags = make([]string, 0)
checks[id] = &clone
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}
}
return checks, nil
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}
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentMembers(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Fetch the ACL token, if any.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
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// Check if the WAN is being queried
wan := false
if other := req.URL.Query().Get("wan"); other != "" {
wan = true
}
segment := req.URL.Query().Get("segment")
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if wan {
switch segment {
case "", api.AllSegments:
// The zero value and the special "give me all members"
// key are ok, otherwise the argument doesn't apply to
// the WAN.
default:
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Cannot provide a segment with wan=true")
return nil, nil
}
}
var members []serf.Member
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if wan {
members = s.agent.WANMembers()
} else {
var err error
if segment == api.AllSegments {
members, err = s.agent.delegate.LANMembersAllSegments()
} else {
members, err = s.agent.delegate.LANSegmentMembers(segment)
}
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
if err := s.agent.filterMembers(token, &members); err != nil {
return nil, err
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}
return members, nil
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}
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentJoin(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName) {
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
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// Check if the WAN is being queried
wan := false
if other := req.URL.Query().Get("wan"); other != "" {
wan = true
}
// Get the address
addr := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/join/")
if wan {
_, err = s.agent.JoinWAN([]string{addr})
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} else {
_, err = s.agent.JoinLAN([]string{addr})
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}
return nil, err
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}
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentLeave(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName) {
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
if err := s.agent.Leave(); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return nil, s.agent.ShutdownAgent()
}
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func (s *HTTPServer) AgentForceLeave(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName) {
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
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addr := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/force-leave/")
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return nil, s.agent.ForceLeave(addr)
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}
// syncChanges is a helper function which wraps a blocking call to sync
// services and checks to the server. If the operation fails, we only
// only warn because the write did succeed and anti-entropy will sync later.
func (s *HTTPServer) syncChanges() {
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if err := s.agent.State.SyncChanges(); err != nil {
s.agent.logger.Printf("[ERR] agent: failed to sync changes: %v", err)
}
}
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentRegisterCheck(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
var args structs.CheckDefinition
// Fixup the type decode of TTL or Interval.
decodeCB := func(raw interface{}) error {
return FixupCheckType(raw)
}
if err := decodeBody(req, &args, decodeCB); err != nil {
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resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Request decode failed: %v", err)
return nil, nil
}
// Verify the check has a name.
if args.Name == "" {
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resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing check name")
return nil, nil
}
if args.Status != "" && !structs.ValidStatus(args.Status) {
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resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Bad check status")
return nil, nil
}
// Construct the health check.
health := args.HealthCheck(s.agent.config.NodeName)
// Verify the check type.
chkType := args.CheckType()
err := chkType.Validate()
if err != nil {
2017-08-23 19:19:11 +00:00
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprint(resp, fmt.Errorf("Invalid check: %v", err))
return nil, nil
}
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
if err := s.agent.vetCheckRegister(token, health); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Add the check.
if err := s.agent.AddCheck(health, chkType, true, token, ConfigSourceRemote); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s.syncChanges()
return nil, nil
}
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentDeregisterCheck(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
checkID := types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/deregister/"))
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
if err := s.agent.vetCheckUpdate(token, checkID); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := s.agent.RemoveCheck(checkID, true); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s.syncChanges()
return nil, nil
}
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentCheckPass(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
checkID := types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/pass/"))
note := req.URL.Query().Get("note")
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
if err := s.agent.vetCheckUpdate(token, checkID); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := s.agent.updateTTLCheck(checkID, api.HealthPassing, note); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s.syncChanges()
return nil, nil
}
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentCheckWarn(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
checkID := types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/warn/"))
note := req.URL.Query().Get("note")
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
if err := s.agent.vetCheckUpdate(token, checkID); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := s.agent.updateTTLCheck(checkID, api.HealthWarning, note); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s.syncChanges()
return nil, nil
}
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentCheckFail(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
checkID := types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/fail/"))
note := req.URL.Query().Get("note")
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
if err := s.agent.vetCheckUpdate(token, checkID); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := s.agent.updateTTLCheck(checkID, api.HealthCritical, note); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s.syncChanges()
return nil, nil
}
// checkUpdate is the payload for a PUT to AgentCheckUpdate.
type checkUpdate struct {
// Status us one of the api.Health* states, "passing", "warning", or
// "critical".
Status string
// Output is the information to post to the UI for operators as the
// output of the process that decided to hit the TTL check. This is
// different from the note field that's associated with the check
// itself.
Output string
}
// AgentCheckUpdate is a PUT-based alternative to the GET-based Pass/Warn/Fail
// APIs.
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentCheckUpdate(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
var update checkUpdate
if err := decodeBody(req, &update, nil); err != nil {
2017-08-23 19:19:11 +00:00
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Request decode failed: %v", err)
return nil, nil
}
switch update.Status {
case api.HealthPassing:
case api.HealthWarning:
case api.HealthCritical:
default:
2017-08-23 19:19:11 +00:00
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Invalid check status: '%s'", update.Status)
return nil, nil
}
total := len(update.Output)
if total > checks.BufSize {
update.Output = fmt.Sprintf("%s ... (captured %d of %d bytes)",
update.Output[:checks.BufSize], checks.BufSize, total)
}
checkID := types.CheckID(strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/check/update/"))
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
if err := s.agent.vetCheckUpdate(token, checkID); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if err := s.agent.updateTTLCheck(checkID, update.Status, update.Output); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s.syncChanges()
return nil, nil
}
// agentHealthService Returns Health for a given service ID
func agentHealthService(serviceID string, s *HTTPServer) (int, string, api.HealthChecks) {
checks := s.agent.State.Checks()
serviceChecks := make(api.HealthChecks, 0)
for _, c := range checks {
if c.ServiceID == serviceID || c.ServiceID == "" {
// TODO: harmonize struct.HealthCheck and api.HealthCheck (or at least extract conversion function)
healthCheck := &api.HealthCheck{
Node: c.Node,
CheckID: string(c.CheckID),
Name: c.Name,
Status: c.Status,
Notes: c.Notes,
Output: c.Output,
ServiceID: c.ServiceID,
ServiceName: c.ServiceName,
ServiceTags: c.ServiceTags,
}
serviceChecks = append(serviceChecks, healthCheck)
}
}
status := serviceChecks.AggregatedStatus()
switch status {
case api.HealthWarning:
return http.StatusTooManyRequests, status, serviceChecks
case api.HealthPassing:
return http.StatusOK, status, serviceChecks
default:
return http.StatusServiceUnavailable, status, serviceChecks
}
}
func returnTextPlain(req *http.Request) bool {
if contentType := req.Header.Get("Accept"); strings.HasPrefix(contentType, "text/plain") {
return true
}
if format := req.URL.Query().Get("format"); format != "" {
return format == "text"
}
return false
}
// AgentHealthServiceByID return the local Service Health given its ID
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentHealthServiceByID(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Pull out the service id (service id since there may be several instance of the same service on this host)
serviceID := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/health/service/id/")
if serviceID == "" {
return nil, &BadRequestError{Reason: "Missing serviceID"}
}
services := s.agent.State.Services()
proxies := s.agent.State.Proxies()
for _, service := range services {
if service.ID == serviceID {
code, status, healthChecks := agentHealthService(serviceID, s)
if returnTextPlain(req) {
return status, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: code, Reason: status, ContentType: "text/plain"}
}
serviceInfo := buildAgentService(service, proxies)
result := &api.AgentServiceChecksInfo{
AggregatedStatus: status,
Checks: healthChecks,
Service: &serviceInfo,
}
return result, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: code, Reason: status, ContentType: "application/json"}
}
}
notFoundReason := fmt.Sprintf("ServiceId %s not found", serviceID)
if returnTextPlain(req) {
return notFoundReason, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: http.StatusNotFound, Reason: fmt.Sprintf("ServiceId %s not found", serviceID), ContentType: "application/json"}
}
return &api.AgentServiceChecksInfo{
AggregatedStatus: api.HealthCritical,
Checks: nil,
Service: nil,
}, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: http.StatusNotFound, Reason: notFoundReason, ContentType: "application/json"}
}
// AgentHealthServiceByName return the worse status of all the services with given name on an agent
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentHealthServiceByName(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Pull out the service name
serviceName := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/health/service/name/")
if serviceName == "" {
return nil, &BadRequestError{Reason: "Missing service Name"}
}
code := http.StatusNotFound
status := fmt.Sprintf("ServiceName %s Not Found", serviceName)
services := s.agent.State.Services()
result := make([]api.AgentServiceChecksInfo, 0, 16)
proxies := s.agent.State.Proxies()
for _, service := range services {
if service.Service == serviceName {
scode, sstatus, healthChecks := agentHealthService(service.ID, s)
serviceInfo := buildAgentService(service, proxies)
res := api.AgentServiceChecksInfo{
AggregatedStatus: sstatus,
Checks: healthChecks,
Service: &serviceInfo,
}
result = append(result, res)
// When service is not found, we ignore it and keep existing HTTP status
if code == http.StatusNotFound {
code = scode
status = sstatus
}
// We take the worst of all statuses, so we keep iterating
// passing: 200 < warning: 429 < critical: 503
if code < scode {
code = scode
status = sstatus
}
}
}
if returnTextPlain(req) {
return status, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: code, Reason: status, ContentType: "text/plain"}
}
return result, CodeWithPayloadError{StatusCode: code, Reason: status, ContentType: "application/json"}
}
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentRegisterService(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
var args structs.ServiceDefinition
// Fixup the type decode of TTL or Interval if a check if provided.
decodeCB := func(raw interface{}) error {
rawMap, ok := raw.(map[string]interface{})
if !ok {
return nil
}
// see https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/pull/3557 why we need this
// and why we should get rid of it.
config.TranslateKeys(rawMap, map[string]string{
"enable_tag_override": "EnableTagOverride",
// Managed Proxy Config
"exec_mode": "ExecMode",
// Proxy Upstreams
"destination_name": "DestinationName",
"destination_type": "DestinationType",
"destination_namespace": "DestinationNamespace",
"local_bind_port": "LocalBindPort",
"local_bind_address": "LocalBindAddress",
// Proxy Config
"destination_service_name": "DestinationServiceName",
"destination_service_id": "DestinationServiceID",
"local_service_port": "LocalServicePort",
"local_service_address": "LocalServiceAddress",
// SidecarService
"sidecar_service": "SidecarService",
// DON'T Recurse into these opaque config maps or we might mangle user's
// keys. Note empty canonical is a special sentinel to prevent recursion.
"Meta": "",
// upstreams is an array but this prevents recursion into config field of
// any item in the array.
"Proxy.Config": "",
"Proxy.Upstreams.Config": "",
"Connect.Proxy.Config": "",
"Connect.Proxy.Upstreams.Config": "",
// Same exceptions as above, but for a nested sidecar_service note we use
// the canonical form SidecarService since that is translated by the time
// the lookup here happens. Note that sidecar service doesn't support
// managed proxies (connect.proxy).
"Connect.SidecarService.Meta": "",
"Connect.SidecarService.Proxy.Config": "",
"Connect.SidecarService.Proxy.Upstreams.config": "",
})
for k, v := range rawMap {
switch strings.ToLower(k) {
case "check":
if err := FixupCheckType(v); err != nil {
return err
}
case "checks":
chkTypes, ok := v.([]interface{})
if !ok {
continue
}
for _, chkType := range chkTypes {
if err := FixupCheckType(chkType); err != nil {
return err
}
}
}
}
return nil
}
if err := decodeBody(req, &args, decodeCB); err != nil {
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resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Request decode failed: %v", err)
return nil, nil
}
// Verify the service has a name.
if args.Name == "" {
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resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing service name")
return nil, nil
}
// Check the service address here and in the catalog RPC endpoint
// since service registration isn't synchronous.
if ipaddr.IsAny(args.Address) {
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resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Invalid service address")
return nil, nil
}
// Get the node service.
ns := args.NodeService()
2018-09-07 14:30:47 +00:00
if ns.Weights != nil {
if err := structs.ValidateWeights(ns.Weights); err != nil {
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprint(resp, fmt.Errorf("Invalid Weights: %v", err))
return nil, nil
}
}
if err := structs.ValidateMetadata(ns.Meta, false); err != nil {
2018-02-07 00:54:42 +00:00
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprint(resp, fmt.Errorf("Invalid Service Meta: %v", err))
2018-02-07 00:54:42 +00:00
return nil, nil
}
// Run validation. This is the same validation that would happen on
// the catalog endpoint so it helps ensure the sync will work properly.
if err := ns.Validate(); err != nil {
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprintf(resp, err.Error())
return nil, nil
}
// Verify the check type.
chkTypes, err := args.CheckTypes()
if err != nil {
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprint(resp, fmt.Errorf("Invalid check: %v", err))
return nil, nil
}
for _, check := range chkTypes {
if check.Status != "" && !structs.ValidStatus(check.Status) {
2017-08-23 19:19:11 +00:00
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Status for checks must 'passing', 'warning', 'critical'")
return nil, nil
}
}
// Verify the sidecar check types
if args.Connect != nil && args.Connect.SidecarService != nil {
chkTypes, err := args.Connect.SidecarService.CheckTypes()
if err != nil {
return nil, &BadRequestError{
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("Invalid check in sidecar_service: %v", err),
}
}
for _, check := range chkTypes {
if check.Status != "" && !structs.ValidStatus(check.Status) {
return nil, &BadRequestError{
Reason: "Status for checks must 'passing', 'warning', 'critical'",
}
}
}
}
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
if err := s.agent.vetServiceRegister(token, ns); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// See if we have a sidecar to register too
sidecar, sidecarChecks, sidecarToken, err := s.agent.sidecarServiceFromNodeService(ns, token)
if err != nil {
return nil, &BadRequestError{
Reason: fmt.Sprintf("Invalid SidecarService: %s", err)}
}
if sidecar != nil {
// Make sure we are allowed to register the sidecar using the token
// specified (might be specific to sidecar or the same one as the overall
// request).
if err := s.agent.vetServiceRegister(sidecarToken, sidecar); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// We parsed the sidecar registration, now remove it from the NodeService
// for the actual service since it's done it's job and we don't want to
// persist it in the actual state/catalog. SidecarService is meant to be a
// registration syntax sugar so don't propagate it any further.
ns.Connect.SidecarService = nil
}
// Get any proxy registrations
proxy, err := args.ConnectManagedProxy()
if err != nil {
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprintf(resp, err.Error())
return nil, nil
}
// If we have a proxy, verify that we're allowed to add a proxy via the API
if proxy != nil && !s.agent.config.ConnectProxyAllowManagedAPIRegistration {
return nil, &BadRequestError{
Reason: "Managed proxy registration via the API is disallowed."}
}
// Add the service.
if err := s.agent.AddService(ns, chkTypes, true, token, ConfigSourceRemote); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Add proxy (which will add proxy service so do it before we trigger sync)
if proxy != nil {
if err := s.agent.AddProxy(proxy, true, false, "", ConfigSourceRemote); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
// Add sidecar.
if sidecar != nil {
if err := s.agent.AddService(sidecar, sidecarChecks, true, sidecarToken, ConfigSourceRemote); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
s.syncChanges()
return nil, nil
}
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentDeregisterService(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
serviceID := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/service/deregister/")
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
if err := s.agent.vetServiceUpdate(token, serviceID); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Verify this isn't a proxy
if s.agent.State.Proxy(serviceID) != nil {
return nil, &BadRequestError{
Reason: "Managed proxy service cannot be deregistered directly. " +
"Deregister the service that has a managed proxy to automatically " +
"deregister the managed proxy itself."}
}
if err := s.agent.RemoveService(serviceID, true); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
s.syncChanges()
return nil, nil
}
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentServiceMaintenance(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Ensure we have a service ID
serviceID := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/service/maintenance/")
if serviceID == "" {
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resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing service ID")
return nil, nil
}
// Ensure we have some action
params := req.URL.Query()
if _, ok := params["enable"]; !ok {
2017-08-23 19:19:11 +00:00
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing value for enable")
return nil, nil
}
raw := params.Get("enable")
enable, err := strconv.ParseBool(raw)
if err != nil {
2017-08-23 19:19:11 +00:00
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Invalid value for enable: %q", raw)
return nil, nil
}
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
if err := s.agent.vetServiceUpdate(token, serviceID); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if enable {
reason := params.Get("reason")
if err = s.agent.EnableServiceMaintenance(serviceID, reason, token); err != nil {
2017-08-23 19:19:11 +00:00
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
fmt.Fprint(resp, err.Error())
return nil, nil
}
} else {
if err = s.agent.DisableServiceMaintenance(serviceID); err != nil {
2017-08-23 19:19:11 +00:00
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
fmt.Fprint(resp, err.Error())
return nil, nil
}
}
s.syncChanges()
return nil, nil
}
2015-01-15 19:20:22 +00:00
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentNodeMaintenance(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Ensure we have some action
params := req.URL.Query()
if _, ok := params["enable"]; !ok {
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resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprint(resp, "Missing value for enable")
2015-01-15 19:20:22 +00:00
return nil, nil
}
raw := params.Get("enable")
enable, err := strconv.ParseBool(raw)
if err != nil {
2017-08-23 19:19:11 +00:00
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Invalid value for enable: %q", raw)
2015-01-15 19:20:22 +00:00
return nil, nil
}
// Get the provided token, if any, and vet against any ACL policies.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if rule != nil && !rule.NodeWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName, nil) {
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
2015-01-15 19:20:22 +00:00
if enable {
s.agent.EnableNodeMaintenance(params.Get("reason"), token)
2015-01-15 19:20:22 +00:00
} else {
s.agent.DisableNodeMaintenance()
}
s.syncChanges()
2015-01-15 19:20:22 +00:00
return nil, nil
}
2016-11-16 21:45:26 +00:00
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentMonitor(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
if err != nil {
2016-11-28 21:08:31 +00:00
return nil, err
}
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentRead(s.agent.config.NodeName) {
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
2016-11-28 21:08:31 +00:00
// Get the provided loglevel.
2016-11-16 21:45:26 +00:00
logLevel := req.URL.Query().Get("loglevel")
if logLevel == "" {
logLevel = "INFO"
}
// Upper case the level since that's required by the filter.
2016-11-16 21:45:26 +00:00
logLevel = strings.ToUpper(logLevel)
// Create a level filter and flusher.
2016-11-16 21:45:26 +00:00
filter := logger.LevelFilter()
filter.MinLevel = logutils.LogLevel(logLevel)
if !logger.ValidateLevelFilter(filter.MinLevel, filter) {
2017-08-23 19:19:11 +00:00
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Unknown log level: %s", filter.MinLevel)
2016-11-16 21:45:26 +00:00
return nil, nil
}
flusher, ok := resp.(http.Flusher)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Streaming not supported")
}
// Set up a log handler.
2016-11-16 21:45:26 +00:00
handler := &httpLogHandler{
filter: filter,
logCh: make(chan string, 512),
logger: s.agent.logger,
2016-11-16 21:45:26 +00:00
}
s.agent.LogWriter.RegisterHandler(handler)
defer s.agent.LogWriter.DeregisterHandler(handler)
2016-11-16 21:45:26 +00:00
notify := resp.(http.CloseNotifier).CloseNotify()
// Send header so client can start streaming body
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
// 0 byte write is needed before the Flush call so that if we are using
// a gzip stream it will go ahead and write out the HTTP response header
resp.Write([]byte(""))
flusher.Flush()
// Stream logs until the connection is closed.
2016-11-16 21:45:26 +00:00
for {
select {
case <-notify:
s.agent.LogWriter.DeregisterHandler(handler)
2016-11-28 21:08:31 +00:00
if handler.droppedCount > 0 {
s.agent.logger.Printf("[WARN] agent: Dropped %d logs during monitor request", handler.droppedCount)
}
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return nil, nil
case log := <-handler.logCh:
fmt.Fprintln(resp, log)
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flusher.Flush()
}
}
}
type httpLogHandler struct {
2016-11-28 21:08:31 +00:00
filter *logutils.LevelFilter
logCh chan string
logger *log.Logger
droppedCount int
2016-11-16 21:45:26 +00:00
}
func (h *httpLogHandler) HandleLog(log string) {
// Check the log level
if !h.filter.Check([]byte(log)) {
return
}
// Do a non-blocking send
select {
case h.logCh <- log:
default:
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// Just increment a counter for dropped logs to this handler; we can't log now
// because the lock is already held by the LogWriter invoking this
2017-04-20 19:00:03 +00:00
h.droppedCount++
2016-11-16 21:45:26 +00:00
}
}
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentToken(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
if s.checkACLDisabled(resp, req) {
return nil, nil
}
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if rule != nil && !rule.AgentWrite(s.agent.config.NodeName) {
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
// The body is just the token, but it's in a JSON object so we can add
// fields to this later if needed.
var args api.AgentToken
if err := decodeBody(req, &args, nil); err != nil {
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest)
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Request decode failed: %v", err)
return nil, nil
}
ACL Token Persistence and Reloading (#5328) This PR adds two features which will be useful for operators when ACLs are in use. 1. Tokens set in configuration files are now reloadable. 2. If `acl.enable_token_persistence` is set to `true` in the configuration, tokens set via the `v1/agent/token` endpoint are now persisted to disk and loaded when the agent starts (or during configuration reload) Note that token persistence is opt-in so our users who do not want tokens on the local disk will see no change. Some other secondary changes: * Refactored a bunch of places where the replication token is retrieved from the token store. This token isn't just for replicating ACLs and now it is named accordingly. * Allowed better paths in the `v1/agent/token/` API. Instead of paths like: `v1/agent/token/acl_replication_token` the path can now be just `v1/agent/token/replication`. The old paths remain to be valid. * Added a couple new API functions to set tokens via the new paths. Deprecated the old ones and pointed to the new names. The names are also generally better and don't imply that what you are setting is for ACLs but rather are setting ACL tokens. There is a minor semantic difference there especially for the replication token as again, its no longer used only for ACL token/policy replication. The new functions will detect 404s and fallback to using the older token paths when talking to pre-1.4.3 agents. * Docs updated to reflect the API additions and to show using the new endpoints. * Updated the ACL CLI set-agent-tokens command to use the non-deprecated APIs.
2019-02-27 19:28:31 +00:00
if s.agent.config.ACLEnableTokenPersistence {
// we hold the lock around updating the internal token store
// as well as persisting the tokens because we don't want to write
// into the store to have something else wipe it out before we can
// persist everything (like an agent config reload). The token store
// lock is only held for those operations so other go routines that
// just need to read some token out of the store will not be impacted
// any more than they would be without token persistence.
s.agent.persistedTokensLock.Lock()
defer s.agent.persistedTokensLock.Unlock()
}
// Figure out the target token.
target := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/token/")
switch target {
ACL Token Persistence and Reloading (#5328) This PR adds two features which will be useful for operators when ACLs are in use. 1. Tokens set in configuration files are now reloadable. 2. If `acl.enable_token_persistence` is set to `true` in the configuration, tokens set via the `v1/agent/token` endpoint are now persisted to disk and loaded when the agent starts (or during configuration reload) Note that token persistence is opt-in so our users who do not want tokens on the local disk will see no change. Some other secondary changes: * Refactored a bunch of places where the replication token is retrieved from the token store. This token isn't just for replicating ACLs and now it is named accordingly. * Allowed better paths in the `v1/agent/token/` API. Instead of paths like: `v1/agent/token/acl_replication_token` the path can now be just `v1/agent/token/replication`. The old paths remain to be valid. * Added a couple new API functions to set tokens via the new paths. Deprecated the old ones and pointed to the new names. The names are also generally better and don't imply that what you are setting is for ACLs but rather are setting ACL tokens. There is a minor semantic difference there especially for the replication token as again, its no longer used only for ACL token/policy replication. The new functions will detect 404s and fallback to using the older token paths when talking to pre-1.4.3 agents. * Docs updated to reflect the API additions and to show using the new endpoints. * Updated the ACL CLI set-agent-tokens command to use the non-deprecated APIs.
2019-02-27 19:28:31 +00:00
case "acl_token", "default":
s.agent.tokens.UpdateUserToken(args.Token, token_store.TokenSourceAPI)
ACL Token Persistence and Reloading (#5328) This PR adds two features which will be useful for operators when ACLs are in use. 1. Tokens set in configuration files are now reloadable. 2. If `acl.enable_token_persistence` is set to `true` in the configuration, tokens set via the `v1/agent/token` endpoint are now persisted to disk and loaded when the agent starts (or during configuration reload) Note that token persistence is opt-in so our users who do not want tokens on the local disk will see no change. Some other secondary changes: * Refactored a bunch of places where the replication token is retrieved from the token store. This token isn't just for replicating ACLs and now it is named accordingly. * Allowed better paths in the `v1/agent/token/` API. Instead of paths like: `v1/agent/token/acl_replication_token` the path can now be just `v1/agent/token/replication`. The old paths remain to be valid. * Added a couple new API functions to set tokens via the new paths. Deprecated the old ones and pointed to the new names. The names are also generally better and don't imply that what you are setting is for ACLs but rather are setting ACL tokens. There is a minor semantic difference there especially for the replication token as again, its no longer used only for ACL token/policy replication. The new functions will detect 404s and fallback to using the older token paths when talking to pre-1.4.3 agents. * Docs updated to reflect the API additions and to show using the new endpoints. * Updated the ACL CLI set-agent-tokens command to use the non-deprecated APIs.
2019-02-27 19:28:31 +00:00
case "acl_agent_token", "agent":
s.agent.tokens.UpdateAgentToken(args.Token, token_store.TokenSourceAPI)
ACL Token Persistence and Reloading (#5328) This PR adds two features which will be useful for operators when ACLs are in use. 1. Tokens set in configuration files are now reloadable. 2. If `acl.enable_token_persistence` is set to `true` in the configuration, tokens set via the `v1/agent/token` endpoint are now persisted to disk and loaded when the agent starts (or during configuration reload) Note that token persistence is opt-in so our users who do not want tokens on the local disk will see no change. Some other secondary changes: * Refactored a bunch of places where the replication token is retrieved from the token store. This token isn't just for replicating ACLs and now it is named accordingly. * Allowed better paths in the `v1/agent/token/` API. Instead of paths like: `v1/agent/token/acl_replication_token` the path can now be just `v1/agent/token/replication`. The old paths remain to be valid. * Added a couple new API functions to set tokens via the new paths. Deprecated the old ones and pointed to the new names. The names are also generally better and don't imply that what you are setting is for ACLs but rather are setting ACL tokens. There is a minor semantic difference there especially for the replication token as again, its no longer used only for ACL token/policy replication. The new functions will detect 404s and fallback to using the older token paths when talking to pre-1.4.3 agents. * Docs updated to reflect the API additions and to show using the new endpoints. * Updated the ACL CLI set-agent-tokens command to use the non-deprecated APIs.
2019-02-27 19:28:31 +00:00
case "acl_agent_master_token", "agent_master":
s.agent.tokens.UpdateAgentMasterToken(args.Token, token_store.TokenSourceAPI)
ACL Token Persistence and Reloading (#5328) This PR adds two features which will be useful for operators when ACLs are in use. 1. Tokens set in configuration files are now reloadable. 2. If `acl.enable_token_persistence` is set to `true` in the configuration, tokens set via the `v1/agent/token` endpoint are now persisted to disk and loaded when the agent starts (or during configuration reload) Note that token persistence is opt-in so our users who do not want tokens on the local disk will see no change. Some other secondary changes: * Refactored a bunch of places where the replication token is retrieved from the token store. This token isn't just for replicating ACLs and now it is named accordingly. * Allowed better paths in the `v1/agent/token/` API. Instead of paths like: `v1/agent/token/acl_replication_token` the path can now be just `v1/agent/token/replication`. The old paths remain to be valid. * Added a couple new API functions to set tokens via the new paths. Deprecated the old ones and pointed to the new names. The names are also generally better and don't imply that what you are setting is for ACLs but rather are setting ACL tokens. There is a minor semantic difference there especially for the replication token as again, its no longer used only for ACL token/policy replication. The new functions will detect 404s and fallback to using the older token paths when talking to pre-1.4.3 agents. * Docs updated to reflect the API additions and to show using the new endpoints. * Updated the ACL CLI set-agent-tokens command to use the non-deprecated APIs.
2019-02-27 19:28:31 +00:00
case "acl_replication_token", "replication":
s.agent.tokens.UpdateReplicationToken(args.Token, token_store.TokenSourceAPI)
default:
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "Token %q is unknown", target)
return nil, nil
}
ACL Token Persistence and Reloading (#5328) This PR adds two features which will be useful for operators when ACLs are in use. 1. Tokens set in configuration files are now reloadable. 2. If `acl.enable_token_persistence` is set to `true` in the configuration, tokens set via the `v1/agent/token` endpoint are now persisted to disk and loaded when the agent starts (or during configuration reload) Note that token persistence is opt-in so our users who do not want tokens on the local disk will see no change. Some other secondary changes: * Refactored a bunch of places where the replication token is retrieved from the token store. This token isn't just for replicating ACLs and now it is named accordingly. * Allowed better paths in the `v1/agent/token/` API. Instead of paths like: `v1/agent/token/acl_replication_token` the path can now be just `v1/agent/token/replication`. The old paths remain to be valid. * Added a couple new API functions to set tokens via the new paths. Deprecated the old ones and pointed to the new names. The names are also generally better and don't imply that what you are setting is for ACLs but rather are setting ACL tokens. There is a minor semantic difference there especially for the replication token as again, its no longer used only for ACL token/policy replication. The new functions will detect 404s and fallback to using the older token paths when talking to pre-1.4.3 agents. * Docs updated to reflect the API additions and to show using the new endpoints. * Updated the ACL CLI set-agent-tokens command to use the non-deprecated APIs.
2019-02-27 19:28:31 +00:00
if s.agent.config.ACLEnableTokenPersistence {
tokens := persistedTokens{}
if tok, source := s.agent.tokens.UserTokenAndSource(); tok != "" && source == token_store.TokenSourceAPI {
tokens.Default = tok
}
if tok, source := s.agent.tokens.AgentTokenAndSource(); tok != "" && source == token_store.TokenSourceAPI {
tokens.Agent = tok
}
if tok, source := s.agent.tokens.AgentMasterTokenAndSource(); tok != "" && source == token_store.TokenSourceAPI {
tokens.AgentMaster = tok
}
if tok, source := s.agent.tokens.ReplicationTokenAndSource(); tok != "" && source == token_store.TokenSourceAPI {
tokens.Replication = tok
}
data, err := json.Marshal(tokens)
if err != nil {
s.agent.logger.Printf("[WARN] agent: failed to persist tokens - %v", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Failed to marshal tokens for persistence: %v", err)
}
if err := file.WriteAtomicWithPerms(filepath.Join(s.agent.config.DataDir, tokensPath), data, 0600); err != nil {
s.agent.logger.Printf("[WARN] agent: failed to persist tokens - %v", err)
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Failed to persist tokens - %v", err)
}
}
2018-03-21 15:56:14 +00:00
s.agent.logger.Printf("[INFO] agent: Updated agent's ACL token %q", target)
return nil, nil
}
2018-03-17 04:39:26 +00:00
// AgentConnectCARoots returns the trusted CA roots.
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentConnectCARoots(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
var args structs.DCSpecificRequest
if done := s.parse(resp, req, &args.Datacenter, &args.QueryOptions); done {
return nil, nil
}
raw, m, err := s.agent.cache.Get(cachetype.ConnectCARootName, &args)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer setCacheMeta(resp, &m)
// Add cache hit
reply, ok := raw.(*structs.IndexedCARoots)
if !ok {
// This should never happen, but we want to protect against panics
return nil, fmt.Errorf("internal error: response type not correct")
}
defer setMeta(resp, &reply.QueryMeta)
return *reply, nil
2018-03-17 04:39:26 +00:00
}
2018-03-21 17:55:39 +00:00
// AgentConnectCALeafCert returns the certificate bundle for a service
// instance. This supports blocking queries to update the returned bundle.
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentConnectCALeafCert(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Get the service name. Note that this is the name of the service,
2018-05-22 17:33:14 +00:00
// not the ID of the service instance.
serviceName := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/connect/ca/leaf/")
2018-03-21 17:55:39 +00:00
args := cachetype.ConnectCALeafRequest{
Service: serviceName, // Need name not ID
}
var qOpts structs.QueryOptions
// Store DC in the ConnectCALeafRequest but query opts separately
// Don't resolve a proxy token to a real token that will be
// done with a call to verifyProxyToken later along with
// other security relevant checks.
if done := s.parseWithoutResolvingProxyToken(resp, req, &args.Datacenter, &qOpts); done {
return nil, nil
}
args.MinQueryIndex = qOpts.MinQueryIndex
args.MaxQueryTime = qOpts.MaxQueryTime
2018-03-21 17:55:39 +00:00
// Verify the proxy token. This will check both the local proxy token
// as well as the ACL if the token isn't local. The checks done in
// verifyProxyToken are still relevant because a leaf cert can be cached
// verifying the proxy token matches the service id or that a real
// acl token still is valid and has ServiceWrite is necessary or
// that cached cert is potentially unprotected.
effectiveToken, _, err := s.agent.verifyProxyToken(qOpts.Token, serviceName, "")
if err != nil {
2018-03-21 17:55:39 +00:00
return nil, err
}
args.Token = effectiveToken
raw, m, err := s.agent.cache.Get(cachetype.ConnectCALeafName, &args)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
defer setCacheMeta(resp, &m)
reply, ok := raw.(*structs.IssuedCert)
if !ok {
// This should never happen, but we want to protect against panics
return nil, fmt.Errorf("internal error: response type not correct")
}
setIndex(resp, reply.ModifyIndex)
2018-03-21 17:55:39 +00:00
return reply, nil
2018-03-21 17:55:39 +00:00
}
// GET /v1/agent/connect/proxy/:proxy_service_id
//
// Returns the local proxy config for the identified proxy. Requires token=
// param with the correct local ProxyToken (not ACL token).
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentConnectProxyConfig(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Get the proxy ID. Note that this is the ID of a proxy's service instance.
id := strings.TrimPrefix(req.URL.Path, "/v1/agent/connect/proxy/")
// Maybe block
var queryOpts structs.QueryOptions
if parseWait(resp, req, &queryOpts) {
// parseWait returns an error itself
return nil, nil
}
// Parse the token - don't resolve a proxy token to a real token
// that will be done with a call to verifyProxyToken later along with
// other security relevant checks.
var token string
s.parseTokenWithoutResolvingProxyToken(req, &token)
// Parse hash specially since it's only this endpoint that uses it currently.
// Eventually this should happen in parseWait and end up in QueryOptions but I
// didn't want to make very general changes right away.
hash := req.URL.Query().Get("hash")
return s.agentLocalBlockingQuery(resp, hash, &queryOpts,
func(ws memdb.WatchSet) (string, interface{}, error) {
// Retrieve the proxy specified
proxy := s.agent.State.Proxy(id)
if proxy == nil {
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "unknown proxy service ID: %s", id)
return "", nil, nil
}
// Lookup the target service as a convenience
target := s.agent.State.Service(proxy.Proxy.TargetServiceID)
if target == nil {
// Not found since this endpoint is only useful for agent-managed proxies so
// service missing means the service was deregistered racily with this call.
resp.WriteHeader(http.StatusNotFound)
fmt.Fprintf(resp, "unknown target service ID: %s", proxy.Proxy.TargetServiceID)
return "", nil, nil
}
// Validate the ACL token - because this endpoint uses data local to a single
// agent, this function is responsible for all enforcement regarding
// protection of the configuration. verifyProxyToken will match the proxies
// token to the correct service or in the case of being provide a real ACL
// token it will ensure that the requester has ServiceWrite privileges
// for this service.
_, isProxyToken, err := s.agent.verifyProxyToken(token, target.Service, id)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, err
}
// Watch the proxy for changes
ws.Add(proxy.WatchCh)
hash, err := hashstructure.Hash(proxy.Proxy, nil)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, err
}
contentHash := fmt.Sprintf("%x", hash)
2018-06-19 11:11:42 +00:00
// Set defaults
config, err := s.agent.applyProxyConfigDefaults(proxy.Proxy)
if err != nil {
return "", nil, err
}
// Only merge in telemetry config from agent if the requested is
// authorized with a proxy token. This prevents us leaking potentially
// sensitive config like Circonus API token via a public endpoint. Proxy
// tokens are only ever generated in-memory and passed via ENV to a child
// proxy process so potential for abuse here seems small. This endpoint in
// general is only useful for managed proxies now so it should _always_ be
// true that auth is via a proxy token but inconvenient for testing if we
// lock it down so strictly.
if isProxyToken {
// Add telemetry config. Copy the global config so we can customize the
// prefix.
telemetryCfg := s.agent.config.Telemetry
telemetryCfg.MetricsPrefix = telemetryCfg.MetricsPrefix + ".proxy." + target.ID
// First see if the user has specified telemetry
if userRaw, ok := config["telemetry"]; ok {
// User specified domething, see if it is compatible with agent
// telemetry config:
var uCfg lib.TelemetryConfig
dec, err := mapstructure.NewDecoder(&mapstructure.DecoderConfig{
Result: &uCfg,
// Make sure that if the user passes something that isn't just a
// simple override of a valid TelemetryConfig that we fail so that we
// don't clobber their custom config.
ErrorUnused: true,
})
if err == nil {
if err = dec.Decode(userRaw); err == nil {
// It did decode! Merge any unspecified fields from agent config.
uCfg.MergeDefaults(&telemetryCfg)
config["telemetry"] = uCfg
}
}
// Failed to decode, just keep user's config["telemetry"] verbatim
// with no agent merge.
} else {
// Add agent telemetry config.
config["telemetry"] = telemetryCfg
}
}
reply := &api.ConnectProxyConfig{
ProxyServiceID: proxy.Proxy.ProxyService.ID,
TargetServiceID: target.ID,
TargetServiceName: target.Service,
ContentHash: contentHash,
ExecMode: api.ProxyExecMode(proxy.Proxy.ExecMode.String()),
Command: proxy.Proxy.Command,
Config: config,
Add Proxy Upstreams to Service Definition (#4639) * Refactor Service Definition ProxyDestination. This includes: - Refactoring all internal structs used - Updated tests for both deprecated and new input for: - Agent Services endpoint response - Agent Service endpoint response - Agent Register endpoint - Unmanaged deprecated field - Unmanaged new fields - Managed deprecated upstreams - Managed new - Catalog Register - Unmanaged deprecated field - Unmanaged new fields - Managed deprecated upstreams - Managed new - Catalog Services endpoint response - Catalog Node endpoint response - Catalog Service endpoint response - Updated API tests for all of the above too (both deprecated and new forms of register) TODO: - config package changes for on-disk service definitions - proxy config endpoint - built-in proxy support for new fields * Agent proxy config endpoint updated with upstreams * Config file changes for upstreams. * Add upstream opaque config and update all tests to ensure it works everywhere. * Built in proxy working with new Upstreams config * Command fixes and deprecations * Fix key translation, upstream type defaults and a spate of other subtele bugs found with ned to end test scripts... TODO: tests still failing on one case that needs a fix. I think it's key translation for upstreams nested in Managed proxy struct. * Fix translated keys in API registration. ≈ * Fixes from docs - omit some empty undocumented fields in API - Bring back ServiceProxyDestination in Catalog responses to not break backwards compat - this was removed assuming it was only used internally. * Documentation updates for Upstreams in service definition * Fixes for tests broken by many refactors. * Enable travis on f-connect branch in this branch too. * Add consistent Deprecation comments to ProxyDestination uses * Update version number on deprecation notices, and correct upstream datacenter field with explanation in docs
2018-09-12 16:07:47 +00:00
Upstreams: proxy.Proxy.Upstreams.ToAPI(),
}
return contentHash, reply, nil
})
}
type agentLocalBlockingFunc func(ws memdb.WatchSet) (string, interface{}, error)
// agentLocalBlockingQuery performs a blocking query in a generic way against
// local agent state that has no RPC or raft to back it. It uses `hash` parameter
// instead of an `index`. The resp is needed to write the `X-Consul-ContentHash`
// header back on return no Status nor body content is ever written to it.
func (s *HTTPServer) agentLocalBlockingQuery(resp http.ResponseWriter, hash string,
queryOpts *structs.QueryOptions, fn agentLocalBlockingFunc) (interface{}, error) {
// If we are not blocking we can skip tracking and allocating - nil WatchSet
// is still valid to call Add on and will just be a no op.
var ws memdb.WatchSet
var timeout *time.Timer
if hash != "" {
// TODO(banks) at least define these defaults somewhere in a const. Would be
// nice not to duplicate the ones in consul/rpc.go too...
wait := queryOpts.MaxQueryTime
if wait == 0 {
wait = 5 * time.Minute
}
if wait > 10*time.Minute {
wait = 10 * time.Minute
}
// Apply a small amount of jitter to the request.
wait += lib.RandomStagger(wait / 16)
timeout = time.NewTimer(wait)
}
for {
// Must reset this every loop in case the Watch set is already closed but
// hash remains same. In that case we'll need to re-block on ws.Watch()
// again.
ws = memdb.NewWatchSet()
curHash, curResp, err := fn(ws)
if err != nil {
return curResp, err
}
// Return immediately if there is no timeout, the hash is different or the
// Watch returns true (indicating timeout fired). Note that Watch on a nil
// WatchSet immediately returns false which would incorrectly cause this to
// loop and repeat again, however we rely on the invariant that ws == nil
// IFF timeout == nil in which case the Watch call is never invoked.
if timeout == nil || hash != curHash || ws.Watch(timeout.C) {
resp.Header().Set("X-Consul-ContentHash", curHash)
return curResp, err
}
// Watch returned false indicating a change was detected, loop and repeat
// the callback to load the new value. If agent sync is paused it means
// local state is currently being bulk-edited e.g. config reload. In this
// case it's likely that local state just got unloaded and may or may not be
// reloaded yet. Wait a short amount of time for Sync to resume to ride out
// typical config reloads.
if syncPauseCh := s.agent.syncPausedCh(); syncPauseCh != nil {
select {
case <-syncPauseCh:
case <-timeout.C:
}
}
}
}
// AgentConnectAuthorize
//
// POST /v1/agent/connect/authorize
//
2018-05-19 04:03:10 +00:00
// Note: when this logic changes, consider if the Intention.Check RPC method
// also needs to be updated.
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentConnectAuthorize(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Fetch the token
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
// Decode the request from the request body
var authReq structs.ConnectAuthorizeRequest
if err := decodeBody(req, &authReq, nil); err != nil {
return nil, BadRequestError{fmt.Sprintf("Request decode failed: %v", err)}
}
2018-03-27 17:09:13 +00:00
authz, reason, cacheMeta, err := s.agent.ConnectAuthorize(token, &authReq)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
setCacheMeta(resp, cacheMeta)
return &connectAuthorizeResp{
Authorized: authz,
Reason: reason,
}, nil
}
// connectAuthorizeResp is the response format/structure for the
// /v1/agent/connect/authorize endpoint.
type connectAuthorizeResp struct {
Authorized bool // True if authorized, false if not
Reason string // Reason for the Authorized value (whether true or false)
}
New command: consul debug (#4754) * agent/debug: add package for debugging, host info * api: add v1/agent/host endpoint * agent: add v1/agent/host endpoint * command/debug: implementation of static capture * command/debug: tests and only configured targets * agent/debug: add basic test for host metrics * command/debug: add methods for dynamic data capture * api: add debug/pprof endpoints * command/debug: add pprof * command/debug: timing, wg, logs to disk * vendor: add gopsutil/disk * command/debug: add a usage section * website: add docs for consul debug * agent/host: require operator:read * api/host: improve docs and no retry timing * command/debug: fail on extra arguments * command/debug: fixup file permissions to 0644 * command/debug: remove server flags * command/debug: improve clarity of usage section * api/debug: add Trace for profiling, fix profile * command/debug: capture profile and trace at the same time * command/debug: add index document * command/debug: use "clusters" in place of members * command/debug: remove address in output * command/debug: improve comment on metrics sleep * command/debug: clarify usage * agent: always register pprof handlers and protect This will allow us to avoid a restart of a target agent for profiling by always registering the pprof handlers. Given this is a potentially sensitive path, it is protected with an operator:read ACL and enable debug being set to true on the target agent. enable_debug still requires a restart. If ACLs are disabled, enable_debug is sufficient. * command/debug: use trace.out instead of .prof More in line with golang docs. * agent: fix comment wording * agent: wrap table driven tests in t.run()
2018-10-17 20:20:35 +00:00
// AgentHost
//
// GET /v1/agent/host
//
// Retrieves information about resources available and in-use for the
// host the agent is running on such as CPU, memory, and disk usage. Requires
// a operator:read ACL token.
func (s *HTTPServer) AgentHost(resp http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) (interface{}, error) {
// Fetch the ACL token, if any, and enforce agent policy.
var token string
s.parseToken(req, &token)
rule, err := s.agent.resolveToken(token)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
New command: consul debug (#4754) * agent/debug: add package for debugging, host info * api: add v1/agent/host endpoint * agent: add v1/agent/host endpoint * command/debug: implementation of static capture * command/debug: tests and only configured targets * agent/debug: add basic test for host metrics * command/debug: add methods for dynamic data capture * api: add debug/pprof endpoints * command/debug: add pprof * command/debug: timing, wg, logs to disk * vendor: add gopsutil/disk * command/debug: add a usage section * website: add docs for consul debug * agent/host: require operator:read * api/host: improve docs and no retry timing * command/debug: fail on extra arguments * command/debug: fixup file permissions to 0644 * command/debug: remove server flags * command/debug: improve clarity of usage section * api/debug: add Trace for profiling, fix profile * command/debug: capture profile and trace at the same time * command/debug: add index document * command/debug: use "clusters" in place of members * command/debug: remove address in output * command/debug: improve comment on metrics sleep * command/debug: clarify usage * agent: always register pprof handlers and protect This will allow us to avoid a restart of a target agent for profiling by always registering the pprof handlers. Given this is a potentially sensitive path, it is protected with an operator:read ACL and enable debug being set to true on the target agent. enable_debug still requires a restart. If ACLs are disabled, enable_debug is sufficient. * command/debug: use trace.out instead of .prof More in line with golang docs. * agent: fix comment wording * agent: wrap table driven tests in t.run()
2018-10-17 20:20:35 +00:00
if rule != nil && !rule.OperatorRead() {
return nil, acl.ErrPermissionDenied
}
return debug.CollectHostInfo(), nil
}