consul/agent/xds/listeners.go

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// Copyright (c) HashiCorp, Inc.
[COMPLIANCE] License changes (#18443) * Adding explicit MPL license for sub-package This directory and its subdirectories (packages) contain files licensed with the MPLv2 `LICENSE` file in this directory and are intentionally licensed separately from the BSL `LICENSE` file at the root of this repository. * Adding explicit MPL license for sub-package This directory and its subdirectories (packages) contain files licensed with the MPLv2 `LICENSE` file in this directory and are intentionally licensed separately from the BSL `LICENSE` file at the root of this repository. * Updating the license from MPL to Business Source License Going forward, this project will be licensed under the Business Source License v1.1. Please see our blog post for more details at <Blog URL>, FAQ at www.hashicorp.com/licensing-faq, and details of the license at www.hashicorp.com/bsl. * add missing license headers * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 * Update copyright file headers to BUSL-1.1 --------- Co-authored-by: hashicorp-copywrite[bot] <110428419+hashicorp-copywrite[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
2023-08-11 13:12:13 +00:00
// SPDX-License-Identifier: BUSL-1.1
package xds
import (
"errors"
"fmt"
"net"
"net/url"
"regexp"
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
envoy_core_v3 "github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane/envoy/config/core/v3"
envoy_listener_v3 "github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane/envoy/config/listener/v3"
envoy_route_v3 "github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane/envoy/config/route/v3"
envoy_grpc_http1_bridge_v3 "github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane/envoy/extensions/filters/http/grpc_http1_bridge/v3"
envoy_grpc_stats_v3 "github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane/envoy/extensions/filters/http/grpc_stats/v3"
envoy_http_router_v3 "github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane/envoy/extensions/filters/http/router/v3"
envoy_extensions_filters_listener_http_inspector_v3 "github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane/envoy/extensions/filters/listener/http_inspector/v3"
envoy_original_dst_v3 "github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane/envoy/extensions/filters/listener/original_dst/v3"
envoy_tls_inspector_v3 "github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane/envoy/extensions/filters/listener/tls_inspector/v3"
envoy_connection_limit_v3 "github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane/envoy/extensions/filters/network/connection_limit/v3"
envoy_http_v3 "github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane/envoy/extensions/filters/network/http_connection_manager/v3"
envoy_sni_cluster_v3 "github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane/envoy/extensions/filters/network/sni_cluster/v3"
envoy_tcp_proxy_v3 "github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane/envoy/extensions/filters/network/tcp_proxy/v3"
envoy_tls_v3 "github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane/envoy/extensions/transport_sockets/tls/v3"
envoy_type_v3 "github.com/envoyproxy/go-control-plane/envoy/type/v3"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/xds/config"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/xds/naming"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/xds/platform"
"github.com/hashicorp/go-hclog"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/encoding/protojson"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/proto"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/anypb"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/durationpb"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/wrapperspb"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/acl"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/connect"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/proxycfg"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/structs"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/xds/accesslogs"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/agent/xds/response"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/envoyextensions/xdscommon"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/lib"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/lib/stringslice"
Protobuf Refactoring for Multi-Module Cleanliness (#16302) Protobuf Refactoring for Multi-Module Cleanliness This commit includes the following: Moves all packages that were within proto/ to proto/private Rewrites imports to account for the packages being moved Adds in buf.work.yaml to enable buf workspaces Names the proto-public buf module so that we can override the Go package imports within proto/buf.yaml Bumps the buf version dependency to 1.14.0 (I was trying out the version to see if it would get around an issue - it didn't but it also doesn't break things and it seemed best to keep up with the toolchain changes) Why: In the future we will need to consume other protobuf dependencies such as the Google HTTP annotations for openapi generation or grpc-gateway usage. There were some recent changes to have our own ratelimiting annotations. The two combined were not working when I was trying to use them together (attempting to rebase another branch) Buf workspaces should be the solution to the problem Buf workspaces means that each module will have generated Go code that embeds proto file names relative to the proto dir and not the top level repo root. This resulted in proto file name conflicts in the Go global protobuf type registry. The solution to that was to add in a private/ directory into the path within the proto/ directory. That then required rewriting all the imports. Is this safe? AFAICT yes The gRPC wire protocol doesn't seem to care about the proto file names (although the Go grpc code does tack on the proto file name as Metadata in the ServiceDesc) Other than imports, there were no changes to any generated code as a result of this.
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"github.com/hashicorp/consul/proto/private/pbpeering"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/sdk/iptables"
"github.com/hashicorp/consul/types"
)
// listenersFromSnapshot returns the xDS API representation of the "listeners" in the snapshot.
Support Incremental xDS mode (#9855) This adds support for the Incremental xDS protocol when using xDS v3. This is best reviewed commit-by-commit and will not be squashed when merged. Union of all commit messages follows to give an overarching summary: xds: exclusively support incremental xDS when using xDS v3 Attempts to use SoTW via v3 will fail, much like attempts to use incremental via v2 will fail. Work around a strange older envoy behavior involving empty CDS responses over incremental xDS. xds: various cleanups and refactors that don't strictly concern the addition of incremental xDS support Dissolve the connectionInfo struct in favor of per-connection ResourceGenerators instead. Do a better job of ensuring the xds code uses a well configured logger that accurately describes the connected client. xds: pull out checkStreamACLs method in advance of a later commit xds: rewrite SoTW xDS protocol tests to use protobufs rather than hand-rolled json strings In the test we very lightly reuse some of the more boring protobuf construction helper code that is also technically under test. The important thing of the protocol tests is testing the protocol. The actual inputs and outputs are largely already handled by the xds golden output tests now so these protocol tests don't have to do double-duty. This also updates the SoTW protocol test to exclusively use xDS v2 which is the only variant of SoTW that will be supported in Consul 1.10. xds: default xds.Server.AuthCheckFrequency at use-time instead of construction-time
2021-04-29 18:54:05 +00:00
func (s *ResourceGenerator) listenersFromSnapshot(cfgSnap *proxycfg.ConfigSnapshot) ([]proto.Message, error) {
if cfgSnap == nil {
return nil, errors.New("nil config given")
}
switch cfgSnap.Kind {
case structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy:
Support Incremental xDS mode (#9855) This adds support for the Incremental xDS protocol when using xDS v3. This is best reviewed commit-by-commit and will not be squashed when merged. Union of all commit messages follows to give an overarching summary: xds: exclusively support incremental xDS when using xDS v3 Attempts to use SoTW via v3 will fail, much like attempts to use incremental via v2 will fail. Work around a strange older envoy behavior involving empty CDS responses over incremental xDS. xds: various cleanups and refactors that don't strictly concern the addition of incremental xDS support Dissolve the connectionInfo struct in favor of per-connection ResourceGenerators instead. Do a better job of ensuring the xds code uses a well configured logger that accurately describes the connected client. xds: pull out checkStreamACLs method in advance of a later commit xds: rewrite SoTW xDS protocol tests to use protobufs rather than hand-rolled json strings In the test we very lightly reuse some of the more boring protobuf construction helper code that is also technically under test. The important thing of the protocol tests is testing the protocol. The actual inputs and outputs are largely already handled by the xds golden output tests now so these protocol tests don't have to do double-duty. This also updates the SoTW protocol test to exclusively use xDS v2 which is the only variant of SoTW that will be supported in Consul 1.10. xds: default xds.Server.AuthCheckFrequency at use-time instead of construction-time
2021-04-29 18:54:05 +00:00
return s.listenersFromSnapshotConnectProxy(cfgSnap)
Implement APIGateway proxycfg snapshot (#16194) * Stub proxycfg handler for API gateway * Add Service Kind constants/handling for API Gateway * Begin stubbing for SDS * Add new Secret type to xDS order of operations * Continue stubbing of SDS * Iterate on proxycfg handler for API gateway * Handle BoundAPIGateway config entry subscription in proxycfg-glue * Add API gateway to config snapshot validation * Add API gateway to config snapshot clone, leaf, etc. * Subscribe to bound route + cert config entries on bound-api-gateway * Track routes + certs on API gateway config snapshot * Generate DeepCopy() for types used in watch.Map * Watch all active references on api-gateway, unwatch inactive * Track loading of initial bound-api-gateway config entry * Use proper proto package for SDS mapping * Use ResourceReference instead of ServiceName, collect resources * Fix typo, add + remove TODOs * Watch discovery chains for TCPRoute * Add TODO for updating gateway services for api-gateway * make proto * Regenerate deep-copy for proxycfg * Set datacenter on upstream ID from query source * Watch discovery chains for http-route service backends * Add ServiceName getter to HTTP+TCP Service structs * Clean up unwatched discovery chains on API Gateway * Implement watch for ingress leaf certificate * Collect upstreams on http-route + tcp-route updates * Remove unused GatewayServices update handler * Remove unnecessary gateway services logic for API Gateway * Remove outdate TODO * Use .ToIngress where appropriate, including TODO for cleaning up * Cancel before returning error * Remove GatewayServices subscription * Add godoc for handlerAPIGateway functions * Update terminology from Connect => Consul Service Mesh Consistent with terminology changes in https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/pull/12690 * Add missing TODO * Remove duplicate switch case * Rerun deep-copy generator * Use correct property on config snapshot * Remove unnecessary leaf cert watch * Clean up based on code review feedback * Note handler properties that are initialized but set elsewhere * Add TODO for moving helper func into structs pkg * Update generated DeepCopy code * gofmt * Generate DeepCopy() for API gateway listener types * Improve variable name * Regenerate DeepCopy() code * Fix linting issue * Temporarily remove the secret type from resource generation
2023-02-08 21:52:12 +00:00
case structs.ServiceKindTerminatingGateway,
structs.ServiceKindMeshGateway,
structs.ServiceKindIngressGateway,
structs.ServiceKindAPIGateway:
Support Incremental xDS mode (#9855) This adds support for the Incremental xDS protocol when using xDS v3. This is best reviewed commit-by-commit and will not be squashed when merged. Union of all commit messages follows to give an overarching summary: xds: exclusively support incremental xDS when using xDS v3 Attempts to use SoTW via v3 will fail, much like attempts to use incremental via v2 will fail. Work around a strange older envoy behavior involving empty CDS responses over incremental xDS. xds: various cleanups and refactors that don't strictly concern the addition of incremental xDS support Dissolve the connectionInfo struct in favor of per-connection ResourceGenerators instead. Do a better job of ensuring the xds code uses a well configured logger that accurately describes the connected client. xds: pull out checkStreamACLs method in advance of a later commit xds: rewrite SoTW xDS protocol tests to use protobufs rather than hand-rolled json strings In the test we very lightly reuse some of the more boring protobuf construction helper code that is also technically under test. The important thing of the protocol tests is testing the protocol. The actual inputs and outputs are largely already handled by the xds golden output tests now so these protocol tests don't have to do double-duty. This also updates the SoTW protocol test to exclusively use xDS v2 which is the only variant of SoTW that will be supported in Consul 1.10. xds: default xds.Server.AuthCheckFrequency at use-time instead of construction-time
2021-04-29 18:54:05 +00:00
return s.listenersFromSnapshotGateway(cfgSnap)
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("Invalid service kind: %v", cfgSnap.Kind)
}
}
// listenersFromSnapshotConnectProxy returns the "listeners" for a connect proxy service
Support Incremental xDS mode (#9855) This adds support for the Incremental xDS protocol when using xDS v3. This is best reviewed commit-by-commit and will not be squashed when merged. Union of all commit messages follows to give an overarching summary: xds: exclusively support incremental xDS when using xDS v3 Attempts to use SoTW via v3 will fail, much like attempts to use incremental via v2 will fail. Work around a strange older envoy behavior involving empty CDS responses over incremental xDS. xds: various cleanups and refactors that don't strictly concern the addition of incremental xDS support Dissolve the connectionInfo struct in favor of per-connection ResourceGenerators instead. Do a better job of ensuring the xds code uses a well configured logger that accurately describes the connected client. xds: pull out checkStreamACLs method in advance of a later commit xds: rewrite SoTW xDS protocol tests to use protobufs rather than hand-rolled json strings In the test we very lightly reuse some of the more boring protobuf construction helper code that is also technically under test. The important thing of the protocol tests is testing the protocol. The actual inputs and outputs are largely already handled by the xds golden output tests now so these protocol tests don't have to do double-duty. This also updates the SoTW protocol test to exclusively use xDS v2 which is the only variant of SoTW that will be supported in Consul 1.10. xds: default xds.Server.AuthCheckFrequency at use-time instead of construction-time
2021-04-29 18:54:05 +00:00
func (s *ResourceGenerator) listenersFromSnapshotConnectProxy(cfgSnap *proxycfg.ConfigSnapshot) ([]proto.Message, error) {
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resources := make([]proto.Message, 1)
var err error
// Configure inbound listener.
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resources[0], err = s.makeInboundListener(cfgSnap, xdscommon.PublicListenerName)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// This outboundListener is exclusively used when transparent proxy mode is active.
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// In that situation there is a single listener where we are redirecting outbound traffic,
// and each upstream gets a filter chain attached to that listener.
var outboundListener *envoy_listener_v3.Listener
if cfgSnap.Proxy.Mode == structs.ProxyModeTransparent {
port := iptables.DefaultTProxyOutboundPort
if cfgSnap.Proxy.TransparentProxy.OutboundListenerPort != 0 {
port = cfgSnap.Proxy.TransparentProxy.OutboundListenerPort
}
originalDstFilter, err := makeEnvoyListenerFilter("envoy.filters.listener.original_dst", &envoy_original_dst_v3.OriginalDst{})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
opts := makeListenerOpts{
name: xdscommon.OutboundListenerName,
accessLogs: cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
addr: "127.0.0.1",
port: port,
direction: envoy_core_v3.TrafficDirection_OUTBOUND,
logger: s.Logger,
}
outboundListener = makeListener(opts)
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outboundListener.FilterChains = make([]*envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain, 0)
outboundListener.ListenerFilters = []*envoy_listener_v3.ListenerFilter{
// The original_dst filter is a listener filter that recovers the original destination
// address before the iptables redirection. This filter is needed for transparent
// proxies because they route to upstreams using filter chains that match on the
// destination IP address. If the filter is not present, no chain will match.
originalDstFilter,
}
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}
proxyCfg, err := config.ParseProxyConfig(cfgSnap.Proxy.Config)
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if err != nil {
// Don't hard fail on a config typo, just warn. The parse func returns
// default config if there is an error so it's safe to continue.
s.Logger.Warn("failed to parse Connect.Proxy.Config", "error", err)
}
var tracing *envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager_Tracing
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if proxyCfg.ListenerTracingJSON != "" {
if tracing, err = makeTracingFromUserConfig(proxyCfg.ListenerTracingJSON); err != nil {
s.Logger.Warn("failed to parse ListenerTracingJSON config", "error", err)
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}
}
upstreamsSnapshot, err := cfgSnap.ToConfigSnapshotUpstreams()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
for uid, chain := range cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.DiscoveryChain {
upstreamCfg, skip := cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.GetUpstream(uid, &cfgSnap.ProxyID.EnterpriseMeta)
if skip {
// Discovery chain is not associated with a known explicit or implicit upstream so it is skipped.
continue
}
cfg := s.getAndModifyUpstreamConfigForListener(uid, upstreamCfg, chain)
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// If escape hatch is present, create a listener from it and move on to the next
if cfg.EnvoyListenerJSON != "" {
upstreamListener, err := makeListenerFromUserConfig(cfg.EnvoyListenerJSON)
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if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
resources = append(resources, upstreamListener)
continue
}
// RDS, Envoy's Route Discovery Service, is only used for HTTP services with a customized discovery chain.
useRDS := chain.Protocol != "tcp" && !chain.Default
var clusterName string
if !useRDS {
// When not using RDS we must generate a cluster name to attach to the filter chain.
// With RDS, cluster names get attached to the dynamic routes instead.
target, err := simpleChainTarget(chain)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
clusterName = s.getTargetClusterName(upstreamsSnapshot, chain, target.ID, false)
if clusterName == "" {
continue
}
}
filterName := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.%s.%s", chain.ServiceName, chain.Namespace, chain.Partition, chain.Datacenter)
// Generate the upstream listeners for when they are explicitly set with a local bind port or socket path
if upstreamCfg != nil && upstreamCfg.HasLocalPortOrSocket() {
filterChain, err := s.makeUpstreamFilterChain(filterChainOpts{
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
routeName: uid.EnvoyID(),
clusterName: clusterName,
filterName: filterName,
protocol: cfg.Protocol,
useRDS: useRDS,
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tracing: tracing,
})
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if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
opts := makeListenerOpts{
name: uid.EnvoyID(),
accessLogs: cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
direction: envoy_core_v3.TrafficDirection_OUTBOUND,
logger: s.Logger,
upstream: upstreamCfg,
}
upstreamListener := makeListener(opts)
s.injectConnectionBalanceConfig(cfg.BalanceOutboundConnections, upstreamListener)
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upstreamListener.FilterChains = []*envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain{
filterChain,
}
resources = append(resources, upstreamListener)
// Avoid creating filter chains below for upstreams that have dedicated listeners
continue
}
// The rest of this loop is used exclusively for transparent proxies.
// Below we create a filter chain per upstream, rather than a listener per upstream
// as we do for explicit upstreams above.
filterChain, err := s.makeUpstreamFilterChain(filterChainOpts{
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
routeName: uid.EnvoyID(),
clusterName: clusterName,
filterName: filterName,
protocol: cfg.Protocol,
useRDS: useRDS,
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tracing: tracing,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
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endpoints := cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.WatchedUpstreamEndpoints[uid][chain.ID()]
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uniqueAddrs := make(map[string]struct{})
if chain.Partition == cfgSnap.ProxyID.PartitionOrDefault() {
for _, ip := range chain.AutoVirtualIPs {
uniqueAddrs[ip] = struct{}{}
}
for _, ip := range chain.ManualVirtualIPs {
uniqueAddrs[ip] = struct{}{}
}
}
// Match on the virtual IP for the upstream service (identified by the chain's ID).
// We do not match on all endpoints here since it would lead to load balancing across
// all instances when any instance address is dialed.
for _, e := range endpoints {
if e.Service.Kind == structs.ServiceKind(structs.TerminatingGateway) {
key := structs.ServiceGatewayVirtualIPTag(chain.CompoundServiceName())
if vip := e.Service.TaggedAddresses[key]; vip.Address != "" {
uniqueAddrs[vip.Address] = struct{}{}
}
continue
}
if vip := e.Service.TaggedAddresses[structs.TaggedAddressVirtualIP]; vip.Address != "" {
uniqueAddrs[vip.Address] = struct{}{}
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}
// The virtualIPTag is used by consul-k8s to store the ClusterIP for a service.
// We only match on this virtual IP if the upstream is in the proxy's partition.
// This is because the IP is not guaranteed to be unique across k8s clusters.
if acl.EqualPartitions(e.Node.PartitionOrDefault(), cfgSnap.ProxyID.PartitionOrDefault()) {
if vip := e.Service.TaggedAddresses[naming.VirtualIPTag]; vip.Address != "" {
uniqueAddrs[vip.Address] = struct{}{}
}
}
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}
if len(uniqueAddrs) > 2 {
s.Logger.Debug("detected multiple virtual IPs for an upstream, all will be used to match traffic",
"upstream", uid, "ip_count", len(uniqueAddrs))
}
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// For every potential address we collected, create the appropriate address prefix to match on.
// In this case we are matching on exact addresses, so the prefix is the address itself,
// and the prefix length is based on whether it's IPv4 or IPv6.
filterChain.FilterChainMatch = makeFilterChainMatchFromAddrs(uniqueAddrs)
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// Only attach the filter chain if there are addresses to match on
if filterChain.FilterChainMatch != nil && len(filterChain.FilterChainMatch.PrefixRanges) > 0 {
outboundListener.FilterChains = append(outboundListener.FilterChains, filterChain)
}
}
requiresTLSInspector := false
requiresHTTPInspector := false
configuredPorts := make(map[int]interface{})
err = cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.DestinationsUpstream.ForEachKeyE(func(uid proxycfg.UpstreamID) error {
svcConfig, ok := cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.DestinationsUpstream.Get(uid)
if !ok || svcConfig == nil {
return nil
}
if structs.IsProtocolHTTPLike(svcConfig.Protocol) {
if _, ok := configuredPorts[svcConfig.Destination.Port]; ok {
return nil
}
configuredPorts[svcConfig.Destination.Port] = struct{}{}
const name = "~http" // name used for the shared route name
routeName := clusterNameForDestination(cfgSnap, name, fmt.Sprintf("%d", svcConfig.Destination.Port), svcConfig.NamespaceOrDefault(), svcConfig.PartitionOrDefault())
filterChain, err := s.makeUpstreamFilterChain(filterChainOpts{
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
routeName: routeName,
filterName: routeName,
protocol: svcConfig.Protocol,
useRDS: true,
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tracing: tracing,
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
filterChain.FilterChainMatch = makeFilterChainMatchFromAddressWithPort("", svcConfig.Destination.Port)
outboundListener.FilterChains = append(outboundListener.FilterChains, filterChain)
requiresHTTPInspector = true
} else {
for _, address := range svcConfig.Destination.Addresses {
clusterName := clusterNameForDestination(cfgSnap, uid.Name, address, uid.NamespaceOrDefault(), uid.PartitionOrDefault())
filterChain, err := s.makeUpstreamFilterChain(filterChainOpts{
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
routeName: uid.EnvoyID(),
clusterName: clusterName,
filterName: clusterName,
protocol: svcConfig.Protocol,
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tracing: tracing,
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
filterChain.FilterChainMatch = makeFilterChainMatchFromAddressWithPort(address, svcConfig.Destination.Port)
outboundListener.FilterChains = append(outboundListener.FilterChains, filterChain)
requiresTLSInspector = len(filterChain.FilterChainMatch.ServerNames) != 0 || requiresTLSInspector
}
}
return nil
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if requiresTLSInspector {
tlsInspector, err := makeTLSInspectorListenerFilter()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
outboundListener.ListenerFilters = append(outboundListener.ListenerFilters, tlsInspector)
}
if requiresHTTPInspector {
httpInspector, err := makeHTTPInspectorListenerFilter()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
outboundListener.ListenerFilters = append(outboundListener.ListenerFilters, httpInspector)
}
// Looping over explicit and implicit upstreams is only needed for cross-peer
// because they do not have discovery chains.
for _, uid := range cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.PeeredUpstreamIDs() {
upstreamCfg, skip := cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.GetUpstream(uid, &cfgSnap.ProxyID.EnterpriseMeta)
if skip {
// Not associated with a known explicit or implicit upstream so it is skipped.
continue
}
peerMeta, found := cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.UpstreamPeerMeta(uid)
if !found {
s.Logger.Warn("failed to fetch upstream peering metadata for listener", "uid", uid)
}
cfg := s.getAndModifyUpstreamConfigForPeeredListener(uid, upstreamCfg, peerMeta)
// If escape hatch is present, create a listener from it and move on to the next
if cfg.EnvoyListenerJSON != "" {
upstreamListener, err := makeListenerFromUserConfig(cfg.EnvoyListenerJSON)
if err != nil {
s.Logger.Error("failed to parse envoy_listener_json",
"upstream", uid,
"error", err)
continue
}
resources = append(resources, upstreamListener)
continue
}
tbs, ok := cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.UpstreamPeerTrustBundles.Get(uid.Peer)
if !ok {
// this should never happen since we loop through upstreams with
// set trust bundles
return nil, fmt.Errorf("trust bundle not ready for peer %s", uid.Peer)
}
clusterName := generatePeeredClusterName(uid, tbs)
// Generate the upstream listeners for when they are explicitly set with a local bind port or socket path
if upstreamCfg != nil && upstreamCfg.HasLocalPortOrSocket() {
filterChain, err := s.makeUpstreamFilterChain(filterChainOpts{
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
clusterName: clusterName,
filterName: fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.%s",
upstreamCfg.DestinationName,
upstreamCfg.DestinationNamespace,
upstreamCfg.DestinationPeer),
routeName: uid.EnvoyID(),
protocol: cfg.Protocol,
useRDS: false,
statPrefix: "upstream_peered.",
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
opts := makeListenerOpts{
name: uid.EnvoyID(),
accessLogs: cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
direction: envoy_core_v3.TrafficDirection_OUTBOUND,
logger: s.Logger,
upstream: upstreamCfg,
}
upstreamListener := makeListener(opts)
s.injectConnectionBalanceConfig(cfg.BalanceOutboundConnections, upstreamListener)
upstreamListener.FilterChains = []*envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain{
filterChain,
}
resources = append(resources, upstreamListener)
// Avoid creating filter chains below for upstreams that have dedicated listeners
continue
}
// The rest of this loop is used exclusively for transparent proxies.
// Below we create a filter chain per upstream, rather than a listener per upstream
// as we do for explicit upstreams above.
filterChain, err := s.makeUpstreamFilterChain(filterChainOpts{
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
routeName: uid.EnvoyID(),
clusterName: clusterName,
filterName: fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.%s",
uid.Name,
uid.NamespaceOrDefault(),
uid.Peer),
protocol: cfg.Protocol,
useRDS: false,
statPrefix: "upstream_peered.",
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tracing: tracing,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
endpoints, _ := cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.PeerUpstreamEndpoints.Get(uid)
uniqueAddrs := make(map[string]struct{})
// Match on the virtual IP for the upstream service (identified by the chain's ID).
// We do not match on all endpoints here since it would lead to load balancing across
// all instances when any instance address is dialed.
for _, e := range endpoints {
if vip := e.Service.TaggedAddresses[structs.TaggedAddressVirtualIP]; vip.Address != "" {
uniqueAddrs[vip.Address] = struct{}{}
}
// The virtualIPTag is used by consul-k8s to store the ClusterIP for a service.
// For services imported from a peer,the partition will be equal in all cases.
if acl.EqualPartitions(e.Node.PartitionOrDefault(), cfgSnap.ProxyID.PartitionOrDefault()) {
if vip := e.Service.TaggedAddresses[naming.VirtualIPTag]; vip.Address != "" {
uniqueAddrs[vip.Address] = struct{}{}
}
}
}
if len(uniqueAddrs) > 2 {
s.Logger.Debug("detected multiple virtual IPs for an upstream, all will be used to match traffic",
"upstream", uid, "ip_count", len(uniqueAddrs))
}
// For every potential address we collected, create the appropriate address prefix to match on.
// In this case we are matching on exact addresses, so the prefix is the address itself,
// and the prefix length is based on whether it's IPv4 or IPv6.
filterChain.FilterChainMatch = makeFilterChainMatchFromAddrs(uniqueAddrs)
// Only attach the filter chain if there are addresses to match on
if filterChain.FilterChainMatch != nil && len(filterChain.FilterChainMatch.PrefixRanges) > 0 {
outboundListener.FilterChains = append(outboundListener.FilterChains, filterChain)
}
}
if outboundListener != nil {
// Add a passthrough for every mesh endpoint that can be dialed directly,
// as opposed to via a virtual IP.
var passthroughChains []*envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain
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for _, targets := range cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.PassthroughUpstreams {
for tid, addrs := range targets {
uid := proxycfg.NewUpstreamIDFromTargetID(tid)
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sni := connect.ServiceSNI(
uid.Name, "", uid.NamespaceOrDefault(), uid.PartitionOrDefault(), cfgSnap.Datacenter, cfgSnap.Roots.TrustDomain)
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filterName := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.%s.%s", uid.Name, uid.NamespaceOrDefault(), uid.PartitionOrDefault(), cfgSnap.Datacenter)
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filterChain, err := s.makeUpstreamFilterChain(filterChainOpts{
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
clusterName: "passthrough~" + sni,
filterName: filterName,
protocol: "tcp",
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
filterChain.FilterChainMatch = makeFilterChainMatchFromAddrs(addrs)
passthroughChains = append(passthroughChains, filterChain)
}
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}
outboundListener.FilterChains = append(outboundListener.FilterChains, passthroughChains...)
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// Filter chains are stable sorted to avoid draining if the list is provided out of order
sort.SliceStable(outboundListener.FilterChains, func(i, j int) bool {
si := ""
sj := ""
if len(outboundListener.FilterChains[i].FilterChainMatch.PrefixRanges) > 0 {
si += outboundListener.FilterChains[i].FilterChainMatch.PrefixRanges[0].AddressPrefix +
"/" + outboundListener.FilterChains[i].FilterChainMatch.PrefixRanges[0].PrefixLen.String() +
":" + outboundListener.FilterChains[i].FilterChainMatch.DestinationPort.String()
}
if len(outboundListener.FilterChains[i].FilterChainMatch.ServerNames) > 0 {
si += outboundListener.FilterChains[i].FilterChainMatch.ServerNames[0] +
":" + outboundListener.FilterChains[i].FilterChainMatch.DestinationPort.String()
} else {
si += outboundListener.FilterChains[i].FilterChainMatch.DestinationPort.String()
}
if len(outboundListener.FilterChains[j].FilterChainMatch.PrefixRanges) > 0 {
sj += outboundListener.FilterChains[j].FilterChainMatch.PrefixRanges[0].AddressPrefix +
"/" + outboundListener.FilterChains[j].FilterChainMatch.PrefixRanges[0].PrefixLen.String() +
":" + outboundListener.FilterChains[j].FilterChainMatch.DestinationPort.String()
}
if len(outboundListener.FilterChains[j].FilterChainMatch.ServerNames) > 0 {
sj += outboundListener.FilterChains[j].FilterChainMatch.ServerNames[0] +
":" + outboundListener.FilterChains[j].FilterChainMatch.DestinationPort.String()
} else {
sj += outboundListener.FilterChains[j].FilterChainMatch.DestinationPort.String()
}
return si < sj
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})
// Add a catch-all filter chain that acts as a TCP proxy to destinations outside the mesh
if meshConf := cfgSnap.MeshConfig(); meshConf == nil ||
!meshConf.TransparentProxy.MeshDestinationsOnly {
filterChain, err := s.makeUpstreamFilterChain(filterChainOpts{
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
clusterName: naming.OriginalDestinationClusterName,
filterName: naming.OriginalDestinationClusterName,
protocol: "tcp",
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
outboundListener.DefaultFilterChain = filterChain
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}
// Only add the outbound listener if configured.
if len(outboundListener.FilterChains) > 0 || outboundListener.DefaultFilterChain != nil {
resources = append(resources, outboundListener)
}
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}
// Looping over explicit upstreams is only needed for prepared queries because they do not have discovery chains
for uid, u := range cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.UpstreamConfig {
if u.DestinationType != structs.UpstreamDestTypePreparedQuery {
2021-03-17 19:40:49 +00:00
continue
}
cfg, err := structs.ParseUpstreamConfig(u.Config)
if err != nil {
// Don't hard fail on a config typo, just warn. The parse func returns
// default config if there is an error so it's safe to continue.
s.Logger.Warn("failed to parse", "upstream", uid, "error", err)
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}
// If escape hatch is present, create a listener from it and move on to the next
if cfg.EnvoyListenerJSON != "" {
upstreamListener, err := makeListenerFromUserConfig(cfg.EnvoyListenerJSON)
if err != nil {
s.Logger.Error("failed to parse envoy_listener_json",
"upstream", uid,
"error", err)
continue
}
resources = append(resources, upstreamListener)
continue
}
opts := makeListenerOpts{
name: uid.EnvoyID(),
accessLogs: cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
direction: envoy_core_v3.TrafficDirection_OUTBOUND,
logger: s.Logger,
upstream: u,
}
upstreamListener := makeListener(opts)
s.injectConnectionBalanceConfig(cfg.BalanceOutboundConnections, upstreamListener)
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filterChain, err := s.makeUpstreamFilterChain(filterChainOpts{
// TODO (SNI partition) add partition for upstream SNI
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
clusterName: connect.UpstreamSNI(u, "", cfgSnap.Datacenter, cfgSnap.Roots.TrustDomain),
filterName: uid.EnvoyID(),
routeName: uid.EnvoyID(),
protocol: cfg.Protocol,
2022-08-02 06:52:48 +00:00
tracing: tracing,
})
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if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
upstreamListener.FilterChains = []*envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain{
filterChain,
}
resources = append(resources, upstreamListener)
}
cfgSnap.Proxy.Expose.Finalize()
paths := cfgSnap.Proxy.Expose.Paths
// Add service health checks to the list of paths to create listeners for if needed
if cfgSnap.Proxy.Expose.Checks {
psid := structs.NewServiceID(cfgSnap.Proxy.DestinationServiceID, &cfgSnap.ProxyID.EnterpriseMeta)
for _, check := range cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.WatchedServiceChecks[psid] {
p, err := parseCheckPath(check)
if err != nil {
s.Logger.Warn("failed to create listener for", "check", check.CheckID, "error", err)
continue
}
paths = append(paths, p)
}
}
// Configure additional listener for exposed check paths
for _, path := range paths {
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clusterName := xdscommon.LocalAppClusterName
if path.LocalPathPort != cfgSnap.Proxy.LocalServicePort {
clusterName = makeExposeClusterName(path.LocalPathPort)
}
l, err := s.makeExposedCheckListener(cfgSnap, clusterName, path)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
resources = append(resources, l)
}
return resources, nil
}
func makeFilterChainMatchFromAddrs(addrs map[string]struct{}) *envoy_listener_v3.FilterChainMatch {
ranges := make([]*envoy_core_v3.CidrRange, 0)
for addr := range addrs {
ip := net.ParseIP(addr)
if ip == nil {
continue
}
pfxLen := uint32(32)
if ip.To4() == nil {
pfxLen = 128
}
ranges = append(ranges, &envoy_core_v3.CidrRange{
AddressPrefix: addr,
PrefixLen: &wrapperspb.UInt32Value{Value: pfxLen},
})
}
// The match rules are stable sorted to avoid draining if the list is provided out of order
sort.SliceStable(ranges, func(i, j int) bool {
return ranges[i].AddressPrefix < ranges[j].AddressPrefix
})
return &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChainMatch{
PrefixRanges: ranges,
}
}
func makeFilterChainMatchFromAddressWithPort(address string, port int) *envoy_listener_v3.FilterChainMatch {
ranges := make([]*envoy_core_v3.CidrRange, 0)
ip := net.ParseIP(address)
if ip == nil {
if address != "" {
return &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChainMatch{
ServerNames: []string{address},
DestinationPort: &wrapperspb.UInt32Value{Value: uint32(port)},
}
}
return &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChainMatch{
DestinationPort: &wrapperspb.UInt32Value{Value: uint32(port)},
}
}
pfxLen := uint32(32)
if ip.To4() == nil {
pfxLen = 128
}
ranges = append(ranges, &envoy_core_v3.CidrRange{
AddressPrefix: address,
PrefixLen: &wrapperspb.UInt32Value{Value: pfxLen},
})
return &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChainMatch{
PrefixRanges: ranges,
DestinationPort: &wrapperspb.UInt32Value{Value: uint32(port)},
}
}
func parseCheckPath(check structs.CheckType) (structs.ExposePath, error) {
var path structs.ExposePath
if check.HTTP != "" {
path.Protocol = "http"
// Get path and local port from original HTTP target
u, err := url.Parse(check.HTTP)
if err != nil {
return path, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse url '%s': %v", check.HTTP, err)
}
path.Path = u.Path
_, portStr, err := net.SplitHostPort(u.Host)
if err != nil {
return path, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse port from '%s': %v", check.HTTP, err)
}
path.LocalPathPort, err = strconv.Atoi(portStr)
if err != nil {
return path, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse port from '%s': %v", check.HTTP, err)
}
// Get listener port from proxied HTTP target
u, err = url.Parse(check.ProxyHTTP)
if err != nil {
return path, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse url '%s': %v", check.ProxyHTTP, err)
}
_, portStr, err = net.SplitHostPort(u.Host)
if err != nil {
return path, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse port from '%s': %v", check.ProxyHTTP, err)
}
path.ListenerPort, err = strconv.Atoi(portStr)
if err != nil {
return path, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse port from '%s': %v", check.ProxyHTTP, err)
}
}
if check.GRPC != "" {
path.Path = "/grpc.health.v1.Health/Check"
path.Protocol = "http2"
// Get local port from original GRPC target of the form: host/service
proxyServerAndService := strings.SplitN(check.GRPC, "/", 2)
_, portStr, err := net.SplitHostPort(proxyServerAndService[0])
if err != nil {
return path, fmt.Errorf("failed to split host/port from '%s': %v", check.GRPC, err)
}
path.LocalPathPort, err = strconv.Atoi(portStr)
if err != nil {
return path, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse port from '%s': %v", check.GRPC, err)
}
// Get listener port from proxied GRPC target of the form: host/service
proxyServerAndService = strings.SplitN(check.ProxyGRPC, "/", 2)
_, portStr, err = net.SplitHostPort(proxyServerAndService[0])
if err != nil {
return path, fmt.Errorf("failed to split host/port from '%s': %v", check.ProxyGRPC, err)
}
path.ListenerPort, err = strconv.Atoi(portStr)
if err != nil {
return path, fmt.Errorf("failed to parse port from '%s': %v", check.ProxyGRPC, err)
}
}
path.ParsedFromCheck = true
return path, nil
}
// listenersFromSnapshotGateway returns the "listener" for a terminating-gateway or mesh-gateway service
Support Incremental xDS mode (#9855) This adds support for the Incremental xDS protocol when using xDS v3. This is best reviewed commit-by-commit and will not be squashed when merged. Union of all commit messages follows to give an overarching summary: xds: exclusively support incremental xDS when using xDS v3 Attempts to use SoTW via v3 will fail, much like attempts to use incremental via v2 will fail. Work around a strange older envoy behavior involving empty CDS responses over incremental xDS. xds: various cleanups and refactors that don't strictly concern the addition of incremental xDS support Dissolve the connectionInfo struct in favor of per-connection ResourceGenerators instead. Do a better job of ensuring the xds code uses a well configured logger that accurately describes the connected client. xds: pull out checkStreamACLs method in advance of a later commit xds: rewrite SoTW xDS protocol tests to use protobufs rather than hand-rolled json strings In the test we very lightly reuse some of the more boring protobuf construction helper code that is also technically under test. The important thing of the protocol tests is testing the protocol. The actual inputs and outputs are largely already handled by the xds golden output tests now so these protocol tests don't have to do double-duty. This also updates the SoTW protocol test to exclusively use xDS v2 which is the only variant of SoTW that will be supported in Consul 1.10. xds: default xds.Server.AuthCheckFrequency at use-time instead of construction-time
2021-04-29 18:54:05 +00:00
func (s *ResourceGenerator) listenersFromSnapshotGateway(cfgSnap *proxycfg.ConfigSnapshot) ([]proto.Message, error) {
cfg, err := config.ParseGatewayConfig(cfgSnap.Proxy.Config)
if err != nil {
// Don't hard fail on a config typo, just warn. The parse func returns
// default config if there is an error so it's safe to continue.
s.Logger.Warn("failed to parse Connect.Proxy.Config", "error", err)
}
// We'll collect all of the desired listeners first, and deduplicate them later.
type namedAddress struct {
name string
structs.ServiceAddress
}
addrs := make([]namedAddress, 0)
var resources []proto.Message
if !cfg.NoDefaultBind {
addr := cfgSnap.Address
if addr == "" {
addr = "0.0.0.0"
}
a := structs.ServiceAddress{
Address: addr,
Port: cfgSnap.Port,
}
addrs = append(addrs, namedAddress{name: "default", ServiceAddress: a})
}
if cfg.BindTaggedAddresses {
for name, addrCfg := range cfgSnap.TaggedAddresses {
a := structs.ServiceAddress{
Address: addrCfg.Address,
Port: addrCfg.Port,
}
addrs = append(addrs, namedAddress{name: name, ServiceAddress: a})
}
}
for name, addrCfg := range cfg.BindAddresses {
a := structs.ServiceAddress{
Address: addrCfg.Address,
Port: addrCfg.Port,
}
addrs = append(addrs, namedAddress{name: name, ServiceAddress: a})
}
// Prevent invalid configurations of binding to the same port/addr twice
// including with the any addresses
//
// Sort the list and then if two items share a service address, take the
// first one to ensure we generate one listener per address and it's
// stable.
sort.Slice(addrs, func(i, j int) bool {
return addrs[i].name < addrs[j].name
})
// Make listeners and deduplicate on the fly.
seen := make(map[structs.ServiceAddress]bool)
for _, a := range addrs {
if seen[a.ServiceAddress] {
continue
}
seen[a.ServiceAddress] = true
var l *envoy_listener_v3.Listener
switch cfgSnap.Kind {
case structs.ServiceKindTerminatingGateway:
Support Incremental xDS mode (#9855) This adds support for the Incremental xDS protocol when using xDS v3. This is best reviewed commit-by-commit and will not be squashed when merged. Union of all commit messages follows to give an overarching summary: xds: exclusively support incremental xDS when using xDS v3 Attempts to use SoTW via v3 will fail, much like attempts to use incremental via v2 will fail. Work around a strange older envoy behavior involving empty CDS responses over incremental xDS. xds: various cleanups and refactors that don't strictly concern the addition of incremental xDS support Dissolve the connectionInfo struct in favor of per-connection ResourceGenerators instead. Do a better job of ensuring the xds code uses a well configured logger that accurately describes the connected client. xds: pull out checkStreamACLs method in advance of a later commit xds: rewrite SoTW xDS protocol tests to use protobufs rather than hand-rolled json strings In the test we very lightly reuse some of the more boring protobuf construction helper code that is also technically under test. The important thing of the protocol tests is testing the protocol. The actual inputs and outputs are largely already handled by the xds golden output tests now so these protocol tests don't have to do double-duty. This also updates the SoTW protocol test to exclusively use xDS v2 which is the only variant of SoTW that will be supported in Consul 1.10. xds: default xds.Server.AuthCheckFrequency at use-time instead of construction-time
2021-04-29 18:54:05 +00:00
l, err = s.makeTerminatingGatewayListener(cfgSnap, a.name, a.Address, a.Port)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
Implement APIGateway proxycfg snapshot (#16194) * Stub proxycfg handler for API gateway * Add Service Kind constants/handling for API Gateway * Begin stubbing for SDS * Add new Secret type to xDS order of operations * Continue stubbing of SDS * Iterate on proxycfg handler for API gateway * Handle BoundAPIGateway config entry subscription in proxycfg-glue * Add API gateway to config snapshot validation * Add API gateway to config snapshot clone, leaf, etc. * Subscribe to bound route + cert config entries on bound-api-gateway * Track routes + certs on API gateway config snapshot * Generate DeepCopy() for types used in watch.Map * Watch all active references on api-gateway, unwatch inactive * Track loading of initial bound-api-gateway config entry * Use proper proto package for SDS mapping * Use ResourceReference instead of ServiceName, collect resources * Fix typo, add + remove TODOs * Watch discovery chains for TCPRoute * Add TODO for updating gateway services for api-gateway * make proto * Regenerate deep-copy for proxycfg * Set datacenter on upstream ID from query source * Watch discovery chains for http-route service backends * Add ServiceName getter to HTTP+TCP Service structs * Clean up unwatched discovery chains on API Gateway * Implement watch for ingress leaf certificate * Collect upstreams on http-route + tcp-route updates * Remove unused GatewayServices update handler * Remove unnecessary gateway services logic for API Gateway * Remove outdate TODO * Use .ToIngress where appropriate, including TODO for cleaning up * Cancel before returning error * Remove GatewayServices subscription * Add godoc for handlerAPIGateway functions * Update terminology from Connect => Consul Service Mesh Consistent with terminology changes in https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/pull/12690 * Add missing TODO * Remove duplicate switch case * Rerun deep-copy generator * Use correct property on config snapshot * Remove unnecessary leaf cert watch * Clean up based on code review feedback * Note handler properties that are initialized but set elsewhere * Add TODO for moving helper func into structs pkg * Update generated DeepCopy code * gofmt * Generate DeepCopy() for API gateway listener types * Improve variable name * Regenerate DeepCopy() code * Fix linting issue * Temporarily remove the secret type from resource generation
2023-02-08 21:52:12 +00:00
case structs.ServiceKindAPIGateway:
xds: generate listeners directly from API gateway snapshot (#17398) * API Gateway XDS Primitives, endpoints and clusters (#17002) * XDS primitive generation for endpoints and clusters Co-authored-by: Nathan Coleman <nathan.coleman@hashicorp.com> * server_test * deleted extra file * add missing parents to test --------- Co-authored-by: Nathan Coleman <nathan.coleman@hashicorp.com> * Routes for API Gateway (#17158) * XDS primitive generation for endpoints and clusters Co-authored-by: Nathan Coleman <nathan.coleman@hashicorp.com> * server_test * deleted extra file * add missing parents to test * checkpoint * delete extra file * httproute flattening code * linting issue * so close on this, calling for tonight * unit test passing * add in header manip to virtual host * upstream rebuild commented out * Use consistent upstream name whether or not we're rebuilding * Start working through route naming logic * Fix typos in test descriptions * Simplify route naming logic * Simplify RebuildHTTPRouteUpstream * Merge additional compiled discovery chains instead of overwriting * Use correct chain for flattened route, clean up + add TODOs * Remove empty conditional branch * Restore previous variable declaration Limit the scope of this PR * Clean up, improve TODO * add logging, clean up todos * clean up function --------- Co-authored-by: Nathan Coleman <nathan.coleman@hashicorp.com> * checkpoint, skeleton, tests not passing * checkpoint * endpoints xds cluster configuration * resources test fix * fix reversion in resources_test * checkpoint * Update agent/proxycfg/api_gateway.go Co-authored-by: John Maguire <john.maguire@hashicorp.com> * unit tests passing * gofmt * add deterministic sorting to appease the unit test gods * remove panic * Find ready upstream matching listener instead of first in list * Clean up, improve TODO * Modify getReadyUpstreams to filter upstreams by listener (#17410) Each listener would previously have all upstreams from any route that bound to the listener. This is problematic when a route bound to one listener also binds to other listeners and so includes upstreams for multiple listeners. The list for a given listener would then wind up including upstreams for other listeners. * clean up todos, references to api gateway in listeners_ingress * merge in Nathan's fix * Update agent/consul/discoverychain/gateway.go * cleanup current todos, remove snapshot manipulation from generation code * Update agent/structs/config_entry_gateways.go Co-authored-by: Thomas Eckert <teckert@hashicorp.com> * Update agent/consul/discoverychain/gateway.go Co-authored-by: Nathan Coleman <nathan.coleman@hashicorp.com> * Update agent/consul/discoverychain/gateway.go Co-authored-by: Nathan Coleman <nathan.coleman@hashicorp.com> * Update agent/proxycfg/snapshot.go Co-authored-by: Nathan Coleman <nathan.coleman@hashicorp.com> * clarified header comment for FlattenHTTPRoute, changed RebuildHTTPRouteUpstream to BuildHTTPRouteUpstream * simplify cert logic * Delete scratch * revert route related changes in listener PR * Update agent/consul/discoverychain/gateway.go * Update agent/proxycfg/snapshot.go * clean up uneeded extra lines in endpoints --------- Co-authored-by: Nathan Coleman <nathan.coleman@hashicorp.com> Co-authored-by: John Maguire <john.maguire@hashicorp.com> Co-authored-by: Thomas Eckert <teckert@hashicorp.com>
2023-05-22 21:36:29 +00:00
listeners, err := s.makeAPIGatewayListeners(a.Address, cfgSnap)
Implement APIGateway proxycfg snapshot (#16194) * Stub proxycfg handler for API gateway * Add Service Kind constants/handling for API Gateway * Begin stubbing for SDS * Add new Secret type to xDS order of operations * Continue stubbing of SDS * Iterate on proxycfg handler for API gateway * Handle BoundAPIGateway config entry subscription in proxycfg-glue * Add API gateway to config snapshot validation * Add API gateway to config snapshot clone, leaf, etc. * Subscribe to bound route + cert config entries on bound-api-gateway * Track routes + certs on API gateway config snapshot * Generate DeepCopy() for types used in watch.Map * Watch all active references on api-gateway, unwatch inactive * Track loading of initial bound-api-gateway config entry * Use proper proto package for SDS mapping * Use ResourceReference instead of ServiceName, collect resources * Fix typo, add + remove TODOs * Watch discovery chains for TCPRoute * Add TODO for updating gateway services for api-gateway * make proto * Regenerate deep-copy for proxycfg * Set datacenter on upstream ID from query source * Watch discovery chains for http-route service backends * Add ServiceName getter to HTTP+TCP Service structs * Clean up unwatched discovery chains on API Gateway * Implement watch for ingress leaf certificate * Collect upstreams on http-route + tcp-route updates * Remove unused GatewayServices update handler * Remove unnecessary gateway services logic for API Gateway * Remove outdate TODO * Use .ToIngress where appropriate, including TODO for cleaning up * Cancel before returning error * Remove GatewayServices subscription * Add godoc for handlerAPIGateway functions * Update terminology from Connect => Consul Service Mesh Consistent with terminology changes in https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/pull/12690 * Add missing TODO * Remove duplicate switch case * Rerun deep-copy generator * Use correct property on config snapshot * Remove unnecessary leaf cert watch * Clean up based on code review feedback * Note handler properties that are initialized but set elsewhere * Add TODO for moving helper func into structs pkg * Update generated DeepCopy code * gofmt * Generate DeepCopy() for API gateway listener types * Improve variable name * Regenerate DeepCopy() code * Fix linting issue * Temporarily remove the secret type from resource generation
2023-02-08 21:52:12 +00:00
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
xds: generate listeners directly from API gateway snapshot (#17398) * API Gateway XDS Primitives, endpoints and clusters (#17002) * XDS primitive generation for endpoints and clusters Co-authored-by: Nathan Coleman <nathan.coleman@hashicorp.com> * server_test * deleted extra file * add missing parents to test --------- Co-authored-by: Nathan Coleman <nathan.coleman@hashicorp.com> * Routes for API Gateway (#17158) * XDS primitive generation for endpoints and clusters Co-authored-by: Nathan Coleman <nathan.coleman@hashicorp.com> * server_test * deleted extra file * add missing parents to test * checkpoint * delete extra file * httproute flattening code * linting issue * so close on this, calling for tonight * unit test passing * add in header manip to virtual host * upstream rebuild commented out * Use consistent upstream name whether or not we're rebuilding * Start working through route naming logic * Fix typos in test descriptions * Simplify route naming logic * Simplify RebuildHTTPRouteUpstream * Merge additional compiled discovery chains instead of overwriting * Use correct chain for flattened route, clean up + add TODOs * Remove empty conditional branch * Restore previous variable declaration Limit the scope of this PR * Clean up, improve TODO * add logging, clean up todos * clean up function --------- Co-authored-by: Nathan Coleman <nathan.coleman@hashicorp.com> * checkpoint, skeleton, tests not passing * checkpoint * endpoints xds cluster configuration * resources test fix * fix reversion in resources_test * checkpoint * Update agent/proxycfg/api_gateway.go Co-authored-by: John Maguire <john.maguire@hashicorp.com> * unit tests passing * gofmt * add deterministic sorting to appease the unit test gods * remove panic * Find ready upstream matching listener instead of first in list * Clean up, improve TODO * Modify getReadyUpstreams to filter upstreams by listener (#17410) Each listener would previously have all upstreams from any route that bound to the listener. This is problematic when a route bound to one listener also binds to other listeners and so includes upstreams for multiple listeners. The list for a given listener would then wind up including upstreams for other listeners. * clean up todos, references to api gateway in listeners_ingress * merge in Nathan's fix * Update agent/consul/discoverychain/gateway.go * cleanup current todos, remove snapshot manipulation from generation code * Update agent/structs/config_entry_gateways.go Co-authored-by: Thomas Eckert <teckert@hashicorp.com> * Update agent/consul/discoverychain/gateway.go Co-authored-by: Nathan Coleman <nathan.coleman@hashicorp.com> * Update agent/consul/discoverychain/gateway.go Co-authored-by: Nathan Coleman <nathan.coleman@hashicorp.com> * Update agent/proxycfg/snapshot.go Co-authored-by: Nathan Coleman <nathan.coleman@hashicorp.com> * clarified header comment for FlattenHTTPRoute, changed RebuildHTTPRouteUpstream to BuildHTTPRouteUpstream * simplify cert logic * Delete scratch * revert route related changes in listener PR * Update agent/consul/discoverychain/gateway.go * Update agent/proxycfg/snapshot.go * clean up uneeded extra lines in endpoints --------- Co-authored-by: Nathan Coleman <nathan.coleman@hashicorp.com> Co-authored-by: John Maguire <john.maguire@hashicorp.com> Co-authored-by: Thomas Eckert <teckert@hashicorp.com>
2023-05-22 21:36:29 +00:00
Implement APIGateway proxycfg snapshot (#16194) * Stub proxycfg handler for API gateway * Add Service Kind constants/handling for API Gateway * Begin stubbing for SDS * Add new Secret type to xDS order of operations * Continue stubbing of SDS * Iterate on proxycfg handler for API gateway * Handle BoundAPIGateway config entry subscription in proxycfg-glue * Add API gateway to config snapshot validation * Add API gateway to config snapshot clone, leaf, etc. * Subscribe to bound route + cert config entries on bound-api-gateway * Track routes + certs on API gateway config snapshot * Generate DeepCopy() for types used in watch.Map * Watch all active references on api-gateway, unwatch inactive * Track loading of initial bound-api-gateway config entry * Use proper proto package for SDS mapping * Use ResourceReference instead of ServiceName, collect resources * Fix typo, add + remove TODOs * Watch discovery chains for TCPRoute * Add TODO for updating gateway services for api-gateway * make proto * Regenerate deep-copy for proxycfg * Set datacenter on upstream ID from query source * Watch discovery chains for http-route service backends * Add ServiceName getter to HTTP+TCP Service structs * Clean up unwatched discovery chains on API Gateway * Implement watch for ingress leaf certificate * Collect upstreams on http-route + tcp-route updates * Remove unused GatewayServices update handler * Remove unnecessary gateway services logic for API Gateway * Remove outdate TODO * Use .ToIngress where appropriate, including TODO for cleaning up * Cancel before returning error * Remove GatewayServices subscription * Add godoc for handlerAPIGateway functions * Update terminology from Connect => Consul Service Mesh Consistent with terminology changes in https://github.com/hashicorp/consul/pull/12690 * Add missing TODO * Remove duplicate switch case * Rerun deep-copy generator * Use correct property on config snapshot * Remove unnecessary leaf cert watch * Clean up based on code review feedback * Note handler properties that are initialized but set elsewhere * Add TODO for moving helper func into structs pkg * Update generated DeepCopy code * gofmt * Generate DeepCopy() for API gateway listener types * Improve variable name * Regenerate DeepCopy() code * Fix linting issue * Temporarily remove the secret type from resource generation
2023-02-08 21:52:12 +00:00
resources = append(resources, listeners...)
case structs.ServiceKindIngressGateway:
listeners, err := s.makeIngressGatewayListeners(a.Address, cfgSnap)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
resources = append(resources, listeners...)
case structs.ServiceKindMeshGateway:
l, err = s.makeMeshGatewayListener(a.name, a.Address, a.Port, cfgSnap)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
}
2020-04-17 01:08:41 +00:00
if l != nil {
resources = append(resources, l)
}
}
return resources, err
}
// makeListener returns a listener with name and bind details set. Filters must
// be added before it's useful.
//
// Note on names: Envoy listeners attempt graceful transitions of connections
// when their config changes but that means they can't have their bind address
// or port changed in a running instance. Since our users might choose to change
// a bind address or port for the public or upstream listeners, we need to
// encode those into the unique name for the listener such that if the user
// changes them, we actually create a whole new listener on the new address and
// port. Envoy should take care of closing the old one once it sees it's no
// longer in the config.
type makeListenerOpts struct {
addr string
accessLogs structs.AccessLogsConfig
logger hclog.Logger
mode string
name string
path string
port int
direction envoy_core_v3.TrafficDirection
upstream *structs.Upstream
}
func makeListener(opts makeListenerOpts) *envoy_listener_v3.Listener {
if opts.upstream != nil && opts.upstream.LocalBindPort == 0 && opts.upstream.LocalBindSocketPath != "" {
opts.path = opts.upstream.LocalBindSocketPath
opts.mode = opts.upstream.LocalBindSocketMode
return makePipeListener(opts)
}
if opts.upstream != nil {
opts.port = opts.upstream.LocalBindPort
opts.addr = opts.upstream.LocalBindAddress
return makeListenerWithDefault(opts)
}
return makeListenerWithDefault(opts)
}
func makeListenerWithDefault(opts makeListenerOpts) *envoy_listener_v3.Listener {
if opts.addr == "" {
opts.addr = "127.0.0.1"
}
accessLog, err := accesslogs.MakeAccessLogs(&opts.accessLogs, true)
if err != nil && opts.logger != nil {
// Since access logging is non-essential for routing, warn and move on
opts.logger.Warn("error generating access log xds", err)
}
return &envoy_listener_v3.Listener{
Name: fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s:%d", opts.name, opts.addr, opts.port),
AccessLog: accessLog,
Address: response.MakeAddress(opts.addr, opts.port),
TrafficDirection: opts.direction,
}
}
func makePipeListener(opts makeListenerOpts) *envoy_listener_v3.Listener {
// We've already validated this, so it should not fail.
modeInt, err := strconv.ParseUint(opts.mode, 0, 32)
if err != nil {
modeInt = 0
}
accessLog, err := accesslogs.MakeAccessLogs(&opts.accessLogs, true)
if err != nil && opts.logger != nil {
// Since access logging is non-essential for routing, warn and move on
opts.logger.Warn("error generating access log xds", err)
}
return &envoy_listener_v3.Listener{
Name: fmt.Sprintf("%s:%s", opts.name, opts.path),
AccessLog: accessLog,
Address: response.MakePipeAddress(opts.path, uint32(modeInt)),
TrafficDirection: opts.direction,
}
}
// makeListenerFromUserConfig returns the listener config decoded from an
// arbitrary proto3 json format string or an error if it's invalid.
//
// For now we only support embedding in JSON strings because of the hcl parsing
// pain (see Background section in the comment for decode.HookWeakDecodeFromSlice).
// This may be fixed in decode.HookWeakDecodeFromSlice in the future.
//
// When we do that we can support just nesting the config directly into the
// JSON/hcl naturally but this is a stop-gap that gets us an escape hatch
// immediately. It's also probably not a bad thing to support long-term since
// any config generated by other systems will likely be in canonical protobuf
// from rather than our slight variant in JSON/hcl.
func makeListenerFromUserConfig(configJSON string) (*envoy_listener_v3.Listener, error) {
// Type field is present so decode it as a anypb.Any
var any anypb.Any
if err := protojson.Unmarshal([]byte(configJSON), &any); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var l envoy_listener_v3.Listener
if err := proto.Unmarshal(any.Value, &l); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &l, nil
}
func (s *ResourceGenerator) injectConnectionBalanceConfig(balanceType string, listener *envoy_listener_v3.Listener) {
switch balanceType {
case "":
// Default with no balancing.
case structs.ConnectionExactBalance:
listener.ConnectionBalanceConfig = &envoy_listener_v3.Listener_ConnectionBalanceConfig{
BalanceType: &envoy_listener_v3.Listener_ConnectionBalanceConfig_ExactBalance_{},
}
default:
s.Logger.Warn("ignoring invalid connection balance option", "value", balanceType)
}
}
// Ensure that the first filter in each filter chain of a public listener is
// the authz filter to prevent unauthorized access.
Support Incremental xDS mode (#9855) This adds support for the Incremental xDS protocol when using xDS v3. This is best reviewed commit-by-commit and will not be squashed when merged. Union of all commit messages follows to give an overarching summary: xds: exclusively support incremental xDS when using xDS v3 Attempts to use SoTW via v3 will fail, much like attempts to use incremental via v2 will fail. Work around a strange older envoy behavior involving empty CDS responses over incremental xDS. xds: various cleanups and refactors that don't strictly concern the addition of incremental xDS support Dissolve the connectionInfo struct in favor of per-connection ResourceGenerators instead. Do a better job of ensuring the xds code uses a well configured logger that accurately describes the connected client. xds: pull out checkStreamACLs method in advance of a later commit xds: rewrite SoTW xDS protocol tests to use protobufs rather than hand-rolled json strings In the test we very lightly reuse some of the more boring protobuf construction helper code that is also technically under test. The important thing of the protocol tests is testing the protocol. The actual inputs and outputs are largely already handled by the xds golden output tests now so these protocol tests don't have to do double-duty. This also updates the SoTW protocol test to exclusively use xDS v2 which is the only variant of SoTW that will be supported in Consul 1.10. xds: default xds.Server.AuthCheckFrequency at use-time instead of construction-time
2021-04-29 18:54:05 +00:00
func (s *ResourceGenerator) injectConnectFilters(cfgSnap *proxycfg.ConfigSnapshot, listener *envoy_listener_v3.Listener) error {
authzFilter, err := makeRBACNetworkFilter(
cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.Intentions,
cfgSnap.IntentionDefaultAllow,
rbacLocalInfo{
trustDomain: cfgSnap.Roots.TrustDomain,
datacenter: cfgSnap.Datacenter,
partition: cfgSnap.ProxyID.PartitionOrDefault(),
},
cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.InboundPeerTrustBundles,
)
if err != nil {
return err
}
for idx := range listener.FilterChains {
// Insert our authz filter before any others
listener.FilterChains[idx].Filters =
append([]*envoy_listener_v3.Filter{
authzFilter,
}, listener.FilterChains[idx].Filters...)
}
return nil
}
const (
httpConnectionManagerOldName = "envoy.http_connection_manager"
httpConnectionManagerNewName = "envoy.filters.network.http_connection_manager"
)
func extractRdsResourceNames(listener *envoy_listener_v3.Listener) ([]string, error) {
var found []string
for chainIdx, chain := range listener.FilterChains {
for filterIdx, filter := range chain.Filters {
if filter.Name != httpConnectionManagerNewName {
continue
}
tc, ok := filter.ConfigType.(*envoy_listener_v3.Filter_TypedConfig)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf(
"filter chain %d has a %q filter %d with an unsupported config type: %T",
chainIdx,
filter.Name,
filterIdx,
filter.ConfigType,
)
}
var hcm envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager
if err := tc.TypedConfig.UnmarshalTo(&hcm); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if hcm.RouteSpecifier == nil {
continue
}
rds, ok := hcm.RouteSpecifier.(*envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager_Rds)
if !ok {
continue
}
if rds.Rds == nil {
continue
}
found = append(found, rds.Rds.RouteConfigName)
}
}
return found, nil
}
// Locate the existing http connect manager L4 filter and inject our RBAC filter at the top.
func injectHTTPFilterOnFilterChains(
listener *envoy_listener_v3.Listener,
authzFilter *envoy_http_v3.HttpFilter,
) error {
for chainIdx, chain := range listener.FilterChains {
var (
hcmFilter *envoy_listener_v3.Filter
hcmFilterIdx int
)
for filterIdx, filter := range chain.Filters {
if filter.Name == httpConnectionManagerOldName ||
filter.Name == httpConnectionManagerNewName {
hcmFilter = filter
hcmFilterIdx = filterIdx
break
}
}
if hcmFilter == nil {
return fmt.Errorf(
"filter chain %d lacks either a %q or %q filter",
chainIdx,
httpConnectionManagerOldName,
httpConnectionManagerNewName,
)
}
2021-08-20 16:57:45 +00:00
var hcm envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager
tc, ok := hcmFilter.ConfigType.(*envoy_listener_v3.Filter_TypedConfig)
if !ok {
return fmt.Errorf(
"filter chain %d has a %q filter with an unsupported config type: %T",
chainIdx,
hcmFilter.Name,
hcmFilter.ConfigType,
)
}
if err := tc.TypedConfig.UnmarshalTo(&hcm); err != nil {
return err
}
// Insert our authz filter before any others
hcm.HttpFilters = append([]*envoy_http_v3.HttpFilter{
authzFilter,
}, hcm.HttpFilters...)
// And persist the modified filter.
newFilter, err := makeFilter(hcmFilter.Name, &hcm)
if err != nil {
return err
}
chain.Filters[hcmFilterIdx] = newFilter
}
return nil
}
// NOTE: This method MUST only be used for connect proxy public listeners,
// since TLS validation will be done against root certs for all peers
// that might dial this proxy.
func (s *ResourceGenerator) injectConnectTLSForPublicListener(cfgSnap *proxycfg.ConfigSnapshot, listener *envoy_listener_v3.Listener) error {
transportSocket, err := createDownstreamTransportSocketForConnectTLS(cfgSnap, cfgSnap.PeeringTrustBundles())
if err != nil {
return err
}
for idx := range listener.FilterChains {
listener.FilterChains[idx].TransportSocket = transportSocket
}
return nil
}
func getAlpnProtocols(protocol string) []string {
var alpnProtocols []string
switch protocol {
case "grpc", "http2":
alpnProtocols = append(alpnProtocols, "h2", "http/1.1")
case "http":
alpnProtocols = append(alpnProtocols, "http/1.1")
}
return alpnProtocols
}
func createDownstreamTransportSocketForConnectTLS(cfgSnap *proxycfg.ConfigSnapshot, peerBundles []*pbpeering.PeeringTrustBundle) (*envoy_core_v3.TransportSocket, error) {
switch cfgSnap.Kind {
case structs.ServiceKindConnectProxy:
case structs.ServiceKindMeshGateway:
default:
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot inject peering trust bundles for kind %q", cfgSnap.Kind)
}
// Determine listener protocol type from configured service protocol. Don't hard fail on a config typo,
//The parse func returns default config if there is an error, so it's safe to continue.
cfg, _ := config.ParseProxyConfig(cfgSnap.Proxy.Config)
// Create TLS validation context for mTLS with leaf certificate and root certs.
tlsContext := makeCommonTLSContext(
cfgSnap.Leaf(),
cfgSnap.RootPEMs(),
makeTLSParametersFromProxyTLSConfig(cfgSnap.MeshConfigTLSIncoming()),
)
if tlsContext != nil {
// Configure alpn protocols on CommonTLSContext
tlsContext.AlpnProtocols = getAlpnProtocols(cfg.Protocol)
}
// Inject peering trust bundles if this service is exported to peered clusters.
if len(peerBundles) > 0 {
spiffeConfig, err := makeSpiffeValidatorConfig(
cfgSnap.Roots.TrustDomain,
cfgSnap.RootPEMs(),
peerBundles,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
typ, ok := tlsContext.ValidationContextType.(*envoy_tls_v3.CommonTlsContext_ValidationContext)
if !ok {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unexpected type for TLS context validation: %T", tlsContext.ValidationContextType)
}
// makeCommonTLSFromLead injects the local trust domain's CA root certs as the TrustedCA.
// We nil it out here since the local roots are included in the SPIFFE validator config.
typ.ValidationContext.TrustedCa = nil
typ.ValidationContext.CustomValidatorConfig = &envoy_core_v3.TypedExtensionConfig{
// The typed config name is hard-coded because it is not available as a wellknown var in the control plane lib.
Name: "envoy.tls.cert_validator.spiffe",
TypedConfig: spiffeConfig,
}
}
return makeDownstreamTLSTransportSocket(&envoy_tls_v3.DownstreamTlsContext{
CommonTlsContext: tlsContext,
RequireClientCertificate: &wrapperspb.BoolValue{Value: true},
})
}
// SPIFFECertValidatorConfig is used to validate certificates from trust domains other than our own.
// With cluster peering we expect peered clusters to have independent certificate authorities.
// This means that we cannot use a single set of root CA certificates to validate client certificates for mTLS,
// but rather we need to validate against different roots depending on the trust domain of the certificate presented.
func makeSpiffeValidatorConfig(trustDomain, roots string, peerBundles []*pbpeering.PeeringTrustBundle) (*anypb.Any, error) {
// Store the trust bundle for the local trust domain.
bundles := map[string]string{trustDomain: roots}
// Store the trust bundle for each trust domain of the peers this proxy is exported to.
// This allows us to validate traffic from other trust domains.
for _, b := range peerBundles {
var pems string
for _, pem := range b.RootPEMs {
pems += lib.EnsureTrailingNewline(pem)
}
bundles[b.TrustDomain] = pems
}
cfg := &envoy_tls_v3.SPIFFECertValidatorConfig{
TrustDomains: make([]*envoy_tls_v3.SPIFFECertValidatorConfig_TrustDomain, 0, len(bundles)),
}
for domain, bundle := range bundles {
cfg.TrustDomains = append(cfg.TrustDomains, &envoy_tls_v3.SPIFFECertValidatorConfig_TrustDomain{
Name: domain,
TrustBundle: &envoy_core_v3.DataSource{
Specifier: &envoy_core_v3.DataSource_InlineString{
InlineString: bundle,
},
},
})
}
// Sort the trust domains so that the output is stable.
// This benefits tests but also prevents Envoy from mistakenly thinking the listener
// changed and needs to be drained only because this ordering is different.
sort.Slice(cfg.TrustDomains, func(i int, j int) bool {
return cfg.TrustDomains[i].Name < cfg.TrustDomains[j].Name
})
return anypb.New(cfg)
}
Support Incremental xDS mode (#9855) This adds support for the Incremental xDS protocol when using xDS v3. This is best reviewed commit-by-commit and will not be squashed when merged. Union of all commit messages follows to give an overarching summary: xds: exclusively support incremental xDS when using xDS v3 Attempts to use SoTW via v3 will fail, much like attempts to use incremental via v2 will fail. Work around a strange older envoy behavior involving empty CDS responses over incremental xDS. xds: various cleanups and refactors that don't strictly concern the addition of incremental xDS support Dissolve the connectionInfo struct in favor of per-connection ResourceGenerators instead. Do a better job of ensuring the xds code uses a well configured logger that accurately describes the connected client. xds: pull out checkStreamACLs method in advance of a later commit xds: rewrite SoTW xDS protocol tests to use protobufs rather than hand-rolled json strings In the test we very lightly reuse some of the more boring protobuf construction helper code that is also technically under test. The important thing of the protocol tests is testing the protocol. The actual inputs and outputs are largely already handled by the xds golden output tests now so these protocol tests don't have to do double-duty. This also updates the SoTW protocol test to exclusively use xDS v2 which is the only variant of SoTW that will be supported in Consul 1.10. xds: default xds.Server.AuthCheckFrequency at use-time instead of construction-time
2021-04-29 18:54:05 +00:00
func (s *ResourceGenerator) makeInboundListener(cfgSnap *proxycfg.ConfigSnapshot, name string) (proto.Message, error) {
var l *envoy_listener_v3.Listener
var err error
cfg, err := config.ParseProxyConfig(cfgSnap.Proxy.Config)
if err != nil {
// Don't hard fail on a config typo, just warn. The parse func returns
// default config if there is an error so it's safe to continue.
s.Logger.Warn("failed to parse Connect.Proxy.Config", "error", err)
}
// This controls if we do L4 or L7 intention checks.
useHTTPFilter := structs.IsProtocolHTTPLike(cfg.Protocol)
// Generate and return custom public listener from config if one was provided.
if cfg.PublicListenerJSON != "" {
l, err = makeListenerFromUserConfig(cfg.PublicListenerJSON)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
2021-03-17 22:18:56 +00:00
// For HTTP-like services attach an RBAC http filter and do a best-effort insert
if useHTTPFilter {
httpAuthzFilter, err := makeRBACHTTPFilter(
cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.Intentions,
cfgSnap.IntentionDefaultAllow,
rbacLocalInfo{
trustDomain: cfgSnap.Roots.TrustDomain,
datacenter: cfgSnap.Datacenter,
partition: cfgSnap.ProxyID.PartitionOrDefault(),
},
cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.InboundPeerTrustBundles,
Use JWT-auth filter in metadata mode & Delegate validation to RBAC filter (#18062) ### Description <!-- Please describe why you're making this change, in plain English. --> - Currently the jwt-auth filter doesn't take into account the service identity when validating jwt-auth, it only takes into account the path and jwt provider during validation. This causes issues when multiple source intentions restrict access to an endpoint with different JWT providers. - To fix these issues, rather than use the JWT auth filter for validation, we use it in metadata mode and allow it to forward the successful validated JWT token payload to the RBAC filter which will make the decisions. This PR ensures requests with and without JWT tokens successfully go through the jwt-authn filter. The filter however only forwards the data for successful/valid tokens. On the RBAC filter level, we check the payload for claims and token issuer + existing rbac rules. ### Testing & Reproduction steps <!-- * In the case of bugs, describe how to replicate * If any manual tests were done, document the steps and the conditions to replicate * Call out any important/ relevant unit tests, e2e tests or integration tests you have added or are adding --> - This test covers a multi level jwt requirements (requirements at top level and permissions level). It also assumes you have envoy running, you have a redis and a sidecar proxy service registered, and have a way to generate jwks with jwt. I mostly use: https://www.scottbrady91.com/tools/jwt for this. - first write your proxy defaults ``` Kind = "proxy-defaults" name = "global" config { protocol = "http" } ``` - Create two providers ``` Kind = "jwt-provider" Name = "auth0" Issuer = "https://ronald.local" JSONWebKeySet = { Local = { JWKS = "eyJrZXlzIjog....." } } ``` ``` Kind = "jwt-provider" Name = "okta" Issuer = "https://ronald.local" JSONWebKeySet = { Local = { JWKS = "eyJrZXlzIjogW3...." } } ``` - add a service intention ``` Kind = "service-intentions" Name = "redis" JWT = { Providers = [ { Name = "okta" }, ] } Sources = [ { Name = "*" Permissions = [{ Action = "allow" HTTP = { PathPrefix = "/workspace" } JWT = { Providers = [ { Name = "okta" VerifyClaims = [ { Path = ["aud"] Value = "my_client_app" }, { Path = ["sub"] Value = "5be86359073c434bad2da3932222dabe" } ] }, ] } }, { Action = "allow" HTTP = { PathPrefix = "/" } JWT = { Providers = [ { Name = "auth0" }, ] } }] } ] ``` - generate 3 jwt tokens: 1 from auth0 jwks, 1 from okta jwks with different claims than `/workspace` expects and 1 with correct claims - connect to your envoy (change service and address as needed) to view logs and potential errors. You can add: `-- --log-level debug` to see what data is being forwarded ``` consul connect envoy -sidecar-for redis1 -grpc-addr 127.0.0.1:8502 ``` - Make the following requests: ``` curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $Auth0_TOKEN" --insecure --cert leaf.cert --key leaf.key --cacert connect-ca.pem https://localhost:20000/workspace -v RBAC filter denied curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $Okta_TOKEN_with_wrong_claims" --insecure --cert leaf.cert --key leaf.key --cacert connect-ca.pem https://localhost:20000/workspace -v RBAC filter denied curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $Okta_TOKEN_with_correct_claims" --insecure --cert leaf.cert --key leaf.key --cacert connect-ca.pem https://localhost:20000/workspace -v Successful request ``` ### TODO * [x] Update test coverage * [ ] update integration tests (follow-up PR) * [x] appropriate backport labels added
2023-07-17 15:32:49 +00:00
cfgSnap.JWTProviders,
2021-03-17 22:18:56 +00:00
)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Try our best to inject the HTTP RBAC filter.
if err := injectHTTPFilterOnFilterChains(l, httpAuthzFilter); err != nil {
s.Logger.Warn(
"could not inject the HTTP RBAC filter to enforce intentions on user-provided "+
"'envoy_public_listener_json' config; falling back on the RBAC network filter instead",
"proxy", cfgSnap.ProxyID,
"error", err,
)
// If we get an error inject the RBAC network filter instead.
useHTTPFilter = false
}
}
err := s.finalizePublicListenerFromConfig(l, cfgSnap, useHTTPFilter)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to attach Consul filters and TLS context to custom public listener: %v", err)
}
return l, nil
}
2021-03-17 22:18:56 +00:00
// No JSON user config, use default listener address
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// Default to listening on all addresses, but override with bind address if one is set.
addr := cfgSnap.Address
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if addr == "" {
addr = "0.0.0.0"
}
if cfg.BindAddress != "" {
addr = cfg.BindAddress
}
// Override with bind port if one is set, otherwise default to
// proxy service's address
port := cfgSnap.Port
if cfg.BindPort != 0 {
port = cfg.BindPort
}
opts := makeListenerOpts{
name: name,
accessLogs: cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
addr: addr,
port: port,
direction: envoy_core_v3.TrafficDirection_INBOUND,
logger: s.Logger,
}
l = makeListener(opts)
s.injectConnectionBalanceConfig(cfg.BalanceInboundConnections, l)
2022-08-02 06:52:48 +00:00
var tracing *envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager_Tracing
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if cfg.ListenerTracingJSON != "" {
if tracing, err = makeTracingFromUserConfig(cfg.ListenerTracingJSON); err != nil {
s.Logger.Warn("failed to parse ListenerTracingJSON config", "error", err)
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}
}
filterOpts := listenerFilterOpts{
protocol: cfg.Protocol,
filterName: name,
routeName: name,
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cluster: xdscommon.LocalAppClusterName,
requestTimeoutMs: cfg.LocalRequestTimeoutMs,
idleTimeoutMs: cfg.LocalIdleTimeoutMs,
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tracing: tracing,
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
logger: s.Logger,
}
if useHTTPFilter {
Use JWT-auth filter in metadata mode & Delegate validation to RBAC filter (#18062) ### Description <!-- Please describe why you're making this change, in plain English. --> - Currently the jwt-auth filter doesn't take into account the service identity when validating jwt-auth, it only takes into account the path and jwt provider during validation. This causes issues when multiple source intentions restrict access to an endpoint with different JWT providers. - To fix these issues, rather than use the JWT auth filter for validation, we use it in metadata mode and allow it to forward the successful validated JWT token payload to the RBAC filter which will make the decisions. This PR ensures requests with and without JWT tokens successfully go through the jwt-authn filter. The filter however only forwards the data for successful/valid tokens. On the RBAC filter level, we check the payload for claims and token issuer + existing rbac rules. ### Testing & Reproduction steps <!-- * In the case of bugs, describe how to replicate * If any manual tests were done, document the steps and the conditions to replicate * Call out any important/ relevant unit tests, e2e tests or integration tests you have added or are adding --> - This test covers a multi level jwt requirements (requirements at top level and permissions level). It also assumes you have envoy running, you have a redis and a sidecar proxy service registered, and have a way to generate jwks with jwt. I mostly use: https://www.scottbrady91.com/tools/jwt for this. - first write your proxy defaults ``` Kind = "proxy-defaults" name = "global" config { protocol = "http" } ``` - Create two providers ``` Kind = "jwt-provider" Name = "auth0" Issuer = "https://ronald.local" JSONWebKeySet = { Local = { JWKS = "eyJrZXlzIjog....." } } ``` ``` Kind = "jwt-provider" Name = "okta" Issuer = "https://ronald.local" JSONWebKeySet = { Local = { JWKS = "eyJrZXlzIjogW3...." } } ``` - add a service intention ``` Kind = "service-intentions" Name = "redis" JWT = { Providers = [ { Name = "okta" }, ] } Sources = [ { Name = "*" Permissions = [{ Action = "allow" HTTP = { PathPrefix = "/workspace" } JWT = { Providers = [ { Name = "okta" VerifyClaims = [ { Path = ["aud"] Value = "my_client_app" }, { Path = ["sub"] Value = "5be86359073c434bad2da3932222dabe" } ] }, ] } }, { Action = "allow" HTTP = { PathPrefix = "/" } JWT = { Providers = [ { Name = "auth0" }, ] } }] } ] ``` - generate 3 jwt tokens: 1 from auth0 jwks, 1 from okta jwks with different claims than `/workspace` expects and 1 with correct claims - connect to your envoy (change service and address as needed) to view logs and potential errors. You can add: `-- --log-level debug` to see what data is being forwarded ``` consul connect envoy -sidecar-for redis1 -grpc-addr 127.0.0.1:8502 ``` - Make the following requests: ``` curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $Auth0_TOKEN" --insecure --cert leaf.cert --key leaf.key --cacert connect-ca.pem https://localhost:20000/workspace -v RBAC filter denied curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $Okta_TOKEN_with_wrong_claims" --insecure --cert leaf.cert --key leaf.key --cacert connect-ca.pem https://localhost:20000/workspace -v RBAC filter denied curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $Okta_TOKEN_with_correct_claims" --insecure --cert leaf.cert --key leaf.key --cacert connect-ca.pem https://localhost:20000/workspace -v Successful request ``` ### TODO * [x] Update test coverage * [ ] update integration tests (follow-up PR) * [x] appropriate backport labels added
2023-07-17 15:32:49 +00:00
jwtFilter, err := makeJWTAuthFilter(cfgSnap.JWTProviders, cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.Intentions)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
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rbacFilter, err := makeRBACHTTPFilter(
cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.Intentions,
cfgSnap.IntentionDefaultAllow,
rbacLocalInfo{
trustDomain: cfgSnap.Roots.TrustDomain,
datacenter: cfgSnap.Datacenter,
partition: cfgSnap.ProxyID.PartitionOrDefault(),
},
cfgSnap.ConnectProxy.InboundPeerTrustBundles,
Use JWT-auth filter in metadata mode & Delegate validation to RBAC filter (#18062) ### Description <!-- Please describe why you're making this change, in plain English. --> - Currently the jwt-auth filter doesn't take into account the service identity when validating jwt-auth, it only takes into account the path and jwt provider during validation. This causes issues when multiple source intentions restrict access to an endpoint with different JWT providers. - To fix these issues, rather than use the JWT auth filter for validation, we use it in metadata mode and allow it to forward the successful validated JWT token payload to the RBAC filter which will make the decisions. This PR ensures requests with and without JWT tokens successfully go through the jwt-authn filter. The filter however only forwards the data for successful/valid tokens. On the RBAC filter level, we check the payload for claims and token issuer + existing rbac rules. ### Testing & Reproduction steps <!-- * In the case of bugs, describe how to replicate * If any manual tests were done, document the steps and the conditions to replicate * Call out any important/ relevant unit tests, e2e tests or integration tests you have added or are adding --> - This test covers a multi level jwt requirements (requirements at top level and permissions level). It also assumes you have envoy running, you have a redis and a sidecar proxy service registered, and have a way to generate jwks with jwt. I mostly use: https://www.scottbrady91.com/tools/jwt for this. - first write your proxy defaults ``` Kind = "proxy-defaults" name = "global" config { protocol = "http" } ``` - Create two providers ``` Kind = "jwt-provider" Name = "auth0" Issuer = "https://ronald.local" JSONWebKeySet = { Local = { JWKS = "eyJrZXlzIjog....." } } ``` ``` Kind = "jwt-provider" Name = "okta" Issuer = "https://ronald.local" JSONWebKeySet = { Local = { JWKS = "eyJrZXlzIjogW3...." } } ``` - add a service intention ``` Kind = "service-intentions" Name = "redis" JWT = { Providers = [ { Name = "okta" }, ] } Sources = [ { Name = "*" Permissions = [{ Action = "allow" HTTP = { PathPrefix = "/workspace" } JWT = { Providers = [ { Name = "okta" VerifyClaims = [ { Path = ["aud"] Value = "my_client_app" }, { Path = ["sub"] Value = "5be86359073c434bad2da3932222dabe" } ] }, ] } }, { Action = "allow" HTTP = { PathPrefix = "/" } JWT = { Providers = [ { Name = "auth0" }, ] } }] } ] ``` - generate 3 jwt tokens: 1 from auth0 jwks, 1 from okta jwks with different claims than `/workspace` expects and 1 with correct claims - connect to your envoy (change service and address as needed) to view logs and potential errors. You can add: `-- --log-level debug` to see what data is being forwarded ``` consul connect envoy -sidecar-for redis1 -grpc-addr 127.0.0.1:8502 ``` - Make the following requests: ``` curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $Auth0_TOKEN" --insecure --cert leaf.cert --key leaf.key --cacert connect-ca.pem https://localhost:20000/workspace -v RBAC filter denied curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $Okta_TOKEN_with_wrong_claims" --insecure --cert leaf.cert --key leaf.key --cacert connect-ca.pem https://localhost:20000/workspace -v RBAC filter denied curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $Okta_TOKEN_with_correct_claims" --insecure --cert leaf.cert --key leaf.key --cacert connect-ca.pem https://localhost:20000/workspace -v Successful request ``` ### TODO * [x] Update test coverage * [ ] update integration tests (follow-up PR) * [x] appropriate backport labels added
2023-07-17 15:32:49 +00:00
cfgSnap.JWTProviders,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
filterOpts.httpAuthzFilters = []*envoy_http_v3.HttpFilter{}
if jwtFilter != nil {
filterOpts.httpAuthzFilters = append(filterOpts.httpAuthzFilters, jwtFilter)
}
filterOpts.httpAuthzFilters = append(filterOpts.httpAuthzFilters, rbacFilter)
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meshConfig := cfgSnap.MeshConfig()
includeXFCC := meshConfig == nil || meshConfig.HTTP == nil || !meshConfig.HTTP.SanitizeXForwardedClientCert
notGRPC := cfg.Protocol != "grpc"
if includeXFCC && notGRPC {
Add x-forwarded-client-cert headers Description Add x-fowarded-client-cert information on trusted incoming connections. Envoy provides support forwarding and annotating the x-forwarded-client-cert header via the forward_client_cert_details set_current_client_cert_details filter fields. It would be helpful for consul to support this directly in its config. The escape hatches are a bit cumbersome for this purpose. This has been implemented on incoming connections to envoy. Outgoing (from the local service through the sidecar) will not have a certificate, and so are left alone. A service on an incoming connection will now get headers something like this: ``` X-Forwarded-Client-Cert:[By=spiffe://efad7282-d9b2-3298-f6d8-38b37fb58df3.consul/ns/default/dc/dc1/svc/counting;Hash=61ad5cbdfcb50f5a3ec0ca60923d61613c149a9d4495010a64175c05a0268ab2;Cert="-----BEGIN%20CERTIFICATE-----%0AMIICHDCCAcOgAwIBAgIBCDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAxMS8wLQYDVQQDEyZwcmktMTli%0AYXdyb2YuY29uc3VsLmNhLmVmYWQ3MjgyLmNvbnN1bDAeFw0yMjA0MjkwMzE0NTBa%0AFw0yMjA1MDIwMzE0NTBaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAARVIZ7Y%0AZEXfbOGBfxGa7Vuok1MIng%2FuzLQK2xLVlSTIPDbO5hstTGP%2B%2FGx182PYFP3jYqk5%0Aq6rYWe1wiPNMA30Io4H8MIH5MA4GA1UdDwEB%2FwQEAwIDuDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggr%0ABgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDAYDVR0TAQH%2FBAIwADApBgNVHQ4EIgQgrp4q50oX%0AHHghMbxz5Bk8OJFWMdfgH0Upr350WlhyxvkwKwYDVR0jBCQwIoAgUe6uERAIj%2FLM%0AyuFzDc3Wbp9TGAKBJYAwyhF14ToOQCMwYgYDVR0RAQH%2FBFgwVoZUc3BpZmZlOi8v%0AZWZhZDcyODItZDliMi0zMjk4LWY2ZDgtMzhiMzdmYjU4ZGYzLmNvbnN1bC9ucy9k%0AZWZhdWx0L2RjL2RjMS9zdmMvZGFzaGJvYXJkMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0cAMEQCIDwb%0AFlchufggNTijnQ5SUcvTZrWlZyq%2FrdVC20nbbmWLAiAVshNNv1xBqJI1NmY2HI9n%0AgRMfb8aEPVSuxEHhqy57eQ%3D%3D%0A-----END%20CERTIFICATE-----%0A";Chain="-----BEGIN%20CERTIFICATE-----%0AMIICHDCCAcOgAwIBAgIBCDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAxMS8wLQYDVQQDEyZwcmktMTli%0AYXdyb2YuY29uc3VsLmNhLmVmYWQ3MjgyLmNvbnN1bDAeFw0yMjA0MjkwMzE0NTBa%0AFw0yMjA1MDIwMzE0NTBaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAARVIZ7Y%0AZEXfbOGBfxGa7Vuok1MIng%2FuzLQK2xLVlSTIPDbO5hstTGP%2B%2FGx182PYFP3jYqk5%0Aq6rYWe1wiPNMA30Io4H8MIH5MA4GA1UdDwEB%2FwQEAwIDuDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggr%0ABgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDAYDVR0TAQH%2FBAIwADApBgNVHQ4EIgQgrp4q50oX%0AHHghMbxz5Bk8OJFWMdfgH0Upr350WlhyxvkwKwYDVR0jBCQwIoAgUe6uERAIj%2FLM%0AyuFzDc3Wbp9TGAKBJYAwyhF14ToOQCMwYgYDVR0RAQH%2FBFgwVoZUc3BpZmZlOi8v%0AZWZhZDcyODItZDliMi0zMjk4LWY2ZDgtMzhiMzdmYjU4ZGYzLmNvbnN1bC9ucy9k%0AZWZhdWx0L2RjL2RjMS9zdmMvZGFzaGJvYXJkMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0cAMEQCIDwb%0AFlchufggNTijnQ5SUcvTZrWlZyq%2FrdVC20nbbmWLAiAVshNNv1xBqJI1NmY2HI9n%0AgRMfb8aEPVSuxEHhqy57eQ%3D%3D%0A-----END%20CERTIFICATE-----%0A";Subject="";URI=spiffe://efad7282-d9b2-3298-f6d8-38b37fb58df3.consul/ns/default/dc/dc1/svc/dashboard] ``` Closes #12852
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filterOpts.forwardClientDetails = true
filterOpts.forwardClientPolicy = envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager_APPEND_FORWARD
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addMeta, err := parseXFCCToDynamicMetaHTTPFilter()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
filterOpts.httpAuthzFilters = append(filterOpts.httpAuthzFilters, addMeta)
Add x-forwarded-client-cert headers Description Add x-fowarded-client-cert information on trusted incoming connections. Envoy provides support forwarding and annotating the x-forwarded-client-cert header via the forward_client_cert_details set_current_client_cert_details filter fields. It would be helpful for consul to support this directly in its config. The escape hatches are a bit cumbersome for this purpose. This has been implemented on incoming connections to envoy. Outgoing (from the local service through the sidecar) will not have a certificate, and so are left alone. A service on an incoming connection will now get headers something like this: ``` X-Forwarded-Client-Cert:[By=spiffe://efad7282-d9b2-3298-f6d8-38b37fb58df3.consul/ns/default/dc/dc1/svc/counting;Hash=61ad5cbdfcb50f5a3ec0ca60923d61613c149a9d4495010a64175c05a0268ab2;Cert="-----BEGIN%20CERTIFICATE-----%0AMIICHDCCAcOgAwIBAgIBCDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAxMS8wLQYDVQQDEyZwcmktMTli%0AYXdyb2YuY29uc3VsLmNhLmVmYWQ3MjgyLmNvbnN1bDAeFw0yMjA0MjkwMzE0NTBa%0AFw0yMjA1MDIwMzE0NTBaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAARVIZ7Y%0AZEXfbOGBfxGa7Vuok1MIng%2FuzLQK2xLVlSTIPDbO5hstTGP%2B%2FGx182PYFP3jYqk5%0Aq6rYWe1wiPNMA30Io4H8MIH5MA4GA1UdDwEB%2FwQEAwIDuDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggr%0ABgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDAYDVR0TAQH%2FBAIwADApBgNVHQ4EIgQgrp4q50oX%0AHHghMbxz5Bk8OJFWMdfgH0Upr350WlhyxvkwKwYDVR0jBCQwIoAgUe6uERAIj%2FLM%0AyuFzDc3Wbp9TGAKBJYAwyhF14ToOQCMwYgYDVR0RAQH%2FBFgwVoZUc3BpZmZlOi8v%0AZWZhZDcyODItZDliMi0zMjk4LWY2ZDgtMzhiMzdmYjU4ZGYzLmNvbnN1bC9ucy9k%0AZWZhdWx0L2RjL2RjMS9zdmMvZGFzaGJvYXJkMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0cAMEQCIDwb%0AFlchufggNTijnQ5SUcvTZrWlZyq%2FrdVC20nbbmWLAiAVshNNv1xBqJI1NmY2HI9n%0AgRMfb8aEPVSuxEHhqy57eQ%3D%3D%0A-----END%20CERTIFICATE-----%0A";Chain="-----BEGIN%20CERTIFICATE-----%0AMIICHDCCAcOgAwIBAgIBCDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAxMS8wLQYDVQQDEyZwcmktMTli%0AYXdyb2YuY29uc3VsLmNhLmVmYWQ3MjgyLmNvbnN1bDAeFw0yMjA0MjkwMzE0NTBa%0AFw0yMjA1MDIwMzE0NTBaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAARVIZ7Y%0AZEXfbOGBfxGa7Vuok1MIng%2FuzLQK2xLVlSTIPDbO5hstTGP%2B%2FGx182PYFP3jYqk5%0Aq6rYWe1wiPNMA30Io4H8MIH5MA4GA1UdDwEB%2FwQEAwIDuDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggr%0ABgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDAYDVR0TAQH%2FBAIwADApBgNVHQ4EIgQgrp4q50oX%0AHHghMbxz5Bk8OJFWMdfgH0Upr350WlhyxvkwKwYDVR0jBCQwIoAgUe6uERAIj%2FLM%0AyuFzDc3Wbp9TGAKBJYAwyhF14ToOQCMwYgYDVR0RAQH%2FBFgwVoZUc3BpZmZlOi8v%0AZWZhZDcyODItZDliMi0zMjk4LWY2ZDgtMzhiMzdmYjU4ZGYzLmNvbnN1bC9ucy9k%0AZWZhdWx0L2RjL2RjMS9zdmMvZGFzaGJvYXJkMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0cAMEQCIDwb%0AFlchufggNTijnQ5SUcvTZrWlZyq%2FrdVC20nbbmWLAiAVshNNv1xBqJI1NmY2HI9n%0AgRMfb8aEPVSuxEHhqy57eQ%3D%3D%0A-----END%20CERTIFICATE-----%0A";Subject="";URI=spiffe://efad7282-d9b2-3298-f6d8-38b37fb58df3.consul/ns/default/dc/dc1/svc/dashboard] ``` Closes #12852
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}
}
// If an inbound connect limit is set, inject a connection limit filter on each chain.
if cfg.MaxInboundConnections > 0 {
connectionLimitFilter, err := makeConnectionLimitFilter(cfg.MaxInboundConnections)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
l.FilterChains = []*envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain{
{
Filters: []*envoy_listener_v3.Filter{
connectionLimitFilter,
},
},
}
}
filter, err := makeListenerFilter(filterOpts)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
if len(l.FilterChains) > 0 {
// The list of FilterChains has already been initialized
l.FilterChains[0].Filters = append(l.FilterChains[0].Filters, filter)
} else {
l.FilterChains = []*envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain{
{
Filters: []*envoy_listener_v3.Filter{
filter,
},
},
}
}
err = s.finalizePublicListenerFromConfig(l, cfgSnap, useHTTPFilter)
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if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to attach Consul filters and TLS context to custom public listener: %v", err)
}
// When permissive mTLS mode is enabled, include an additional filter chain
// that matches on the `destination_port == <service port>`. Traffic sent
// directly to the service port is passed through to the application
// unmodified.
if cfgSnap.Proxy.Mode == structs.ProxyModeTransparent &&
cfgSnap.Proxy.MutualTLSMode == structs.MutualTLSModePermissive {
chain, err := makePermissiveFilterChain(cfgSnap, filterOpts)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("unable to add permissive mtls filter chain: %w", err)
}
if chain == nil {
s.Logger.Debug("no service port defined for service in permissive mTLS mode; not adding filter chain for non-mTLS traffic")
} else {
l.FilterChains = append(l.FilterChains, chain)
// With tproxy, the REDIRECT iptables target rewrites the destination ip/port
// to the proxy ip/port (e.g. 127.0.0.1:20000) for incoming packets.
// We need the original_dst filter to recover the original destination address.
originalDstFilter, err := makeEnvoyListenerFilter("envoy.filters.listener.original_dst", &envoy_original_dst_v3.OriginalDst{})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
l.ListenerFilters = append(l.ListenerFilters, originalDstFilter)
}
}
return l, err
}
func makePermissiveFilterChain(cfgSnap *proxycfg.ConfigSnapshot, opts listenerFilterOpts) (*envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain, error) {
servicePort := cfgSnap.Proxy.LocalServicePort
if servicePort <= 0 {
// No service port means the service does not accept incoming traffic, so
// the connect proxy does not need to listen for incoming non-mTLS traffic.
return nil, nil
}
opts.statPrefix += "permissive_"
filter, err := makeTCPProxyFilter(opts)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
chain := &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain{
FilterChainMatch: &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChainMatch{
DestinationPort: &wrapperspb.UInt32Value{Value: uint32(servicePort)},
},
Filters: []*envoy_listener_v3.Filter{filter},
}
return chain, nil
}
2021-03-17 22:18:56 +00:00
// finalizePublicListenerFromConfig is used for best-effort injection of Consul filter-chains onto listeners.
// This include L4 authorization filters and TLS context.
func (s *ResourceGenerator) finalizePublicListenerFromConfig(l *envoy_listener_v3.Listener, cfgSnap *proxycfg.ConfigSnapshot, useHTTPFilter bool) error {
if !useHTTPFilter {
// Best-effort injection of L4 intentions
Support Incremental xDS mode (#9855) This adds support for the Incremental xDS protocol when using xDS v3. This is best reviewed commit-by-commit and will not be squashed when merged. Union of all commit messages follows to give an overarching summary: xds: exclusively support incremental xDS when using xDS v3 Attempts to use SoTW via v3 will fail, much like attempts to use incremental via v2 will fail. Work around a strange older envoy behavior involving empty CDS responses over incremental xDS. xds: various cleanups and refactors that don't strictly concern the addition of incremental xDS support Dissolve the connectionInfo struct in favor of per-connection ResourceGenerators instead. Do a better job of ensuring the xds code uses a well configured logger that accurately describes the connected client. xds: pull out checkStreamACLs method in advance of a later commit xds: rewrite SoTW xDS protocol tests to use protobufs rather than hand-rolled json strings In the test we very lightly reuse some of the more boring protobuf construction helper code that is also technically under test. The important thing of the protocol tests is testing the protocol. The actual inputs and outputs are largely already handled by the xds golden output tests now so these protocol tests don't have to do double-duty. This also updates the SoTW protocol test to exclusively use xDS v2 which is the only variant of SoTW that will be supported in Consul 1.10. xds: default xds.Server.AuthCheckFrequency at use-time instead of construction-time
2021-04-29 18:54:05 +00:00
if err := s.injectConnectFilters(cfgSnap, l); err != nil {
return nil
}
}
// Always apply TLS certificates
if err := s.injectConnectTLSForPublicListener(cfgSnap, l); err != nil {
return nil
}
return nil
}
Support Incremental xDS mode (#9855) This adds support for the Incremental xDS protocol when using xDS v3. This is best reviewed commit-by-commit and will not be squashed when merged. Union of all commit messages follows to give an overarching summary: xds: exclusively support incremental xDS when using xDS v3 Attempts to use SoTW via v3 will fail, much like attempts to use incremental via v2 will fail. Work around a strange older envoy behavior involving empty CDS responses over incremental xDS. xds: various cleanups and refactors that don't strictly concern the addition of incremental xDS support Dissolve the connectionInfo struct in favor of per-connection ResourceGenerators instead. Do a better job of ensuring the xds code uses a well configured logger that accurately describes the connected client. xds: pull out checkStreamACLs method in advance of a later commit xds: rewrite SoTW xDS protocol tests to use protobufs rather than hand-rolled json strings In the test we very lightly reuse some of the more boring protobuf construction helper code that is also technically under test. The important thing of the protocol tests is testing the protocol. The actual inputs and outputs are largely already handled by the xds golden output tests now so these protocol tests don't have to do double-duty. This also updates the SoTW protocol test to exclusively use xDS v2 which is the only variant of SoTW that will be supported in Consul 1.10. xds: default xds.Server.AuthCheckFrequency at use-time instead of construction-time
2021-04-29 18:54:05 +00:00
func (s *ResourceGenerator) makeExposedCheckListener(cfgSnap *proxycfg.ConfigSnapshot, cluster string, path structs.ExposePath) (proto.Message, error) {
cfg, err := config.ParseProxyConfig(cfgSnap.Proxy.Config)
if err != nil {
// Don't hard fail on a config typo, just warn. The parse func returns
// default config if there is an error so it's safe to continue.
s.Logger.Warn("failed to parse Connect.Proxy.Config", "error", err)
}
// No user config, use default listener
addr := cfgSnap.Address
// Override with bind address if one is set, otherwise default to 0.0.0.0
if cfg.BindAddress != "" {
addr = cfg.BindAddress
} else if addr == "" {
addr = "0.0.0.0"
}
// Strip any special characters from path to make a valid and hopefully unique name
r := regexp.MustCompile(`[^a-zA-Z0-9]+`)
strippedPath := r.ReplaceAllString(path.Path, "")
listenerName := fmt.Sprintf("exposed_path_%s", strippedPath)
listenerOpts := makeListenerOpts{
name: listenerName,
accessLogs: cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
addr: addr,
port: path.ListenerPort,
direction: envoy_core_v3.TrafficDirection_INBOUND,
logger: s.Logger,
}
l := makeListener(listenerOpts)
filterName := fmt.Sprintf("exposed_path_filter_%s_%d", strippedPath, path.ListenerPort)
filterOpts := listenerFilterOpts{
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useRDS: false,
protocol: path.Protocol,
filterName: filterName,
routeName: filterName,
cluster: cluster,
statPrefix: "",
routePath: path.Path,
httpAuthzFilters: nil,
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
logger: s.Logger,
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// in the exposed check listener we don't set the tracing configuration
}
f, err := makeListenerFilter(filterOpts)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
chain := &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain{
Filters: []*envoy_listener_v3.Filter{f},
}
// For registered checks restrict traffic sources to localhost and Consul's advertise addr
if path.ParsedFromCheck {
// For the advertise addr we use a CidrRange that only matches one address
advertise := s.CfgFetcher.AdvertiseAddrLAN()
// Get prefix length based on whether address is ipv4 (32 bits) or ipv6 (128 bits)
advertiseLen := 32
ip := net.ParseIP(advertise)
if ip != nil && strings.Contains(advertise, ":") {
advertiseLen = 128
}
ranges := make([]*envoy_core_v3.CidrRange, 0, 3)
ranges = append(ranges,
&envoy_core_v3.CidrRange{AddressPrefix: "127.0.0.1", PrefixLen: &wrapperspb.UInt32Value{Value: 8}},
&envoy_core_v3.CidrRange{AddressPrefix: advertise, PrefixLen: &wrapperspb.UInt32Value{Value: uint32(advertiseLen)}},
)
if ok, err := platform.SupportsIPv6(); err != nil {
return nil, err
} else if ok {
ranges = append(ranges,
&envoy_core_v3.CidrRange{AddressPrefix: "::1", PrefixLen: &wrapperspb.UInt32Value{Value: 128}},
)
}
chain.FilterChainMatch = &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChainMatch{
SourcePrefixRanges: ranges,
}
}
l.FilterChains = []*envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain{chain}
return l, err
}
Support Incremental xDS mode (#9855) This adds support for the Incremental xDS protocol when using xDS v3. This is best reviewed commit-by-commit and will not be squashed when merged. Union of all commit messages follows to give an overarching summary: xds: exclusively support incremental xDS when using xDS v3 Attempts to use SoTW via v3 will fail, much like attempts to use incremental via v2 will fail. Work around a strange older envoy behavior involving empty CDS responses over incremental xDS. xds: various cleanups and refactors that don't strictly concern the addition of incremental xDS support Dissolve the connectionInfo struct in favor of per-connection ResourceGenerators instead. Do a better job of ensuring the xds code uses a well configured logger that accurately describes the connected client. xds: pull out checkStreamACLs method in advance of a later commit xds: rewrite SoTW xDS protocol tests to use protobufs rather than hand-rolled json strings In the test we very lightly reuse some of the more boring protobuf construction helper code that is also technically under test. The important thing of the protocol tests is testing the protocol. The actual inputs and outputs are largely already handled by the xds golden output tests now so these protocol tests don't have to do double-duty. This also updates the SoTW protocol test to exclusively use xDS v2 which is the only variant of SoTW that will be supported in Consul 1.10. xds: default xds.Server.AuthCheckFrequency at use-time instead of construction-time
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func (s *ResourceGenerator) makeTerminatingGatewayListener(
cfgSnap *proxycfg.ConfigSnapshot,
name, addr string,
port int,
) (*envoy_listener_v3.Listener, error) {
listenerOpts := makeListenerOpts{
name: name,
accessLogs: cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
addr: addr,
port: port,
direction: envoy_core_v3.TrafficDirection_INBOUND,
logger: s.Logger,
}
l := makeListener(listenerOpts)
tlsInspector, err := makeTLSInspectorListenerFilter()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
l.ListenerFilters = []*envoy_listener_v3.ListenerFilter{tlsInspector}
// Make a FilterChain for each linked service
// Match on the cluster name,
for _, svc := range cfgSnap.TerminatingGateway.ValidServices() {
clusterName := connect.ServiceSNI(svc.Name, "", svc.NamespaceOrDefault(), svc.PartitionOrDefault(), cfgSnap.Datacenter, cfgSnap.Roots.TrustDomain)
// Resolvers are optional.
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resolver, hasResolver := cfgSnap.TerminatingGateway.ServiceResolvers[svc]
intentions := cfgSnap.TerminatingGateway.Intentions[svc]
svcConfig := cfgSnap.TerminatingGateway.ServiceConfigs[svc]
peerTrustBundles := cfgSnap.TerminatingGateway.InboundPeerTrustBundles[svc]
cfg, err := config.ParseProxyConfig(svcConfig.ProxyConfig)
if err != nil {
// Don't hard fail on a config typo, just warn. The parse func returns
// default config if there is an error so it's safe to continue.
Support Incremental xDS mode (#9855) This adds support for the Incremental xDS protocol when using xDS v3. This is best reviewed commit-by-commit and will not be squashed when merged. Union of all commit messages follows to give an overarching summary: xds: exclusively support incremental xDS when using xDS v3 Attempts to use SoTW via v3 will fail, much like attempts to use incremental via v2 will fail. Work around a strange older envoy behavior involving empty CDS responses over incremental xDS. xds: various cleanups and refactors that don't strictly concern the addition of incremental xDS support Dissolve the connectionInfo struct in favor of per-connection ResourceGenerators instead. Do a better job of ensuring the xds code uses a well configured logger that accurately describes the connected client. xds: pull out checkStreamACLs method in advance of a later commit xds: rewrite SoTW xDS protocol tests to use protobufs rather than hand-rolled json strings In the test we very lightly reuse some of the more boring protobuf construction helper code that is also technically under test. The important thing of the protocol tests is testing the protocol. The actual inputs and outputs are largely already handled by the xds golden output tests now so these protocol tests don't have to do double-duty. This also updates the SoTW protocol test to exclusively use xDS v2 which is the only variant of SoTW that will be supported in Consul 1.10. xds: default xds.Server.AuthCheckFrequency at use-time instead of construction-time
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s.Logger.Warn(
"failed to parse Connect.Proxy.Config for linked service",
"service", svc.String(),
"error", err,
)
}
opts := terminatingGatewayFilterChainOpts{
cluster: clusterName,
service: svc,
intentions: intentions,
protocol: cfg.Protocol,
peerTrustBundles: peerTrustBundles,
}
clusterChain, err := s.makeFilterChainTerminatingGateway(cfgSnap, opts)
if err != nil {
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to make filter chain for cluster %q: %v", clusterName, err)
}
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l.FilterChains = append(l.FilterChains, clusterChain)
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// if there is a service-resolver for this service then also setup subset filter chains for it
if hasResolver {
// generate 1 filter chain for each service subset
for subsetName := range resolver.Subsets {
subsetClusterName := connect.ServiceSNI(svc.Name, subsetName, svc.NamespaceOrDefault(), svc.PartitionOrDefault(), cfgSnap.Datacenter, cfgSnap.Roots.TrustDomain)
opts.cluster = subsetClusterName
subsetClusterChain, err := s.makeFilterChainTerminatingGateway(cfgSnap, opts)
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if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to make filter chain for cluster %q: %v", subsetClusterName, err)
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}
l.FilterChains = append(l.FilterChains, subsetClusterChain)
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}
}
}
for _, svc := range cfgSnap.TerminatingGateway.ValidDestinations() {
intentions := cfgSnap.TerminatingGateway.Intentions[svc]
svcConfig := cfgSnap.TerminatingGateway.ServiceConfigs[svc]
peerTrustBundles := cfgSnap.TerminatingGateway.InboundPeerTrustBundles[svc]
cfg, err := config.ParseProxyConfig(svcConfig.ProxyConfig)
if err != nil {
// Don't hard fail on a config typo, just warn. The parse func returns
// default config if there is an error so it's safe to continue.
s.Logger.Warn(
"failed to parse Connect.Proxy.Config for linked destination",
"destination", svc.String(),
"error", err,
)
}
var dest *structs.DestinationConfig
dest = &svcConfig.Destination
opts := terminatingGatewayFilterChainOpts{
service: svc,
intentions: intentions,
protocol: cfg.Protocol,
port: dest.Port,
peerTrustBundles: peerTrustBundles,
}
for _, address := range dest.Addresses {
clusterName := clusterNameForDestination(cfgSnap, svc.Name, address, svc.NamespaceOrDefault(), svc.PartitionOrDefault())
opts.cluster = clusterName
opts.address = address
clusterChain, err := s.makeFilterChainTerminatingGateway(cfgSnap, opts)
if err != nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("failed to make filter chain for cluster %q: %v", clusterName, err)
}
l.FilterChains = append(l.FilterChains, clusterChain)
}
}
// Before we add the fallback, sort these chains by the matched name. All
// of these filter chains are independent, but envoy requires them to be in
// some order. If we put them in a random order then every xDS iteration
// envoy will force the listener to be replaced. Sorting these has no
// effect on how they operate, but it does mean that we won't churn
// listeners at idle.
sort.Slice(l.FilterChains, func(i, j int) bool {
return l.FilterChains[i].FilterChainMatch.ServerNames[0] < l.FilterChains[j].FilterChainMatch.ServerNames[0]
})
// This fallback catch-all filter ensures a listener will be present for health checks to pass
// Envoy will reset these connections since known endpoints are caught by filter chain matches above
filterOpts := listenerFilterOpts{
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
cluster: "",
filterName: name,
logger: s.Logger,
statPrefix: "terminating_gateway.",
}
tcpProxy, err := makeTCPProxyFilter(filterOpts)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
sniCluster, err := makeSNIClusterFilter()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
fallback := &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain{
Filters: []*envoy_listener_v3.Filter{
sniCluster,
tcpProxy,
},
}
l.FilterChains = append(l.FilterChains, fallback)
return l, nil
}
type terminatingGatewayFilterChainOpts struct {
cluster string
service structs.ServiceName
intentions structs.SimplifiedIntentions
protocol string
address string // only valid for destination listeners
port int // only valid for destination listeners
peerTrustBundles []*pbpeering.PeeringTrustBundle
}
func (s *ResourceGenerator) makeFilterChainTerminatingGateway(cfgSnap *proxycfg.ConfigSnapshot, tgtwyOpts terminatingGatewayFilterChainOpts) (*envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain, error) {
tlsContext := &envoy_tls_v3.DownstreamTlsContext{
CommonTlsContext: makeCommonTLSContext(
cfgSnap.TerminatingGateway.ServiceLeaves[tgtwyOpts.service],
cfgSnap.RootPEMs(),
makeTLSParametersFromProxyTLSConfig(cfgSnap.MeshConfigTLSIncoming()),
),
RequireClientCertificate: &wrapperspb.BoolValue{Value: true},
}
transportSocket, err := makeDownstreamTLSTransportSocket(tlsContext)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
filterChain := &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain{
FilterChainMatch: makeSNIFilterChainMatch(tgtwyOpts.cluster),
Filters: make([]*envoy_listener_v3.Filter, 0, 3),
TransportSocket: transportSocket,
}
// This controls if we do L4 or L7 intention checks.
useHTTPFilter := structs.IsProtocolHTTPLike(tgtwyOpts.protocol)
// If this is L4, the first filter we setup is to do intention checks.
if !useHTTPFilter {
authFilter, err := makeRBACNetworkFilter(
tgtwyOpts.intentions,
cfgSnap.IntentionDefaultAllow,
rbacLocalInfo{
trustDomain: cfgSnap.Roots.TrustDomain,
datacenter: cfgSnap.Datacenter,
partition: cfgSnap.ProxyID.PartitionOrDefault(),
},
tgtwyOpts.peerTrustBundles,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
filterChain.Filters = append(filterChain.Filters, authFilter)
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}
proxyCfg, err := config.ParseProxyConfig(cfgSnap.Proxy.Config)
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if err != nil {
// Don't hard fail on a config typo, just warn. The parse func returns
// default config if there is an error so it's safe to continue.
s.Logger.Warn("failed to parse Connect.Proxy.Config", "error", err)
}
var tracing *envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager_Tracing
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if proxyCfg.ListenerTracingJSON != "" {
if tracing, err = makeTracingFromUserConfig(proxyCfg.ListenerTracingJSON); err != nil {
s.Logger.Warn("failed to parse ListenerTracingJSON config", "error", err)
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}
}
// Lastly we setup the actual proxying component. For L4 this is a straight
// tcp proxy. For L7 this is a very hands-off HTTP proxy just to inject an
// HTTP filter to do intention checks here instead.
opts := listenerFilterOpts{
protocol: tgtwyOpts.protocol,
filterName: fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.%s.%s", tgtwyOpts.service.Name, tgtwyOpts.service.NamespaceOrDefault(), tgtwyOpts.service.PartitionOrDefault(), cfgSnap.Datacenter),
routeName: tgtwyOpts.cluster, // Set cluster name for route config since each will have its own
cluster: tgtwyOpts.cluster,
statPrefix: "upstream.",
routePath: "",
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tracing: tracing,
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
logger: s.Logger,
}
if useHTTPFilter {
var err error
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rbacFilter, err := makeRBACHTTPFilter(
tgtwyOpts.intentions,
cfgSnap.IntentionDefaultAllow,
rbacLocalInfo{
trustDomain: cfgSnap.Roots.TrustDomain,
datacenter: cfgSnap.Datacenter,
partition: cfgSnap.ProxyID.PartitionOrDefault(),
},
tgtwyOpts.peerTrustBundles,
Use JWT-auth filter in metadata mode & Delegate validation to RBAC filter (#18062) ### Description <!-- Please describe why you're making this change, in plain English. --> - Currently the jwt-auth filter doesn't take into account the service identity when validating jwt-auth, it only takes into account the path and jwt provider during validation. This causes issues when multiple source intentions restrict access to an endpoint with different JWT providers. - To fix these issues, rather than use the JWT auth filter for validation, we use it in metadata mode and allow it to forward the successful validated JWT token payload to the RBAC filter which will make the decisions. This PR ensures requests with and without JWT tokens successfully go through the jwt-authn filter. The filter however only forwards the data for successful/valid tokens. On the RBAC filter level, we check the payload for claims and token issuer + existing rbac rules. ### Testing & Reproduction steps <!-- * In the case of bugs, describe how to replicate * If any manual tests were done, document the steps and the conditions to replicate * Call out any important/ relevant unit tests, e2e tests or integration tests you have added or are adding --> - This test covers a multi level jwt requirements (requirements at top level and permissions level). It also assumes you have envoy running, you have a redis and a sidecar proxy service registered, and have a way to generate jwks with jwt. I mostly use: https://www.scottbrady91.com/tools/jwt for this. - first write your proxy defaults ``` Kind = "proxy-defaults" name = "global" config { protocol = "http" } ``` - Create two providers ``` Kind = "jwt-provider" Name = "auth0" Issuer = "https://ronald.local" JSONWebKeySet = { Local = { JWKS = "eyJrZXlzIjog....." } } ``` ``` Kind = "jwt-provider" Name = "okta" Issuer = "https://ronald.local" JSONWebKeySet = { Local = { JWKS = "eyJrZXlzIjogW3...." } } ``` - add a service intention ``` Kind = "service-intentions" Name = "redis" JWT = { Providers = [ { Name = "okta" }, ] } Sources = [ { Name = "*" Permissions = [{ Action = "allow" HTTP = { PathPrefix = "/workspace" } JWT = { Providers = [ { Name = "okta" VerifyClaims = [ { Path = ["aud"] Value = "my_client_app" }, { Path = ["sub"] Value = "5be86359073c434bad2da3932222dabe" } ] }, ] } }, { Action = "allow" HTTP = { PathPrefix = "/" } JWT = { Providers = [ { Name = "auth0" }, ] } }] } ] ``` - generate 3 jwt tokens: 1 from auth0 jwks, 1 from okta jwks with different claims than `/workspace` expects and 1 with correct claims - connect to your envoy (change service and address as needed) to view logs and potential errors. You can add: `-- --log-level debug` to see what data is being forwarded ``` consul connect envoy -sidecar-for redis1 -grpc-addr 127.0.0.1:8502 ``` - Make the following requests: ``` curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $Auth0_TOKEN" --insecure --cert leaf.cert --key leaf.key --cacert connect-ca.pem https://localhost:20000/workspace -v RBAC filter denied curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $Okta_TOKEN_with_wrong_claims" --insecure --cert leaf.cert --key leaf.key --cacert connect-ca.pem https://localhost:20000/workspace -v RBAC filter denied curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $Okta_TOKEN_with_correct_claims" --insecure --cert leaf.cert --key leaf.key --cacert connect-ca.pem https://localhost:20000/workspace -v Successful request ``` ### TODO * [x] Update test coverage * [ ] update integration tests (follow-up PR) * [x] appropriate backport labels added
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cfgSnap.JWTProviders,
)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
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opts.httpAuthzFilters = []*envoy_http_v3.HttpFilter{rbacFilter}
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opts.cluster = ""
opts.useRDS = true
Add x-forwarded-client-cert headers Description Add x-fowarded-client-cert information on trusted incoming connections. Envoy provides support forwarding and annotating the x-forwarded-client-cert header via the forward_client_cert_details set_current_client_cert_details filter fields. It would be helpful for consul to support this directly in its config. The escape hatches are a bit cumbersome for this purpose. This has been implemented on incoming connections to envoy. Outgoing (from the local service through the sidecar) will not have a certificate, and so are left alone. A service on an incoming connection will now get headers something like this: ``` X-Forwarded-Client-Cert:[By=spiffe://efad7282-d9b2-3298-f6d8-38b37fb58df3.consul/ns/default/dc/dc1/svc/counting;Hash=61ad5cbdfcb50f5a3ec0ca60923d61613c149a9d4495010a64175c05a0268ab2;Cert="-----BEGIN%20CERTIFICATE-----%0AMIICHDCCAcOgAwIBAgIBCDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAxMS8wLQYDVQQDEyZwcmktMTli%0AYXdyb2YuY29uc3VsLmNhLmVmYWQ3MjgyLmNvbnN1bDAeFw0yMjA0MjkwMzE0NTBa%0AFw0yMjA1MDIwMzE0NTBaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAARVIZ7Y%0AZEXfbOGBfxGa7Vuok1MIng%2FuzLQK2xLVlSTIPDbO5hstTGP%2B%2FGx182PYFP3jYqk5%0Aq6rYWe1wiPNMA30Io4H8MIH5MA4GA1UdDwEB%2FwQEAwIDuDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggr%0ABgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDAYDVR0TAQH%2FBAIwADApBgNVHQ4EIgQgrp4q50oX%0AHHghMbxz5Bk8OJFWMdfgH0Upr350WlhyxvkwKwYDVR0jBCQwIoAgUe6uERAIj%2FLM%0AyuFzDc3Wbp9TGAKBJYAwyhF14ToOQCMwYgYDVR0RAQH%2FBFgwVoZUc3BpZmZlOi8v%0AZWZhZDcyODItZDliMi0zMjk4LWY2ZDgtMzhiMzdmYjU4ZGYzLmNvbnN1bC9ucy9k%0AZWZhdWx0L2RjL2RjMS9zdmMvZGFzaGJvYXJkMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0cAMEQCIDwb%0AFlchufggNTijnQ5SUcvTZrWlZyq%2FrdVC20nbbmWLAiAVshNNv1xBqJI1NmY2HI9n%0AgRMfb8aEPVSuxEHhqy57eQ%3D%3D%0A-----END%20CERTIFICATE-----%0A";Chain="-----BEGIN%20CERTIFICATE-----%0AMIICHDCCAcOgAwIBAgIBCDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAxMS8wLQYDVQQDEyZwcmktMTli%0AYXdyb2YuY29uc3VsLmNhLmVmYWQ3MjgyLmNvbnN1bDAeFw0yMjA0MjkwMzE0NTBa%0AFw0yMjA1MDIwMzE0NTBaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAARVIZ7Y%0AZEXfbOGBfxGa7Vuok1MIng%2FuzLQK2xLVlSTIPDbO5hstTGP%2B%2FGx182PYFP3jYqk5%0Aq6rYWe1wiPNMA30Io4H8MIH5MA4GA1UdDwEB%2FwQEAwIDuDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggr%0ABgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDAYDVR0TAQH%2FBAIwADApBgNVHQ4EIgQgrp4q50oX%0AHHghMbxz5Bk8OJFWMdfgH0Upr350WlhyxvkwKwYDVR0jBCQwIoAgUe6uERAIj%2FLM%0AyuFzDc3Wbp9TGAKBJYAwyhF14ToOQCMwYgYDVR0RAQH%2FBFgwVoZUc3BpZmZlOi8v%0AZWZhZDcyODItZDliMi0zMjk4LWY2ZDgtMzhiMzdmYjU4ZGYzLmNvbnN1bC9ucy9k%0AZWZhdWx0L2RjL2RjMS9zdmMvZGFzaGJvYXJkMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0cAMEQCIDwb%0AFlchufggNTijnQ5SUcvTZrWlZyq%2FrdVC20nbbmWLAiAVshNNv1xBqJI1NmY2HI9n%0AgRMfb8aEPVSuxEHhqy57eQ%3D%3D%0A-----END%20CERTIFICATE-----%0A";Subject="";URI=spiffe://efad7282-d9b2-3298-f6d8-38b37fb58df3.consul/ns/default/dc/dc1/svc/dashboard] ``` Closes #12852
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if meshConfig := cfgSnap.MeshConfig(); meshConfig == nil || meshConfig.HTTP == nil || !meshConfig.HTTP.SanitizeXForwardedClientCert {
opts.forwardClientDetails = true
// This assumes that we have a client cert (mTLS) (implied by the context of this function)
opts.forwardClientPolicy = envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager_APPEND_FORWARD
Add x-forwarded-client-cert headers Description Add x-fowarded-client-cert information on trusted incoming connections. Envoy provides support forwarding and annotating the x-forwarded-client-cert header via the forward_client_cert_details set_current_client_cert_details filter fields. It would be helpful for consul to support this directly in its config. The escape hatches are a bit cumbersome for this purpose. This has been implemented on incoming connections to envoy. Outgoing (from the local service through the sidecar) will not have a certificate, and so are left alone. A service on an incoming connection will now get headers something like this: ``` X-Forwarded-Client-Cert:[By=spiffe://efad7282-d9b2-3298-f6d8-38b37fb58df3.consul/ns/default/dc/dc1/svc/counting;Hash=61ad5cbdfcb50f5a3ec0ca60923d61613c149a9d4495010a64175c05a0268ab2;Cert="-----BEGIN%20CERTIFICATE-----%0AMIICHDCCAcOgAwIBAgIBCDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAxMS8wLQYDVQQDEyZwcmktMTli%0AYXdyb2YuY29uc3VsLmNhLmVmYWQ3MjgyLmNvbnN1bDAeFw0yMjA0MjkwMzE0NTBa%0AFw0yMjA1MDIwMzE0NTBaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAARVIZ7Y%0AZEXfbOGBfxGa7Vuok1MIng%2FuzLQK2xLVlSTIPDbO5hstTGP%2B%2FGx182PYFP3jYqk5%0Aq6rYWe1wiPNMA30Io4H8MIH5MA4GA1UdDwEB%2FwQEAwIDuDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggr%0ABgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDAYDVR0TAQH%2FBAIwADApBgNVHQ4EIgQgrp4q50oX%0AHHghMbxz5Bk8OJFWMdfgH0Upr350WlhyxvkwKwYDVR0jBCQwIoAgUe6uERAIj%2FLM%0AyuFzDc3Wbp9TGAKBJYAwyhF14ToOQCMwYgYDVR0RAQH%2FBFgwVoZUc3BpZmZlOi8v%0AZWZhZDcyODItZDliMi0zMjk4LWY2ZDgtMzhiMzdmYjU4ZGYzLmNvbnN1bC9ucy9k%0AZWZhdWx0L2RjL2RjMS9zdmMvZGFzaGJvYXJkMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0cAMEQCIDwb%0AFlchufggNTijnQ5SUcvTZrWlZyq%2FrdVC20nbbmWLAiAVshNNv1xBqJI1NmY2HI9n%0AgRMfb8aEPVSuxEHhqy57eQ%3D%3D%0A-----END%20CERTIFICATE-----%0A";Chain="-----BEGIN%20CERTIFICATE-----%0AMIICHDCCAcOgAwIBAgIBCDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAxMS8wLQYDVQQDEyZwcmktMTli%0AYXdyb2YuY29uc3VsLmNhLmVmYWQ3MjgyLmNvbnN1bDAeFw0yMjA0MjkwMzE0NTBa%0AFw0yMjA1MDIwMzE0NTBaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAARVIZ7Y%0AZEXfbOGBfxGa7Vuok1MIng%2FuzLQK2xLVlSTIPDbO5hstTGP%2B%2FGx182PYFP3jYqk5%0Aq6rYWe1wiPNMA30Io4H8MIH5MA4GA1UdDwEB%2FwQEAwIDuDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggr%0ABgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDAYDVR0TAQH%2FBAIwADApBgNVHQ4EIgQgrp4q50oX%0AHHghMbxz5Bk8OJFWMdfgH0Upr350WlhyxvkwKwYDVR0jBCQwIoAgUe6uERAIj%2FLM%0AyuFzDc3Wbp9TGAKBJYAwyhF14ToOQCMwYgYDVR0RAQH%2FBFgwVoZUc3BpZmZlOi8v%0AZWZhZDcyODItZDliMi0zMjk4LWY2ZDgtMzhiMzdmYjU4ZGYzLmNvbnN1bC9ucy9k%0AZWZhdWx0L2RjL2RjMS9zdmMvZGFzaGJvYXJkMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0cAMEQCIDwb%0AFlchufggNTijnQ5SUcvTZrWlZyq%2FrdVC20nbbmWLAiAVshNNv1xBqJI1NmY2HI9n%0AgRMfb8aEPVSuxEHhqy57eQ%3D%3D%0A-----END%20CERTIFICATE-----%0A";Subject="";URI=spiffe://efad7282-d9b2-3298-f6d8-38b37fb58df3.consul/ns/default/dc/dc1/svc/dashboard] ``` Closes #12852
2022-04-26 20:46:29 +00:00
}
}
filter, err := makeListenerFilter(opts)
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if err != nil {
s.Logger.Error("failed to make listener", "cluster", tgtwyOpts.cluster, "error", err)
return nil, err
2020-04-14 14:59:23 +00:00
}
filterChain.Filters = append(filterChain.Filters, filter)
2020-04-14 14:59:23 +00:00
return filterChain, nil
2020-04-14 14:59:23 +00:00
}
Support Incremental xDS mode (#9855) This adds support for the Incremental xDS protocol when using xDS v3. This is best reviewed commit-by-commit and will not be squashed when merged. Union of all commit messages follows to give an overarching summary: xds: exclusively support incremental xDS when using xDS v3 Attempts to use SoTW via v3 will fail, much like attempts to use incremental via v2 will fail. Work around a strange older envoy behavior involving empty CDS responses over incremental xDS. xds: various cleanups and refactors that don't strictly concern the addition of incremental xDS support Dissolve the connectionInfo struct in favor of per-connection ResourceGenerators instead. Do a better job of ensuring the xds code uses a well configured logger that accurately describes the connected client. xds: pull out checkStreamACLs method in advance of a later commit xds: rewrite SoTW xDS protocol tests to use protobufs rather than hand-rolled json strings In the test we very lightly reuse some of the more boring protobuf construction helper code that is also technically under test. The important thing of the protocol tests is testing the protocol. The actual inputs and outputs are largely already handled by the xds golden output tests now so these protocol tests don't have to do double-duty. This also updates the SoTW protocol test to exclusively use xDS v2 which is the only variant of SoTW that will be supported in Consul 1.10. xds: default xds.Server.AuthCheckFrequency at use-time instead of construction-time
2021-04-29 18:54:05 +00:00
func (s *ResourceGenerator) makeMeshGatewayListener(name, addr string, port int, cfgSnap *proxycfg.ConfigSnapshot) (*envoy_listener_v3.Listener, error) {
tlsInspector, err := makeTLSInspectorListenerFilter()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
sniCluster, err := makeSNIClusterFilter()
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// The cluster name here doesn't matter as the sni_cluster
// filter will fill it in for us.
filterOpts := listenerFilterOpts{
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
cluster: "",
filterName: name,
logger: s.Logger,
statPrefix: "mesh_gateway_local.",
}
tcpProxy, err := makeTCPProxyFilter(filterOpts)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
sniClusterChain := &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain{
Filters: []*envoy_listener_v3.Filter{
sniCluster,
tcpProxy,
},
}
opts := makeListenerOpts{
name: name,
accessLogs: cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
addr: addr,
port: port,
direction: envoy_core_v3.TrafficDirection_UNSPECIFIED,
logger: s.Logger,
}
l := makeListener(opts)
l.ListenerFilters = []*envoy_listener_v3.ListenerFilter{tlsInspector}
for _, svc := range cfgSnap.MeshGatewayValidExportedServices() {
peerNames := cfgSnap.MeshGateway.ExportedServicesWithPeers[svc]
chain := cfgSnap.MeshGateway.DiscoveryChain[svc]
filterChain, err := s.makeMeshGatewayPeerFilterChain(cfgSnap, svc, peerNames, chain)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
} else if filterChain == nil {
continue
}
l.FilterChains = append(l.FilterChains, filterChain)
}
2021-10-27 18:36:44 +00:00
// We need 1 Filter Chain per remote cluster
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keys := cfgSnap.MeshGateway.GatewayKeys()
for _, key := range keys {
if key.Matches(cfgSnap.Datacenter, cfgSnap.ProxyID.PartitionOrEmpty()) {
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
continue // skip local
}
clusterName := connect.GatewaySNI(key.Datacenter, key.Partition, cfgSnap.Roots.TrustDomain)
filterName := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", name, key.String())
filterOpts := listenerFilterOpts{
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
cluster: clusterName,
filterName: filterName,
logger: s.Logger,
statPrefix: "mesh_gateway_remote.",
}
dcTCPProxy, err := makeTCPProxyFilter(filterOpts)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
l.FilterChains = append(l.FilterChains, &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain{
FilterChainMatch: &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChainMatch{
ServerNames: []string{fmt.Sprintf("*.%s", clusterName)},
},
Filters: []*envoy_listener_v3.Filter{
dcTCPProxy,
},
})
}
// --------
// WAN Federation over mesh gateways
// --------
2021-10-26 22:10:30 +00:00
if cfgSnap.ProxyID.InDefaultPartition() &&
2021-10-26 21:58:23 +00:00
cfgSnap.ServiceMeta[structs.MetaWANFederationKey] == "1" &&
cfgSnap.ServerSNIFn != nil {
for _, key := range keys {
if key.Datacenter == cfgSnap.Datacenter {
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
continue // skip local
}
clusterName := cfgSnap.ServerSNIFn(key.Datacenter, "")
filterName := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", name, key.String())
filterOpts := listenerFilterOpts{
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
cluster: clusterName,
filterName: filterName,
logger: s.Logger,
statPrefix: "mesh_gateway_remote.",
}
dcTCPProxy, err := makeTCPProxyFilter(filterOpts)
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
l.FilterChains = append(l.FilterChains, &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain{
FilterChainMatch: &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChainMatch{
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
ServerNames: []string{fmt.Sprintf("*.%s", clusterName)},
},
Filters: []*envoy_listener_v3.Filter{
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
dcTCPProxy,
},
})
}
// Wildcard all flavors to each server.
servers, _ := cfgSnap.MeshGateway.WatchedLocalServers.Get(structs.ConsulServiceName)
for _, srv := range servers {
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
clusterName := cfgSnap.ServerSNIFn(cfgSnap.Datacenter, srv.Node.Node)
filterName := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", name, cfgSnap.Datacenter)
filterOpts := listenerFilterOpts{
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
cluster: clusterName,
filterName: filterName,
logger: s.Logger,
statPrefix: "mesh_gateway_local_server.",
}
dcTCPProxy, err := makeTCPProxyFilter(filterOpts)
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
l.FilterChains = append(l.FilterChains, &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain{
FilterChainMatch: &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChainMatch{
ServerNames: []string{clusterName},
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
},
Filters: []*envoy_listener_v3.Filter{
wan federation via mesh gateways (#6884) This is like a Möbius strip of code due to the fact that low-level components (serf/memberlist) are connected to high-level components (the catalog and mesh-gateways) in a twisty maze of references which make it hard to dive into. With that in mind here's a high level summary of what you'll find in the patch: There are several distinct chunks of code that are affected: * new flags and config options for the server * retry join WAN is slightly different * retry join code is shared to discover primary mesh gateways from secondary datacenters * because retry join logic runs in the *agent* and the results of that operation for primary mesh gateways are needed in the *server* there are some methods like `RefreshPrimaryGatewayFallbackAddresses` that must occur at multiple layers of abstraction just to pass the data down to the right layer. * new cache type `FederationStateListMeshGatewaysName` for use in `proxycfg/xds` layers * the function signature for RPC dialing picked up a new required field (the node name of the destination) * several new RPCs for manipulating a FederationState object: `FederationState:{Apply,Get,List,ListMeshGateways}` * 3 read-only internal APIs for debugging use to invoke those RPCs from curl * raft and fsm changes to persist these FederationStates * replication for FederationStates as they are canonically stored in the Primary and replicated to the Secondaries. * a special derivative of anti-entropy that runs in secondaries to snapshot their local mesh gateway `CheckServiceNodes` and sync them into their upstream FederationState in the primary (this works in conjunction with the replication to distribute addresses for all mesh gateways in all DCs to all other DCs) * a "gateway locator" convenience object to make use of this data to choose the addresses of gateways to use for any given RPC or gossip operation to a remote DC. This gets data from the "retry join" logic in the agent and also directly calls into the FSM. * RPC (`:8300`) on the server sniffs the first byte of a new connection to determine if it's actually doing native TLS. If so it checks the ALPN header for protocol determination (just like how the existing system uses the type-byte marker). * 2 new kinds of protocols are exclusively decoded via this native TLS mechanism: one for ferrying "packet" operations (udp-like) from the gossip layer and one for "stream" operations (tcp-like). The packet operations re-use sockets (using length-prefixing) to cut down on TLS re-negotiation overhead. * the server instances specially wrap the `memberlist.NetTransport` when running with gateway federation enabled (in a `wanfed.Transport`). The general gist is that if it tries to dial a node in the SAME datacenter (deduced by looking at the suffix of the node name) there is no change. If dialing a DIFFERENT datacenter it is wrapped up in a TLS+ALPN blob and sent through some mesh gateways to eventually end up in a server's :8300 port. * a new flag when launching a mesh gateway via `consul connect envoy` to indicate that the servers are to be exposed. This sets a special service meta when registering the gateway into the catalog. * `proxycfg/xds` notice this metadata blob to activate additional watches for the FederationState objects as well as the location of all of the consul servers in that datacenter. * `xds:` if the extra metadata is in place additional clusters are defined in a DC to bulk sink all traffic to another DC's gateways. For the current datacenter we listen on a wildcard name (`server.<dc>.consul`) that load balances all servers as well as one mini-cluster per node (`<node>.server.<dc>.consul`) * the `consul tls cert create` command got a new flag (`-node`) to help create an additional SAN in certs that can be used with this flavor of federation.
2020-03-09 20:59:02 +00:00
dcTCPProxy,
},
})
}
}
// --------
// Peering control plane
// --------
// Create a single filter chain for local servers to be dialed by peers.
// When peering through gateways we load balance across the local servers. They cannot be addressed individually.
if cfgSnap.MeshConfig().PeerThroughMeshGateways() {
servers, _ := cfgSnap.MeshGateway.WatchedLocalServers.Get(structs.ConsulServiceName)
// Peering control-plane traffic can only ever be handled by the local leader.
// We avoid routing to read replicas since they will never be Raft voters.
if haveVoters(servers) {
clusterName := connect.PeeringServerSAN(cfgSnap.Datacenter, cfgSnap.Roots.TrustDomain)
filterName := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s", name, cfgSnap.Datacenter)
filterOpts := listenerFilterOpts{
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
cluster: clusterName,
filterName: filterName,
logger: s.Logger,
statPrefix: "mesh_gateway_local_peering_server.",
}
filter, err := makeTCPProxyFilter(filterOpts)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
l.FilterChains = append(l.FilterChains, &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain{
FilterChainMatch: &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChainMatch{
ServerNames: []string{clusterName},
},
Filters: []*envoy_listener_v3.Filter{
filter,
},
})
}
}
// Create a filter chain per outbound peer server cluster. Listen for the SNI provided
// as the peer's ServerName.
var peerServerFilterChains []*envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain
for name := range cfgSnap.MeshGateway.PeerServers {
filterOpts := listenerFilterOpts{
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
cluster: name,
filterName: name,
logger: s.Logger,
statPrefix: "mesh_gateway_remote_peering_servers.",
}
dcTCPProxy, err := makeTCPProxyFilter(filterOpts)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
peerServerFilterChains = append(peerServerFilterChains, &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain{
FilterChainMatch: makeSNIFilterChainMatch(name),
Filters: []*envoy_listener_v3.Filter{
dcTCPProxy,
},
})
}
// Sort so the output is stable and the listener doesn't get drained
sort.Slice(peerServerFilterChains, func(i, j int) bool {
return peerServerFilterChains[i].FilterChainMatch.ServerNames[0] < peerServerFilterChains[j].FilterChainMatch.ServerNames[0]
})
l.FilterChains = append(l.FilterChains, peerServerFilterChains...)
// This needs to get tacked on at the end as it has no
// matching and will act as a catch all
l.FilterChains = append(l.FilterChains, sniClusterChain)
return l, nil
}
func (s *ResourceGenerator) makeMeshGatewayPeerFilterChain(
cfgSnap *proxycfg.ConfigSnapshot,
svc structs.ServiceName,
peerNames []string,
chain *structs.CompiledDiscoveryChain,
) (*envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain, error) {
var (
useHTTPFilter = structs.IsProtocolHTTPLike(chain.Protocol)
// RDS, Envoy's Route Discovery Service, is only used for HTTP services.
useRDS = useHTTPFilter
)
if useHTTPFilter && cfgSnap.MeshGateway.Leaf == nil {
return nil, nil // ignore; not ready
}
var clusterName string
if !useRDS {
// When not using RDS we must generate a cluster name to attach to the filter chain.
// With RDS, cluster names get attached to the dynamic routes instead.
target, err := simpleChainTarget(chain)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
clusterName = meshGatewayExportedClusterNamePrefix + naming.CustomizeClusterName(target.Name, chain)
}
uid := proxycfg.NewUpstreamIDFromServiceName(svc)
filterName := fmt.Sprintf("%s.%s.%s.%s", chain.ServiceName, chain.Namespace, chain.Partition, chain.Datacenter)
filterChain, err := s.makeUpstreamFilterChain(filterChainOpts{
accessLogs: &cfgSnap.Proxy.AccessLogs,
routeName: uid.EnvoyID(),
clusterName: clusterName,
filterName: filterName,
protocol: chain.Protocol,
useRDS: useRDS,
statPrefix: "mesh_gateway_local_peered.",
forwardClientDetails: true,
forwardClientPolicy: envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager_SANITIZE_SET,
})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
var peeredServerNames []string
for _, peerName := range peerNames {
peeredSNI := connect.PeeredServiceSNI(
svc.Name,
svc.NamespaceOrDefault(),
svc.PartitionOrDefault(),
peerName,
cfgSnap.Roots.TrustDomain,
)
peeredServerNames = append(peeredServerNames, peeredSNI)
}
filterChain.FilterChainMatch = &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChainMatch{
ServerNames: peeredServerNames,
}
if useHTTPFilter {
// We only terminate TLS if we're doing an L7 proxy.
var peerBundles []*pbpeering.PeeringTrustBundle
for _, bundle := range cfgSnap.MeshGateway.PeeringTrustBundles {
if stringslice.Contains(peerNames, bundle.PeerName) {
peerBundles = append(peerBundles, bundle)
}
}
peeredTransportSocket, err := createDownstreamTransportSocketForConnectTLS(cfgSnap, peerBundles)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
filterChain.TransportSocket = peeredTransportSocket
}
return filterChain, nil
}
type filterChainOpts struct {
accessLogs *structs.AccessLogsConfig
routeName string
clusterName string
filterName string
protocol string
useRDS bool
tlsContext *envoy_tls_v3.DownstreamTlsContext
statPrefix string
forwardClientDetails bool
forwardClientPolicy envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager_ForwardClientCertDetails
2022-08-02 06:52:48 +00:00
tracing *envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager_Tracing
}
2021-03-17 19:40:49 +00:00
func (s *ResourceGenerator) makeUpstreamFilterChain(opts filterChainOpts) (*envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain, error) {
if opts.statPrefix == "" {
opts.statPrefix = "upstream."
}
filter, err := makeListenerFilter(listenerFilterOpts{
useRDS: opts.useRDS,
protocol: opts.protocol,
filterName: opts.filterName,
routeName: opts.routeName,
cluster: opts.clusterName,
statPrefix: opts.statPrefix,
forwardClientDetails: opts.forwardClientDetails,
forwardClientPolicy: opts.forwardClientPolicy,
2022-08-02 06:52:48 +00:00
tracing: opts.tracing,
accessLogs: opts.accessLogs,
logger: s.Logger,
})
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if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
transportSocket, err := makeDownstreamTLSTransportSocket(opts.tlsContext)
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if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChain{
Filters: []*envoy_listener_v3.Filter{
filter,
},
TransportSocket: transportSocket,
}, nil
}
// simpleChainTarget returns the discovery target for a chain with a single node.
// A chain can have a single target if it is for a TCP service or an HTTP service without
// multiple splits/routes/failovers.
func simpleChainTarget(chain *structs.CompiledDiscoveryChain) (*structs.DiscoveryTarget, error) {
startNode := chain.Nodes[chain.StartNode]
if startNode == nil {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("missing first node in compiled discovery chain for: %s", chain.ServiceName)
}
if startNode.Type != structs.DiscoveryGraphNodeTypeResolver {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("expected discovery chain with single node, found unexpected start node: %s", startNode.Type)
}
targetID := startNode.Resolver.Target
return chain.Targets[targetID], nil
}
func (s *ResourceGenerator) getAndModifyUpstreamConfigForListener(
uid proxycfg.UpstreamID,
u *structs.Upstream,
chain *structs.CompiledDiscoveryChain,
) structs.UpstreamConfig {
var (
cfg structs.UpstreamConfig
err error
)
2021-03-17 19:40:49 +00:00
configMap := make(map[string]interface{})
if u != nil {
configMap = u.Config
}
if chain == nil || chain.Default {
cfg, err = structs.ParseUpstreamConfigNoDefaults(configMap)
if err != nil {
// Don't hard fail on a config typo, just warn. The parse func returns
// default config if there is an error so it's safe to continue.
s.Logger.Warn("failed to parse", "upstream", uid, "error", err)
}
} else {
// Use NoDefaults here so that we can set the protocol to the chain
// protocol if necessary
2021-03-17 19:40:49 +00:00
cfg, err = structs.ParseUpstreamConfigNoDefaults(configMap)
if err != nil {
// Don't hard fail on a config typo, just warn. The parse func returns
// default config if there is an error so it's safe to continue.
s.Logger.Warn("failed to parse", "upstream", uid, "error", err)
}
if cfg.EnvoyListenerJSON != "" {
Support Incremental xDS mode (#9855) This adds support for the Incremental xDS protocol when using xDS v3. This is best reviewed commit-by-commit and will not be squashed when merged. Union of all commit messages follows to give an overarching summary: xds: exclusively support incremental xDS when using xDS v3 Attempts to use SoTW via v3 will fail, much like attempts to use incremental via v2 will fail. Work around a strange older envoy behavior involving empty CDS responses over incremental xDS. xds: various cleanups and refactors that don't strictly concern the addition of incremental xDS support Dissolve the connectionInfo struct in favor of per-connection ResourceGenerators instead. Do a better job of ensuring the xds code uses a well configured logger that accurately describes the connected client. xds: pull out checkStreamACLs method in advance of a later commit xds: rewrite SoTW xDS protocol tests to use protobufs rather than hand-rolled json strings In the test we very lightly reuse some of the more boring protobuf construction helper code that is also technically under test. The important thing of the protocol tests is testing the protocol. The actual inputs and outputs are largely already handled by the xds golden output tests now so these protocol tests don't have to do double-duty. This also updates the SoTW protocol test to exclusively use xDS v2 which is the only variant of SoTW that will be supported in Consul 1.10. xds: default xds.Server.AuthCheckFrequency at use-time instead of construction-time
2021-04-29 18:54:05 +00:00
s.Logger.Warn("ignoring escape hatch setting because already configured for",
"discovery chain", chain.ServiceName, "upstream", uid, "config", "envoy_listener_json")
// Remove from config struct so we don't use it later on
cfg.EnvoyListenerJSON = ""
}
}
protocol := cfg.Protocol
if chain != nil {
if protocol == "" {
protocol = chain.Protocol
}
if protocol == "" {
protocol = "tcp"
}
} else {
protocol = "tcp"
}
// set back on the config so that we can use it from return value
cfg.Protocol = protocol
return cfg
}
func (s *ResourceGenerator) getAndModifyUpstreamConfigForPeeredListener(
uid proxycfg.UpstreamID,
u *structs.Upstream,
peerMeta structs.PeeringServiceMeta,
) structs.UpstreamConfig {
var (
cfg structs.UpstreamConfig
err error
)
configMap := make(map[string]interface{})
if u != nil {
configMap = u.Config
}
cfg, err = structs.ParseUpstreamConfigNoDefaults(configMap)
if err != nil {
// Don't hard fail on a config typo, just warn. The parse func returns
// default config if there is an error so it's safe to continue.
s.Logger.Warn("failed to parse", "upstream", uid, "error", err)
}
// Ignore the configured protocol for peer upstreams, since it is defined by the remote
// cluster, which we cannot control.
protocol := peerMeta.Protocol
if protocol == "" {
protocol = "tcp"
}
// set back on the config so that we can use it from return value
cfg.Protocol = protocol
if cfg.ConnectTimeoutMs == 0 {
cfg.ConnectTimeoutMs = 5000
}
if cfg.MeshGateway.Mode == "" && u != nil {
cfg.MeshGateway = u.MeshGateway
}
return cfg
}
type listenerFilterOpts struct {
// All listener filters
accessLogs *structs.AccessLogsConfig
cluster string
filterName string
logger hclog.Logger
protocol string
statPrefix string
// HTTP listener filter options
forwardClientDetails bool
forwardClientPolicy envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager_ForwardClientCertDetails
2023-01-06 17:13:40 +00:00
httpAuthzFilters []*envoy_http_v3.HttpFilter
idleTimeoutMs *int
requestTimeoutMs *int
routeName string
routePath string
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tracing *envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager_Tracing
useRDS bool
}
func makeListenerFilter(opts listenerFilterOpts) (*envoy_listener_v3.Filter, error) {
switch opts.protocol {
case "grpc", "http2", "http":
return makeHTTPFilter(opts)
case "tcp":
fallthrough
default:
if opts.useRDS {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("RDS is not compatible with the tcp proxy filter")
} else if opts.cluster == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cluster name is required for a tcp proxy filter")
}
return makeTCPProxyFilter(opts)
}
}
func makeTLSInspectorListenerFilter() (*envoy_listener_v3.ListenerFilter, error) {
return makeEnvoyListenerFilter("envoy.filters.listener.tls_inspector", &envoy_tls_inspector_v3.TlsInspector{})
}
func makeHTTPInspectorListenerFilter() (*envoy_listener_v3.ListenerFilter, error) {
return makeEnvoyListenerFilter("envoy.filters.listener.http_inspector", &envoy_extensions_filters_listener_http_inspector_v3.HttpInspector{})
}
2021-08-24 13:10:16 +00:00
func makeSNIFilterChainMatch(sniMatches ...string) *envoy_listener_v3.FilterChainMatch {
if sniMatches == nil {
return nil
}
return &envoy_listener_v3.FilterChainMatch{
2021-08-24 13:10:16 +00:00
ServerNames: sniMatches,
}
}
func makeSNIClusterFilter() (*envoy_listener_v3.Filter, error) {
return makeFilter("envoy.filters.network.sni_cluster", &envoy_sni_cluster_v3.SniCluster{})
}
func makeTCPProxyFilter(opts listenerFilterOpts) (*envoy_listener_v3.Filter, error) {
accessLogs, err := accesslogs.MakeAccessLogs(opts.accessLogs, false)
if err != nil && opts.logger != nil {
opts.logger.Warn("could not make access log xds for tcp proxy", err)
}
cfg := &envoy_tcp_proxy_v3.TcpProxy{
AccessLog: accessLogs,
ClusterSpecifier: &envoy_tcp_proxy_v3.TcpProxy_Cluster{Cluster: opts.cluster},
StatPrefix: makeStatPrefix(opts.statPrefix, opts.filterName),
}
return makeFilter("envoy.filters.network.tcp_proxy", cfg)
}
func makeConnectionLimitFilter(limit int) (*envoy_listener_v3.Filter, error) {
cfg := &envoy_connection_limit_v3.ConnectionLimit{
StatPrefix: "inbound_connection_limit",
MaxConnections: wrapperspb.UInt64(uint64(limit)),
}
return makeFilter("envoy.filters.network.connection_limit", cfg)
}
func makeStatPrefix(prefix, filterName string) string {
// Replace colons here because Envoy does that in the metrics for the actual
// clusters but doesn't in the stat prefix here while dashboards assume they
// will match.
return fmt.Sprintf("%s%s", prefix, strings.Replace(filterName, ":", "_", -1))
}
2022-08-02 06:52:48 +00:00
func makeTracingFromUserConfig(configJSON string) (*envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager_Tracing, error) {
// Type field is present so decode it as a anypb.Any
var any anypb.Any
if err := protojson.Unmarshal([]byte(configJSON), &any); err != nil {
2022-08-02 06:52:48 +00:00
return nil, err
}
var t envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager_Tracing
if err := proto.Unmarshal(any.Value, &t); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &t, nil
}
func makeHTTPFilter(opts listenerFilterOpts) (*envoy_listener_v3.Filter, error) {
router, err := makeEnvoyHTTPFilter("envoy.filters.http.router", &envoy_http_router_v3.Router{})
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
accessLogs, err := accesslogs.MakeAccessLogs(opts.accessLogs, false)
if err != nil && opts.logger != nil {
opts.logger.Warn("could not make access log xds for http connection manager", err)
}
cfg := &envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager{
AccessLog: accessLogs,
StatPrefix: makeStatPrefix(opts.statPrefix, opts.filterName),
CodecType: envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager_AUTO,
HttpFilters: []*envoy_http_v3.HttpFilter{
router,
},
Tracing: &envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager_Tracing{
// Don't trace any requests by default unless the client application
// explicitly propagates trace headers that indicate this should be
// sampled.
RandomSampling: &envoy_type_v3.Percent{Value: 0.0},
},
// Explicitly enable WebSocket upgrades for all HTTP listeners
UpgradeConfigs: []*envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager_UpgradeConfig{
{UpgradeType: "websocket"},
},
}
2022-08-02 06:52:48 +00:00
if opts.tracing != nil {
cfg.Tracing = opts.tracing
}
if opts.useRDS {
if opts.cluster != "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("cannot specify cluster name when using RDS")
}
cfg.RouteSpecifier = &envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager_Rds{
Rds: &envoy_http_v3.Rds{
RouteConfigName: opts.routeName,
ConfigSource: &envoy_core_v3.ConfigSource{
ResourceApiVersion: envoy_core_v3.ApiVersion_V3,
ConfigSourceSpecifier: &envoy_core_v3.ConfigSource_Ads{
Ads: &envoy_core_v3.AggregatedConfigSource{},
},
},
},
}
} else {
if opts.cluster == "" {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("must specify cluster name when not using RDS")
}
route := &envoy_route_v3.Route{
Match: &envoy_route_v3.RouteMatch{
PathSpecifier: &envoy_route_v3.RouteMatch_Prefix{
Prefix: "/",
},
// TODO(banks) Envoy supports matching only valid GRPC
// requests which might be nice to add here for gRPC services
// but it's not supported in our current envoy SDK version
// although docs say it was supported by 1.8.0. Going to defer
// that until we've updated the deps.
},
Action: &envoy_route_v3.Route_Route{
Route: &envoy_route_v3.RouteAction{
ClusterSpecifier: &envoy_route_v3.RouteAction_Cluster{
Cluster: opts.cluster,
},
},
},
}
if opts.requestTimeoutMs != nil {
r := route.GetRoute()
r.Timeout = durationpb.New(time.Duration(*opts.requestTimeoutMs) * time.Millisecond)
}
if opts.idleTimeoutMs != nil {
r := route.GetRoute()
r.IdleTimeout = durationpb.New(time.Duration(*opts.idleTimeoutMs) * time.Millisecond)
}
// If a path is provided, do not match on a catch-all prefix
if opts.routePath != "" {
route.Match.PathSpecifier = &envoy_route_v3.RouteMatch_Path{Path: opts.routePath}
}
cfg.RouteSpecifier = &envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager_RouteConfig{
RouteConfig: &envoy_route_v3.RouteConfiguration{
Name: opts.routeName,
VirtualHosts: []*envoy_route_v3.VirtualHost{
{
Name: opts.filterName,
Domains: []string{"*"},
Routes: []*envoy_route_v3.Route{
route,
},
},
},
},
}
}
if opts.protocol == "http2" || opts.protocol == "grpc" {
cfg.Http2ProtocolOptions = &envoy_core_v3.Http2ProtocolOptions{}
}
Add x-forwarded-client-cert headers Description Add x-fowarded-client-cert information on trusted incoming connections. Envoy provides support forwarding and annotating the x-forwarded-client-cert header via the forward_client_cert_details set_current_client_cert_details filter fields. It would be helpful for consul to support this directly in its config. The escape hatches are a bit cumbersome for this purpose. This has been implemented on incoming connections to envoy. Outgoing (from the local service through the sidecar) will not have a certificate, and so are left alone. A service on an incoming connection will now get headers something like this: ``` X-Forwarded-Client-Cert:[By=spiffe://efad7282-d9b2-3298-f6d8-38b37fb58df3.consul/ns/default/dc/dc1/svc/counting;Hash=61ad5cbdfcb50f5a3ec0ca60923d61613c149a9d4495010a64175c05a0268ab2;Cert="-----BEGIN%20CERTIFICATE-----%0AMIICHDCCAcOgAwIBAgIBCDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAxMS8wLQYDVQQDEyZwcmktMTli%0AYXdyb2YuY29uc3VsLmNhLmVmYWQ3MjgyLmNvbnN1bDAeFw0yMjA0MjkwMzE0NTBa%0AFw0yMjA1MDIwMzE0NTBaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAARVIZ7Y%0AZEXfbOGBfxGa7Vuok1MIng%2FuzLQK2xLVlSTIPDbO5hstTGP%2B%2FGx182PYFP3jYqk5%0Aq6rYWe1wiPNMA30Io4H8MIH5MA4GA1UdDwEB%2FwQEAwIDuDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggr%0ABgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDAYDVR0TAQH%2FBAIwADApBgNVHQ4EIgQgrp4q50oX%0AHHghMbxz5Bk8OJFWMdfgH0Upr350WlhyxvkwKwYDVR0jBCQwIoAgUe6uERAIj%2FLM%0AyuFzDc3Wbp9TGAKBJYAwyhF14ToOQCMwYgYDVR0RAQH%2FBFgwVoZUc3BpZmZlOi8v%0AZWZhZDcyODItZDliMi0zMjk4LWY2ZDgtMzhiMzdmYjU4ZGYzLmNvbnN1bC9ucy9k%0AZWZhdWx0L2RjL2RjMS9zdmMvZGFzaGJvYXJkMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0cAMEQCIDwb%0AFlchufggNTijnQ5SUcvTZrWlZyq%2FrdVC20nbbmWLAiAVshNNv1xBqJI1NmY2HI9n%0AgRMfb8aEPVSuxEHhqy57eQ%3D%3D%0A-----END%20CERTIFICATE-----%0A";Chain="-----BEGIN%20CERTIFICATE-----%0AMIICHDCCAcOgAwIBAgIBCDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAxMS8wLQYDVQQDEyZwcmktMTli%0AYXdyb2YuY29uc3VsLmNhLmVmYWQ3MjgyLmNvbnN1bDAeFw0yMjA0MjkwMzE0NTBa%0AFw0yMjA1MDIwMzE0NTBaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAARVIZ7Y%0AZEXfbOGBfxGa7Vuok1MIng%2FuzLQK2xLVlSTIPDbO5hstTGP%2B%2FGx182PYFP3jYqk5%0Aq6rYWe1wiPNMA30Io4H8MIH5MA4GA1UdDwEB%2FwQEAwIDuDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggr%0ABgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDAYDVR0TAQH%2FBAIwADApBgNVHQ4EIgQgrp4q50oX%0AHHghMbxz5Bk8OJFWMdfgH0Upr350WlhyxvkwKwYDVR0jBCQwIoAgUe6uERAIj%2FLM%0AyuFzDc3Wbp9TGAKBJYAwyhF14ToOQCMwYgYDVR0RAQH%2FBFgwVoZUc3BpZmZlOi8v%0AZWZhZDcyODItZDliMi0zMjk4LWY2ZDgtMzhiMzdmYjU4ZGYzLmNvbnN1bC9ucy9k%0AZWZhdWx0L2RjL2RjMS9zdmMvZGFzaGJvYXJkMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0cAMEQCIDwb%0AFlchufggNTijnQ5SUcvTZrWlZyq%2FrdVC20nbbmWLAiAVshNNv1xBqJI1NmY2HI9n%0AgRMfb8aEPVSuxEHhqy57eQ%3D%3D%0A-----END%20CERTIFICATE-----%0A";Subject="";URI=spiffe://efad7282-d9b2-3298-f6d8-38b37fb58df3.consul/ns/default/dc/dc1/svc/dashboard] ``` Closes #12852
2022-04-26 20:46:29 +00:00
// Note the default leads to setting HttpConnectionManager_SANITIZE
if opts.forwardClientDetails {
cfg.ForwardClientCertDetails = opts.forwardClientPolicy
cfg.SetCurrentClientCertDetails = &envoy_http_v3.HttpConnectionManager_SetCurrentClientCertDetails{
Subject: &wrapperspb.BoolValue{Value: true},
Add x-forwarded-client-cert headers Description Add x-fowarded-client-cert information on trusted incoming connections. Envoy provides support forwarding and annotating the x-forwarded-client-cert header via the forward_client_cert_details set_current_client_cert_details filter fields. It would be helpful for consul to support this directly in its config. The escape hatches are a bit cumbersome for this purpose. This has been implemented on incoming connections to envoy. Outgoing (from the local service through the sidecar) will not have a certificate, and so are left alone. A service on an incoming connection will now get headers something like this: ``` X-Forwarded-Client-Cert:[By=spiffe://efad7282-d9b2-3298-f6d8-38b37fb58df3.consul/ns/default/dc/dc1/svc/counting;Hash=61ad5cbdfcb50f5a3ec0ca60923d61613c149a9d4495010a64175c05a0268ab2;Cert="-----BEGIN%20CERTIFICATE-----%0AMIICHDCCAcOgAwIBAgIBCDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAxMS8wLQYDVQQDEyZwcmktMTli%0AYXdyb2YuY29uc3VsLmNhLmVmYWQ3MjgyLmNvbnN1bDAeFw0yMjA0MjkwMzE0NTBa%0AFw0yMjA1MDIwMzE0NTBaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAARVIZ7Y%0AZEXfbOGBfxGa7Vuok1MIng%2FuzLQK2xLVlSTIPDbO5hstTGP%2B%2FGx182PYFP3jYqk5%0Aq6rYWe1wiPNMA30Io4H8MIH5MA4GA1UdDwEB%2FwQEAwIDuDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggr%0ABgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDAYDVR0TAQH%2FBAIwADApBgNVHQ4EIgQgrp4q50oX%0AHHghMbxz5Bk8OJFWMdfgH0Upr350WlhyxvkwKwYDVR0jBCQwIoAgUe6uERAIj%2FLM%0AyuFzDc3Wbp9TGAKBJYAwyhF14ToOQCMwYgYDVR0RAQH%2FBFgwVoZUc3BpZmZlOi8v%0AZWZhZDcyODItZDliMi0zMjk4LWY2ZDgtMzhiMzdmYjU4ZGYzLmNvbnN1bC9ucy9k%0AZWZhdWx0L2RjL2RjMS9zdmMvZGFzaGJvYXJkMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0cAMEQCIDwb%0AFlchufggNTijnQ5SUcvTZrWlZyq%2FrdVC20nbbmWLAiAVshNNv1xBqJI1NmY2HI9n%0AgRMfb8aEPVSuxEHhqy57eQ%3D%3D%0A-----END%20CERTIFICATE-----%0A";Chain="-----BEGIN%20CERTIFICATE-----%0AMIICHDCCAcOgAwIBAgIBCDAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjAxMS8wLQYDVQQDEyZwcmktMTli%0AYXdyb2YuY29uc3VsLmNhLmVmYWQ3MjgyLmNvbnN1bDAeFw0yMjA0MjkwMzE0NTBa%0AFw0yMjA1MDIwMzE0NTBaMAAwWTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAARVIZ7Y%0AZEXfbOGBfxGa7Vuok1MIng%2FuzLQK2xLVlSTIPDbO5hstTGP%2B%2FGx182PYFP3jYqk5%0Aq6rYWe1wiPNMA30Io4H8MIH5MA4GA1UdDwEB%2FwQEAwIDuDAdBgNVHSUEFjAUBggr%0ABgEFBQcDAgYIKwYBBQUHAwEwDAYDVR0TAQH%2FBAIwADApBgNVHQ4EIgQgrp4q50oX%0AHHghMbxz5Bk8OJFWMdfgH0Upr350WlhyxvkwKwYDVR0jBCQwIoAgUe6uERAIj%2FLM%0AyuFzDc3Wbp9TGAKBJYAwyhF14ToOQCMwYgYDVR0RAQH%2FBFgwVoZUc3BpZmZlOi8v%0AZWZhZDcyODItZDliMi0zMjk4LWY2ZDgtMzhiMzdmYjU4ZGYzLmNvbnN1bC9ucy9k%0AZWZhdWx0L2RjL2RjMS9zdmMvZGFzaGJvYXJkMAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0cAMEQCIDwb%0AFlchufggNTijnQ5SUcvTZrWlZyq%2FrdVC20nbbmWLAiAVshNNv1xBqJI1NmY2HI9n%0AgRMfb8aEPVSuxEHhqy57eQ%3D%3D%0A-----END%20CERTIFICATE-----%0A";Subject="";URI=spiffe://efad7282-d9b2-3298-f6d8-38b37fb58df3.consul/ns/default/dc/dc1/svc/dashboard] ``` Closes #12852
2022-04-26 20:46:29 +00:00
Cert: true,
Chain: true,
Dns: true,
Uri: true,
}
}
// Like injectConnectFilters for L4, here we ensure that the first filter
// (other than the "envoy.grpc_http1_bridge" filter) in the http filter
// chain of a public listener is the authz filter to prevent unauthorized
// access and that every filter chain uses our TLS certs.
2023-01-06 17:13:40 +00:00
if len(opts.httpAuthzFilters) > 0 {
cfg.HttpFilters = append(opts.httpAuthzFilters, cfg.HttpFilters...)
}
if opts.protocol == "grpc" {
grpcHttp1Bridge, err := makeEnvoyHTTPFilter(
"envoy.filters.http.grpc_http1_bridge",
&envoy_grpc_http1_bridge_v3.Config{},
)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// In envoy 1.14.x the default value "stats_for_all_methods=true" was
// deprecated, and was changed to "false" in 1.18.x. Avoid using the
// default. TODO: we may want to expose this to users somehow easily.
grpcStatsFilter, err := makeEnvoyHTTPFilter(
"envoy.filters.http.grpc_stats",
&envoy_grpc_stats_v3.FilterConfig{
PerMethodStatSpecifier: &envoy_grpc_stats_v3.FilterConfig_StatsForAllMethods{
StatsForAllMethods: response.MakeBoolValue(true),
},
},
)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Add grpc bridge before router and authz, and the stats in front of that.
cfg.HttpFilters = append([]*envoy_http_v3.HttpFilter{
grpcStatsFilter,
grpcHttp1Bridge,
}, cfg.HttpFilters...)
}
return makeFilter("envoy.filters.network.http_connection_manager", cfg)
}
func makeEnvoyListenerFilter(name string, cfg proto.Message) (*envoy_listener_v3.ListenerFilter, error) {
any, err := anypb.New(cfg)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &envoy_listener_v3.ListenerFilter{
Name: name,
ConfigType: &envoy_listener_v3.ListenerFilter_TypedConfig{TypedConfig: any},
}, nil
}
func makeFilter(name string, cfg proto.Message) (*envoy_listener_v3.Filter, error) {
any, err := anypb.New(cfg)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &envoy_listener_v3.Filter{
Name: name,
ConfigType: &envoy_listener_v3.Filter_TypedConfig{TypedConfig: any},
}, nil
}
func makeEnvoyHTTPFilter(name string, cfg proto.Message) (*envoy_http_v3.HttpFilter, error) {
any, err := anypb.New(cfg)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &envoy_http_v3.HttpFilter{
Name: name,
ConfigType: &envoy_http_v3.HttpFilter_TypedConfig{TypedConfig: any},
}, nil
}
func makeCommonTLSContext(
leaf *structs.IssuedCert,
rootPEMs string,
tlsParams *envoy_tls_v3.TlsParameters,
) *envoy_tls_v3.CommonTlsContext {
if rootPEMs == "" {
return nil
}
ingress: allow setting TLS min version and cipher suites in ingress gateway config entries (#11576) * xds: refactor ingress listener SDS configuration * xds: update resolveListenerSDS call args in listeners_test * ingress: add TLS min, max and cipher suites to GatewayTLSConfig * xds: implement envoyTLSVersions and envoyTLSCipherSuites * xds: merge TLS config * xds: configure TLS parameters with ingress TLS context from leaf * xds: nil check in resolveListenerTLSConfig validation * xds: nil check in makeTLSParameters* functions * changelog: add entry for TLS params on ingress config entries * xds: remove indirection for TLS params in TLSConfig structs * xds: return tlsContext, nil instead of ambiguous err Co-authored-by: Chris S. Kim <ckim@hashicorp.com> * xds: switch zero checks to types.TLSVersionUnspecified * ingress: add validation for ingress config entry TLS params * ingress: validate listener TLS config * xds: add basic ingress with TLS params tests * xds: add ingress listeners mixed TLS min version defaults precedence test * xds: add more explicit tests for ingress listeners inheriting gateway defaults * xds: add test for single TLS listener on gateway without TLS defaults * xds: regen golden files for TLSVersionInvalid zero value, add TLSVersionAuto listener test * types/tls: change TLSVersion to string * types/tls: update TLSCipherSuite to string type * types/tls: implement validation functions for TLSVersion and TLSCipherSuites, make some maps private * api: add TLS params to GatewayTLSConfig, add tests * api: add TLSMinVersion to ingress gateway config entry test JSON * xds: switch to Envoy TLS cipher suite encoding from types package * xds: fixup validation for TLSv1_3 min version with cipher suites * add some kitchen sink tests and add a missing struct tag * xds: check if mergedCfg.TLSVersion is in TLSVersionsWithConfigurableCipherSuites * xds: update connectTLSEnabled comment * xds: remove unsued resolveGatewayServiceTLSConfig function * xds: add makeCommonTLSContextFromLeafWithoutParams * types/tls: add LessThan comparator function for concrete values * types/tls: change tlsVersions validation map from string to TLSVersion keys * types/tls: remove unused envoyTLSCipherSuites * types/tls: enable chacha20 cipher suites for Consul agent * types/tls: remove insecure cipher suites from allowed config TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 and TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 are both explicitly listed as insecure and disabled in the Go source. Refs https://cs.opensource.google/go/go/+/refs/tags/go1.17.3:src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go;l=329-330 * types/tls: add ValidateConsulAgentCipherSuites function, make direct lookup map private * types/tls: return all unmatched cipher suites in validation errors * xds: check that Envoy API value matching TLS version is found when building TlsParameters * types/tls: check that value is found in map before appending to slice in MarshalEnvoyTLSCipherSuiteStrings * types/tls: cast to string rather than fmt.Printf in TLSCihperSuite.String() * xds: add TLSVersionUnspecified to list of configurable cipher suites * structs: update note about config entry warning * xds: remove TLS min version cipher suite unconfigurable test placeholder * types/tls: update tests to remove assumption about private map values Co-authored-by: R.B. Boyer <rb@hashicorp.com>
2022-01-11 16:46:42 +00:00
if tlsParams == nil {
tlsParams = &envoy_tls_v3.TlsParameters{}
}
return &envoy_tls_v3.CommonTlsContext{
ingress: allow setting TLS min version and cipher suites in ingress gateway config entries (#11576) * xds: refactor ingress listener SDS configuration * xds: update resolveListenerSDS call args in listeners_test * ingress: add TLS min, max and cipher suites to GatewayTLSConfig * xds: implement envoyTLSVersions and envoyTLSCipherSuites * xds: merge TLS config * xds: configure TLS parameters with ingress TLS context from leaf * xds: nil check in resolveListenerTLSConfig validation * xds: nil check in makeTLSParameters* functions * changelog: add entry for TLS params on ingress config entries * xds: remove indirection for TLS params in TLSConfig structs * xds: return tlsContext, nil instead of ambiguous err Co-authored-by: Chris S. Kim <ckim@hashicorp.com> * xds: switch zero checks to types.TLSVersionUnspecified * ingress: add validation for ingress config entry TLS params * ingress: validate listener TLS config * xds: add basic ingress with TLS params tests * xds: add ingress listeners mixed TLS min version defaults precedence test * xds: add more explicit tests for ingress listeners inheriting gateway defaults * xds: add test for single TLS listener on gateway without TLS defaults * xds: regen golden files for TLSVersionInvalid zero value, add TLSVersionAuto listener test * types/tls: change TLSVersion to string * types/tls: update TLSCipherSuite to string type * types/tls: implement validation functions for TLSVersion and TLSCipherSuites, make some maps private * api: add TLS params to GatewayTLSConfig, add tests * api: add TLSMinVersion to ingress gateway config entry test JSON * xds: switch to Envoy TLS cipher suite encoding from types package * xds: fixup validation for TLSv1_3 min version with cipher suites * add some kitchen sink tests and add a missing struct tag * xds: check if mergedCfg.TLSVersion is in TLSVersionsWithConfigurableCipherSuites * xds: update connectTLSEnabled comment * xds: remove unsued resolveGatewayServiceTLSConfig function * xds: add makeCommonTLSContextFromLeafWithoutParams * types/tls: add LessThan comparator function for concrete values * types/tls: change tlsVersions validation map from string to TLSVersion keys * types/tls: remove unused envoyTLSCipherSuites * types/tls: enable chacha20 cipher suites for Consul agent * types/tls: remove insecure cipher suites from allowed config TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 and TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 are both explicitly listed as insecure and disabled in the Go source. Refs https://cs.opensource.google/go/go/+/refs/tags/go1.17.3:src/crypto/tls/cipher_suites.go;l=329-330 * types/tls: add ValidateConsulAgentCipherSuites function, make direct lookup map private * types/tls: return all unmatched cipher suites in validation errors * xds: check that Envoy API value matching TLS version is found when building TlsParameters * types/tls: check that value is found in map before appending to slice in MarshalEnvoyTLSCipherSuiteStrings * types/tls: cast to string rather than fmt.Printf in TLSCihperSuite.String() * xds: add TLSVersionUnspecified to list of configurable cipher suites * structs: update note about config entry warning * xds: remove TLS min version cipher suite unconfigurable test placeholder * types/tls: update tests to remove assumption about private map values Co-authored-by: R.B. Boyer <rb@hashicorp.com>
2022-01-11 16:46:42 +00:00
TlsParams: tlsParams,
TlsCertificates: []*envoy_tls_v3.TlsCertificate{
{
CertificateChain: &envoy_core_v3.DataSource{
Specifier: &envoy_core_v3.DataSource_InlineString{
InlineString: lib.EnsureTrailingNewline(leaf.CertPEM),
},
},
PrivateKey: &envoy_core_v3.DataSource{
Specifier: &envoy_core_v3.DataSource_InlineString{
InlineString: lib.EnsureTrailingNewline(leaf.PrivateKeyPEM),
},
},
},
},
ValidationContextType: &envoy_tls_v3.CommonTlsContext_ValidationContext{
ValidationContext: &envoy_tls_v3.CertificateValidationContext{
// TODO(banks): later for L7 support we may need to configure ALPN here.
TrustedCa: &envoy_core_v3.DataSource{
Specifier: &envoy_core_v3.DataSource_InlineString{
InlineString: rootPEMs,
},
},
},
},
}
}
func makeDownstreamTLSTransportSocket(tlsContext *envoy_tls_v3.DownstreamTlsContext) (*envoy_core_v3.TransportSocket, error) {
if tlsContext == nil {
return nil, nil
}
return makeTransportSocket("tls", tlsContext)
}
func makeUpstreamTLSTransportSocket(tlsContext *envoy_tls_v3.UpstreamTlsContext) (*envoy_core_v3.TransportSocket, error) {
if tlsContext == nil {
return nil, nil
}
return makeTransportSocket("tls", tlsContext)
}
func makeTransportSocket(name string, config proto.Message) (*envoy_core_v3.TransportSocket, error) {
any, err := anypb.New(config)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return &envoy_core_v3.TransportSocket{
Name: name,
ConfigType: &envoy_core_v3.TransportSocket_TypedConfig{
TypedConfig: any,
},
}, nil
}
func makeCommonTLSContextFromFiles(caFile, certFile, keyFile string) *envoy_tls_v3.CommonTlsContext {
ctx := envoy_tls_v3.CommonTlsContext{
TlsParams: &envoy_tls_v3.TlsParameters{},
}
// Verify certificate of peer if caFile is specified
if caFile != "" {
ctx.ValidationContextType = &envoy_tls_v3.CommonTlsContext_ValidationContext{
ValidationContext: &envoy_tls_v3.CertificateValidationContext{
TrustedCa: &envoy_core_v3.DataSource{
Specifier: &envoy_core_v3.DataSource_Filename{
Filename: caFile,
},
},
},
}
}
// Present certificate for mTLS if cert and key files are specified
if certFile != "" && keyFile != "" {
ctx.TlsCertificates = []*envoy_tls_v3.TlsCertificate{
{
CertificateChain: &envoy_core_v3.DataSource{
Specifier: &envoy_core_v3.DataSource_Filename{
Filename: certFile,
},
},
PrivateKey: &envoy_core_v3.DataSource{
Specifier: &envoy_core_v3.DataSource_Filename{
Filename: keyFile,
},
},
},
}
}
return &ctx
}
func validateListenerTLSConfig(tlsMinVersion types.TLSVersion, cipherSuites []types.TLSCipherSuite) error {
// Validate. Configuring cipher suites is only applicable to connections negotiated
// via TLS 1.2 or earlier. Other cases shouldn't be possible as we validate them at
// input but be resilient to bugs later.
if len(cipherSuites) != 0 {
if _, ok := tlsVersionsWithConfigurableCipherSuites[tlsMinVersion]; !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("configuring CipherSuites is only applicable to connections negotiated with TLS 1.2 or earlier, TLSMinVersion is set to %s in config", tlsMinVersion)
}
}
return nil
}
var tlsVersionsWithConfigurableCipherSuites = map[types.TLSVersion]struct{}{
// Remove these two if Envoy ever sets TLS 1.3 as default minimum
types.TLSVersionUnspecified: {},
types.TLSVersionAuto: {},
types.TLSv1_0: {},
types.TLSv1_1: {},
types.TLSv1_2: {},
}
func makeTLSParametersFromProxyTLSConfig(tlsConf *structs.MeshDirectionalTLSConfig) *envoy_tls_v3.TlsParameters {
if tlsConf == nil {
return &envoy_tls_v3.TlsParameters{}
}
return makeTLSParametersFromTLSConfig(tlsConf.TLSMinVersion, tlsConf.TLSMaxVersion, tlsConf.CipherSuites)
}
func makeTLSParametersFromTLSConfig(
tlsMinVersion types.TLSVersion,
tlsMaxVersion types.TLSVersion,
cipherSuites []types.TLSCipherSuite,
) *envoy_tls_v3.TlsParameters {
tlsParams := envoy_tls_v3.TlsParameters{}
if tlsMinVersion != types.TLSVersionUnspecified {
if minVersion, ok := envoyTLSVersions[tlsMinVersion]; ok {
tlsParams.TlsMinimumProtocolVersion = minVersion
}
}
if tlsMaxVersion != types.TLSVersionUnspecified {
if maxVersion, ok := envoyTLSVersions[tlsMaxVersion]; ok {
tlsParams.TlsMaximumProtocolVersion = maxVersion
}
}
if len(cipherSuites) != 0 {
tlsParams.CipherSuites = types.MarshalEnvoyTLSCipherSuiteStrings(cipherSuites)
}
return &tlsParams
}
var envoyTLSVersions = map[types.TLSVersion]envoy_tls_v3.TlsParameters_TlsProtocol{
types.TLSVersionAuto: envoy_tls_v3.TlsParameters_TLS_AUTO,
types.TLSv1_0: envoy_tls_v3.TlsParameters_TLSv1_0,
types.TLSv1_1: envoy_tls_v3.TlsParameters_TLSv1_1,
types.TLSv1_2: envoy_tls_v3.TlsParameters_TLSv1_2,
types.TLSv1_3: envoy_tls_v3.TlsParameters_TLSv1_3,
}