Merge pull request #1 from status-im/sia

Evaluation of the Sia whitepaper
This commit is contained in:
Dmitriy Ryajov 2020-12-12 11:28:00 -06:00 committed by GitHub
commit f2fbaa35b5
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: 4AEE18F83AFDEB23
1 changed files with 51 additions and 0 deletions

51
evaluations/sia.md Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
An evaluation of the Sia whitepaper
===================================
2020-12-07 Mark Spanbroek
https://sia.tech/sia.pdf
Goal of this evaluation is to find things to adopt or avoid while designing
Dagger. It is not meant to be a criticism of Sia.
#### Pros:
+ Clients do not need to actively monitor hosts (§1). Once a contract has been
agreed upon, the host earns/loses coins based on proofs of storage that the
network can check.
+ Denial of service attacks can be mitigated by burning funds associated with
missed proofs (§4).
+ Proof of storage is simple; provide a random piece of the file, and the
corresponding Merkle proof (§5.1).
+ Promotes erasure codes to safeguard against data loss (§7.2).
+ Suggests to use payment channels for micro-payments (§7.3).
+ The basic reputation system is protected against Sybil attacks (§7.4).
#### Cons:
- Sia has its own blockchain (§1), which makes some attacks more likely
(§5.2, §5.3). This can be mitigated by adopting a widely used, general purpose
blockchain such as Ethereum.
- Requires a multi-signature scheme (§2).
- The proof-of-storage algorithm requires that hosts store the entire file (§4),
instead of a few chunks.
- Contracts can be edited (§4). This feels like an unnecessary complication of
the protocol.
- Randomness for the storage proofs comes from the latest block hash (§5.1).
This can be manipulated, especially when using a specialized blockchain for
storage.
- There is an arbitrary data field that might be used for advertisements in a
storage marketplace (§6). This feels like a very restrictive environment for a
marketplace, and an unnecessary complication for the underlying blockchain.
- It is suggested that clients use erasure coding before encryption (§7.2). If
this were reversed (first encryption, then erase coding) then this would open
up scenario's for caching and re-hosting by those who do not possess the
decryption key.
- Consecutive micropayments are presented as a solution for the trust problems
while downloading (§7.3). This assumes that the whole file, or a large part of
it, is stored on a single host. It also doesn't entirely mitigate withholding
attacks.
- The basic reputation system favors hosts that have already earned or bought
coins (§7.4). It is also unclear how the reputation system discourages abuse.
- Governance seems fairly centralized, with most funds and proceeds going to a
single company (§8).