Fixed repair reward
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@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ including a small amount of host losses that can be tolerated.
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proof parameters # proof of retrievability parameters
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erasure coding # erasure coding parameters
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dispersal # dispersal parameter
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repair reward # amount of tokens paid for repairs
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hosts # amount of storage hosts (including loss)
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loss # number of allowed host losses
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@ -100,11 +101,11 @@ for every second of the interval a certain amount of tokens are awarded to the
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host. Hosts that fill a slot are required to submit frequent proofs of storage.
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When a certain number of proofs is missed, the slot is considered empty again.
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The collateral associated with the slot is used to pay a fee to the node that
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indicated that proofs were missing. The rest of the slot collateral is reserved
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for repairs. An empty slot can be filled again once another host submits a
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correct proof together with collateral. Payouts for the time interval that a
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slot is empty are burned.
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The collateral associated with the slot is mostly burned. Some of it is used to
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pay a fee to the node that indicated that proofs were missing, and some of it is
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reserved for repairs. An empty slot can be filled again once another host
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submits a correct proof together with collateral. Payouts for the time interval
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that a slot is empty are burned.
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Payouts for all hosts are accumulated in the contract and payed out at contract
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end. This is to ensure that the incentive posed by the collateral is not
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@ -164,18 +165,18 @@ The client is able to retrieve any funds that are left in the contract.
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Repairs
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When a slot becomes empty, the remaining collateral associated with the slot is
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used as an incentive to repair the lost content. Repair typically involves
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downloading other parts of the content and using erasure coding to restore the
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missing parts. This incurs costs for a host. To compensate the host for these
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costs it receives not only its own collateral back at the end of the contract,
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but also the remaining collateral from the host that failed to hold a slot.
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When a slot becomes empty, some of the remaining collateral associated with the
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slot is used as an incentive to repair the lost content. Repair typically
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involves downloading other parts of the content and using erasure coding to
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restore the missing parts. This incurs costs for a host. To compensate the host
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for these costs it receives not only its own collateral back at the end of the
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contract, but also a reward. The size of the reward is a parameter of the
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contract.
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We expect the collateral to be significantly higher than the costs of repair.
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This means that hosts in the network can benefit greatly from repairs, and they
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may prioritize repairs over filling slots in new contracts. This is intentional,
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we want the network to prioritize honoring existing contracts over starting new
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ones.
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The size of the reward should be chosen carefully. It should not be too low, to
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incentivize hosts in the network to prioritize repairs over filling new slots in
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the network. It should also not be too high, to prevent malicious nodes in the
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network to try to disable hosts in an attempt to collect the reward.
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Renewal
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-------
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