Fixed repair reward

This commit is contained in:
Mark Spanbroek 2022-06-07 11:32:10 +02:00 committed by markspanbroek
parent d636511777
commit 8ad08f9b55
1 changed files with 17 additions and 16 deletions

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@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ including a small amount of host losses that can be tolerated.
proof parameters # proof of retrievability parameters
erasure coding # erasure coding parameters
dispersal # dispersal parameter
repair reward # amount of tokens paid for repairs
hosts # amount of storage hosts (including loss)
loss # number of allowed host losses
@ -100,11 +101,11 @@ for every second of the interval a certain amount of tokens are awarded to the
host. Hosts that fill a slot are required to submit frequent proofs of storage.
When a certain number of proofs is missed, the slot is considered empty again.
The collateral associated with the slot is used to pay a fee to the node that
indicated that proofs were missing. The rest of the slot collateral is reserved
for repairs. An empty slot can be filled again once another host submits a
correct proof together with collateral. Payouts for the time interval that a
slot is empty are burned.
The collateral associated with the slot is mostly burned. Some of it is used to
pay a fee to the node that indicated that proofs were missing, and some of it is
reserved for repairs. An empty slot can be filled again once another host
submits a correct proof together with collateral. Payouts for the time interval
that a slot is empty are burned.
Payouts for all hosts are accumulated in the contract and payed out at contract
end. This is to ensure that the incentive posed by the collateral is not
@ -164,18 +165,18 @@ The client is able to retrieve any funds that are left in the contract.
Repairs
-------
When a slot becomes empty, the remaining collateral associated with the slot is
used as an incentive to repair the lost content. Repair typically involves
downloading other parts of the content and using erasure coding to restore the
missing parts. This incurs costs for a host. To compensate the host for these
costs it receives not only its own collateral back at the end of the contract,
but also the remaining collateral from the host that failed to hold a slot.
When a slot becomes empty, some of the remaining collateral associated with the
slot is used as an incentive to repair the lost content. Repair typically
involves downloading other parts of the content and using erasure coding to
restore the missing parts. This incurs costs for a host. To compensate the host
for these costs it receives not only its own collateral back at the end of the
contract, but also a reward. The size of the reward is a parameter of the
contract.
We expect the collateral to be significantly higher than the costs of repair.
This means that hosts in the network can benefit greatly from repairs, and they
may prioritize repairs over filling slots in new contracts. This is intentional,
we want the network to prioritize honoring existing contracts over starting new
ones.
The size of the reward should be chosen carefully. It should not be too low, to
incentivize hosts in the network to prioritize repairs over filling new slots in
the network. It should also not be too high, to prevent malicious nodes in the
network to try to disable hosts in an attempt to collect the reward.
Renewal
-------