From 037d0f7f2b7c09ae2be21ae3b0d23d11146983b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Mark Spanbroek Date: Tue, 8 Dec 2020 16:11:35 +0100 Subject: [PATCH] Added evaluation of the Filecoin paper --- evaluations/filecoin.md | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 48 insertions(+) create mode 100644 evaluations/filecoin.md diff --git a/evaluations/filecoin.md b/evaluations/filecoin.md new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3d0b089 --- /dev/null +++ b/evaluations/filecoin.md @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ +An evaluation of the Filecoin whitepaper +======================================== + +2020-12-08 Mark Spanbroek + +https://filecoin.io/filecoin.pdf + +Goal of this evaluation is to find things to adopt or avoid while designing +Dagger. It is not meant to be a criticism of Filecoin. + +#### Pros: + ++ Clients do not need to actively monitor hosts. Once a deal has been agreed + upon, the network checks proofs of storage. ++ The network actively tries to repair storage faults by introducing new + orders in the storage market. (§4.3.4). ++ Integrity is achieved because files are addressed using their content + hash (§4.4). ++ Marketplaces are explicitly designed and specified (§5). ++ Micropayments via payment channels (§5.3.1). ++ Integration with other blockchain systems such as Ethereum (§7.2) are being + worked on. + +#### Cons: + +- Filecoin requires its own very specific blockchain, which influences a lot + of its design. There is tight coupling between the blockchain, storage + accounting, proofs and markets. +- Proof of spacetime is much more complex than simple challenges, and only + required to make the blockchain work (§3.3, §6.2) +- A miners influence is proportional to the amount of storage they're + providing (§1.2), which is an incentive to become big. This could lead to + the same centralization issues that plague Bitcoin. +- Incentives are geared towards making the particulars of the Filecoin + design work, instead of directly aligned with users' interest. For instance, + there are incentives for storage and retrieval, but it seems that a miner + would be able to make money by only storing data, and never offering it for + retrieval. Also, the incentive for a miner to store multiple independent + copies does not mean protection against loss if they're all located on the + same failing disk. +- The blockchain contains a complete allocation table of all things that are + stored in the network (§4.2), which raises questions about scalability. +- Zero cash entry (such as in Swarm) doesn't seem possible. +- Consecutive micropayments are presented as a solution for the trust problems + while retrieving (§5.3.1), which doesn't entirely mitigate withholding + attacks. +- The addition of smart contracts (§7.1) feels like an unnecessary + complication.