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Automatically merged updates to draft EIP(s) 1559 (#3293)

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@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ The transaction will always pay the base fee per gas of the block it was include
## Motivation
Ethereum historically priced transaction fees using a simple auction mechanism, where users send transactions with bids ("gasprices") and miners choose transactions with the highest bids, and transactions that get included pay the bid that they specify. This leads to several large sources of inefficiency:
* **Mismatch between volatility of transaction fee levels and social cost of transactions**: bids to include transactions on mature public blockchains, that have enough usage so that blocks are full, tend to be extremely volatile. On Ethereum, minimum bids range between 1 and 100 nanoeth (10^9 nanoeth = 1 ETH), but sometimes go over 100 nanoeth and have reached over 200 nanoeth. This clearly creates many inefficiencies, because it's absurd to suggest that the cost incurred by the network from accepting one more transaction into a block actually is 200x more when gas prices are 200 nanoeth than when they are 1 nanoeth; in both cases, it's a difference between 8 million gas and 8.02 million gas.
* **Mismatch between volatility of transaction fee levels and social cost of transactions**: bids to include transactions on mature public blockchains, that have enough usage so that blocks are full, tend to be extremely volatile. It's absurd to suggest that the cost incurred by the network from accepting one more transaction into a block actually is 10x more when the cost per gas is 10 nanoeth compared to when the cost per gas is 1 nanoeth; in both cases, it's a difference between 8 million gas and 8.02 million gas.
* **Needless delays for users**: because of the hard per-block gas limit coupled with natural volatility in transaction volume, transactions often wait for several blocks before getting included, but this is socially unproductive; no one significantly gains from the fact that there is no "slack" mechanism that allows one block to be bigger and the next block to be smaller to meet block-by-block differences in demand.
* **Inefficiencies of first price auctions**: The current approach, where transaction senders publish a transaction with a bid a maximum fee, miners choose the highest-paying transactions, and everyone pays what they bid. This is well-known in mechanism design literature to be highly inefficient, and so complex fee estimation algorithms are required. But even these algorithms often end up not working very well, leading to frequent fee overpayment.
* **Instability of blockchains with no block reward**: In the long run, blockchains where there is no issuance (including Bitcoin and Zcash) at present intend to switch to rewarding miners entirely through transaction fees. However, there are known issues with this that likely leads to a lot of instability, incentivizing mining "sister blocks" that steal transaction fees, opening up much stronger selfish mining attack vectors, and more. There is at present no good mitigation for this.