Code must be validated at contract creation time – not runtime – by the provided algorithm or its equivalent. Therefore, a table of valid dynamic jumps is specified in an EOF container _section_. This allows for a one-pass algorithm that is (and must be) linear in the size of the _code_ plus the _section_, so as not to be a DoS vulnerability.
Dynamic jumps, where the destination of a JUMP or JUMPI is not known until runtime, can be an obstacle to statically proving this sort of safety, but have also been seen as necessary to implement the return jump from a subroutine. But consider this example of calling a minimal subroutine
Note that the return address and the destination address are pushed on the stack as constants -- the `JUMP` instructions are in fact static, not dynamic, in the sense that they jump to the same `PC` on every run. SO we do not need (nor typically use) dynamic jumps to implement subroutines.
Still, providing for the safe use of dynamic jumps makes for concise and efficient implementations of language constructs like switches and virtual functions. Dynamic jumps can be an obstacle to linear-time validation of EVM bytecode. But even where jumps are dynamic it is possible to tabulate valid destinations in advance, and the Ethereum Object Format gives us a place to store such tables.
We need [EIP-3540: EVM Object Format (EOF)](./eip-3540.md) to support container sections and [EIP-3670: EOF - Code Validation](./eip-3670.md) to support validation of instructions.
1. A new EOF section called `vjumptable` (`section_kind = 4`) is introduced. It contains a sequence of *n* tuples *(jumpsrc, jumpdest<sub>i</sub>*, sorted in ascending lexicographic order. Each tuple represents a valid jump from one location in the _code_ to another.
2. A new EOF section called `vtraptable` (`section_kind = 5`) is introduced. It contains a sequence of *n* tuples *(jumpsrc, jumpdst<sub>i</sub>*, sorted in ascending lexicographic order. Each tuple represents a valid jump from one location in the _code_ to another.
At runtime, a dynamic jump cause a search for a match in the `vjumptable.` if found, the jump proceeds to the _jumpdest_. If not, the jump proceeds to the matching _jumpdest_ in the _vtraptable_. In this way dynamic jumps always succeed.
_Execution_ is as defined in the [Yellow Paper](https://ethereum.github.io/yellowpaper/paper.pdf) a sequence of changes to the EVM state. The conditions on valid _code_ are preserved by state changes. At runtime, if execution of an instruction would violate a condition the execution is in an exceptional halting state. The Yellow Paper defines five such states.
We would like to consider EVM _code_ valid iff no execution of the program can lead to an exceptional halting state, but we must be able to validate _code_ in linear time to avoid denial of service attacks. So in practice, we can only partially meet these requirements. Our validation algorithm does not consider the codes data and computations, only its control flow and stack use. This means we will reject programs with any invalid _code_ paths, even if those paths are not reachable at runtime.
We consider a _JUMP_ or _JUMPI_ instruction to be _static_ if its `jumpsrc` argument was first placed on the stack as a constant (e.g. via a `PUSH…`), and its value has not changed since, other than by a `DUP…` or `SWAP…`.
We need to define `stack depth`. The Yellow Paper has the `stack pointer` (`SP`) pointing just past the top item on the `data stack`. We define the `stack base` (`BP`)as the element that the `SP` addressed at the entry to the current _basic block_, or `0` on program entry. So we can define the `stack depth` as the number of stack elements between the current `SP` and the current `BP`.
> This section specifies an algorithm for checking the above the rules. Equivalent code must be run at creation time. We assume that the validation defined in EIP-3540 and EIP-3670 has already run to check _Rule 0_, although in practice the algorithms can be merged.
The following is a pseudo-Go implementation of an algorithm for enforcing program validity. This algorithm is a symbolic execution of the program that recursively traverses the bytecode, following its control flow and stack use and checking for violations of the rules above. It uses a stack to track the slots that hold `PUSHed` constants, from which it pops the destinations to validate during the analysis.
This algorithm runs in time equal to `O(vertices + edges)` in the program's control-flow graph, where edges represent control flow and the vertices represent basic blocks – thus the algorithm takes time proportional to the size of the bytecode.
The alternative to checking validity at creation time is checking it at runtime. This hurts performance and is a denial of service vulnerability. Thus the above rules and accompanying one-pass validation algorithm.
_Rule 1_ – requiring static or previously tabulated destinations for `JUMP` and `JUMPI`– simplifies static jumps and constrains dynamic jumps.
* Jump destinations are currently checked at runtime, but static jumps can be validated at creation time.
* Requiring the possible destinations of dynamic jumps to be tabulated in advance allows for tractable bytecode traversal for creation-time validation: a jump table takes up space proportional to the number of jump destinations, so attempting to attack the validation algorithm with large numbers of jump destinations will also reduce the available space for _code_ to be validated.
_Rule 2_ – requiring positive, consistent stack depth – ensures sufficient stack. Exceptions can be caused by irreducible paths like jumping into loops and subroutines, and by calling subroutines with insufficient numbers of arguments.
These changes affect the semantics of existing EVM code – the use of JUMP, JUMPI, and the stack are restricted, such that some _code_ that would always run correctly will nonetheless be invalid EVM _code_.
