A flash loan is a smart contract transaction in which a lender smart contract lends assets to a borrower smart contract with the condition that the assets are returned, plus an optional fee, before the end of the transaction. This ERC specifies interfaces for lenders to accept flash loan requests, and for borrowers to take temporary control of the transaction within the lender execution. The process for the safe execution of flash loans is also specified.
Flash loans allow smart contracts to lend an amount of tokens without a requirement for collateral, with the condition that they must be returned within the same transaction.
Early adopters of the flash loan pattern have produced different interfaces and different use patterns. The diversification is expected to intensify, and with it the technical debt required to integrate with diverse flash lending patterns.
- Repayment approaches at the end of the transaction, where some pull the principal plus the fee from the loan receiver, and others where the loan receiver needs to manually return the principal and the fee to the lender.
- Some lenders offer the ability to repay the loan using a token that is different to what was originally borrowed, which can reduce the overall complexity of the flash transaction and gas fees.
- Some lenders offer a single entry point into the protocol regardless of whether you're buying, selling, depositing or chaining them together as a flash loan, whereas other protocols offer discrete entry points.
- Some lenders allow to flash mint any amount of their native token without charging a fee, effectively allowing flash loans bounded by computational constraints instead of asset ownership constraints.
The `maxFlashLoan` function MUST return the maximum loan possible for `token`. If a `token` is not currently supported `maxFlashLoan` MUST return 0, instead of reverting.
The `flashLoan` function MUST include a `fee` argument to `onFlashLoan` with the fee to pay for the loan on top of the principal, ensuring that `fee == flashFee(token, amount)`.
The `lender` MUST verify that the `onFlashLoan` callback returns the keccak256 hash of "ERC3156FlashBorrower.onFlashLoan".
The interfaces described in this ERC have been chosen as to cover the known flash lending use cases, while allowing for safe and gas efficient implementations.
`flashLoan` has been chosen as a function name as descriptive enough, unlikely to clash with other functions in the lender, and including both the use cases in which the tokens lent are held or minted by the lender.
Existing flash lenders all provide flash loans of several token types from the same contract. Providing a `token` parameter in both the `flashLoan` and `onFlashLoan` functions matches closely the observed functionality.
A `bytes calldata data` parameter is included for the caller to pass arbitrary information to the `receiver`, without impacting the utility of the `flashLoan` standard.
`onFlashLoan` has been chosen as a function name as descriptive enough, unlikely to clash with other functions in the `receiver`, and following the `onAction` naming pattern used as well in EIP-667.
A `initiator` will often be required in the `onFlashLoan` function, which the lender knows as `msg.sender`. An alternative implementation which would embed the `initiator` in the `data` parameter by the caller would require an additional mechanism for the receiver to verify its accuracy, and is not advisable.
The `amount` will be required in the `onFlashLoan` function, which the lender took as a parameter. An alternative implementation which would embed the `amount` in the `data` parameter by the caller would require an additional mechanism for the receiver to verify its accuracy, and is not advisable.
A `fee` will often be calculated in the `flashLoan` function, which the `receiver` must be aware of for repayment. Passing the `fee` as a parameter instead of appended to `data` is simple and effective.
The `amount + fee` are pulled from the `receiver` to allow the `lender` to implement other features that depend on using `transferFrom`, without having to lock them for the duration of a flash loan. An alternative implementation where the repayment is transferred to the `lender` is also possible, but would need all other features in the lender to be also based in using `transfer` instead of `transferFrom`. Given the lower complexity and prevalence of a "pull" architecture over a "push" architecture, "pull" was chosen.
*@param receiver The contract receiving the tokens, needs to implement the `onFlashLoan(address user, uint256 amount, uint256 fee, bytes calldata)` interface.
*@param receiver The contract receiving the tokens, needs to implement the `onFlashLoan(address user, uint256 amount, uint256 fee, bytes calldata)` interface.
The arguments of `onFlashLoan` are expected to reflect the conditions of the flash loan, but cannot be trusted unconditionally. They can be divided in two groups, that require different checks before they can be trusted to be genuine.
0. No arguments can be assumed to be genuine without some kind of verification. `initiator`, `token` and `amount` refer to a past transaction that might not have happened if the caller of `onFlashLoan` decides to lie. `fee` might be false or calculated incorrectly. `data` might have been manipulated by the caller.
1. To trust that the value of `initiator`, `token`, `amount` and `fee` are genuine a reasonable pattern is to verify that the `onFlashLoan` caller is in a whitelist of verified flash lenders. Since often the caller of `flashLoan` will also be receiving the `onFlashLoan` callback this will be trivial. In all other cases flash lenders will need to be approved if the arguments in `onFlashLoan` are to be trusted.
2. To trust that the value of `data` is genuine, in addition to the check in point 1, it is recommended to verify that the `initiator` belongs to a group of trusted addresses. Trusting the `lender` and the `initiator` is enough to trust that the contents of `data` are genuine.
Any `receiver` that includes in `onFlashLoan` the approval for the `lender` to take the `amount + fee` needs to be combined with a mechanism to verify that the initiator is trusted.
If an unsuspecting contract with a non-reverting fallback function, or an EOA, would approve a `lender` implementing ERC3156, and not immediately use the approval, and if the `lender` would not verify the return value of `onFlashLoan`, then the unsuspecting contract or EOA could be drained of funds up to their allowance or balance limit. This would be executed by an `initiator` calling `flashLoan` on the victim. The flash loan would be executed and repaid, plus any fees, which would be accumulated by the `lender`. For this reason, it is important that the `lender` implements the specification in full and reverts if `onFlashLoan` doesn't return the keccak256 hash for "ERC3156FlashBorrower.onFlashLoan".
The typical quantum of tokens involved in flash mint transactions will give rise to new innovative attack vectors.
#### Example 1 - interest rate attack
If there exists a lending protocol that offers stable interests rates, but it does not have floor/ceiling rate limits and it does not rebalance the fixed rate based on flash-induced liquidity changes, then it could be susceptible to the following scenario:
The key takeaway being the obvious need to implement a flat floor/ceiling rate limit and to rebalance the rate based on short term liquidity changes.
#### Example 2 - arithmetic overflow and underflow
If the flash mint provider does not place any limits on the amount of flash mintable tokens in a transaction, then anyone can flash mint 2^256-1 amount of tokens.
The protocols on the receiving end of the flash mints will need to ensure their contracts can handle this, either by using a compiler that embeds overflow protection in the smart contract bytecode, or by setting explicit checks.
Assume a smart contract that flash lends its native token. The same smart contract borrows from a third party when users burn the native token. This pattern would be used to aggregate in the smart contract the collateralized debt of several users into a single account in the third party. The flash mint could be used to cause the lender to borrow to its limit, and then pushing interest rates in the underlying lender, liquidate the flash lender:
1. Flash mint from `lender` a very large amount of FOO.
2. Redeem FOO for BAR, causing `lender` to borrow from `underwriter` all the way to its borrowing limit.
3. Trigger a debt rate increase in `underwriter`, making `lender` undercollateralized.