EIPs/EIPS/eip-1102.md

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---
eip: 1102
title: Opt-in provider access
author: Paul Bouchon <mail@bitpshr.net>
discussions-to: https://ethereum-magicians.org/t/eip-1102-opt-in-provider-access/414
status: Draft
type: Standards Track
category: Interface
created: 2018-05-04
---
## Simple summary
This proposal describes a way for DOM environments to expose an Ethereum provider that requires user approval.
## Abstract
The previous generation of Ethereum-enabled DOM environments follows a pattern of injecting a fully-enabled provider into the DOM without user consent. This puts users of such environments at risk because malicious websites can use this provider to view account information and to arbitrarily initiate unwanted Ethereum transactions on a user's behalf.
This proposal outlines a protocol in which DOM environments expose a read-only provider until full provider access is approved by the user.
## Specification
### Concepts
#### RFC-2119
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in [RFC-2119](https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2119.txt).
#### Read-only provider
A read-only provider has no populated accounts and any RPC request that requires an account will fail.
#### Full provider
A full provider has populated accounts and any RPC request that requires an account will succeed.
#### `Provider#enable`
Providers exposed by DOM environments define a new `enable` method that returns a Promise. Calling this method triggers a user interface that allows the user to approve or deny full provider access for a given dapp. The returned Promise is resolved if the user approves full provider access or rejected if the user denies full provider access.
```js
ethereum.enable(): Promise<any>
```
### Protocol
DOM environments expose a read-only provider globally at `window.ethereum` by default. Before initiating any RPC request that requires an account, like `eth_sendTransaction`, dapps must request a full provider by calling a new provider method, `ethereum.enable()`. This method triggers a user interface that allows the user to approve or deny full provider access for a given dapp. If the user approves full provider access, the provider at `window.ethereum` is populated with accounts and fully-enabled; if the user denies full provider access, the provider at `window.ethereum` is left unchanged.
#### Typical dapp initialization
```
START dapp
IF web3 is defined
CONTINUE dapp
IF web3 is undefined
STOP dapp
```
#### Proposed dapp initialization
```
START dapp
IF provider is defined
ENABLE[1] full provider
IF user approves
RESOLVE[2] full provider
CONTINUE dapp
IF user denies
REJECT[3] with error
STOP dapp
IF provider is undefined
STOP dapp
```
##### `[1] ENABLE`
Dapps **MUST** request a full provider by calling the `enable` method on the default read-only provider. This method **MUST** trigger a user interface that allows the user to approve or deny full provider access for a given dapp. This method **MUST** return a Promise that is resolved with an array of the user's public addresses if the user approves full provider access or rejected if the user denies full provider access.
##### `[2] RESOLVE`
If a user approves full provider access, DOM environments **MUST** expose a fully-enabled provider at `window.ethereum` that is populated with accounts. The Promise returned when calling the `enable` method **MUST** be resolved with an array of the user's public addresses.
##### `[3] REJECT`
If a user denies full provider access, the Promise returned when calling the `enable` method **MUST** be rejected with an informative Error.
### Example initialization
```js
window.addEventListener('load', async () => {
// Read-only provider is exposed by default
console.log(await ethereum.send('net_version'));
try {
// Request full provider if needed
await ethereum.enable();
// Full provider exposed
await ethereum.send('eth_sendTransaction', [/* ... */]);
} catch (error) {
// User denied full provider access
}
});
```
### Constraints
* Browsers **MUST** expose a read-only provider at `window.ethereum` by default.
* Browsers **MUST NOT** expose a full provider globally by default.
* Dapps **MUST** request access to a full provider.
* Users **MUST** be able to approve or deny full provider access.
* A full provider **MUST** be exposed at `window.ethereum` after user approval.
* Dapps **MUST** be notified of user approval of full provider access.
* Dapps **MUST** be notified of user denial of full provider access.
## Rationale
The pattern of full provider auto-injection followed by the previous generation of Ethereum-enabled DOM environments fails to protect user privacy and fails to maintain safe user experience: untrusted websites can both view account information and arbitrarily initiate transactions on a user's behalf. Even though most users may reject unsolicited transactions on untrusted websites, a protocol for provider exposure should make such unsolicited requests impossible.
This proposal establishes a new pattern wherein dapps must request access to a full Ethereum provider. This protocol directly strengthens user privacy by hiding user accounts and preventing unsolicited transaction requests on untrusted sites.
### Immediate value-add
* Users can reject full provider access on untrusted sites to hide accounts.
* Users can reject full provider access on untrusted sites to prevent unsolicited transactions.
### Long-term value-add
* Dapps could request specific account information based on user consent.
* Dapps could request specific user information based on user consent (uPort, DIDs).
* Dapps could request a specific network based on user consent.
* Dapps could request multiple instances of the above based on user consent.
## Backwards compatibility
This proposal impacts dapp authors and requires that they request access to a full Ethereum provider before using it to initiate any RPC call that requires an account. This proposal also impacts developers of Ethereum-enabled DOM environments or dapp browsers as these tools should no longer auto-expose a full provider populated with accounts; instead, they should expose a read-only provider and only expose a full provider if a website requests one and a user consents to its access.
## Implementation
The MetaMask team is currently working an [MVP implementation](https://github.com/MetaMask/metamask-extension/pull/4703) of the strategy described above and expects to begin limited user testing soon.
## Copyright
Copyright and related rights waived via [CC0](https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/).