5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Remco Bloemen
7769c269bf
Do not export global allocator (#533)
* Do not export allocator

* Make sure to use jemalloc in all downstream tests

* Update readme

* Remove test jemalloc boilerplate

* One more

* Fix clippies

* One more

* Clippy

Co-authored-by: Daniel Lubarov <daniel@lubarov.com>
2022-05-03 13:16:53 -07:00
Daniel Lubarov
7d6c0a448d
Halo2 style lookup arguments in System Zero (#513)
* Halo2 style lookup arguments in System Zero

It's a really nice and simple protocol, particularly for the verifier since the constraints are trivial (aside from the underlying batched permutation checks, which we already support). See the [Halo2 book](https://zcash.github.io/halo2/design/proving-system/lookup.html) and this [talk](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YlTt12s7vGE&t=5237s) by @daira.

Previously we generated the whole trace in row-wise form, but it's much more efficient to generate these "permuted" columns column-wise. So I changed our STARK framework to accept the trace in column-wise form. STARK impls now have the flexibility to do some generation row-wise and some column-wise (without extra costs; there's a single transpose as before).

* sorting

* fixes

* PR feedback

* into_iter

* timing
2022-03-16 17:37:34 -07:00
Daniel Lubarov
6072fab077
Implement a mul-add circuit in the ALU (#495)
* Implement a mul-add circuit in the ALU

The inputs are assumed to be `u32`s, while the output is encoded as four `u16 limbs`. Each output limb is range-checked.

So, our basic mul-add constraint looks like

    out_0 + 2^16 out_1 + 2^32 out_2 + 2^48 out_3 = in_1 * in_2 + in_3

The right hand side will never overflow, since `u32::MAX * u32::MAX + u32::MAX < |F|`. However, the left hand side could overflow, even though we know each limb is less than `2^16`.

For example, an operation like `0 * 0 + 0` could have two possible outputs, 0 and `|F|`, both of which would satisfy the constraint above. To prevent these non-canonical outputs, we need a comparison to enforce that `out < |F|`.

Thankfully, `F::MAX` has all zeros in its low 32 bits, so `x <= F::MAX` is equivalent to `x_lo == 0 || x_hi != u32::MAX`. `x_hi != u32::MAX` can be checked by showing that `u32::MAX - x_hi` has an inverse. If `x_hi != u32::MAX`, the prover provides this (purported) inverse in an advice column.

See @bobbinth's [post](https://hackmd.io/NC-yRmmtRQSvToTHb96e8Q#Checking-element-validity) for details. That post calls the purported inverse column `m`; I named it `canonical_inv` in this code.

* fix

* PR feedback

* naming
2022-02-21 00:39:04 -08:00
Jakub Nabaglo
83a572717e
Implement Poseidon in system_zero/permutation_unit (#459)
* Implement Poseidon in system_zero/permutation_unit

* Minor cleanup

* Daniel PR comments

* Update dependencies
2022-02-04 16:50:57 -08:00
Daniel Lubarov
c0ac79e2e1
Beginning of STARK implementation (#413)
* Beginning of STARK implementation

* PR feedback

* minor

* Suppress warnings for now
2022-01-26 00:09:29 -08:00