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evaluations/threat-modeling.md
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@ -15,22 +15,22 @@ Anyone is invited to contribute to this document, as it is a [collective effort]
## Analysis
| Category | Threat | Description | Impact | Mitigation |
| ----------- | -------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------ |
| Spoofing | Phishing-Induced Spoofing | Exploits the private key loaded directly into the app via phishing to send unwanted requests. | Draining the user's wallet funds, store unwanted content. | Use cold wallet. |
| Spoofing | Same-Chain Replay | Reuses a signed transaction on the same chain to spoof user actions. | Drained wallet funds. | Include a unique nonce in request data. |
| Spoofing | Cross-Chain Replay | Replays a signed transaction on another chain. | Drained wallet funds. | Implement EIP-712. |
| Spoofing | Client Spoofing via API | Access to the exposed node to use the API. | Node full access. | Educate users. |
| Tempering | Fake proofs | The storage provider sends fake proofs. | Contracts reward without actual data storage, reducing network reliability. | Require random challenges periodically. |
| Tempering | `markProofAsMissing` re-entrancy | The validator uses re-entrancy to slash multiple times. | Excessive collateral slashing of the host, proof validation failure. | Apply the `Checks-Effects-Interactions` pattern. |
| Repudiation | Denial of File Upload | User denies uploading illegal content. | Reputation impact and trust failure | Make a clear legal statement. |
| Repudiation | Lazy Host | Service provider does not fill the slot’s content. | Reduces network reliability. | Allow multiple reservations per slot. |
| Category | Threat | Description | Impact | Mitigation |
| ----------- | ----------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ------------------------------------------------ |
| Spoofing | [Phishing-Induced spoofing](#phishing-induced-spoofing) | Exploits the private key loaded directly into the app via phishing to send unwanted requests. | Draining the user's wallet funds, store unwanted content. | Use cold wallet. |
| Spoofing | [Same-Chain attack replays](#same-chain-attack-replays) | Reuses a signed transaction on the same chain to spoof user actions. | Drained wallet funds. | Include a unique nonce in request data. |
| Spoofing | [Cross-Chain attack replays](#cross-chain-attack-replays) | Replays a signed transaction on another chain. | Drained wallet funds. | Implement EIP-712. |
| Spoofing | [Client spoofing via API](#client-spoofing-via-api) | Access to the exposed node to use the API. | Node full access. | Educate users. |
| Tempering | [Fake proofs](#fake-proofs) | The storage provider sends fake proofs. | Contracts reward without actual data storage, reducing network reliability. | Require random challenges periodically. |
| Tempering | [markProofAsMissing re-entrency](#markproofasmissing-re-entrency) | The validator uses re-entrancy to slash multiple times. | Excessive collateral slashing of the host, proof validation failure. | Apply the `Checks-Effects-Interactions` pattern. |
| Repudiation | [Denial of file upload](#denial-of-file-upload) | User denies uploading illegal content. | Reputation impact and trust failure | Make a clear legal statement. |
| Repudiation | [Lazy host](#lazy-host) | Service provider does not fill the slot’s content. | Reduces network reliability. | Allow multiple reservations per slot. |
## Spoofing
Threat action aimed at impersonating users or storage providers to access or manipulate files and contracts in the network.
### Phishing-Induced Spoofing
### Phishing-Induced spoofing
#### Scenario
@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ Edit/view: https://cascii.app/3577b
Include a unique, random `nonce` in the request data. This ensures signatures are unique per request, preventing reuse on the same chain. Codex’s current implementation includes this, fully mitigating the threat.
### Cross-Chain Replay
### Cross-Chain attack replays
#### Scenario
@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ Edit/view: https://cascii.app/d312b
Implement EIP-712 to include chain-specific data in signed transaction, ensuring signatures are valid only on the intended chain and preventing unauthorized replays on other chains.
### Client Spoofing via API
### Client spoofing via API
#### Scenario
@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ Edit/view: https://cascii.app/70aed
Make a clear statement that Codex is not responsible for such content and warn users of the potential risk for downloading an unknown CID.
### Lazy Host
### Lazy host
#### Scenario