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standards/core/store.md
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@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ contributors:
## Abstract ## Abstract
This specification explains the `WAKU2-STORE` protocol, This specification explains the `WAKU2-STORE` protocol,
which enables querying of messages received through the relay protocol and which enables querying of [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](/waku/standards/core/14/message.md)s.
stored by other nodes. It also supports pagination for more efficient querying of historical messages.
**Protocol identifier***: `/vac/waku/store-query/3.0.0` **Protocol identifier***: `/vac/waku/store-query/3.0.0`
@ -32,18 +32,6 @@ The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL
### Design Requirements ### Design Requirements
Nodes willing to provide the storage service using `WAKU2-STORE` protocol,
SHOULD provide a complete and full view of message history.
As such, they are required to be *highly available* and
specifically have a *high uptime* to consistently receive and
store network messages.
The high uptime requirement makes sure that no message is missed out,
hence a complete and
intact view of the message history is delivered to the querying nodes.
Nevertheless, in case storage service nodes cannot afford high availability,
the querying nodes may retrieve the historical messages from multiple sources to achieve a full and
intact view of the past.
The concept of `ephemeral` messages introduced in [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](/waku/standards/core/14/message.md) affects `WAKU2-STORE` as well. The concept of `ephemeral` messages introduced in [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](/waku/standards/core/14/message.md) affects `WAKU2-STORE` as well.
Nodes running `WAKU2-STORE` SHOULD support `ephemeral` messages as specified in [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](/waku/standards/core/14/message.md). Nodes running `WAKU2-STORE` SHOULD support `ephemeral` messages as specified in [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](/waku/standards/core/14/message.md).
Nodes running `WAKU2-STORE` SHOULD NOT store messages with the `ephemeral` flag set to `true`. Nodes running `WAKU2-STORE` SHOULD NOT store messages with the `ephemeral` flag set to `true`.
@ -110,9 +98,8 @@ The store can be queried to return either a set of keys or a set of key-value pa
Within the store query protocol, Within the store query protocol,
the [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](/waku/standards/core/14/message.md) keys and the [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](/waku/standards/core/14/message.md) keys and
values MUST be represented in a `WakuMessageKeyValue` message. values MUST be represented in a `WakuMessageKeyValue` message.
This message MUST contain the deterministic `message_hash` as the key.
- MUST contain the deterministic `message_hash` as the key. It MAY contain the full [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](/waku/standards/core/14/message.md) and
- it MAY contain the full [14/WAKU2-MESSAGE](/waku/standards/core/14/message.md) and
associated pubsub topic as the value in the `message` and associated pubsub topic as the value in the `message` and
`pubsub_topic` fields, depending on the use case as set out below. `pubsub_topic` fields, depending on the use case as set out below.
@ -366,7 +353,7 @@ lies about the history of messages as it is against the description of the `WAKU
The following are not considered as part of the adversarial model: The following are not considered as part of the adversarial model:
- An adversary with a global view of all the peers and their connections. - An adversary with a global view of all the peers and their connections.
- An adversary that can eavesdrop on communication links between arbitrary pairs of peers (unless the adversary is one end of the communication). - An adversary that can eavesdrop on communication links between arbitrary pairs of peers (unless the adversary is one end of the communication).
Specifically, the communication channels are assumed to be secure. In specific, the communication channels are assumed to be secure.
### Future Work ### Future Work