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@ -9,15 +9,15 @@ contributors:
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## Abstract
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## Abstract
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This document describes membership management for the RLN smart contract, in particular:
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This document describes membership management within the RLN smart contract, specifically addressing:
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- membership-related contract functionality;
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- membership-related contract functionality;
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- suggested parameters valued for the initial mainnet deployment;
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- suggested parameter values for the initial mainnet deployment;
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- contract governance and upgradability.
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- contract governance and upgradability.
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This document currently only considers membership-related functionality.
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Currently, this document focuses solely on membership-related functionality.
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It might later evolve into a full-fledged contract specification.
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It might later evolve into a comprehensive contract specification.
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RLN is only deployed on Sepolia testnet ([source code](https://github.com/waku-org/waku-rlnv2-contract/blob/main/src/WakuRlnV2.sol)) as of August 2024.
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As of August 2024, RLN is deployed only on Sepolia testnet ([source code](https://github.com/waku-org/waku-rlnv2-contract/blob/main/src/WakuRlnV2.sol)).
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This document aims to outline the path to its mainnet deployment.
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This document aims to outline the path to its mainnet deployment.
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## Syntax
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## Syntax
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@ -26,16 +26,16 @@ The key words “MUST”, “MUST NOT”, “REQUIRED”, “SHALL”, “SHALL
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## Background
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## Background
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Rate-Limiting Nullifier (RLN) is a ZK-based gadget used for privacy-preserving rate limiting in Waku.
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Rate-Limiting Nullifier (RLN) is a Zero-Knowledge (ZK) based gadget used for privacy-preserving rate limiting in Waku.
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The RLN smart contract is the core element of RLN architecture.
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The RLN smart contract (referred to as "the contract" hereinafter) is the central component of the RLN architecture.
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The smart contract stores the RLN tree that contains all currently existing memberships.
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The contract stores the RLN tree, which contains all current memberships.
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Users interact with the contract to manage their memberships
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Users interact with the contract to manage their memberships
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and to get the necessary data for proof generation and verification.
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and obtain the necessary data for proof generation and verification.
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Sending messages is handled by Waku RLN Relay nodes.
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Message transmission is handled by Waku RLN Relay nodes.
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To send a message, the sender MUST prove its validity in terms of RLN.
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The sender of a message MUST prove its validity according to RLN requirements.
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RLN Relay nodes MUST NOT relay invalid messages.
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RLN Relay nodes MUST NOT relay invalid messages.
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See [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](https://github.com/vacp2p/rfc-index/blob/main/waku/standards/core/17/rln-relay.md) for the full specification of RLN Relay.
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For the full specification of RLN Relay, see See [17/WAKU2-RLN-RELAY](https://github.com/vacp2p/rfc-index/blob/main/waku/standards/core/17/rln-relay.md).
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## Contract overview
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## Contract overview
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@ -44,18 +44,20 @@ The contract MUST provide the following functionalities:
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- extend a membership;
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- extend a membership;
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- withdraw a deposit.
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- withdraw a deposit.
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A membership _holder_ is the entity that controls the secret of the respective RLN commitment.
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A membership _holder_ is the entity that controls the secret associated with the respective RLN commitment.
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A membership _keeper_ is the entity that controls the Ethereum address that registered that membership.
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A membership _keeper_ is the entity that controls the Ethereum address used to register that membership.
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The holder and the keeper MAY differ for the same membership.
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The holder and the keeper MAY be different entities for the same membership.
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The contract SHOULD only distinguish between the keeper and non-keepers when authorizing membership-related requests.
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When authorizing membership-related requests,
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the contract SHOULD distinguish between the keeper and non-keepers,
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and MAY also use additional criteria.
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Contract parameters and their RECOMMENDED values for the initial mainnet deployment are as follows:
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Contract parameters and their RECOMMENDED values for the initial mainnet deployment are as follows:
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| Parameter | Symbol | Value | Units |
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| Parameter | Symbol | Value | Units |
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| ------------------------------------------- | --------- | -------- | -------------------- |
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| ------------------------------------------------------- | --------- | -------- | -------------------- |
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| Epoch length | `epoch` | `10` | minutes |
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| Epoch length | `epoch` | `10` | minutes |
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| Maximum total rate limit of all memberships | `R_{max}` | `160000` | messages per `epoch` |
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| Maximum total rate limit of all memberships in the tree | `R_{max}` | `160000` | messages per `epoch` |
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| Minimal rate limit of one membership | `r_{min}` | `20` | messages per `epoch` |
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| Minimum rate limit of one membership | `r_{min}` | `20` | messages per `epoch` |
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| Maximum rate limit of one membership | `r_{max}` | `600` | messages per `epoch` |
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| Maximum rate limit of one membership | `r_{max}` | `600` | messages per `epoch` |
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| Membership price for `1` message per epoch | `p_u` | `0.05` | `USD` |
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| Membership price for `1` message per epoch | `p_u` | `0.05` | `USD` |
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| Membership expiration term | `T` | `180` | days |
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| Membership expiration term | `T` | `180` | days |
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@ -89,10 +91,10 @@ graph TD;
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State updates triggered by a transaction (e.g., from _GracePeriod_ to _Active_ as a result of `extend`) MUST be applied immediately.
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State updates triggered by a transaction (e.g., from _GracePeriod_ to _Active_ as a result of `extend`) MUST be applied immediately.
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State updates defined by time progression (e.g., from _GracePeriod_ to _Expired_ after time `G`) MAY be applied lazily.
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State updates defined by time progression (e.g., from _GracePeriod_ to _Expired_ after time `G`) MAY be applied lazily.
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When providing any membership-specific functionality, the contract MUST:
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When handling a membership-specific transaction, the contract MUST:
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- check whether the state of the membership involved is up-to-date;
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- check whether the state of the involved membership is up-to-date;
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- if necessary, update the membership state;
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- if necessary, update the membership state;
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- process the transaction in accordance with the up-to-date membership state.
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- process the transaction in accordance with the updated membership state.
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Memberships MUST be included in the RLN tree according to the following table:
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Memberships MUST be included in the RLN tree according to the following table:
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@ -106,14 +108,14 @@ Memberships MUST be included in the RLN tree according to the following table:
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Memberships MUST NOT be transferable.
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Memberships MUST NOT be transferable.
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A user MAY use one Ethereum address to manage multiple memberships.
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A user MAY use one Ethereum address to manage multiple memberships.
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A user MAY use one Waku node to manage multiple memberships. [^1]
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A user MAY use one Waku node[^1] to manage multiple memberships.
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[^1]: No Waku implementation supports managing multiple memberships from one node (as of August 2024).
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[^1]: No Waku implementation supports managing multiple memberships from one node (as of August 2024).
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## Contract functionalities
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## Contract functionalities
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Availability of membership-specific functionalities MUST be as follows:
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Availability of membership-specific functionalities[^2] MUST be as follows:
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| | Active | GracePeriod | Expired | ErasedAwaitsWithdrawal | Erased |
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| | Active | GracePeriod | Expired | ErasedAwaitsWithdrawal | Erased |
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| --------------------- | ------ | ----------- | ------- | ---------------------- | ------ |
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| --------------------- | ------ | ----------- | ------- | ---------------------- | ------ |
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@ -121,48 +123,45 @@ Availability of membership-specific functionalities MUST be as follows:
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| Extend the membership | No | Yes | No | No | No |
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| Extend the membership | No | Yes | No | No | No |
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| Withdraw the deposit | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
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| Withdraw the deposit | No | Yes | Yes | Yes | No |
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Sending a message is included here for completeness,
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[^2]: Sending a message is included here for completeness, although it is part of the RLN Relay protocol and not the contract.
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although it is part of the RLN Relay protocol and not the RLN contract.
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### Register a membership
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### Register a membership
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Membership registration is subject to the following conditions:
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Membership registration is subject to the following conditions:
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- if there are _Expired_ memberships in the RLN tree, the new membership MUST overwrite an _Expired_ membership;
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- If there are _Expired_ memberships in the RLN tree, the new membership MUST overwrite an _Expired_ membership.
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- the new membership SHOULD overwrite the membership that had been _Expired_ for the longest time;
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- The new membership SHOULD overwrite the membership that has been _Expired_ for the longest time.
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- if a new membership A overwrites an _Expired_ membership B:
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- If a new membership A overwrites an _Expired_ membership B:
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- membership B MUST become _ErasedAwaitsWithdrawal_;
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- membership B MUST become _ErasedAwaitsWithdrawal_;
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- the current total rate limit MUST be decremented by the rate limit of membership B;
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- the current total rate limit MUST be decremented by the rate limit of membership B;
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- the contract MUST take all necessary steps to ensure that the keeper of membership B can withdraw their deposit later;
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- the contract MUST take all necessary steps to ensure that the keeper of membership B can withdraw their deposit later.
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- registration MUST fail if the total rate limit of _Active_, _GracePeriod_, and _Expired_ memberships, including the one being created, would exceed `R_{max}`;
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- Registration MUST fail if the total rate limit of _Active_, _GracePeriod_, and _Expired_ memberships, including the one being created, would exceed `R_{max}`.
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- registration MUST fail if the requested rate limit for a new membership is lower than `r_{min}` or higher than `r_{max}`;
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- Registration MUST fail if the requested rate limit for a new membership is lower than `r_{min}` or higher than `r_{max}`.
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- the user MUST lock-up a deposit to register a membership;
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- The keeper MUST lock up a deposit to register a membership.
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- the user MUST specify the rate limit of the new membership[^2];
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- The keeper MUST specify the rate limit[^3] of a membership at registration time.
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- the size of the deposit MUST depend on the requested rate limit;
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- The size of the deposit MUST depend on the specified rate limit.
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- in case of a successful registration:
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- In case of a successful registration:
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- the new membership MUST become _Active_;
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- the new membership MUST become _Active_;
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- the current total rate limit MUST be incremented by the rate limit of the new membership;
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- the current total rate limit MUST be incremented by the rate limit of the new membership.
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- a newly created membership MUST have an expiration time `T` and a grace period `G`.
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- A membership MUST have an expiration time `T` and a grace period `G`.
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[^2]: A user-facing application SHOULD suggest default values for rate limits for the user.
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[^3]: A user-facing application SHOULD suggest default rate limits to the keeper (see Implementation Suggestions).
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### Extend a membership
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### Extend a membership
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Extending a membership is subject to the following conditions:
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Extending a membership is subject to the following conditions:
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- extension MUST fail if the membership is in any state other than _GracePeriod_;
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- The extension MUST fail if the membership is in any state other than _GracePeriod_.
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- the membership keeper MUST be able to extend their membership;
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- The membership keeper MUST be able to extend their membership.
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- any user except the membership keeper MUST NOT be able to extend a membership;
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- Any user other than the membership keeper MUST NOT be able to extend a membership.
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- after a successful extension, the membership MUST become _Active_.
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- After a successful extension, the membership MUST become _Active_.
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### Withdraw the deposit
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### Withdraw the deposit
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Deposit withdrawal is subject to the following conditions:
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Deposit withdrawal is subject to the following conditions:
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- the membership keeper MUST be able to withdraw their deposit;
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- The membership keeper MUST be able to withdraw their deposit.
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- any user except the membership keeper MUST NOT be able to withdraw its deposit;
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- Any user other than the membership keeper MUST NOT be able to withdraw its deposit.
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- a deposit MUST be withdrawn in full;
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- A deposit MUST be withdrawn in full.
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- a withdrawal MUST fail if the membership is not in _GracePeriod_, _Expired_, or _ErasedAwaitsWithdrawal_;
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- A withdrawal MUST fail if the membership is not in _GracePeriod_, _Expired_, or _ErasedAwaitsWithdrawal_.
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- a membership MUST become _Erased_ after withdrawal.
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- A membership MUST become _Erased_ after withdrawal.
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## Governance and upgradability
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## Governance and upgradability
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@ -173,12 +172,15 @@ The _Owner_ MUST be able to pause any of the following contract functionalities:
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- extend a membership;
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- extend a membership;
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- withdraw a deposit.
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- withdraw a deposit.
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At some point, the _Owner_ SHOULD renounce their privileges, and the contract MUST become immutable.
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At some point, the _Owner_ SHOULD renounce their privileges,
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Further upgrades, if necessary, SHOULD be done by deploying a new contract and migrating the membership set.
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and the contract MUST become immutable.
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If further upgrades are necessary,
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a new contract SHOULD be deployed,
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and the membership set SHOULD be migrated.
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## Implementation Suggestions
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## Implementation Suggestions
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User-facing application SHOULD suggest one or a few rate limits (tiers) to simplify their users' choice among the following RECOMMENDED rate limits:
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User-facing applications SHOULD suggest one or more rate limits (tiers) to simplify user selection among the following RECOMMENDED options:
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- `20` messages per epoch as low-tier;
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- `20` messages per epoch as low-tier;
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- `200` messages per epoch as mid-tier;
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- `200` messages per epoch as mid-tier;
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- `600` messages per epoch as high-tier.
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- `600` messages per epoch as high-tier.
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@ -190,100 +192,107 @@ and notify the user when their membership is about to expire.
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### Why can't I withdraw a deposit from an _Active_ membership?
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### Why can't I withdraw a deposit from an _Active_ membership?
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The rationale for this limitation is to prevent an undesirable usage pattern where users make deposits and withdrawals in short succession.
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The rationale for this limitation is to prevent a usage pattern where users make deposits and withdrawals in quick succession.
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Such pattern may lead to network instability and should be carefully studied if seen as desirable.
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Such a pattern could lead to network instability and should be carefully considered if deemed desirable.
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### Why can't I extend an _Active_ membership?
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### Why can't I extend an _Active_ membership?
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Memberships can only be extended during _GracePeriod_.
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Memberships can only be extended during _GracePeriod_.
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We do not allow extending an _Active_ membership.
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Extending an _Active_ membership is not allowed.
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The rationale is that if the contract _Owner_ changes some contract parameters (e.g., for security purposes),
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The rationale is to make possible parameter changes that the contract _Owner_ might make (e.g., for security reasons) applicable to most memberships.
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users with extended memberships will not be affected by the changes for a long time.
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### What if I don't extend my membership within its _GracePeriod_?
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### What if I don't extend my membership within its _GracePeriod_?
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The user who does not extend their _GracePeriod_ membership,
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If a user does not extend their membership during the _GracePeriod_,
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assume the risk of their _Expired_ membership being overwritten.
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they risk having their _Expired_ membership overwritten.
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We expect, generally, that a user would not want to take that risk
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Generally, users are expected to either extend their membership or withdraw their deposit to avoid this risk.
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and would either extend their membership or withdraw their deposit.
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### Can I send messages when my membership is _Expired_?
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### Can I send messages when my membership is _Expired_?
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An _Expired_ membership allows sending messages for some time.
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An _Expired_ membership allows sending messages for a certain period.
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Sending messages is managed by RLN Relay nodes.
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The RLN proof that message senders provide to RLN Relay nodes does not prove the state of the membership,
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The RLN proof that message senders provide to RLN Relay nodes doesn't prove the state of that membership.
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only its inclusion in the tree.
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_Expired_ memberships are not erased from the tree proactively.
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_Expired_ memberships are not proactively erased from the tree.
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An _Expired_ membership is only erased when either a new membership overwrites it,
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An _Expired_ membership is erased only when a new membership overwrites it or when its deposit is withdrawn.
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or when its deposit is withdrawn.
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Once erased (i.e., _Erased_ or _ErasedAwaitsWithdrawal_), the membership can no longer be used to send messages.
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After a membership is erased, it can no longer be used for sending messages.
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### Will my deposit be slashed if I exceed the rate limit?
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### Will my deposit be slashed if I exceed the rate limit?
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This specification does not involve slashing.
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This specification does not include slashing.
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The aim of the deposit initially is to protect the network from denial-of-service attacks with bandwidth capping.
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The deposit's current purpose is purely to protect the network from denial-of-service attacks through bandwidth capping.
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### Do I need an extra deposit to extend a membership?
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### Do I need an extra deposit to extend my membership?
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Membership extension requires no additional deposit.
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Membership extension requires no additional deposit.
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The opportunity cost of locked-up capital plus gas fees for extension transactions make extensions non-free, which is sufficient for the initial mainnet deployment.
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The opportunity cost of locked-up capital and gas fees for extension transactions make extensions non-free,
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which is sufficient for the initial mainnet deployment.
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### Why this particular epoch length?
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### Why this particular epoch length?
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Epoch length is a global parameter set in the smart contract.
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Epoch length is a global parameter defined in the contract.
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Rate limits are defined in terms of the maximum allowed messages per epoch.
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Rate limits are defined in terms of the maximum allowed messages per epoch.
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There is a trade-off between short and long epochs.
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We chose an epoch length of `10` minutes as a reasonable middle-ground.
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On the one hand, longer epochs allow for better accommodating short-term usage peaks.
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There is a trade-off between short and long epochs.
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On the other hand, long epochs increases memory requirements for RLN Relay nodes.
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Longer epochs accommodate short-term usage peaks better,
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but they increase memory requirements for RLN Relay nodes.
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An epoch length of `10` minutes was chosen as a reasonable middle ground.
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Each message contains a nullifier that proves its validity in terms of RLN.
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Each message contains a nullifier that proves its validity in terms of RLN.
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Each RLN Relay node must store in memory a nullifier log for the current epoch.
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Each RLN Relay node must store a nullifier log for the current epoch in memory.
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Each nullifier plus metadata is `128` bytes (per message).
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A nullifier plus metadata is `128` bytes per message.
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With a `10`-minute epoch, one high-tier user with a `1` message per second rate limit generates up to `600 * 128 / 1024 = 75 KiB` of nullifier log data per epoch.
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With a `10`-minute epoch, a high-tier user with a `1` message per second rate limit generates up to `600 * 128 / 1024 = 75 KiB` of nullifier log data per epoch.
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This corresponds to:
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This equates to, approximately:
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- for 1000 users: approximately `73 MiB`;
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- `73 MiB` for 1000 users;
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- for 10 thousand users: approximately `732 MiB`.
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- `732 MiB` for 10 thousand users.
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### Why is there a cap on the total rate limit?
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### Why is there a cap on the total rate limit?
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|
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Total network bandwidth is a limited resource.
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Total network bandwidth is a limited resource.
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We want to cap the total rate limit, at least in the initial mainnet deployment, to avoid overstretching the network's capabilities.
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To avoid overstretching the network's capabilities for the initial mainnet deployment,
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we define a cap `R_{max}` on the total rate limit.
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### Why is there a minimal rate limit?
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### Why is there a minimum rate limit?
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The minimal rate limit prevents an attack where someone registers a large number of memberships with a tiny rate limit each, causing the RLN tree to contain too many elements.
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The minimum rate limit `r_{min}` prevents an attack where a large number of tiny memberships cause RLN tree bloat.
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### Why is there a maximum rate limit?
|
||||||
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The maximum rate limit `r_{max}` prevents any single actor from consuming an excessive portion of the total available rate limit.
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However, it is still possible for an attacker to register multiple Ethereum addresses,
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and occupy a significant portion of the total rate limit through several memberships.
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### Are there bulk discounts for high-rate memberships?
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### Are there bulk discounts for high-rate memberships?
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For the initial mainnet deployment, there are no bulk discounts.
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For the initial mainnet deployment, no bulk discounts are offered.
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Membership price is linearly proportional to its rate limit.
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Membership price is linearly proportional to its rate limit.
|
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We choose this pricing scheme for simplicity.
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We choose this pricing scheme for simplicity.
|
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Finding a pricing scheme with the right trade-off remains subject for future work, as
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Future work may explore alternative pricing schemes that balance efficiency with centralization risk.
|
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high-rate memberships are arguably more efficient but can incentivize centralization.
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### Why only accept DAI?
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### Why only accept DAI?
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|
||||||
When choosing a token to accept, we considered the following criteria:
|
When choosing a token to accept, we considered the following criteria:
|
||||||
- a stablecoin, as USD-denominated pricing is familiar for users and requires no oracle;
|
- a stablecoin, as USD-denominated pricing is familiar for users and requires no oracle;
|
||||||
- popular, high liquidity;
|
- popular with high liquidity;
|
||||||
- preferably decentralized;
|
- decentralized;
|
||||||
- with a reasonably good anti-censorship track record.
|
- reasonably good censorship-resistance.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Based on these criteria, we chose DAI for the initial mainnet deployment.
|
Based on these criteria, we chose DAI for the initial mainnet deployment.
|
||||||
Other tokens may be added in the future.
|
Other tokens may be added in the future.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Security / Privacy Considerations
|
## Security / Privacy Considerations
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Issuing membership-specific transactions (e.g., membership extension and deposit withdrawal) publicly links it to an Ethereum address.
|
Issuing membership-specific transactions,
|
||||||
Note that this does not degrade the privacy of the relayed messages,
|
such as membership extensions and deposit withdrawals,
|
||||||
as message validation doesn't require the sender to disclose which membership they hold.
|
publicly associates a membership with an Ethereum address.
|
||||||
|
However, this association does not compromise the privacy of the relayed messages,
|
||||||
|
as the protocol does not require the sender to disclose their specific membership to RLN Relay nodes.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
To produce an RLN proof, a message sender must obtain a Merkle proof that their membership belongs to the RLN tree.
|
To generate an RLN proof, a message sender must obtain a Merkle proof confirming that their membership belongs to the RLN tree.
|
||||||
One way to obtain this proof is to request it from the smart contract itself.
|
This proof can be requested directly from the contract.
|
||||||
Requesting a proof through a third-party RPC provider may endanger the sender's privacy.
|
Requesting the proof through a third-party RPC provider could compromise the sender's privacy,
|
||||||
The provider would be able to link the requester's Ethereum address and the RLN membership with the corresponding API key.
|
as the provider might link the requester's Ethereum address, their RLN membership, and the corresponding API key.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
## Copyright
|
## Copyright
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Loading…
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user