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docs: fix spelling and add cspell word list
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docs/cspell.json
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{ "words":
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[
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"deanonymise",
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"filecoin",
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"hopr",
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"incentivisation",
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"ipfs",
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"lightpush",
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"waku"
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]
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}
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@ -1,6 +1,10 @@
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Waku is a family of decentralized communication protocols.
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---
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title: Incentivisation
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---
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Waku is a family of decentralised communication protocols.
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The Waku Network (TWN) consists of independent nodes running Waku protocols.
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The Waku Network (TWN) consists of independent nodes running Waku protocols.
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TWN needs incentivization (shortened to i13n) to ensure proper node behavior.
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TWN needs incentivisation (shortened to i13n) to ensure proper node behaviour.
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The goal of this document is to outline and contextualize our approach to TWN i13n.
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The goal of this document is to outline and contextualize our approach to TWN i13n.
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After providing an overview of Waku and relevant prior work,
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After providing an overview of Waku and relevant prior work,
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@ -8,10 +12,10 @@ we focus on Waku Store - a client-server protocol for querying historical messag
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We introduce a minimal viable addition to Store to enable i13n,
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We introduce a minimal viable addition to Store to enable i13n,
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and list research directions for future work.
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and list research directions for future work.
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# Incentivization in decentralized networks
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# Incentivisation in decentralised networks
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## Incentivization tools
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## Incentivisation tools
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We can think of incentivization tools as a two-by-two matrix:
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We can think of incentivisation tools as a two-by-two matrix:
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- rewards vs punishment;
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- rewards vs punishment;
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- monetary vs reputation.
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- monetary vs reputation.
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@ -25,11 +29,11 @@ Reputation only works if high reputation brings tangible benefits.
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For example, if nodes chose neighbors based on reputation, low-reputation nodes miss out on potential revenue.
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For example, if nodes chose neighbors based on reputation, low-reputation nodes miss out on potential revenue.
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Reputation scores may be local (a node assigns scores to its neighbors) or global (each node gets a uniform score).
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Reputation scores may be local (a node assigns scores to its neighbors) or global (each node gets a uniform score).
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Global reputation in its simplest form involves a trusted third party,
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Global reputation in its simplest form involves a trusted third party,
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although decentralized approaches are also possible.
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although decentralised approaches are also possible.
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## Prior work
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## Prior work
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We may split incentivized decentralized networks into early file-sharing, blockchains, and decentralized storage.
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We may split incentivized decentralised networks into early file-sharing, blockchains, and decentralised storage.
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### Early P2P file-sharing
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### Early P2P file-sharing
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@ -46,16 +50,16 @@ PoW miners are automatically assigned newly mined coins for generating blocks.
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Miners must expend physical resources to generate a block.
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Miners must expend physical resources to generate a block.
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If the block is invalid, these expenses are not compensated (implicit monetary punishment).
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If the block is invalid, these expenses are not compensated (implicit monetary punishment).
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Proof-of-stake (PoS), used in Ethereum and many other cryptocurrencies, introduces explicit monetary punishments.
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Proof-of-stake (PoS), used in Ethereum and many other cryptocurrencies, introduces explicit monetary punishments.
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PoS validators lock up (stake) native tokens and get rewarded for validating blocks or slashed for misbehavior.
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PoS validators lock up (stake) native tokens and get rewarded for validating blocks or slashed for misbehaviour.
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### Decentralized storage
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### Decentralised storage
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Post-Bitcoin decentralized storage networks include Codex, Storj, Sia, Filecoin, IPFS.
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Post-Bitcoin decentralised storage networks include Codex, Storj, Sia, Filecoin, IPFS.
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Their i13n methods combine techniques from early P2P file-sharing with blockchain-inspired reward mechanisms.
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Their i13n methods combine techniques from early P2P file-sharing with blockchain-inspired reward mechanisms.
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# Waku background
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# Waku background
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Waku is a [family of protocols](https://waku.org/about/architect) for a modular privacy-preserving censorship-resistant decentralized communication network.
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Waku is a [family of protocols](https://waku.org/about/architect) for a modular privacy-preserving censorship-resistant decentralised communication network.
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The backbone of Waku is the Relay protocol (and its spam-protected version [RLN-Relay](https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/17/)).
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The backbone of Waku is the Relay protocol (and its spam-protected version [RLN-Relay](https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/17/)).
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Additionally, there are light protocols: Store, Filter, and Lightpush.
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Additionally, there are light protocols: Store, Filter, and Lightpush.
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Light protocols are also referred to as client-server protocols and request-response protocols.
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Light protocols are also referred to as client-server protocols and request-response protocols.
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@ -72,12 +76,12 @@ In light protocols, a client sends a request to a server, and a server performs
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## Waku i13n challenges
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## Waku i13n challenges
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Waku has no consensus and no native token, which brings it closer to reputation-incentivized file-sharing networks.
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Waku has no consensus and no native token, which brings it closer to reputation-incentivised file-sharing networks.
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As of late 2023, Waku only operates under reputation-based rewards and punishments.
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As of late 2023, Waku only operates under reputation-based rewards and punishments.
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While [RLN-Relay](https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/17/) adds monetary punishments for spammers, slashing is yet to be activated.
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While [RLN-Relay](https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/17/) adds monetary punishments for spammers, slashing is yet to be activated.
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Monetary rewards and punishments should ideally be atomically linked with the node's behavior.
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Monetary rewards and punishments should ideally be atomically linked with the node's behaviour.
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A benefit of blockchains in this respect is that the desired behavior of miners or validators can be verified automatically.
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A benefit of blockchains in this respect is that the desired behaviour of miners or validators can be verified automatically.
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Enforcing atomicity in a communication network is more challenging:
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Enforcing atomicity in a communication network is more challenging:
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it is non-trivial to prove that a given piece of data has been relayed.
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it is non-trivial to prove that a given piece of data has been relayed.
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@ -96,9 +100,9 @@ The response may be split into multiple parts, as specified by pagination parame
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We define a _relevant_ message as a message that matches client-defined criteria (e.g., relayed within a given time frame).
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We define a _relevant_ message as a message that matches client-defined criteria (e.g., relayed within a given time frame).
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Upon receiving a request, a server should quickly send back a response containing all and only relevant messages.
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Upon receiving a request, a server should quickly send back a response containing all and only relevant messages.
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# Waku Store incentivization
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# Waku Store incentivisation
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An incentivized Store protocol has the following extra steps:
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An incentivised Store protocol has the following extra steps:
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1. pricing:
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1. pricing:
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1. cost calculation
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1. cost calculation
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2. price advertisement
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2. price advertisement
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@ -155,7 +159,7 @@ The client gives proof of payment before it receives the response.
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Other options could be:
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Other options could be:
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1. the client pays after the fact;
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1. the client pays after the fact;
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2. the client pays partly upfront and partly after the fact;
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2. the client pays partly upfront and partly after the fact;
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3. a centralized third party (either trusted or semi-trusted, like a smart contract) ensures atomicity;
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3. a centralised third party (either trusted or semi-trusted, like a smart contract) ensures atomicity;
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4. cryptographically ensured atomicity (similar to atomic swaps, Lightning, or Hopr).
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4. cryptographically ensured atomicity (similar to atomic swaps, Lightning, or Hopr).
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Our design considerations are:
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Our design considerations are:
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@ -165,7 +169,7 @@ Our design considerations are:
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In light of these criteria, we suggest that the client pays first.
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In light of these criteria, we suggest that the client pays first.
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This is simpler than splitting the payment, or involving an extra atomicity-enforcing mechanism.
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This is simpler than splitting the payment, or involving an extra atomicity-enforcing mechanism.
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Moreover, pre-payment is arguably more privacy-preserving than post-payment, which encourages servers to deanonymize clients to prevent fraud.
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Moreover, pre-payment is arguably more privacy-preserving than post-payment, which encourages servers to deanonymise clients to prevent fraud.
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### Future work
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### Future work
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@ -179,7 +183,7 @@ Moreover, pre-payment is arguably more privacy-preserving than post-payment, whi
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We use reputation to discourage the server from taking the payment and not responding.
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We use reputation to discourage the server from taking the payment and not responding.
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The client keeps track of the server's reputation:
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The client keeps track of the server's reputation:
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- all servers start with zero reputation points;
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- all servers start with zero reputation points;
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- if the server honors the request, it gets `+n` points;
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- if the server honours the request, it gets `+n` points;
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- if the server does not respond before a timeout, it gets `-m` points.
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- if the server does not respond before a timeout, it gets `-m` points.
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- if the server's reputation drops below `k` points, the client will never query it again.
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- if the server's reputation drops below `k` points, the client will never query it again.
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@ -189,7 +193,7 @@ Optionally, a client may treat a given server as trusted, assigning it a constan
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Potential issues:
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Potential issues:
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- An attacker can establish new server identities and continue running away with clients' money. Countermeasures:
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- An attacker can establish new server identities and continue running away with clients' money. Countermeasures:
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- a client only queries trusted servers (which however leads to centralization);
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- a client only queries trusted servers (which however leads to centralisation);
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- when querying a new server, a client first sends a small (i.e. cheap) request as a test;
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- when querying a new server, a client first sends a small (i.e. cheap) request as a test;
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- more generally, the client selects a server on a case-by-case basis, weighing the payment amount against the server's reputation.
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- more generally, the client selects a server on a case-by-case basis, weighing the payment amount against the server's reputation.
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- The ban mechanism can theoretically be abused. For instance, a competitor may attack the victim server and cause the clients who were awaiting the response to ban that server. Countermeasure: prevent DoS-attacks.
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- The ban mechanism can theoretically be abused. For instance, a competitor may attack the victim server and cause the clients who were awaiting the response to ban that server. Countermeasure: prevent DoS-attacks.
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@ -213,11 +217,11 @@ Cross-checking is absent in PoC but may be considered later.
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# Evaluation
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# Evaluation
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We should think about what the success metrics for an incentivized protocol are, and how to measure them both in simulated settings, as well as in a live network.
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We should think about what the success metrics for an incentivised protocol are, and how to measure them both in simulated settings, as well as in a live network.
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# Longer-term future work
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# Longer-term future work
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- Analyze privacy issues - see https://github.com/waku-org/research/issues/61
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- Analyze privacy issues - see https://github.com/waku-org/research/issues/61
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- Analyze decentralized storage protocols and their relevance e.g. as back-end storage for Store servers - see https://github.com/waku-org/research/issues/34
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- Analyze decentralised storage protocols and their relevance e.g. as back-end storage for Store servers - see https://github.com/waku-org/research/issues/34
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- Analyze the role of message senders, in particular, whether they should pay for sending non-ephemeral messages - see https://github.com/waku-org/research/issues/32
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- Analyze the role of message senders, in particular, whether they should pay for sending non-ephemeral messages - see https://github.com/waku-org/research/issues/32
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- Generalize incentivization protocol to other Waku light protocols (Lightpush and Filter) - see https://github.com/waku-org/research/issues/67.
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- Generalise incentivisation protocol to other Waku light protocols (Lightpush and Filter) - see https://github.com/waku-org/research/issues/67.
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