kaichao f41fb40c2f
feat: extend the http registry to store account's installations (#129)
* feat: account to device store

* feat: accout traits and codec

* feat: integrate accounts abstraction

* chore: clean docs and naming

* remove account public key from payload

* chore: fix clippy

* feat: lamport check before update account store

* chore: rebase to core

* chore: register account in new core

* chore: rebase changes and use account pub for index account store

* chore: move chat store outside of libchat

* chore: use account pub for registry
2026-06-11 21:07:11 +08:00

331 lines
12 KiB
Rust

use std::fmt::Debug;
use std::time::{Duration, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
use base64::Engine;
use base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64;
use crypto::{Ed25519Signature, Ed25519VerifyingKey};
use libchat::{
AccountDirectory, BundleError, DeviceSet, IdentityProvider, RegistrationService,
SignedDeviceBundle, verify_bundle,
};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
/// HTTP client for the testnet KeyPackage Registry service.
///
/// Throwaway transport for issue #110 — replaced by λLEZ in v0.3.
///
/// The wire carries `device_id` (the hex device verifying key), an opaque
/// `payload` blob, and its `signature`. The signed bytes and the transmitted
/// `payload` bytes are identical, so every verifier checks the signature over
/// exactly what it received — no field-by-field reconstruction to keep in sync.
/// The `payload` is opaque to the server: it verifies `signature` over `payload`
/// with `device_id`'s key (proof-of-possession — only the holder of that key can
/// publish under `device_id`) without decoding the payload.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct HttpRegistry {
base_url: String,
http: reqwest::blocking::Client,
}
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error)]
pub enum HttpRegistryError {
#[error("http: {0}")]
Http(#[from] reqwest::Error),
#[error("server returned status {0}: {1}")]
Server(u16, String),
#[error("decode: {0}")]
Decode(String),
#[error("clock before unix epoch")]
Clock,
#[error("signature verification failed")]
SignatureInvalid,
#[error("bundle: {0}")]
Bundle(#[from] BundleError),
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
struct SubmitRequest {
/// hex of the 32-byte device verifying key — the verification + storage key.
device_id: String,
/// base64 of the canonical signed payload (see [`encode_payload`]).
payload: String,
/// base64 of the 64-byte Ed25519 signature over `payload`.
signature: String,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
struct FetchResponse {
payload: String,
signature: String,
}
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
struct SubmitAccountRequest {
/// hex of the 32-byte account verifying key — verification + storage key.
account_pub: String,
/// base64 of the canonical signed device-list payload.
payload: String,
/// base64 of the 64-byte account signature over `payload`.
signature: String,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
struct FetchAccountResponse {
payload: String,
signature: String,
#[allow(dead_code)] // server's prune clock; freshness is taken from the bundle's lamport
updated_at: i64,
}
impl HttpRegistry {
pub fn new(base_url: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
Self::with_timeout(base_url, Duration::from_secs(10))
}
pub fn with_timeout(base_url: impl Into<String>, timeout: Duration) -> Self {
let http = reqwest::blocking::Client::builder()
.timeout(timeout)
.build()
.expect("reqwest client builder is infallible with these options");
Self {
base_url: base_url.into().trim_end_matches('/').to_string(),
http,
}
}
}
impl Debug for HttpRegistry {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
f.debug_struct("HttpRegistry")
.field("base_url", &self.base_url)
.finish()
}
}
impl RegistrationService for HttpRegistry {
type Error = HttpRegistryError;
fn register(
&mut self,
identity: &dyn IdentityProvider,
key_bundle: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<(), HttpRegistryError> {
let device_id = hex::encode(identity.public_key().as_ref());
let timestamp_ms = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.map_err(|_| HttpRegistryError::Clock)?
.as_millis() as u64;
// Sign exactly the bytes that go on the wire.
let payload = encode_payload(timestamp_ms, &key_bundle);
let signature = identity.sign(&payload);
let req = SubmitRequest {
device_id,
payload: BASE64.encode(&payload),
signature: BASE64.encode(signature.as_ref()),
};
let url = format!("{}/v0/keypackage", self.base_url);
let resp = self.http.post(&url).json(&req).send()?;
if !resp.status().is_success() {
let status = resp.status().as_u16();
let body = resp.text().unwrap_or_default();
return Err(HttpRegistryError::Server(status, body));
}
Ok(())
}
fn retrieve(&self, device_id: &str) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>, HttpRegistryError> {
let url = format!("{}/v0/keypackage/{}", self.base_url, device_id);
let resp = self.http.get(&url).send()?;
if resp.status().as_u16() == 404 {
return Ok(None);
}
if !resp.status().is_success() {
let status = resp.status().as_u16();
let body = resp.text().unwrap_or_default();
return Err(HttpRegistryError::Server(status, body));
}
let body: FetchResponse = resp.json()?;
let payload = BASE64
.decode(&body.payload)
.map_err(|e| HttpRegistryError::Decode(e.to_string()))?;
let signature_arr: [u8; 64] = BASE64
.decode(&body.signature)
.map_err(|e| HttpRegistryError::Decode(e.to_string()))?
.as_slice()
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| HttpRegistryError::Decode("signature not 64 bytes".into()))?;
// Verify over the received payload bytes, using the key we asked for
// (`device_id`). A bundle the requested device didn't sign won't verify.
let device_pubkey: [u8; 32] = hex::decode(device_id)
.map_err(|e| HttpRegistryError::Decode(e.to_string()))?
.as_slice()
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| HttpRegistryError::Decode("device_id not a 32-byte key".into()))?;
let verifying_key = Ed25519VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&device_pubkey)
.map_err(|_| HttpRegistryError::Decode("device_id not a valid ed25519 vk".into()))?;
verifying_key
.verify(&payload, &Ed25519Signature::from(signature_arr))
.map_err(|_| HttpRegistryError::SignatureInvalid)?;
let (_timestamp_ms, key_package) = decode_payload(&payload)
.ok_or_else(|| HttpRegistryError::Decode("short payload".into()))?;
Ok(Some(key_package.to_vec()))
}
}
impl AccountDirectory for HttpRegistry {
type Error = HttpRegistryError;
fn publish(&mut self, bundle: &SignedDeviceBundle) -> Result<(), Self::Error> {
let req = SubmitAccountRequest {
account_pub: hex::encode(bundle.account_pub.as_ref()),
payload: BASE64.encode(&bundle.payload),
signature: BASE64.encode(bundle.signature.as_ref()),
};
let url = format!("{}/v0/account", self.base_url);
let resp = self.http.post(&url).json(&req).send()?;
if !resp.status().is_success() {
let status = resp.status().as_u16();
let body = resp.text().unwrap_or_default();
return Err(HttpRegistryError::Server(status, body));
}
Ok(())
}
fn fetch(&self, account: &Ed25519VerifyingKey) -> Result<Option<DeviceSet>, Self::Error> {
let url = format!(
"{}/v0/account/{}",
self.base_url,
hex::encode(account.as_ref())
);
let resp = self.http.get(&url).send()?;
if resp.status().as_u16() == 404 {
return Ok(None);
}
if !resp.status().is_success() {
let status = resp.status().as_u16();
let body = resp.text().unwrap_or_default();
return Err(HttpRegistryError::Server(status, body));
}
let body: FetchAccountResponse = resp.json()?;
let payload = BASE64
.decode(&body.payload)
.map_err(|e| HttpRegistryError::Decode(e.to_string()))?;
let signature_arr: [u8; 64] = BASE64
.decode(&body.signature)
.map_err(|e| HttpRegistryError::Decode(e.to_string()))?
.as_slice()
.try_into()
.map_err(|_| HttpRegistryError::Decode("signature not 64 bytes".into()))?;
// The directory service is untrusted: verify the account signature over
// the exact received bytes, and that the bundle is bound to the account
// we asked for, before handing back any device keys.
let bundle = SignedDeviceBundle {
account_pub: account.clone(),
payload,
signature: Ed25519Signature::from(signature_arr),
};
let device_set = verify_bundle(account, &bundle)?;
Ok(Some(device_set))
}
}
/// Canonical binary payload — the bytes that are both signed and transmitted
/// verbatim. Opaque to the server; decoded only by consumers:
///
/// ```text
/// timestamp_ms : u64 little-endian (8 bytes)
/// key_package : remaining bytes (variable, last → no length prefix needed)
/// ```
///
/// The fixed-width field first with the one variable field last makes every
/// byte string parse exactly one way — no delimiter, no ambiguity, even though
/// `key_package` is arbitrary bytes. The device verifying key is carried
/// alongside as `device_id`, not embedded here.
fn encode_payload(timestamp_ms: u64, key_package: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(8 + key_package.len());
out.extend_from_slice(&timestamp_ms.to_le_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(key_package);
out
}
/// Inverse of [`encode_payload`]. Returns `None` if the payload is shorter than
/// the fixed header (`8`).
fn decode_payload(payload: &[u8]) -> Option<(u64, &[u8])> {
if payload.len() < 8 {
return None;
}
let timestamp_ms = u64::from_le_bytes(payload[..8].try_into().ok()?);
Some((timestamp_ms, &payload[8..]))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crypto::Ed25519SigningKey;
/// `encode_payload` / `decode_payload` round-trip, including a key_package
/// containing bytes that a delimiter scheme would choke on (`:`, `|`, NUL).
#[test]
fn payload_roundtrips_with_arbitrary_bytes() {
let ts = 1_700_000_000_000u64;
let key_package = b"mls:bytes|with\x00delimiters".to_vec();
let payload = encode_payload(ts, &key_package);
let (got_ts, got_kp) = decode_payload(&payload).unwrap();
assert_eq!(got_ts, ts);
assert_eq!(got_kp, key_package.as_slice());
}
#[test]
fn decode_rejects_short_payload() {
assert!(decode_payload(&[0u8; 7]).is_none());
}
/// Tampering with any byte of the payload breaks verification.
#[test]
fn signature_binds_payload() {
let signing = Ed25519SigningKey::generate();
let verifying = signing.verifying_key();
let payload = encode_payload(1_700_000_000_000, b"original-keypackage");
let signature = signing.sign(&payload);
let tampered = encode_payload(1_700_000_000_000, b"tampered-keypackage");
verifying
.verify(&tampered, &signature)
.expect_err("signature must not verify against a different payload");
}
/// End-to-end of the wire crypto: verify over the received payload bytes
/// using the key recovered from device_id, exactly as `retrieve` does.
#[test]
fn sign_then_verify_over_payload() {
let signing = Ed25519SigningKey::generate();
let pubkey: [u8; 32] = signing.verifying_key().as_ref().try_into().unwrap();
let payload = encode_payload(1_700_000_000_000, b"fake-mls-keypackage-bytes");
let signature = signing.sign(&payload);
// retrieve side: recover key from device_id (hex of pubkey), verify payload.
let device_id = hex::encode(pubkey);
let recovered: [u8; 32] = hex::decode(&device_id)
.unwrap()
.as_slice()
.try_into()
.unwrap();
Ed25519VerifyingKey::from_bytes(&recovered)
.unwrap()
.verify(&payload, &signature)
.expect("recovered key must verify the register-time signature");
}
}