Files
logos-protocol/cpp/token_manager.h
Dario Gabriel LipicarandClaude Opus 5 d872024847 fix(proxy): authorize against a store that can only hold INBOUND tokens
TokenManager is one flat QHash<QString,QString> with no direction tag, and
both directions write into it under a bare module name: the client saves
the OUTBOUND token under the CALLEE's name, the provider saves the INBOUND
token under the CALLER's name. Last write wins. So a reverse lookup there
can name a module we CALL as the module CALLING us — affirmatively wrong,
and worse than answering "unknown".

The per-identity work did not close this. `forIdentity` splits by CALLING
IDENTITY, a different axis, and it returns `&instance()` for every identity
until `isolateIdentity` runs — whose only production caller is
LogosQmlBridge, on the consumer side. For providers the mechanism is inert.

What has kept it from being an auth hole is TOPOLOGY, by accident rather
than design: with a module as a cdylib in its own host process, the glue
splits the directions across two IMAGES — informModuleToken reaches the
host's store, logos_module_accept_token the cdylib's. Any single-image
configuration puts them back in one map: the in-process plugin host that
Basecamp already uses, local/mobile mode, the shared-runtime migration, and
this repo's own test suite.

So ModuleProxy now takes an optional token store and authorizes against
THAT, defaulting to &instance() — every existing two-argument construction
is byte-identical. Its own m_tokens becomes the inbound record and is
documented as the only store that may name a caller, which is the property
caller-identity recovery will need.

Two things found on the way, both worth their own attention:

* m_tokens had ZERO production writers. Its only feeder is
  LogosAPIProvider::saveToken, which nothing in 43 repos calls, so the
  store was permanently empty in production.
* The isAuthorized/getTokenManager split breaks BOTH ways under isolation:
  privately seeded tokens are invisible AND every ambient token is still
  accepted, re-opening the escalation isolation exists to close. The glue
  comment asserts the opposite.

A test changed the design. The first draft recorded the token BEFORE
forwarding to the provider, justified by a re-entrancy window. That test
went red, and lp_module_accept_token turned out to reach module code only
as far as a store write — it calls nothing back. No window, so the record
moved after the provider's verdict.

Proven red-then-green in three builds: with neither mechanism 3 of 7 fail;
with the record but the scan still on instance() exactly one survives, and
that survivor is what makes it a detector for the SCAN rather than the
record; with the anchor read reverted, the anchor test alone fails. Three
tests are pins that hold on both sides and are labelled as such.

The constant-time fold is preserved: only the receiver object changed.

483/483 protocol tests, the module-impl ABI check, and the mingw cross all
pass; downstream logos-qt-sdk is 239/239 with this tree overridden in
(confirmed reaching by the differing store path).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-21 20:50:15 -03:00

364 lines
15 KiB
C++

#ifndef TOKEN_MANAGER_H
#define TOKEN_MANAGER_H
#include <QObject>
#include <QString>
#include <QStringList>
#include <QHash>
#include <QMutex>
#include <QByteArray>
#include <QCryptographicHash>
#include <string>
#include <vector>
#include "logos_shared_api.h"
/**
* @brief Render a capability/auth token safe to write to logs.
*
* Tokens gate all cross-module RPC and are accepted by value (see
* ModuleProxy::isAuthorized), so a raw token recovered from a log line is
* directly replayable. This collapses a token to a non-reversible, non-
* replayable fingerprint — a fixed prefix plus the first bytes of its SHA-256 —
* suitable for correlating log lines without exposing the secret. The
* "redacted:" prefix signals to anyone reading the log that this is a
* deliberately non-replayable fingerprint, not a truncated real token. Empty
* tokens render as "<none>" so missing-token cases stay greppable.
*
* Always pass tokens through this before logging; never log the raw value.
*/
inline QString redactToken(const QString& token)
{
if (token.isEmpty()) {
return QStringLiteral("<none>");
}
const QByteArray digest =
QCryptographicHash::hash(token.toUtf8(), QCryptographicHash::Sha256);
return QStringLiteral("redacted:") + QString::fromLatin1(digest.toHex().left(8)) + QStringLiteral("…");
}
/**
* @brief TokenManager provides a singleton interface for managing authentication tokens
*
* This class manages a collection of tokens identified by keys, providing thread-safe
* access to store, retrieve, and manage tokens throughout the application lifecycle.
*
* LOGOS_SHARED_API: the singleton below is a function-local static, so it is one
* per copy of the code. On PE that means one per IMAGE unless the consumer
* imports it from liblogos_core.dll — which is exactly the token-invisibility
* bug described in logos_shared_api.h. Off Windows, and inside the provider,
* this expands to nothing.
*/
class LOGOS_SHARED_API TokenManager : public QObject
{
Q_OBJECT
public:
/**
* @brief Get the singleton instance of TokenManager
* @return TokenManager& Reference to the singleton instance
*/
static TokenManager& instance();
/* ── per-identity token stores ──────────────────────────────────────────
*
* WHAT THIS EXISTS TO CLOSE. instance() is the IMAGE's store, and in a host
* that loads plugins in-process it is also an ambient ring: the host writes
* `name -> that module's root auth token` for EVERY loaded module. On the
* hot path a client asserts no identity at all — LogosAPIClient::
* invokeRemoteMethod reads the store first and only mints on a miss — so
* whichever plugin asks for target X finds X's own root token sitting there
* and presents it. The provider accepts any token in its image's store, so
* the call authorizes and no `requestModule` is ever logged. Every plugin in
* that image therefore holds every other module's authority, and giving a
* plugin its own ORIGIN STRING does not change that by one byte, because
* origin is never consulted on the path taken.
*
* The fix is to make origin SELECT THE STORE rather than merely label the
* caller. forIdentity(x) is "the store to present tokens from when I am x".
*
* ADDITIVE BY CONSTRUCTION, and that is not a promise but the shape of the
* code: forIdentity() returns instance() — the same object, pointer-identical
* — for every identity until someone calls isolateIdentity() on that exact
* name. A host that knows nothing about any of this sees no change at all.
* These are static member FUNCTIONS: no data member, no virtual, nothing moc
* sees, so the layout every statically-linked plugin was compiled against is
* untouched.
*
* PER-IMAGE IS NOT PER-CLIENT, and both are needed. A module cdylib links
* its own copy of this library and therefore has its own instance(); that
* per-image store is correct and stays. This adds a second axis INSIDE one
* image, for the case the per-image split cannot reach: several identities
* hosted by one process.
*/
/**
* @brief The token store for calling-identity `identity`.
*
* Returns instance() unless `identity` has been isolated, in which case it
* returns that identity's private store. The address is stable for the
* lifetime of the image, so a client may hold it by raw pointer (which
* LogosAPIClient does, and dereferences from async continuations that can
* outlive their caller).
*
* Calling this for a name that is NOT isolated records that a shared store
* was handed out under it — see isolateIdentity().
*/
static TokenManager& forIdentity(const QString& identity);
/**
* @brief Declare `identity` to have a PRIVATE, initially bootstrap-only store.
*
* Idempotent: isolating an already-isolated identity returns true and
* changes nothing.
*
* Returns FALSE — and changes nothing — if forIdentity() already handed the
* SHARED store out under this name. Callers must treat that as fatal for the
* identity rather than continuing. The refusal is not defensive padding:
* LogosAPIClient captures its store as a raw pointer at construction and
* dereferences it on the hot path, so isolating after a client for the name
* exists leaves one client on the ambient ring and another on the private
* store — the precise "looks fixed, isn't" outcome this whole change exists
* to avoid. Isolate before constructing anything for the identity.
*
* Returns false for an empty identity: "" is the not-an-identity value that
* every un-named caller passes, and isolating it would isolate all of them
* into one shared pseudo-store, which is worse than leaving them ambient.
*/
static bool isolateIdentity(const QString& identity);
/** @brief Whether `identity` has a private store. */
static bool isIsolated(const QString& identity);
/** @brief Every isolated identity. Diagnostics only. */
static QStringList isolatedIdentities();
/**
* @brief The keys a private store is seeded with: the trust-root bootstrap.
*
* A private store starts empty of everything a caller could escalate with,
* but NOT empty: a module's first call to an unknown target runs
* `capability_module.requestModule`, and that call is itself authenticated
* with the token stored under "capability_module" (and "core" for the
* host-side channel). Withhold those and the very first exchange fails, so
* an isolated identity could never obtain any token at all.
*
* These two keys, and only these two, are copied from instance() into a
* private store when it is created. Every other module's root token — the
* thing that made the ambient ring an escalation — is not.
*/
static QStringList bootstrapKeys();
/**
* @brief Copy the bootstrap tokens from instance() into `identity`'s private
* store, for keys it does not already hold.
*
* Runs automatically when a private store is created, which is the ordering
* a host already satisfies (bootstrap tokens are seeded before any module
* loads). Exposed for the host that learns a bootstrap token later.
*
* @return the number of keys copied; 0 for a non-isolated identity.
*/
static int seedBootstrapTokens(const QString& identity);
/**
* @brief Clear an isolated identity's private store and re-seed the
* bootstrap, e.g. when the plugin behind it is unloaded.
*
* The store OBJECT is immortal — a client mid-flight must never dereference
* freed memory — so what has a lifetime is its CONTENTS. After a reload the
* identity would otherwise present per-target tokens minted for its previous
* incarnation; the provider rejects them and the existing rejection-driven
* re-exchange heals it in one retry, so skipping this costs latency and log
* noise rather than correctness. Do it anyway.
*
* Deliberately a no-op returning false for a NON-isolated identity: that
* store is the shared ring, and clearing it would take every other
* identity's tokens — including the host's — with it.
*/
static bool resetIdentity(const QString& identity);
/**
* @brief Save a token with the given key
* @param key The identifier for the token
* @param token The token value to store
*/
void saveToken(const QString& key, const QString& token);
/**
* @brief Save a token — const char* overload (resolves ambiguity, delegates to QString)
*/
void saveToken(const char* key, const char* token)
{ saveToken(QString(key), QString(token)); }
/**
* @brief Save a token with the given key (std::string overload)
*/
void saveToken(const std::string& key, const std::string& token);
/**
* @brief Retrieve a token by key
* @param key The identifier for the token
* @return QString The token value, or empty string if not found
*/
QString getToken(const QString& key) const;
/**
* @brief Retrieve a token — const char* overload (resolves ambiguity, delegates to QString)
*/
QString getToken(const char* key) const
{ return getToken(QString(key)); }
/**
* @brief Retrieve a token by key (std::string overload)
* @return std::string The token value, or empty string if not found
*/
std::string getToken(const std::string& key) const;
/**
* @brief Check if a token exists for the given key
* @param key The identifier to check
* @return bool True if token exists, false otherwise
*/
bool hasToken(const QString& key) const;
/**
* @brief hasToken — const char* overload (resolves ambiguity, delegates to QString)
*/
bool hasToken(const char* key) const
{ return hasToken(QString(key)); }
/**
* @brief Check if a token exists for the given key (std::string overload)
*/
bool hasToken(const std::string& key) const;
/**
* @brief Remove a token by key
* @param key The identifier for the token to remove
* @return bool True if token was removed, false if it didn't exist
*/
bool removeToken(const QString& key);
/**
* @brief removeToken — const char* overload (resolves ambiguity, delegates to QString)
*/
bool removeToken(const char* key)
{ return removeToken(QString(key)); }
/**
* @brief Remove a token by key (std::string overload)
*/
bool removeToken(const std::string& key);
/**
* @brief Clear all tokens
*/
void clearAllTokens();
/**
* @brief Get all token keys
* @return QList<QString> List of all token keys
*/
QList<QString> getTokenKeys() const;
/**
* @brief Get all token keys (std::string flavour)
*
* Named rather than overloaded because C++ cannot overload on return type
* alone. Exists for the Qt-free callers — lp_token_keys() and, through it,
* any language SDK — so the conversion lives here next to the store rather
* than being retyped at each boundary.
*/
std::vector<std::string> getTokenKeysStd() const;
/**
* @brief Get the number of stored tokens
* @return int Number of tokens stored
*/
int tokenCount() const;
signals:
/**
* @brief Emitted when a token is saved
* @param key The key of the saved token
*/
void tokenSaved(const QString& key);
/**
* @brief Emitted when a token is removed
* @param key The key of the removed token
*/
void tokenRemoved(const QString& key);
/**
* @brief Emitted when all tokens are cleared
*/
void allTokensCleared();
private:
/**
* @brief Private constructor for singleton pattern
* @param parent Parent QObject
*
* Still private with per-identity stores in the picture, and that is what
* forces forIdentity()/isolateIdentity() to be static MEMBERS rather than
* free functions or a helper struct: only a member can construct one. A
* public constructor would also defeat the purpose — nothing would make two
* callers naming the same identity find the SAME store, and lp_client_create's
* frozen signature has no way to be handed one.
*/
explicit TokenManager(QObject *parent = nullptr);
/**
* @brief Private destructor
*
* Private, so a per-identity store cannot be deleted from outside — which is
* exactly the intended lifetime. Private stores are heap-allocated and never
* destroyed: LogosAPIClient holds its store by raw pointer and touches it
* from async continuations that can fire after their caller returned, and
* lp_client_destroy already defers client teardown to the owner thread and
* documents that the client simply leaks if that loop never runs again. A
* refcounted store would put destruction order on that path for a security
* object. One QHash per isolated identity is not a cost worth that.
*/
~TokenManager();
// Delete copy constructor and assignment operator to enforce singleton
TokenManager(const TokenManager&) = delete;
TokenManager& operator=(const TokenManager&) = delete;
/**
* @brief Hash map storing tokens by key.
*
* DIRECTION-MIXED, AND THEREFORE NEVER A CALLER ORACLE. One flat map with no
* direction tag, written from both sides of every relationship:
*
* * OUTBOUND — LogosAPIClient stores the token it will PRESENT to a callee
* under the CALLEE's name (logos_api_client.cpp:176, async twin :332).
* * INBOUND — a token RECEIVED from a caller is stored under the CALLER's
* name (lp_module_accept_token -> logos_protocol.cpp:635, and
* LogosProviderBase::informModuleToken in logos-plugin-qt).
*
* Same key namespace, last write wins. So a reverse lookup here — "which key
* holds this token, therefore who is calling me" — can name a module we CALL
* as the module CALLING us. That is affirmatively wrong, and worse than
* declining to answer. ModuleProxy::m_tokens is the caller-keyed,
* inbound-only record; anything that needs to NAME a caller uses that.
*
* The two directions do not currently collide in the DEFAULT topology, but
* only by accident of linkage: a module cdylib links its own copy of this
* library, so its outbound writes land in the cdylib image's instance()
* while the host image's store takes the inbound ones. Any single-image
* configuration — an in-process plugin host, the shared-runtime migration,
* this test suite — puts both in one map again.
*/
QHash<QString, QString> m_tokens;
/**
* @brief Mutex for thread-safe access to tokens
*/
mutable QMutex m_mutex;
};
#endif // TOKEN_MANAGER_H