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Verification of my own item-16 result, which I had flagged as resting on a step I had not checked: "break-even" was measured as revenue SHARE >= stake share, and share-to-pay equivalence rests on sec 6.6's issuance argument. It does not hold as stated. A revenue share is measured against the canonical block rate, but pay is set by the estimator. TSI drives COUNTED density -- canonical plus recovered uncles -- to f per slot, so a run yields f/D-hat block-finding events per slot and a deflating attack makes the lottery easier for everyone. Pay per slot is adv_rate * f / D-hat against an honest miner's alpha * f, so the correction on the share ratio is density/D-hat, which is below 1 whenever any uncle is recovered. Scoring on share credits the attacker with pay it never receives. The headline survives; one row does not. At alpha = 0.4 the true break-even point deflates to 0.649 rather than 0.642 (against the revenue-optimal 0.811), so 16 points of free deflation instead of 17. But at alpha = 0.36 the policy I reported as paying 1.033x stake actually pays 0.95x, and NO policy in the sweep both pays and deflates there -- that row is withdrawn. The exposure therefore opens near alpha ~ 0.37-0.38, above the 1/3 selfish threshold, not at it. That is a better result for the protocol than the one I published yesterday, which is the direction these corrections usually do not go. pay_vs_honest is now computed in deflation_frontier() and is the criterion best_profitable() selects on, so the claim is reproducible rather than resting on a hand check. The conversion neglects the multi-winner factor c(f) ~ 1.017 between events and occupied slots (sec 2.1), noted inline and small against a 16-point effect. Downstream citations in sec 1, sec 8.2 and item 16 updated. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>