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Sec 6.8 recorded that "the per-node engine has no private-chain strategy", which is why every selfish result came from the global race model with uncle recovery as a free knob eta -- and why open item 5 (does the uncle cap need margin under attack-inflated orphaning?) could not be sized: a knob has no queue to overflow. adversary_strategy="selfish" adds it. The coalition mines one shared private chain and releases under the classic SM1 rules in (a, h) form: adopt when the public chain wins, match at equal length, override at a one-block lead, else wait. Only VISIBILITY is modelled -- the coalition's mining needs no special case, because a member's fork choice already builds on the private tip whenever it leads (that tip has the greatest height among blocks the member can see) and falls back to the public chain exactly when the public chain overtakes, which is the adopt branch. So the private chain forms, extends and is abandoned emergently, and the code that had to be written is the arrival matrix. Design notes worth keeping: - Private blocks reuse the sentinel `withhold` already had (never-arrives), so the existing exclusions from canonical-tip selection apply unchanged; release flips it back and gossips DIRECTLY from the producer, bypassing Blend, since an adversary has no privacy budget to respect and wants the race won. - A private chain breaks the windowed horizon's premise (a hidden block is old enough to look fully-propagated while no honest node has it, and it becomes visible LATER, which the one-way frontier pointer cannot revisit), so selfish forces the exact full scan and full matrix. - Blocks still hidden at epoch end are abandoned and hidden from the coalition too, or the canonical-tip search would crown a chain no honest node saw. Validated against Eyal-Sirer at sub-slot latency: revenue share 0.0356 vs an exact 0.0356 at alpha = 0.1, and above the closed form at higher alpha by just the margin the alpha_eff fork-amplification correction predicts (0.498 vs 0.484 at alpha = 0.4, with fork rate 0.38). Adds p_ref_honest: the reference rate over orphans produced OUTSIDE the coalition. Under a private-chain attack this diverges sharply from p_ref, and only the honest one measures the repair the report credits to uncle counting -- an attacker's own discarded blocks are its loss to bear. test_fork unpacks fork_stats positionally, so its three call sites take the new fifth value. 247 tests pass. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
175 lines
8.1 KiB
Python
175 lines
8.1 KiB
Python
"""The private-chain (SM1) adversary inside the per-node engine (§6.6, open item 5).
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§6.8 recorded that "the per-node engine has no private-chain strategy", which is why the
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selfish results came from the global race model with uncle recovery as a free knob. These
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tests pin the engine version: that it leaves every honest result untouched, that its blocks
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are conserved, and that it actually orphans honest work rather than merely hiding its own.
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"""
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import numpy as np
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import pytest
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from tsi_sim.blocktree import build_tree_pernode
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from tsi_sim.config import SimConfig
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from tsi_sim.engine import _adversary_mask, run_trajectory
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from tsi_sim.rng import rng_for
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from tsi_sim.stake import make_stake
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BASE = dict(n_nodes=200, stake_dist="pareto", topology="blend", degree=6,
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link_latency_mean=0.5, link_latency_dist="geo", blend_hops=3, blend_delay_max=8.0,
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max_uncles=2, k=32, epochs=4, genesis_d_factor=0.5, early_stop=False)
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def _traj(**over):
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return run_trajectory(SimConfig(**{**BASE, **over}))
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def test_selfish_at_zero_stake_keeps_the_honest_fast_paths():
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"""With no coalition, `selfish` must not disturb the honest engine at all.
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Note it is NOT bit-identical to `suppress` at frac = 0: adversary_strategy sits in the base
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RNG key, so switching it reseeds the run even though the field is inert without a coalition.
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That is pre-existing and harmless (both are valid honest runs), so the invariant worth
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pinning is the one that protects committed results — that the windowed fork choice and the
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arrival prune, which `selfish` disables when it IS active, stay enabled and stay exact here.
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"""
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exact = _traj(adversary_strategy="selfish", adversary_frac=0.0,
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windowed_fork_choice=False, prune_arrival=False)
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fast = _traj(adversary_strategy="selfish", adversary_frac=0.0)
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assert [r["mean_ratio"] for r in fast] == [r["mean_ratio"] for r in exact]
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assert max(r["range_ratio"] for r in fast) == 0.0 # honest run: nodes agree exactly
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def test_selfish_key_is_distinct_from_the_other_strategies():
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# adversary_strategy already sits in the base key, so no historical seed moves; this just
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# pins that the new value is not silently aliased onto an existing stream.
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keys = {s: SimConfig(**BASE, adversary_frac=0.3, adversary_strategy=s).key()
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for s in ("suppress", "withhold", "selfish")}
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assert len(set(keys.values())) == 3
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def test_selfish_is_deterministic():
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a = _traj(adversary_frac=0.3, adversary_strategy="selfish")
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b = _traj(adversary_frac=0.3, adversary_strategy="selfish")
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assert [r["mean_ratio"] for r in a] == [r["mean_ratio"] for r in b]
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def _tree(**over):
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cfg = SimConfig(**{**BASE, **over})
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stake = make_stake(cfg, rng_for(cfg))
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mask = _adversary_mask(cfg, stake)
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from tsi_sim import lottery, topology
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root = __import__("tsi_sim.rng", fromlist=["seedseq_for"]).seedseq_for(cfg)
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kids = root.spawn(cfg.epochs + 3)
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pl = topology.build_path_latency(cfg, np.random.default_rng(kids[1]))
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d_est = np.full(cfg.n_nodes, cfg.genesis_d_factor * stake.sum())
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p = lottery.win_probs(stake, d_est, cfg.f)
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ws, wn = lottery.sample_wins(p, cfg.epoch_len, np.random.default_rng(kids[3]))
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slots, groups = lottery.group_by_slot(ws, wn)
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tree, A = build_tree_pernode(slots, groups, pl, cfg, np.random.default_rng(kids[4]),
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adversary_mask=mask)
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return cfg, tree, A, mask
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def test_private_blocks_are_invisible_to_honest_nodes_while_hidden():
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cfg, tree, A, mask = _tree(adversary_frac=0.3, adversary_strategy="selfish")
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E = cfg.epoch_len
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honest = ~mask
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# Every block is either public (some honest node has it) or hidden from ALL honest nodes.
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reaches_honest = (A[honest] <= E).any(axis=0)
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hidden = ~reaches_honest
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hidden[0] = False
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# a hidden block is never a partial leak: no honest node holds it
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assert not (A[honest][:, hidden] <= E).any()
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# and every hidden block was produced by the coalition, never by an honest node
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assert mask[tree.leader[hidden]].all()
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def test_released_blocks_never_precede_their_parent():
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# The release path applies its own no-earlier-than-parent clamp; a violation would let a
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# node build on a child before its parent and corrupt the tree.
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cfg, tree, A, mask = _tree(adversary_frac=0.3, adversary_strategy="selfish")
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for b in range(1, tree.n_blocks):
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p = int(tree.parent[b])
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assert (A[:, b] >= A[:, p] - 1e-9).all(), f"block {b} precedes parent {p}"
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def _honest_orphans_in_window(cfg, tree, A, mask) -> int:
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"""In-window orphans produced by NON-coalition nodes — the displaced honest work."""
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E, T = cfg.epoch_len, cfg.period_T
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nb = tree.n_blocks
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ids = np.arange(nb)
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arrived = (A <= E).any(axis=0)
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arrived[0] = True
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h = np.where(arrived, tree.height, np.iinfo(np.int64).min)
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best = int(np.lexsort((-ids, -tree.slot, h))[-1])
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canonical = np.zeros(nb, dtype=bool)
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b = best
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while b > 0:
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canonical[b] = True
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b = int(tree.parent[b])
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in_win = (tree.slot >= 0) & (tree.slot < T)
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return int((in_win & ~canonical & ~mask[tree.leader]).sum())
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def test_selfish_displaces_honest_work_where_withholding_only_hides_its_own():
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# This is the distinction between the two levers, and the reason only one of them is
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# profitable: withholding discards the coalition's OWN blocks (a dead loss, and honest
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# blocks keep their places), while a private chain overrides HONEST blocks off the chain.
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# Compare the honest orphan count at matched stake -- not fork_rate, which counts the
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# withholder's own vanished blocks as orphans too and so runs high for the wrong reason.
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kw = dict(adversary_frac=0.4, max_uncles=0)
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cfg_s, tree_s, A_s, mask_s = _tree(adversary_strategy="selfish", **kw)
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cfg_w, tree_w, A_w, mask_w = _tree(adversary_strategy="withhold", **kw)
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assert (_honest_orphans_in_window(cfg_s, tree_s, A_s, mask_s)
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> _honest_orphans_in_window(cfg_w, tree_w, A_w, mask_w))
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def test_selfish_deflates_the_estimate_below_the_honest_baseline():
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tail = slice(2, None)
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honest = np.mean([r["mean_ratio"] for r in _traj(max_uncles=0)[tail]])
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selfish = np.mean([r["mean_ratio"] for r in
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_traj(adversary_frac=0.35, adversary_strategy="selfish",
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max_uncles=0)[tail]])
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assert selfish < honest
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def test_uncle_counting_repairs_part_of_the_selfish_deflation():
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# The §6.6 claim, now measurable in the engine rather than through the free knob eta:
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# uncles recover some of the loss, and (per §6.6/fig36) not all of it.
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tail = slice(2, None)
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d0 = np.mean([r["mean_ratio"] for r in
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_traj(adversary_frac=0.35, adversary_strategy="selfish", max_uncles=0)[tail]])
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d2 = np.mean([r["mean_ratio"] for r in
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_traj(adversary_frac=0.35, adversary_strategy="selfish", max_uncles=2)[tail]])
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assert d2 > d0
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def test_p_ref_honest_defaults_to_p_ref_without_a_coalition():
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from tsi_sim.fork import fork_stats
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cfg, tree, A, _ = _tree()
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*_, p_ref, p_ref_h = fork_stats(tree, A, cfg.period_T, cutoff=cfg.epoch_len)
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assert p_ref == p_ref_h
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@pytest.mark.parametrize("strategy", ["selfish", "withhold"])
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def test_hidden_blocks_are_excluded_from_the_canonical_chain(strategy):
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# A chain no honest node ever saw must not be crowned canonical, or it would collect
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# phantom rewards and phantom density.
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from tsi_sim.epoch import _canonical_producer_split
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cfg, tree, A, mask = _tree(adversary_frac=0.4, adversary_strategy=strategy)
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E, T = cfg.epoch_len, cfg.period_T
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adv, hon = _canonical_producer_split(tree, A, mask, T, E)
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reaches_honest = (A[~mask] <= E).any(axis=0)
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# walk the chosen canonical tip: every block on it is public
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ids = np.arange(tree.n_blocks)
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arrived = (A <= E).any(axis=0)
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arrived[0] = True
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h = np.where(arrived, tree.height, np.iinfo(np.int64).min)
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best = int(np.lexsort((-ids, -tree.slot, h))[-1])
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b = best
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while b > 0:
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assert reaches_honest[b], f"canonical block {b} was never public"
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b = int(tree.parent[b])
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assert adv + hon > 0
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