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The study started as a peering-degree question and grew well past it: propagation, adversary exposure, deanonymization and time-to-link, reliability under uniform and correlated churn, messaging redundancy, and cover traffic. The pd name no longer describes it. tools/simulators/blend/pd/ -> tools/simulators/blend/, package src/pd -> src/blend, and reports/blend/pd/ -> reports/blend/. Moved with git mv so history follows. The text substitutions are deliberately narrow. pd is also the conventional pandas alias, and pandas genuinely has a pd.plotting submodule, so a blanket pd. -> blend. rewrite would have corrupted four files. Only package-unambiguous forms were changed: from pd.X, -m pd.X, pd.<our module>, PD_BYTES_BUDGET, src/pd, and the pyproject name. All four import pandas as pd lines are untouched and verified. Both READMEs reframed: peering degree is now presented as the primary axis that ties the others together rather than as the subject, and the relative links, which lost a directory level in the move, are corrected. Verified after the move: ruff clean, 101 tests, 45 verify anchors, make targets, the script shims, an end-to-end smoke run, and data/report_numbers.py still reproducing the report tables from the checked-in evidence. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
37 lines
1.9 KiB
YAML
37 lines
1.9 KiB
YAML
# Cover traffic: the anonymity set it buys, and the stake concentration it tolerates.
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#
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# Every node emits on its own uniformly-chosen slots at rate cover_rate_mult/N, so the default of
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# 1.0 puts one emission per second on the whole network. Winning the block lottery consumes the
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# next scheduled cover, which is what keeps every node's emission COUNT identical whether or not it
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# produces blocks -- the property cover traffic exists to buy.
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#
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# Two things are measured. On a timeline: blending, the broadcasts a relay saw between consecutive
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# releases (the anonymity set, since an observer cannot tell which one it forwarded), against
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# mixing, the messages it held at once. At the baseline rate mixing is essentially nil, so the rate
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# is swept over three decades to find where per-relay mixing actually begins. Over an epoch: which
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# nodes win more proposals than their emission quota and so cannot stay uniform.
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#
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# max_blend_delay is swept alongside the rate because delay is the cheaper lever -- blending is
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# rate*(2M+1)/3, so a longer release interval multiplies the anonymity set without adding a single
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# message to the wire. The cost of that delay is priced in section 3.1.
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n_nodes: [20000]
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degree: [8]
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blend_hops: [3]
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max_blend_delay: [3, 10, 30]
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unresponsive_frac: [0.0]
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cover_rate_mult: [1.0, 4.0, 16.0, 64.0, 256.0]
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f_adv: [0.2]
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adversary_mode: [random]
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seeds: 4
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base:
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# heavy-tailed stake is what makes the quota ceiling bite: the head sits orders of magnitude
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# above it while the tail sits far below, so the breakpoint is measurable rather than assumed.
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stake_dist: zipf
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stake_zipf_a: 1.0
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stake_inference_ratio: 1.0 # D_hat/D from the consensus study; 1.0 = an accurate estimator
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block_interval_slots: 30
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slots_per_epoch: 648000
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traffic_window_slots: 900
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n_rounds: 20 # propagation is not the subject here; keep it cheap
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n_placements: 1
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