Marcin Pawlowski 0510b20684
Countable recovery under a selfish adversary: SM1 hides the first-fork cost
The countable model can reference only the first block of a fork, so a
discarded chain of h honest blocks yields one countable uncle, not h. Sec 6.6
reads the estimator repair off a free knob eta and quotes it at eta = 1 --
attainable under SM1, which acts the moment the honest branch reaches length 1
and so never buries a second block. The optimal SSZ policy waits and does bury
them, and there the deployed counting rules cap eta at 0.44 (alpha = 0.4,
gamma = 0), landing D-hat at 0.81 rather than the 0.94 an unrestricted count
gives -- and the ceiling degrades with alpha while the unrestricted value
improves. So SM1 is a faithful proxy for selfish-mining revenue (0.484 vs
0.489) but not for TSI's estimator damage.

selfish_mdp: carry per-branch orphan counts on the transition table so the
accounting cannot drift from the race logic; optimal_policy_stats solves the
policy's stationary distribution for per-event canonical/orphan rates. The
per-event rates sum to 1 (every block is canonical or orphaned), which the
tests assert as an independent check on the whole derivation.

reorg: the same ceiling for the depth-maximising adversary -- 0.52 at
alpha = 0.30 with the measured honest fork rate -- reached from the other
direction. Neither adversary optimises deflation directly, so both ceilings
are upper bounds on eta; that gap is logged as open item 16.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-05 15:29:57 +02:00
2026-07-30 11:43:55 +02:00
2026-07-30 11:44:33 +02:00

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