Scope-variants lede: say which conclusion each variant touches

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

reports/tsi/README.md

@@ -588,7 +588,7 @@ The curve is **within `0.09` for `β = 0.5` and `β = 1.0`** at every duty — p
 - **The reward metric is relative canonical-block *share*** — which, because TSI holds the counted density at `f` (so the canonical block rate does not inflate when `D̂` deflates), equals the *absolute* per-block reward per unit stake; see the issuance note in [§6.6](#s6-6).
 - **Open-loop, single, equal-stake coalition.** Untested here: adaptive (feedback) schedules that react to the observed `D̂` or target the finalized measurement window directly. (The joint/adaptive adversary is closed in [§6.7](#s6-7); *multiple* non-cooperating coalitions are treated in [§6.9](#s6-9).) The remaining three scope variants — whale coalitions, very slow `β`, and `jitter > 0` — are measured below.
 
-**The scope variants, measured** (`scripts/adversary_variants.py`, 8–12 replicates per cell). None of the three moves a conclusion, and two sharpen one:
+**The scope variants, measured** (`scripts/adversary_variants.py`, 8–12 replicates per cell). None of the three overturns a conclusion; two strengthen one, and the first adds a caveat about how the `β_adv` axis should be read:
 
 - **Whale coalitions (`adversary_selection: whale`, the largest holders at matched stake).** Concentration does not change the deflation: under suppression `D̂` is indistinguishable between a random coalition and a whale one at every stake tested (0.997 vs 0.998 at `β_adv` = 0.1, 1.001 vs 0.998 at 0.3, 0.990 vs 0.985 at 0.5). Under withholding the whale arm reproduces the [§6.4](#s6-4) law `D̂ → (1−β_adv)` *more* cleanly than the random arm does — 0.9005 / 0.6997 / 0.5010 against the predicted 0.9 / 0.7 / 0.5. The concern the scope note raised (a "lumpier share statistic") turns out to point the other way, and the reason is the coalition *construction*, not concentration: a random coalition is grown until its stake first reaches `β_adv`, so the last node added overshoots by its own size — which under a Pareto tail can be a whale. Its realised block share is therefore both biased high and highly variable (0.137 ± 0.108 at a nominal `β_adv` = 0.1), while the whale coalition, filled largest-first up to the target, lands on 0.0999 ± 0.0037. Read the `β_adv` axis of [§6.3](#s6-3)–[§6.4](#s6-4) as a nominal target with that overshoot around it, not as a realised share.
 - **`jitter > 0`.** Re-running the withhold-rejoin schedule in the guaranteed-exact mode across `jitter_mean ∈ {0, 0.3, 1.0}` slots changes nothing measurable: mean `D̂` 0.848 / 0.848 / 0.847, notch amplitude 0.390 / 0.402 / 0.410, attacker block share 0.150 / 0.152 / 0.152, and `range_ratio ≡ 0` throughout — consensus stays exact under attack, as [§6.1](#s6-1) found it does honestly.