Add pd: peering-degree Blend Monte-Carlo graph simulator
Static-graph simulator quantifying how a node's peering degree trades off
propagation speed, adversary exposure, deanonymization, and reliability in the
Blend network. Scales to 1e6 nodes (sparse CSR + sampled Dijkstra); the
adversary and deanonymization metrics are exact at every N.
Model (ms): seeded d-regular peer graph (matching-union), Blend cascade
(sender -> blend_hops timed-release mix relays -> final flood), geographic link
base + exponential transport jitter, per-node processing lag, free-running
release-clock mixing.
Metrics:
- propagation: full-delay mean/p50/p90/p99, path/broadcast split, coverage times
- reliability: message success-delivery-rate ~ (1-unresponsive_frac)^blend_hops
and flood coverage, with unresponsive nodes modelled as routing holes
- adversary (exact): observed/eclipsed fractions, random + worst-case placement
- deanonymization (exact): P(whole blend path adversarial) ~ f_adv^blend_hops,
and full deanonymization (path adversarial AND honest sender peered with an
adversary) = deanon_rate * observed_frac
Deterministic blake2b seed streams, three parquet tables, joblib parallelism,
memguard, an analytic verify harness, 50 unit tests, and an auto-installing
Makefile.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 16:47:46 +02:00
|
|
|
"""Deanonymization metrics: exact closed forms + a Monte-Carlo tie to the actual draw.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
A *deanonymization* event is a round whose whole blend path is adversarial; *full* deanonymization
|
|
|
|
|
additionally requires the honest sender to be directly peered with an adversary. Relays are drawn
|
|
|
|
|
uniformly blind to who is adversarial, so both rates are exact (no sampling in production)."""
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
import numpy as np
|
|
|
|
|
|
Rename the simulator and report from pd to blend
The study started as a peering-degree question and grew well past it: propagation,
adversary exposure, deanonymization and time-to-link, reliability under uniform
and correlated churn, messaging redundancy, and cover traffic. The pd name no
longer describes it.
tools/simulators/blend/pd/ -> tools/simulators/blend/, package src/pd -> src/blend,
and reports/blend/pd/ -> reports/blend/. Moved with git mv so history follows.
The text substitutions are deliberately narrow. pd is also the conventional pandas
alias, and pandas genuinely has a pd.plotting submodule, so a blanket pd. -> blend.
rewrite would have corrupted four files. Only package-unambiguous forms were
changed: from pd.X, -m pd.X, pd.<our module>, PD_BYTES_BUDGET, src/pd, and the
pyproject name. All four import pandas as pd lines are untouched and verified.
Both READMEs reframed: peering degree is now presented as the primary axis that
ties the others together rather than as the subject, and the relative links, which
lost a directory level in the move, are corrected.
Verified after the move: ruff clean, 101 tests, 45 verify anchors, make targets,
the script shims, an end-to-end smoke run, and data/report_numbers.py still
reproducing the report tables from the checked-in evidence.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-06 12:20:07 +02:00
|
|
|
from blend.adversary import adversary_metrics, deanon_metrics, place_adversary
|
|
|
|
|
from blend.config import SimConfig
|
|
|
|
|
from blend.engine import run_graph_cell
|
|
|
|
|
from blend.graph import build_graph
|
Add pd: peering-degree Blend Monte-Carlo graph simulator
Static-graph simulator quantifying how a node's peering degree trades off
propagation speed, adversary exposure, deanonymization, and reliability in the
Blend network. Scales to 1e6 nodes (sparse CSR + sampled Dijkstra); the
adversary and deanonymization metrics are exact at every N.
Model (ms): seeded d-regular peer graph (matching-union), Blend cascade
(sender -> blend_hops timed-release mix relays -> final flood), geographic link
base + exponential transport jitter, per-node processing lag, free-running
release-clock mixing.
Metrics:
- propagation: full-delay mean/p50/p90/p99, path/broadcast split, coverage times
- reliability: message success-delivery-rate ~ (1-unresponsive_frac)^blend_hops
and flood coverage, with unresponsive nodes modelled as routing holes
- adversary (exact): observed/eclipsed fractions, random + worst-case placement
- deanonymization (exact): P(whole blend path adversarial) ~ f_adv^blend_hops,
and full deanonymization (path adversarial AND honest sender peered with an
adversary) = deanon_rate * observed_frac
Deterministic blake2b seed streams, three parquet tables, joblib parallelism,
memguard, an analytic verify harness, 50 unit tests, and an auto-installing
Makefile.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 16:47:46 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_deanon_rate_hand_computed():
|
|
|
|
|
# n=4, 2 adversaries, honest sender leaves 3 nodes (2 adversarial) in the relay pool;
|
|
|
|
|
# k=2 distinct relays both adversarial: C(2,2)/C(3,2) = 1/3.
|
|
|
|
|
dz = deanon_metrics(n=4, n_adv=2, observed_frac=0.5, blend_hops=2)
|
|
|
|
|
assert abs(dz["deanon_rate"] - 1.0 / 3.0) < 1e-12
|
|
|
|
|
assert abs(dz["full_deanon_rate"] - (1.0 / 3.0) * 0.5) < 1e-12
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_deanon_rate_zero_when_too_few_adversaries():
|
|
|
|
|
assert deanon_metrics(n=100, n_adv=1, observed_frac=0.9, blend_hops=2)["deanon_rate"] == 0.0
|
|
|
|
|
assert deanon_metrics(n=100, n_adv=0, observed_frac=0.0, blend_hops=1)["deanon_rate"] == 0.0
|
|
|
|
|
# too few adversaries -> no full deanonymization either
|
|
|
|
|
too_few = deanon_metrics(n=100, n_adv=1, observed_frac=0.9, blend_hops=2)
|
|
|
|
|
assert too_few["full_deanon_rate"] == 0.0
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_full_deanon_is_deanon_times_observed():
|
|
|
|
|
dz = deanon_metrics(n=5000, n_adv=1000, observed_frac=0.73, blend_hops=3)
|
|
|
|
|
assert abs(dz["full_deanon_rate"] - dz["deanon_rate"] * 0.73) < 1e-12
|
|
|
|
|
assert dz["full_deanon_rate"] <= dz["deanon_rate"] + 1e-12
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_deanon_rate_is_placement_independent_but_full_is_not():
|
|
|
|
|
"""The whole-path-adversarial rate depends only on the adversary COUNT; the full rate also
|
|
|
|
|
tracks how many honest nodes are peered with an adversary, which the worst case maximizes."""
|
|
|
|
|
g = build_graph(SimConfig(n_nodes=2000, degree=6, graph_seed=0))
|
|
|
|
|
rng = np.random.default_rng(0)
|
|
|
|
|
rand = adversary_metrics(g, place_adversary(g, 0.2, "random", rng, 10**9))
|
|
|
|
|
wc = adversary_metrics(g, place_adversary(g, 0.2, "worstcase_coverage", rng, 10**9))
|
|
|
|
|
assert rand["n_adv"] == wc["n_adv"] # same budget
|
|
|
|
|
dz_rand = deanon_metrics(g.n, rand["n_adv"], rand["observed_frac"], 3)
|
|
|
|
|
dz_wc = deanon_metrics(g.n, wc["n_adv"], wc["observed_frac"], 3)
|
|
|
|
|
assert abs(dz_rand["deanon_rate"] - dz_wc["deanon_rate"]) < 1e-12 # placement-independent
|
|
|
|
|
assert dz_wc["full_deanon_rate"] >= dz_rand["full_deanon_rate"] - 1e-12 # worst case >= random
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_deanon_asymptotic_fadv_power():
|
|
|
|
|
# C(A,k)/C(n-1,k) -> f_adv^k for large n.
|
|
|
|
|
f, k, n = 0.3, 3, 20000
|
|
|
|
|
dz = deanon_metrics(n=n, n_adv=int(round(f * n)), observed_frac=0.5, blend_hops=k)
|
|
|
|
|
assert abs(dz["deanon_rate"] - f ** k) < 0.002
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_deanon_matches_direct_sampling():
|
|
|
|
|
"""Closed form == empirical rate of the exact honest-sender/blind-relay draw the sim uses."""
|
|
|
|
|
f, k = 0.33, 2
|
|
|
|
|
cfg = SimConfig(n_nodes=1500, degree=8, graph_seed=3, f_adv=f, blend_hops=k)
|
|
|
|
|
g = build_graph(cfg)
|
|
|
|
|
mask = place_adversary(g, f, "random", np.random.default_rng(1), cfg.worstcase_max_n)
|
|
|
|
|
adv = adversary_metrics(g, mask)
|
|
|
|
|
dz = deanon_metrics(g.n, adv["n_adv"], adv["observed_frac"], k)
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
counts = np.add.reduceat(mask[g.indices].astype(np.int32), g.indptr[:-1])
|
|
|
|
|
observed_node = counts >= 1
|
|
|
|
|
honest = np.where(~mask)[0]
|
|
|
|
|
n = g.n
|
|
|
|
|
rng = np.random.default_rng(42)
|
|
|
|
|
trials, d_hit, fd_hit = 40_000, 0, 0
|
|
|
|
|
for _ in range(trials):
|
|
|
|
|
s = int(rng.choice(honest))
|
|
|
|
|
r = rng.choice(n - 1, size=k, replace=False)
|
|
|
|
|
r[r >= s] += 1
|
|
|
|
|
if mask[r].all():
|
|
|
|
|
d_hit += 1
|
|
|
|
|
fd_hit += int(observed_node[s])
|
|
|
|
|
assert abs(dz["deanon_rate"] - d_hit / trials) < max(0.006, 0.1 * dz["deanon_rate"])
|
|
|
|
|
assert abs(dz["full_deanon_rate"] - fd_hit / trials) < max(0.006, 0.12 * dz["full_deanon_rate"])
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_engine_emits_deanon_rows():
|
|
|
|
|
base = SimConfig(n_nodes=1000, degree=8, graph_seed=0, n_placements=2)
|
|
|
|
|
prop_grid = [(2, 0), (3, 0)] # distinct blend_hops = {2, 3}
|
|
|
|
|
adv_grid = [(0.2, "random"), (0.0, "random")]
|
2026-08-05 17:31:23 +02:00
|
|
|
prop_rows, adv_rows, deanon_rows, _ = run_graph_cell(base, prop_grid, [0.0], [1], adv_grid)
|
Add pd: peering-degree Blend Monte-Carlo graph simulator
Static-graph simulator quantifying how a node's peering degree trades off
propagation speed, adversary exposure, deanonymization, and reliability in the
Blend network. Scales to 1e6 nodes (sparse CSR + sampled Dijkstra); the
adversary and deanonymization metrics are exact at every N.
Model (ms): seeded d-regular peer graph (matching-union), Blend cascade
(sender -> blend_hops timed-release mix relays -> final flood), geographic link
base + exponential transport jitter, per-node processing lag, free-running
release-clock mixing.
Metrics:
- propagation: full-delay mean/p50/p90/p99, path/broadcast split, coverage times
- reliability: message success-delivery-rate ~ (1-unresponsive_frac)^blend_hops
and flood coverage, with unresponsive nodes modelled as routing holes
- adversary (exact): observed/eclipsed fractions, random + worst-case placement
- deanonymization (exact): P(whole blend path adversarial) ~ f_adv^blend_hops,
and full deanonymization (path adversarial AND honest sender peered with an
adversary) = deanon_rate * observed_frac
Deterministic blake2b seed streams, three parquet tables, joblib parallelism,
memguard, an analytic verify harness, 50 unit tests, and an auto-installing
Makefile.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 16:47:46 +02:00
|
|
|
|
Add linkability, messaging redundancy and churn percolation to pd; report
Extends the pd Blend simulator along two axes the deanonymization model
opened up, adds the reports/blend/pd report of record, and fixes three
correctness defects found while reviewing the result.
Linkability over time (pd.linkability):
- time to link an emitter ~ 30s*ln(1/(1-alpha))/(stake*q): inversely
proportional to stake, so a 5% staker is linked in ~2 days and a 0.001%
staker only after ~27 years;
- time to certify a node's stake >= theta from the count of attributable
observations (relative precision ~1/sqrt(N)): sizing a node costs 100-400x
more than identifying it, and sub-0.1% stake is practically unlearnable.
Both are closed forms over the exact deanonymization rates and a
stake-proportional 30 s emission cadence, checked against a Monte-Carlo of
the emission process in verify.
Messaging redundancy (R independent cascades per emission, R = 1..4):
- `redundancy` knob threaded through config/rng/propagation/engine/metrics/
sweep; a node receives from whichever cascade reaches it first, so arrival
times combine element-wise. Delivery and capture both follow 1-(1-x)^R, so
redundancy trades reliability against anonymity and divides time-to-link
by ~R. Measured: delivery 0.34 -> 0.81 at 30% churn for R = 1 -> 4, while a
1%-staker's time to link falls 10 d -> 2.5 d.
- Redundancy buys NO coverage: a cascade only delivers if the sender could
already route to its relay, so every delivered cascade floods the sender's
own component. Coverage is flat in R to four decimals at every degree.
- Near the percolation threshold the cascades fail together rather than
independently, so redundancy under-delivers against 1-(1-p1)^R there.
Churn percolation (configs/percolation.yaml, verify check 7):
- the flood only crosses responsive nodes, so it lives on the responsive
sub-graph -- site percolation on a d-regular graph. A network survives churn
only up to u_c = 1 - 1/(degree-1); measured collapse lands on the predicted
threshold for every degree (3 -> 0.50, 6 -> 0.80, 16 -> 0.93), which inverts
into the sizing rule degree > 1 + 1/(1-u).
Correctness fixes:
- redundancy delay used the fastest cascade's own full delay, which
over-states it (min-max vs max-min); now the element-wise earliest arrival,
reducing exactly to the single-cascade model at R = 1 (test);
- the "redundancy improves coverage" claim was false in both the report and
the simulator README -- removed and replaced with the measured result;
- per-hop latency is degree-dependent (1.5 s at degree 16 to 2.7 s at degree
3), not a flat 1.6 s; and the worst-case observation figure was averaged
over degrees -- at degree 8 and f_adv = 0.2 it is 0.83 -> 1.000.
Statistics: round counts raised for resolution rather than speed -- 8000
rounds per cell in the main sweep, 9600 in the redundancy study, 6400 in the
percolation study, giving SEM <= 0.009 on every delivery rate and <= 0.04 s
on every delay mean. The previous redundancy grid (144 rounds/cell) produced a
non-monotonic delivery curve; it is now monotonic and within 0.015 of theory.
Adversary and deanonymization metrics remain closed-form and exact.
reports/blend/pd: the report of record -- peering-degree trade-offs across
speed, observation, eclipse, deanonymization and reliability, plus the
time-to-link, stake-inference, redundancy and churn-threshold sections, with
21 figures of record and an explicit sampling-error statement.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 22:37:22 +02:00
|
|
|
# one deanon row per (placement, distinct blend_hops, redundancy)
|
Add pd: peering-degree Blend Monte-Carlo graph simulator
Static-graph simulator quantifying how a node's peering degree trades off
propagation speed, adversary exposure, deanonymization, and reliability in the
Blend network. Scales to 1e6 nodes (sparse CSR + sampled Dijkstra); the
adversary and deanonymization metrics are exact at every N.
Model (ms): seeded d-regular peer graph (matching-union), Blend cascade
(sender -> blend_hops timed-release mix relays -> final flood), geographic link
base + exponential transport jitter, per-node processing lag, free-running
release-clock mixing.
Metrics:
- propagation: full-delay mean/p50/p90/p99, path/broadcast split, coverage times
- reliability: message success-delivery-rate ~ (1-unresponsive_frac)^blend_hops
and flood coverage, with unresponsive nodes modelled as routing holes
- adversary (exact): observed/eclipsed fractions, random + worst-case placement
- deanonymization (exact): P(whole blend path adversarial) ~ f_adv^blend_hops,
and full deanonymization (path adversarial AND honest sender peered with an
adversary) = deanon_rate * observed_frac
Deterministic blake2b seed streams, three parquet tables, joblib parallelism,
memguard, an analytic verify harness, 50 unit tests, and an auto-installing
Makefile.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 16:47:46 +02:00
|
|
|
assert len(deanon_rows) == len(adv_rows) * 2
|
Add linkability, messaging redundancy and churn percolation to pd; report
Extends the pd Blend simulator along two axes the deanonymization model
opened up, adds the reports/blend/pd report of record, and fixes three
correctness defects found while reviewing the result.
Linkability over time (pd.linkability):
- time to link an emitter ~ 30s*ln(1/(1-alpha))/(stake*q): inversely
proportional to stake, so a 5% staker is linked in ~2 days and a 0.001%
staker only after ~27 years;
- time to certify a node's stake >= theta from the count of attributable
observations (relative precision ~1/sqrt(N)): sizing a node costs 100-400x
more than identifying it, and sub-0.1% stake is practically unlearnable.
Both are closed forms over the exact deanonymization rates and a
stake-proportional 30 s emission cadence, checked against a Monte-Carlo of
the emission process in verify.
Messaging redundancy (R independent cascades per emission, R = 1..4):
- `redundancy` knob threaded through config/rng/propagation/engine/metrics/
sweep; a node receives from whichever cascade reaches it first, so arrival
times combine element-wise. Delivery and capture both follow 1-(1-x)^R, so
redundancy trades reliability against anonymity and divides time-to-link
by ~R. Measured: delivery 0.34 -> 0.81 at 30% churn for R = 1 -> 4, while a
1%-staker's time to link falls 10 d -> 2.5 d.
- Redundancy buys NO coverage: a cascade only delivers if the sender could
already route to its relay, so every delivered cascade floods the sender's
own component. Coverage is flat in R to four decimals at every degree.
- Near the percolation threshold the cascades fail together rather than
independently, so redundancy under-delivers against 1-(1-p1)^R there.
Churn percolation (configs/percolation.yaml, verify check 7):
- the flood only crosses responsive nodes, so it lives on the responsive
sub-graph -- site percolation on a d-regular graph. A network survives churn
only up to u_c = 1 - 1/(degree-1); measured collapse lands on the predicted
threshold for every degree (3 -> 0.50, 6 -> 0.80, 16 -> 0.93), which inverts
into the sizing rule degree > 1 + 1/(1-u).
Correctness fixes:
- redundancy delay used the fastest cascade's own full delay, which
over-states it (min-max vs max-min); now the element-wise earliest arrival,
reducing exactly to the single-cascade model at R = 1 (test);
- the "redundancy improves coverage" claim was false in both the report and
the simulator README -- removed and replaced with the measured result;
- per-hop latency is degree-dependent (1.5 s at degree 16 to 2.7 s at degree
3), not a flat 1.6 s; and the worst-case observation figure was averaged
over degrees -- at degree 8 and f_adv = 0.2 it is 0.83 -> 1.000.
Statistics: round counts raised for resolution rather than speed -- 8000
rounds per cell in the main sweep, 9600 in the redundancy study, 6400 in the
percolation study, giving SEM <= 0.009 on every delivery rate and <= 0.04 s
on every delay mean. The previous redundancy grid (144 rounds/cell) produced a
non-monotonic delivery curve; it is now monotonic and within 0.015 of theory.
Adversary and deanonymization metrics remain closed-form and exact.
reports/blend/pd: the report of record -- peering-degree trade-offs across
speed, observation, eclipse, deanonymization and reliability, plus the
time-to-link, stake-inference, redundancy and churn-threshold sections, with
21 figures of record and an explicit sampling-error statement.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-04 22:37:22 +02:00
|
|
|
cols = {"n_nodes", "degree", "blend_hops", "redundancy", "f_adv", "adversary_mode",
|
|
|
|
|
"graph_seed", "placement_rep", "n_adv", "n_honest", "observed_frac",
|
Add pd: peering-degree Blend Monte-Carlo graph simulator
Static-graph simulator quantifying how a node's peering degree trades off
propagation speed, adversary exposure, deanonymization, and reliability in the
Blend network. Scales to 1e6 nodes (sparse CSR + sampled Dijkstra); the
adversary and deanonymization metrics are exact at every N.
Model (ms): seeded d-regular peer graph (matching-union), Blend cascade
(sender -> blend_hops timed-release mix relays -> final flood), geographic link
base + exponential transport jitter, per-node processing lag, free-running
release-clock mixing.
Metrics:
- propagation: full-delay mean/p50/p90/p99, path/broadcast split, coverage times
- reliability: message success-delivery-rate ~ (1-unresponsive_frac)^blend_hops
and flood coverage, with unresponsive nodes modelled as routing holes
- adversary (exact): observed/eclipsed fractions, random + worst-case placement
- deanonymization (exact): P(whole blend path adversarial) ~ f_adv^blend_hops,
and full deanonymization (path adversarial AND honest sender peered with an
adversary) = deanon_rate * observed_frac
Deterministic blake2b seed streams, three parquet tables, joblib parallelism,
memguard, an analytic verify harness, 50 unit tests, and an auto-installing
Makefile.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-03 16:47:46 +02:00
|
|
|
"deanon_rate", "full_deanon_rate"}
|
|
|
|
|
assert cols <= set(deanon_rows[0])
|
|
|
|
|
assert {row["blend_hops"] for row in deanon_rows} == {2, 3}
|
|
|
|
|
for row in deanon_rows:
|
|
|
|
|
assert 0.0 <= row["full_deanon_rate"] <= row["deanon_rate"] + 1e-12
|
|
|
|
|
if row["f_adv"] == 0.0:
|
|
|
|
|
assert row["deanon_rate"] == 0.0 # no adversary -> no deanonymization
|
2026-08-06 12:28:19 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
# --- attribution confidence -----------------------------------------------------------------------
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_attribution_confidence_endpoints_and_monotonicity():
|
|
|
|
|
"""d/(2d-a): the 0.5 prior with no watched links, certainty when every link is watched."""
|
|
|
|
|
from blend.adversary import attribution_confidence
|
|
|
|
|
d = 8
|
|
|
|
|
assert abs(float(attribution_confidence(0, d)) - 0.5) < 1e-12
|
|
|
|
|
assert abs(float(attribution_confidence(d, d)) - 1.0) < 1e-12
|
|
|
|
|
vals = [float(attribution_confidence(a, d)) for a in range(d + 1)]
|
|
|
|
|
assert all(b > a for a, b in zip(vals, vals[1:], strict=False))
|
|
|
|
|
assert abs(vals[1] - 1 / (2 - 1 / 8)) < 1e-12 # one peer buys only ~0.53
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_confidence_does_not_depend_on_the_number_of_relays():
|
|
|
|
|
"""The conditioning event fixes the relays as adversarial, so an honest sender is not one of
|
|
|
|
|
them; the path length cannot enter the estimator."""
|
|
|
|
|
import inspect
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
from blend.adversary import attribution_confidence
|
|
|
|
|
src = inspect.getsource(attribution_confidence)
|
|
|
|
|
assert "blend_hops" not in src and "hops" not in src.split('"""')[2]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_high_confidence_attribution_equals_the_eclipse_condition():
|
|
|
|
|
"""At degree 8, 90% confidence needs a >= 8 -- every peer adversarial. So the confidence-
|
|
|
|
|
weighted attribution collapses onto eclipse, not onto observed."""
|
|
|
|
|
from blend.adversary import adversary_metrics, attribution_metrics, place_adversary
|
|
|
|
|
g = build_graph(SimConfig(n_nodes=20000, degree=8, graph_seed=0))
|
|
|
|
|
for f in (0.33, 0.5):
|
|
|
|
|
mask = place_adversary(g, f, "random", np.random.default_rng(0), 10**9)
|
|
|
|
|
am = adversary_metrics(g, mask)
|
|
|
|
|
at = attribution_metrics(g, mask)
|
|
|
|
|
assert abs(at["attributable_frac_90"] - am["eclipsed_frac"]) < 1e-12
|
|
|
|
|
assert abs(at["attributable_frac_50"] - am["observed_frac"]) < 1e-12 # >=1 peer clears 0.5
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_confident_attribution_is_far_rarer_than_observation():
|
|
|
|
|
"""The correction that matters: observed_frac massively overstates confident attribution."""
|
|
|
|
|
from blend.adversary import adversary_metrics, attribution_metrics, place_adversary
|
|
|
|
|
g = build_graph(SimConfig(n_nodes=20000, degree=8, graph_seed=1))
|
|
|
|
|
mask = place_adversary(g, 0.2, "random", np.random.default_rng(1), 10**9)
|
|
|
|
|
am = adversary_metrics(g, mask)
|
|
|
|
|
at = attribution_metrics(g, mask)
|
|
|
|
|
assert am["observed_frac"] > 0.8
|
|
|
|
|
assert at["attributable_frac_90"] < 1e-4
|
|
|
|
|
assert at["attribution_conf_mean"] < 0.6 # one or two peers buys very little
|
2026-08-06 13:00:44 +02:00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_neighbourhood_confidence_reduces_to_the_local_model_at_one_hop():
|
|
|
|
|
from blend.adversary import neighbourhood_confidence
|
|
|
|
|
for f in (0.1, 0.2, 0.33):
|
|
|
|
|
assert abs(neighbourhood_confidence(f, 1.0) - 1.0 / (1.0 + (1 - f))) < 1e-12
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_confidence_rises_with_route_length_but_needs_an_unrealistic_one_for_certainty():
|
|
|
|
|
"""Seeing the message anywhere upstream rules out forwarding, so a longer route helps the
|
|
|
|
|
adversary -- but reaching 0.9 needs ~10 upstream hops at f_adv=0.2, and a low-diameter peer
|
|
|
|
|
graph offers about 2.6."""
|
|
|
|
|
from blend.adversary import neighbourhood_confidence
|
|
|
|
|
vals = [neighbourhood_confidence(0.2, L) for L in (1, 2, 5, 10, 20)]
|
|
|
|
|
assert all(b > a for a, b in zip(vals, vals[1:], strict=False))
|
|
|
|
|
assert neighbourhood_confidence(0.2, 2.6) < 0.7 # realistic route: still not confident
|
|
|
|
|
assert neighbourhood_confidence(0.2, 10) > 0.9 # needs ~4x the real route length
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
def test_measured_route_length_leaves_attribution_uncertain():
|
|
|
|
|
"""The bracket closes near the local model, not near certainty."""
|
|
|
|
|
from blend.adversary import mean_upstream_hops, neighbourhood_confidence
|
|
|
|
|
g = build_graph(SimConfig(n_nodes=20000, degree=8, graph_seed=0))
|
|
|
|
|
L = mean_upstream_hops(g, np.random.default_rng(0), samples=12)
|
|
|
|
|
assert 1.5 < L < 4.0 # low-diameter graph, short routes
|
|
|
|
|
assert 0.55 < neighbourhood_confidence(0.2, L) < 0.75
|