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diff --git a/lee/state_machine/core/src/program/mod.rs b/lee/state_machine/core/src/program/mod.rs
index e35a1db59..3beb0f1db 100644
--- a/lee/state_machine/core/src/program/mod.rs
+++ b/lee/state_machine/core/src/program/mod.rs
@@ -47,52 +47,43 @@ pub const UNFINALIZED_IMAGE_ID: [u32; 8] = [0; 8];
 pub type ProgramId = [u32; 8];
 
 /// The account-data layout of a program's header account, deployed via the `Deploy` native
-/// dispatch shortcut (see [`RESERVED_DEPLOYMENT_PROGRAM_ACCOUNT_ID`]).
+/// dispatch shortcut.
 ///
 /// Deliberately holds only small, fixed-size fields — never the program's bytecode, which lives
-/// in a separate account (see `program_loader_core::deploy_segment_account_id`). Keeping the two
-/// apart means anything that needs to authenticate a program's *identity* (e.g. the
-/// privacy-preserving circuit confirming which `image_id` an `AccountId` currently maps to) only
-/// ever has to read this handful of bytes, not the full program — the only account-authentication
-/// primitive available today is whole-account equality, so what's bundled into one account sets
-/// the floor for how cheap that authentication can be.
+/// in separate segment accounts. Keeping the two apart means identity checks (e.g. the
+/// privacy-preserving circuit confirming which `image_id` an `AccountId` maps to) only need to
+/// read this handful of bytes, not the full program — the only account-authentication primitive
+/// today is whole-account equality, so what's bundled into one account sets the floor for how
+/// cheap that check can be.
 ///
 /// Splits genesis (fixed forever) from current (mutable) state so a program can be upgraded —
-/// bytecode rewritten, authority rotated — without its address ever moving:
-/// - `genesis_image_id`/`genesis_update_auth` are the sole inputs to header/segment PDA address
-///   derivation (see `program_loader_core::deploy_header_account_id`/`deploy_segment_account_id`),
-///   chosen once at the program's first-ever `Deploy` and never touched again.
-/// - `current_image_id`/`update_auth`/`program_version` are live, mutable state: `current_image_id`
-///   is `[0; 8]` while unfinalized (initial multi-transaction deploy in progress, or an upgrade's
-///   segment writes have landed but `Finalize` hasn't run yet) — `V03State::get_program` trusts a
-///   non-sentinel `current_image_id` directly rather than re-deriving it from the segments on every
-///   read, so it is only ever written by `program_loader_core::execute_deploy`'s atomic single-tx
-///   fast path or by a signed `Finalize`. `update_auth` starts equal to `genesis_update_auth` and
-///   may diverge after a co-signed `RotateUpdateAuth`.
+/// bytecode rewritten, authority rotated — without its address ever moving. `genesis_image_id`/
+/// `genesis_update_auth` are the sole inputs to header/segment PDA address derivation, chosen
+/// once at the program's first-ever `Deploy` and never touched again. `current_image_id`/
+/// `update_auth`/`program_version` are live, mutable state.
 ///
-/// Lives here rather than in `program_loader_core` so that `V03State::get_program` — a generic,
+/// Lives here rather than in `program_loader_core` so `V03State::get_program` — a generic,
 /// program-agnostic lookup — can decode it without depending on a specific program's crate.
 /// `program_loader_core` re-exports this type.
 #[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, BorshSerialize, BorshDeserialize)]
 pub struct ProgramData {
     pub genesis_image_id: ProgramId,
-    /// `None` means immutable: the program was deployed with no upgrade authority at all, and
-    /// `update_auth` below is (and forever stays) `None` too, since there's no genesis authority
-    /// to ever assign a first `update_auth` from.
+    /// `None` means immutable: deployed with no upgrade authority at all, and `update_auth`
+    /// below stays `None` too — there's no genesis authority to ever assign one from.
     pub genesis_update_auth: Option<AccountId>,
-    /// `[0; 8]` sentinel while unfinalized. See the struct doc for exactly when this is (and
-    /// isn't) written.
+    /// `[0; 8]` sentinel while unfinalized — an initial multi-transaction deploy in progress, or
+    /// an upgrade whose segment writes landed but `Finalize` hasn't run yet.
+    /// `V03State::get_program` trusts a non-sentinel value directly rather than re-deriving it
+    /// from segments on every read, so it's only ever written by `execute_deploy`'s atomic
+    /// single-tx fast path or a signed `Finalize`.
     pub current_image_id: ProgramId,
-    /// How many bytecode segment accounts currently exist, so a reader knows exactly how many
-    /// `program_loader_core::deploy_segment_account_id(genesis_image_id, 0..segment_count,
-    /// genesis_update_auth)` accounts to fetch without probing. May change across an upgrade (a
-    /// new version can have more or fewer segments than the one it replaces).
+    /// How many bytecode segment accounts currently exist. May change across an upgrade (a new
+    /// version can have more or fewer segments than the one it replaces).
     pub segment_count: u32,
     /// Current authority for writing segments, triggering `Finalize`, or co-signing a further
-    /// `RotateUpdateAuth`. `None` means no one can ever authorize a future write — either the
-    /// program was deployed immutably (`genesis_update_auth` is also `None`), or a prior
-    /// `RotateUpdateAuth` deliberately renounced authority for good. Not an address-derivation
-    /// input — see `genesis_update_auth`.
+    /// `RotateUpdateAuth`. `None` means no one can ever authorize a future write — either
+    /// deployed immutably, or a prior `RotateUpdateAuth` renounced authority for good. Not an
+    /// address-derivation input.
     pub update_auth: Option<AccountId>,
     /// `0` until the first successful `Finalize` (or the atomic single-tx fast path), which sets
     /// it to `1`; every subsequent `Finalize` increments it by one. Never reset by anything,
diff --git a/lee/state_machine/src/state/mod.rs b/lee/state_machine/src/state/mod.rs
index f82824aa9..c88844dbf 100644
--- a/lee/state_machine/src/state/mod.rs
+++ b/lee/state_machine/src/state/mod.rs
@@ -207,9 +207,7 @@ impl V03State {
 
     /// Seeds a program directly into state in the exact `1 + segment_count`-account shape a live
     /// `Deploy` dispatch (with no upgrade authority, i.e. immutable) would produce for the same
-    /// `image_id` (see [`Self::get_program`] and
-    /// [`program_loader_core::immutable_deploy_account_id`]), skipping only the dispatch/proving
-    /// machinery genesis has no signer to drive.
+    /// `image_id`, skipping only the dispatch/proving machinery genesis has no signer to drive.
     pub(crate) fn insert_program(&mut self, program: &Program) {
         let update_auth = None;
         let user_elf = program_loader_core::extract_user_elf(program.elf())
@@ -344,10 +342,8 @@ impl V03State {
     /// - Owned by [`RESERVED_DEPLOYMENT_PROGRAM_ACCOUNT_ID`]: deployed via the native `Deploy`
     ///   dispatch shortcut. `account.data` decodes as a [`ProgramData`] header holding the real
     ///   `image_id` and `segment_count`; the program-specific `user_elf` is split across that many
-    ///   separately-addressed segment accounts (see
-    ///   `program_loader_core::deploy_segment_account_id`), which this fetches in order,
-    ///   concatenates, and reconstructs into the full two-ELF binary (see
-    ///   `program_loader_core::reconstruct_program_binary`) before returning it.
+    ///   separately-addressed segment accounts, which this fetches in order, concatenates, and
+    ///   reconstructs into the full two-ELF binary before returning it.
     ///
     /// Returning the real `image_id` — rather than callers deriving one from the address, which
     /// is only valid for the legacy path — is what makes upgrading a `Deploy`-created program
@@ -356,14 +352,10 @@ impl V03State {
     ///
     /// An account that matches neither owner isn't a deployed program, whatever its contents —
     /// this is the single place that distinction is enforced, so callers never have to remember
-    /// to re-check it themselves. `Ok(None)` means no such program exists — including, ordinarily,
-    /// a multi-transaction `Deploy` sequence that hasn't (yet, or ever going to) land every one of
-    /// its `segment_count` segments; a caller mid-sequence sees exactly the same result as a
-    /// program that was never deployed at all, by construction, since a missing segment is
-    /// detected the same way regardless of cause. `Err(LeeError::InvalidProgramBytecode(_))` means
-    /// every segment exists but they don't reconstruct to the `image_id` the header declares — a
-    /// defense-in-depth check against a corrupted or malformed segment set, distinguishable from
-    /// plain absence.
+    /// to re-check it themselves. `None` means no such program is currently dispatchable: no
+    /// account at all, an unfinalized header (`current_image_id` still the sentinel), or a
+    /// multi-transaction `Deploy` sequence missing one of its segments — all indistinguishable
+    /// from a program that was never deployed.
     pub fn get_program(
         &self,
         program_account_id: AccountId,
diff --git a/lee/state_machine/src/validated_state_diff/mod.rs b/lee/state_machine/src/validated_state_diff/mod.rs
index f96e5a5a0..132b621c0 100644
--- a/lee/state_machine/src/validated_state_diff/mod.rs
+++ b/lee/state_machine/src/validated_state_diff/mod.rs
@@ -122,7 +122,8 @@ impl ValidatedStateDiff {
             let mut program_output = if chained_call.program_account_id
                 == RESERVED_DEPLOYMENT_PROGRAM_ACCOUNT_ID
             {
-                // `RESERVED_DEPLOYMENT_PROGRAM_ACCOUNT_ID`'s doc comment for why.
+                // Deploy runs as native Rust instead of interpreting a guest ELF — there's no
+                // guest binary for it.
                 let instruction: program_loader_core::Instruction =
                     risc0_zkvm::serde::from_slice(&chained_call.instruction_data).map_err(|e| {
                         LeeError::InvalidInput(format!("invalid loader instruction: {e}"))
@@ -141,11 +142,11 @@ impl ValidatedStateDiff {
                         } => {
                             // The bytecode itself travels via the transaction's own
                             // `raw_payload`, not `instruction_data` and not
-                            // `chained_call.raw_payload` (which no guest can ever set) — see
-                            // `Message::raw_payload`'s doc comment for why. Deploy only ever
-                            // runs natively, so a chained call into it (at any depth) can still
-                            // reach the top-level payload here, without any intermediary guest
-                            // ever having to carry the bytecode through its own execution.
+                            // `chained_call.raw_payload` (which no guest can ever set). Deploy
+                            // only ever runs natively, so a chained call into it (at any depth)
+                            // can still reach the top-level payload here, without any
+                            // intermediary guest ever having to carry the bytecode through its
+                            // own execution.
                             let bytecode = message.raw_payload.clone().ok_or_else(|| {
                                 LeeError::InvalidInput("Deploy requires a raw_payload".into())
                             })?;
@@ -186,9 +187,8 @@ impl ValidatedStateDiff {
                 )
             } else {
                 // The real `image_id`, sourced from the program's own account rather than
-                // guessed from its address — see `V03State::get_program`'s doc comment for
-                // why that distinction matters once a program's address can outlive its
-                // current bytecode (upgrades).
+                // guessed from its address, since a program's address can outlive its current
+                // bytecode (upgrades).
                 let Some((program_id, elf)) = state.get_program(chained_call.program_account_id)?
                 else {
                     return Err(LeeError::InvalidInput("Unknown program".into()));
diff --git a/lez/programs/program_loader/core/src/lib.rs b/lez/programs/program_loader/core/src/lib.rs
index 043872962..eb429f0e6 100644
--- a/lez/programs/program_loader/core/src/lib.rs
+++ b/lez/programs/program_loader/core/src/lib.rs
@@ -34,18 +34,17 @@ pub enum Instruction {
     /// transaction — its `ProgramData` header too. One or more `Deploy`s (each covering a
     /// contiguous range of segments) complete a deployment or an upgrade; a non-self-contained
     /// one always needs a following [`Instruction::Finalize`] before the program is
-    /// dispatchable again — see [`execute_deploy`] for exactly what each transaction requires.
+    /// dispatchable again.
     ///
     /// The bytecode itself travels via the dispatching message's `raw_payload`, not this
-    /// instruction — see `Message::raw_payload`'s doc comment for why.
+    /// instruction.
     ///
     /// Required accounts, in order:
     /// - The target `ProgramData` header PDA account (`Account::default()` for a program's very
     ///   first `Deploy`, or its already-existing header for any later batch, continuation, or
-    ///   upgrade — see [`execute_deploy`])
+    ///   upgrade)
     /// - Unless this transaction is both self-contained *and* the program's very first `Deploy`: an
-    ///   account matching the authority that must sign this write (see [`execute_deploy`]),
-    ///   `is_authorized`
+    ///   account matching the authority that must sign this write, `is_authorized`
     /// - The target segment PDA accounts this transaction covers (`first_segment, first_segment+1,
     ///   ...`), in order — each `Account::default()` for a program's first deploy, or (for an
     ///   upgrade) either `Account::default()` or already-populated
@@ -56,7 +55,7 @@ pub enum Instruction {
         /// trusts a caller's own claim about a program's genesis pair once its header already
         /// exists — it reads `ProgramData::genesis_image_id`/`genesis_update_auth` straight out
         /// of the header's own account data instead, so there's no way for a transaction to even
-        /// declare a wrong or stale genesis pair for an existing program. See [`Genesis`].
+        /// declare a wrong or stale genesis pair for an existing program.
         genesis: Option<Genesis>,
         /// `segment_number` of this transaction's first segment (0-indexed); its remaining
         /// segment accounts are `first_segment, first_segment+1, ...` in order.
@@ -96,11 +95,11 @@ pub enum Instruction {
 }
 
 /// A program's genesis identity — the address-derivation salt fixed forever at its first
-/// `Deploy`. See [`Instruction::Deploy::genesis`] and [`ProgramData`]'s doc comment.
+/// `Deploy`.
 #[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, Clone, Copy)]
 pub struct Genesis {
     pub image_id: ProgramId,
-    /// `None` means immutable from birth — see `ProgramData::genesis_update_auth`.
+    /// `None` means immutable from birth.
     pub update_auth: Option<AccountId>,
 }
 
@@ -152,13 +151,12 @@ pub fn compute_image_id(user_elf: &[u8]) -> anyhow::Result<ProgramId> {
 /// Derives the PDA seed for a deployed program's `ProgramData` header account.
 ///
 /// Combines the program's genesis identity (`genesis_image_id`), `segment_number` (always `0`
-/// for a header — unrelated to how many bytecode segments the program's data spans, see
-/// [`plan_deploy`]; kept as a parameter only because it shares this shape with
-/// [`deploy_segment_pda_seed`]), and `genesis_update_auth` — included so multiple independent
-/// deployments of identical bytecode land at distinct accounts instead of colliding. Fixed
-/// forever once a program's header is created; never re-derived from its *current*
-/// `image_id`/`update_auth`, which may change across upgrades — see [`ProgramData`]'s doc
-/// comment.
+/// for a header — unrelated to how many bytecode segments the program's data spans; kept as a
+/// parameter only because it shares this shape with [`deploy_segment_pda_seed`]), and
+/// `genesis_update_auth` — included so multiple independent deployments of identical bytecode
+/// land at distinct accounts instead of colliding. Fixed forever once a program's header is
+/// created; never re-derived from its *current* `image_id`/`update_auth`, which may change
+/// across upgrades.
 ///
 /// Domain-separated from other PDA-seed derivations in the codebase, including
 /// [`deploy_segment_pda_seed`], so a header seed can never collide with a segment seed (or
@@ -258,9 +256,8 @@ pub fn deploy_segment_account_id(
 /// `segment_count`, so [`immutable_deploy_account_id`] stays stable regardless of how a deploy is
 /// batched) plus `batch_user_elf` chunked at [`MAX_SEGMENT_DATA_LEN`], numbered `first_segment,
 /// first_segment+1, ...`. `genesis_image_id`/`genesis_update_auth` are always the program's
-/// genesis pair (see [`ProgramData`]'s doc comment) — this function only computes *addresses*
-/// (and the segment byte chunks), never the header's current-state fields, since those depend on
-/// whether the header already exists; see [`execute_deploy`] for that.
+/// genesis pair — this function only computes *addresses* (and the segment byte chunks), never
+/// the header's current-state fields, since those depend on whether the header already exists.
 ///
 /// `segment_count` is the *total* as of this write, not just this batch. [`plan_deploy`] is the
 /// single-batch (whole program, `first_segment` 0) special case of this — the single source of
@@ -282,7 +279,7 @@ pub fn plan_deploy_range(
         // Only used by the fresh-header path in `execute_deploy` and by `V03State::insert_program`
         // — filled in with the real current-state fields there. Placeholder shape here just so
         // `PlannedAccount::data` always exists for the header like it does for a segment; not
-        // meant to be written verbatim by an upgrade/continuation batch (see `execute_deploy`).
+        // meant to be written verbatim by an upgrade/continuation batch.
         data: Vec::new(),
     };
 
@@ -318,8 +315,6 @@ pub fn plan_deploy_range(
 
 /// Computes the account shape (header + N bytecode segments) for deploying the whole of `user_elf`
 /// at `genesis_image_id` under `genesis_update_auth` in a single, self-contained batch.
-///
-/// See [`plan_deploy_range`].
 #[must_use]
 pub fn plan_deploy(
     loader_account_id: AccountId,
@@ -357,8 +352,7 @@ pub fn segment_count_for(user_elf: &[u8]) -> u32 {
 ///
 /// `segment_number` 0, `update_auth` `None`. What every genesis-seeded builtin, and any immutable
 /// (non-upgradeable) `Deploy`, dispatches at. For an upgradeable program this is **not** the
-/// dispatch address — see [`deploy_header_account_id`] with the program's real genesis pair
-/// instead.
+/// dispatch address.
 #[must_use]
 pub fn immutable_deploy_account_id(image_id: ProgramId) -> AccountId {
     deploy_header_account_id(
@@ -391,33 +385,26 @@ fn pass_through_signer(target: &AccountWithMetadata) -> AccountPostState {
 /// a multi-transaction one.
 ///
 /// `genesis` must be `Some` if and only if the header doesn't exist yet (a program's very first
-/// `Deploy`) — see [`Instruction::Deploy::genesis`]. Once a header exists, its own stored
-/// `genesis_image_id`/`genesis_update_auth` are used for every address computation instead;
-/// nothing about a program's genesis identity is ever taken from a caller's declaration once
-/// there's a header to read it from.
+/// `Deploy`). Once a header exists, its own stored `genesis_image_id`/`genesis_update_auth` are
+/// used for every address computation instead — nothing about a program's genesis identity is
+/// ever taken from a caller's declaration once there's a header to read it from.
 ///
-/// Whether this transaction needs a real, checked authorization depends on two independent
-/// things: whether it delivers the *whole* program in one shot (`first_segment == 0` and
-/// `user_elf_batch` covers all `segment_count` segments — i.e. "self-contained"), and whether the
-/// header already exists (i.e. this program has been written to before, whether finalized or
-/// not):
+/// Whether this transaction needs a real, checked authorization depends on two things: whether it
+/// delivers the *whole* program in one shot (`first_segment == 0` and `user_elf_batch` covers all
+/// `segment_count` segments — "self-contained"), and whether the header already exists:
 ///
 /// - **Self-contained *and* the header doesn't exist yet (a brand-new program)**: no signature
 ///   required. `user_elf_batch` is independently decoded and its real `image_id` recomputed
 ///   (combined with the assumed [`KERNEL_ELF`]) and checked against the declared one right here.
 ///   The header is written with `genesis_image_id`/`genesis_update_auth` equal to the declared
-///   values, `current_image_id` set directly to the verified real `image_id` (no separate
-///   [`finalize`] needed), and `program_version` `1`.
+///   values, `current_image_id` set directly to the verified real `image_id`, and `program_version`
+///   `1`.
 /// - **Everything else** (a partial batch of a brand-new deploy, or *any* write once the header
-///   already exists — a continuation of an unfinalized initial deploy, or a genuine upgrade of an
-///   already-finalized one): self-verification can't establish authorization to overwrite
-///   whatever's already there, so a real signer is always required, regardless of size. If the
-///   header doesn't exist yet, that authority is this instruction's own declared genesis
-///   `update_auth`, which must be `Some` — there is no key to sign a partial deploy of an
-///   otherwise-immutable program with. If the header already exists, that authority is whatever its
-///   *current* `ProgramData::update_auth` says (which may have diverged from the genesis value via
-///   [`Instruction::RotateUpdateAuth`], and must likewise be `Some` — a program with no authority
-///   at all, immutable from birth or by renouncement, can never be written to again). Either way,
+///   already exists): self-verification can't establish authorization to overwrite whatever's
+///   already there, so a real signer is always required. That authority is this instruction's own
+///   declared genesis `update_auth` if the header doesn't exist yet, or the header's *current*
+///   `ProgramData::update_auth` otherwise — either way it must be `Some`, since a program with no
+///   authority at all (immutable from birth or by renouncement) can never be written to again.
 ///   `current_image_id` is left at (or reset to) [`UNFINALIZED_IMAGE_ID`]; a [`finalize`] is
 ///   required afterward.
 ///
@@ -427,8 +414,8 @@ fn pass_through_signer(target: &AccountWithMetadata) -> AccountPostState {
 /// `Account::default()` (this upgrade grew the segment count) or already-populated (this upgrade
 /// is overwriting it) — both are fine, since authorization was already established above.
 ///
-/// Called natively from dispatch's `RESERVED_DEPLOYMENT_PROGRAM_ACCOUNT_ID` shortcut (see that
-/// constant's doc comment in `lee_core::program`) — `Deploy` has no guest binary of its own.
+/// Called natively from dispatch's `RESERVED_DEPLOYMENT_PROGRAM_ACCOUNT_ID` shortcut — `Deploy`
+/// has no guest binary of its own.
 #[must_use]
 pub fn execute_deploy(
     self_account_id: AccountId,
@@ -543,8 +530,8 @@ pub fn execute_deploy(
         );
     }
 
-    // pre_states/post_states are matched positionally (see validate_execution), so an
-    // update_auth signer slot present in pre_states must get a matching entry here too.
+    // pre_states/post_states are matched positionally, so an update_auth signer slot present in
+    // pre_states must get a matching entry here too.
     let update_auth_post_state = update_auth_target.map(pass_through_signer);
 
     let header_post_state = if header_is_fresh {
@@ -1117,9 +1104,8 @@ mod tests {
         assert_eq!(header_data2.current_image_id, UNFINALIZED_IMAGE_ID);
     }
 
-    /// Deploys `program` across two batches (so it lands unfinalized, exactly like
-    /// `execute_deploy_two_batch_sequence_leaves_it_unfinalized`), then returns everything needed
-    /// to either finalize it or feed it back into another `execute_deploy`/`finalize`/
+    /// Deploys `program` across two batches, so it lands unfinalized, then returns everything
+    /// needed to either finalize it or feed it back into another `execute_deploy`/`finalize`/
     /// `rotate_update_auth` call: the plan, the header account as it exists on-chain, and every
     /// segment account as it exists on-chain (all real, populated bytes).
     fn deploy_unfinalized_across_two_batches(
@@ -1280,10 +1266,8 @@ mod tests {
     }
 
     /// Deploys `program` in one self-contained transaction with a real `update_auth` — no
-    /// signature needed (per
-    /// `execute_deploy_single_batch_finalizes_atomically_even_with_real_update_auth`),
-    /// and already live (`current_image_id` real, `program_version` 1) with no separate
-    /// `finalize` required. Returns the plan and the on-chain header/segment accounts.
+    /// signature needed, and already live (`current_image_id` real, `program_version` 1) with no
+    /// separate `finalize` required. Returns the plan and the on-chain header/segment accounts.
     fn deploy_and_finalize_in_one_shot(
         full_binary: &[u8],
         image_id: ProgramId,
diff --git a/lez/sequencer/core/src/tests.rs b/lez/sequencer/core/src/tests.rs
index 3fb984529..e1540025f 100644
--- a/lez/sequencer/core/src/tests.rs
+++ b/lez/sequencer/core/src/tests.rs
@@ -4394,9 +4394,7 @@ fn loader_rejects_a_partial_deploy_batch_without_a_valid_signature() {
 
 /// Once a header exists, the authorized `update_auth` can change the declared `segment_count`
 /// between batches (a new version may need more or fewer segments than the last) — this is the
-/// same mechanism upgrades use, not a distinct "racing" bug. Unauthorized third parties still
-/// can't touch an existing header at all — see
-/// `loader_rejects_an_unauthorized_party_touching_an_existing_header`.
+/// same mechanism upgrades use, not a distinct "racing" bug.
 #[test]
 fn loader_allows_the_authorized_party_to_change_segment_count_mid_sequence() {
     let mut state = V03State::new();
@@ -4554,8 +4552,7 @@ fn loader_allows_the_authorized_party_to_rewrite_a_segment() {
 /// A program that wants to chain-call `Deploy` never has to carry the bytecode through its own
 /// execution: `Deploy` only ever runs natively, so the dispatcher resolves its `raw_payload`
 /// straight from the top-level transaction regardless of chain-call depth, and the forwarder here
-/// only ever handles a small `instruction_data` (see
-/// `lee::state_machine::validated_state_diff`'s `Deploy` dispatch branch).
+/// only ever handles a small `instruction_data`.
 #[test]
 fn loader_deploys_program_via_chained_call() {
     let forwarder = test_programs::chained_call_forwarder();
diff --git a/test_fixtures/fixtures/prebuilt_sequencer_db.dump b/test_fixtures/fixtures/prebuilt_sequencer_db.dump
index 785d28c66..b5d8701b1 100644
Binary files a/test_fixtures/fixtures/prebuilt_sequencer_db.dump and b/test_fixtures/fixtures/prebuilt_sequencer_db.dump differ