mirror of
https://github.com/logos-blockchain/logos-execution-zone.git
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add privacy test version
This commit is contained in:
jonesmarvin8
parent
8f43631c79
commit
f0677c0261
35
Cargo.lock
generated
35
Cargo.lock
generated
@ -674,9 +674,9 @@ checksum = "4858a9d740c5007a9069007c3b4e91152d0506f13c1b31dd49051fd537656156"
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[[package]]
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name = "astral-tokio-tar"
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version = "0.6.1"
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version = "0.6.2"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "4ce73b17c62717c4b6a9af10b43e87c578b0cac27e00666d48304d3b7d2c0693"
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checksum = "cb50a7aae84a03bf55b067832bc376f4961b790c97e64d3eacee97d389b90277"
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dependencies = [
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"filetime",
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"futures-core",
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@ -2275,7 +2275,7 @@ dependencies = [
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"libc",
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"option-ext",
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"redox_users",
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"windows-sys 0.59.0",
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"windows-sys 0.61.2",
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]
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[[package]]
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@ -2606,7 +2606,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "39cab71617ae0d63f51a36d69f866391735b51691dbda63cf6f96d042b63efeb"
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dependencies = [
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"libc",
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"windows-sys 0.59.0",
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"windows-sys 0.52.0",
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]
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[[package]]
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@ -3585,7 +3585,7 @@ dependencies = [
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"libc",
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"percent-encoding",
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"pin-project-lite",
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"socket2 0.6.3",
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"socket2 0.5.10",
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"tokio",
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"tower-service",
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"tracing",
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@ -6403,7 +6403,7 @@ version = "0.50.3"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "7957b9740744892f114936ab4a57b3f487491bbeafaf8083688b16841a4240e5"
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dependencies = [
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"windows-sys 0.59.0",
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"windows-sys 0.61.2",
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]
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[[package]]
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@ -7257,7 +7257,7 @@ dependencies = [
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"quinn-udp",
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"rustc-hash",
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"rustls",
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"socket2 0.6.3",
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"socket2 0.5.10",
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"thiserror 2.0.18",
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"tokio",
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"tracing",
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@ -7294,9 +7294,9 @@ dependencies = [
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"cfg_aliases",
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"libc",
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"once_cell",
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"socket2 0.6.3",
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"socket2 0.5.10",
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"tracing",
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"windows-sys 0.59.0",
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"windows-sys 0.52.0",
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]
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[[package]]
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@ -8191,7 +8191,7 @@ dependencies = [
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"errno",
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"libc",
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"linux-raw-sys",
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"windows-sys 0.59.0",
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"windows-sys 0.52.0",
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]
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[[package]]
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@ -8249,7 +8249,7 @@ dependencies = [
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"security-framework",
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"security-framework-sys",
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"webpki-root-certs 0.26.11",
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"windows-sys 0.59.0",
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"windows-sys 0.52.0",
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]
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[[package]]
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@ -9162,7 +9162,7 @@ dependencies = [
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"getrandom 0.4.2",
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"once_cell",
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"rustix",
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"windows-sys 0.59.0",
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"windows-sys 0.52.0",
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]
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[[package]]
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@ -10464,7 +10464,7 @@ version = "0.1.11"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "c2a7b1c03c876122aa43f3020e6c3c3ee5c05081c9a00739faf7503aeba10d22"
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dependencies = [
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"windows-sys 0.59.0",
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"windows-sys 0.52.0",
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]
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[[package]]
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@ -10603,15 +10603,6 @@ dependencies = [
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"windows-targets 0.52.6",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "windows-sys"
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version = "0.59.0"
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source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
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checksum = "1e38bc4d79ed67fd075bcc251a1c39b32a1776bbe92e5bef1f0bf1f8c531853b"
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dependencies = [
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"windows-targets 0.52.6",
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]
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[[package]]
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name = "windows-sys"
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version = "0.61.2"
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@ -500,6 +500,146 @@ mod tests {
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validated_state_diff::ValidatedStateDiff,
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};
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/// Privacy-path version of the authorization-injection attack.
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///
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/// `execute_and_prove` succeeds: all inner receipts are valid, and the outer circuit
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/// honestly commits `victim(is_authorized=true)` to its journal.
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/// `from_privacy_preserving_transaction` rejects the proof because the NSSA validator
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/// independently reconstructs `public_pre_states` from chain state using
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/// `signer_account_ids.contains(victim_id) = false`, producing `victim(is_authorized=false)`.
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/// The committed journal and the expected output diverge, so `receipt.verify` fails.
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#[test]
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fn privacy_malicious_programs_cannot_drain_public_victim() {
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use nssa_core::{
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Commitment, InputAccountIdentity, SharedSecretKey,
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account::{Account, AccountWithMetadata},
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encryption::EphemeralPublicKey,
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};
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use crate::{
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PrivacyPreservingTransaction,
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privacy_preserving_transaction::{
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circuit::{ProgramWithDependencies, execute_and_prove},
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message::Message,
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witness_set::WitnessSet,
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},
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state::{CommitmentSet, tests::test_private_account_keys_1},
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};
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type InjectorInstruction = (
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nssa_core::program::ProgramId, // p2_id
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nssa_core::program::ProgramId, // auth_transfer_id
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[u8; 32], // victim_id_raw
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u128, // victim_balance
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u128, // victim_nonce
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nssa_core::program::ProgramId, // victim_program_owner
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[u8; 32], // recipient_id_raw
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u128, // amount
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);
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// Attacker controls a private account.
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let attacker_keys = test_private_account_keys_1();
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let attacker_id = AccountId::for_regular_private_account(&attacker_keys.npk(), 0);
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let attacker_esk = [12_u8; 32];
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let attacker_ssk = SharedSecretKey::new(attacker_esk, &attacker_keys.vpk());
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let attacker_epk = EphemeralPublicKey::from_scalar(attacker_esk);
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let victim_id = AccountId::new([20_u8; 32]);
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let recipient_id = AccountId::new([42_u8; 32]);
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let victim_balance = 5_000_u128;
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// genesis sets program_owner = authenticated_transfer_program.id() on all accounts.
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let mut state = V03State::new_with_genesis_accounts(
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&[(victim_id, victim_balance), (recipient_id, 0)],
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vec![],
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0,
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);
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state.insert_program(Program::malicious_injector());
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state.insert_program(Program::malicious_launderer());
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// Build attacker's private account and its local commitment tree.
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let attacker_account = Account {
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program_owner: Program::authenticated_transfer_program().id(),
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balance: 100,
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..Account::default()
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};
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let attacker_commitment = Commitment::new(&attacker_id, &attacker_account);
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let mut commitment_set = CommitmentSet::with_capacity(1);
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commitment_set.extend(std::slice::from_ref(&attacker_commitment));
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let membership_proof = commitment_set
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.get_proof_for(&attacker_commitment)
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.expect("attacker commitment must be in the set");
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let attacker_pre = AccountWithMetadata::new(attacker_account, true, attacker_id);
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let victim_account = state.get_account_by_id(victim_id);
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let instruction: InjectorInstruction = (
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Program::malicious_launderer().id(),
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Program::authenticated_transfer_program().id(),
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*victim_id.value(),
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victim_account.balance,
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victim_account.nonce.0,
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victim_account.program_owner,
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*recipient_id.value(),
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victim_balance,
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);
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let instruction_data = Program::serialize_instruction(instruction).unwrap();
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let p2 = Program::malicious_launderer();
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let at = Program::authenticated_transfer_program();
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let program_with_deps = ProgramWithDependencies::new(
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Program::malicious_injector(),
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[(p2.id(), p2), (at.id(), at)].into(),
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);
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// account_identities order must match self.pre_states as built by the circuit:
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// [0] attacker — first seen in P1's program_output.pre_states
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// [1] victim — first seen in authenticated_transfer's program_output.pre_states
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// [2] recipient — first seen in authenticated_transfer's program_output.pre_states
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let account_identities = vec![
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InputAccountIdentity::PrivateAuthorizedUpdate {
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ssk: attacker_ssk,
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nsk: attacker_keys.nsk,
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membership_proof,
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identifier: 0,
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},
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InputAccountIdentity::Public, // victim
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InputAccountIdentity::Public, // recipient
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];
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// execute_and_prove succeeds: all inner receipts are valid.
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// The outer circuit commits victim(is_authorized=true) to its journal.
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let (circuit_output, proof) = execute_and_prove(
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vec![attacker_pre],
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instruction_data,
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account_identities,
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&program_with_deps,
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)
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.expect("execute_and_prove should succeed \u{2014} the programs execute correctly");
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// public_account_ids lists the Public entries from account_identities, in order.
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// The single ciphertext belongs to attacker's private account update.
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let message = Message::try_from_circuit_output(
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vec![victim_id, recipient_id],
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vec![], // no public signers, no nonces
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vec![(attacker_keys.npk(), attacker_keys.vpk(), attacker_epk)],
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circuit_output,
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)
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.unwrap();
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let witness_set = WitnessSet::for_message(&message, proof, &[]); // no signatures
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let tx = PrivacyPreservingTransaction::new(message, witness_set);
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let result = ValidatedStateDiff::from_privacy_preserving_transaction(&tx, &state, 1, 0);
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assert!(
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result.is_err(),
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"attack privacy transaction should be rejected by the validator"
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);
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assert_eq!(state.get_account_by_id(victim_id).balance, victim_balance);
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assert_eq!(state.get_account_by_id(recipient_id).balance, 0);
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}
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/// Demonstrates the authorization-injection vulnerability:
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/// two malicious programs (injector + launderer) drain a victim's balance
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/// without the victim signing anything.
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@ -514,7 +654,7 @@ mod tests {
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/// → `victim.is_authorized=true` passes check ({victim}.contains(victim))
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/// → transfer executes.
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#[test]
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fn malicious_programs_drain_victim_without_signature() {
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fn malicious_programs_cannot_drain_victim_without_signature() {
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// p2_id, auth_transfer_id, victim_id_raw, victim_balance, victim_nonce,
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// victim_program_owner, recipient_id_raw, amount.
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// Primitives only — AccountId/Account cannot round-trip through instruction_data
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